The Transfer Agreement (36 page)

Eyewitnesses, real and induced, former police officials, and even private detectives continued announcing dramatic denials and reversals for years after the trial. Mapai leaders, satisfied that Revisionism was implicated—whether or not juridically guilty—would refuse to discuss the case even decades later. Revisionists and their sympathizers, determined to cast off a "blood libel," produced numerous theories to clear their names. Usually the theories blamed Arabs, sometimes they blamed British agents, and one farfetched story even blamed Goebbels, who supposedly wanted to obliterate the last shreds of his wife Magda's Jewish associations, including her former friend Chaim Arlosoroff. Five decades after the conflict, recriminations still fly among Zionist leaders when the question of Arlosoroff's murder is raised.
⁶

But if the aftermath was bitter, the moment of conflict itself was torment. Jabotinsky's biographer remembered it this way: "For those who did not live during that agonizing summer of I
933,
it is difficult, almost impossible, to imagine the dreadful atmosphere of violent animosity that permeated Jewish life all over the world, particularly in Palestine and Poland."
⁷
Mapai exploited the tragedy to its maximum. A broad anti-Revisionist movement sprang up uniting a range of Zionist ideologies behind Mapai. These groups collectively advocated the banishment of all Revisionists from Zionism. One policy statement declared, "No intercourse whatever with Revisionism! Let our motto be: Expel the Revisionist gangs from Jewish life!" Jabotinsky was often held personally responsible. Pamphlets called him a "bloodthirsty beast."
⁸
David Ben-Gurion, who would become Israel's first prime minister, admitted he was "less interested in whether Stavsky is the murderer than in Jabotinsky." Ben-Gurion declared that Jabotinsky bore total responsibility because he was Revisionism's "commander, leader, and mentor."
⁹

Emulating the very violence they were decrying, Mapai forces called for "avenging our Arlosoroff" with a bloody reprisal against Jabotinsky. Polish newspapers in early July
I
933
printed rumors that Jabotinsky, fearing an attack, had canceled his forthcoming lecture tour. Jabotinsky refused to cancel the tour, but was persuaded to accept a bodyguard.
¹⁰

At each tour stop, he was heckled and harassed. At Brest-Litovsk, home town of accused assassin Stavsky, the throng became vicious. Young Polish Revisionist leader Menachem Begin remembers the event as traumatic:
"An
inflamed crowd tried to stone him [Jabotinsky] and we surrounded him, creating a human wall to absorb the stones."
¹¹
In the town of Pinsk, Begin
remembers the emotional chill as he heard his idol Jabotinsky plead, "The inciters tell you that I educated young Jews to murder one of their own people, while I have devoted my whole life to saving Jews, ... to defending them from pogrom and assault." Begin controlled his emotions that day as he sat behind Jabotinsky, prepared to jump out in case a rock was thrown. But he recalls that another Jabotinsky aide trembled and wept.
¹²
The Revisionist movement was crumbling. The staunchest advocates of Jewish defense had become outcasts among their own people.

Hostilities continued as Mapai forces hammered away at Revisionism, labeling it a Fascist misfit of Zionism, and harassing Jews who supported Jabotinsky. Jabotinsky himself was portrayed as the Jewish Hitler, commanding forces analogous—somehow even linked—to Nazi Storm Troopers. And yet in truth, it was not the stalwarts of Jewish militancy, the Revisionists, who had constructed avenues of commercial and political détente with the Third Reich.
It
was the forces of Mapai.

And as Revisionism fell to one knee in the summer of
'33,
the anti-Nazi boycott fell with it. For to adhere to the boycott was to carry out Revisionist dogma. To reject the boycott was to reject Vladimir Jabotinsky.

The campaign to reject the Revisionist-tainted boycott in Palestine reached a formal level even before Arlosoroff was assassinated. In fact, while Sam Cohen and Arlosoroff were still in London, at the beginning of June, the Mapai-dominated institutions of Palestine were already scurrying to implement Cohen's merchandise deal—whether funneled through Hanotaiah Ltd. or supervised by national Jewish authorities. For example, on June 6, an ad hoc coalition assembled at the Tel Aviv Chamber of Commerce. There were representatives from the Jewish Agency, the Vaad Leumi, the Jaffa-Tel Aviv Chamber of Commerce, the Histadrut, the Citrus Center, the Association of Farmers, the Manufacturers Association, and the Organization of German Immigrants, which was the Palestinian counterpart of the ZVfD. These groups formed something called "The Conference of Representatives of Institutions in Connection with the Question of Clarifying Trade Relations with
Germany"—The Conference of Institutions
for short.
¹³
Their purpose was to explore the many ways Sam Cohen's deal could benefit Palestine commercially.

The Conference of Institutions was afraid to assume an openly anti-boycott stance. So on June 6, they carefully adopted a nonstance. They didn't endorse the anti-Nazi boycott. Nor would they oppose it. Effectively this was of course a vote to accept German goods.
¹⁴

A week later, Sam Cohen returned to Palestine from London. The previous few weeks had been filled with sudden triumphs and reversals for Sam Cohen. In mid-May, he was able to feign legitimacy to the German government and walk away with a cashless transfer that would bring badly needed agricultual materials to his sand dunes soon to be orange groves. Despite the resistance of the ZVfD, Cohen was able to sail to London and on May
30
gain the written endorsement of the Zionist Organization to include Mapai-owned grove companies. However, after Arlosoroffhad been given superseding authority, Sam Cohen refused to relinquish control.

On June I5, Cohen went to see German Consul Heinrich Wolff in Jerusalem and presented the obsolete May
30
letter from the Zionist Organization endorsing Hanotaiah's cashless transfer. Cohen then asked Wolff to help him expand his limited agreement from
I
million to 3 million reichmarks.
¹⁵
To convince Berlin that he was the one man capable of breaking the boycott against Germany, Cohen offered an ace.

Among the most vehement anti-Nazi newspapers in Palestine was
Doar HaYom,
the official Revisionist publication.
Doar HaYom
had been a pioneer in the economic war against Germany. When the boycott itself became an issue within Zionism,
Doar HaYom
steadfastly supported boycott agitation,
often publishing encouraging columns by Vladimir Jabotinsky.
¹⁶
Somehow Mr. Sam Cohen acquired a financial interest in
Doar HaYom.
He was then able to replace the pro-boycott editor with a freelance writer named Moshe Smilansky.
¹⁷
Smilansky was already the editor of
Bustani,
official journal of the citrus growers.
Bustani
under Smilansky was a well-established proponent of better German-Palestinian trade relations; Germany was after all Palestine's second-largest customer for Palestine's number-one export: citrus.
¹⁸
During his June I5 meeting with Consul Wolff, Cohen explained that
Doar HaYom,
which had been so vocal a boycott advocate, would suddenly become silent on the issue.
¹⁹

Consul Wolff agreed to give Cohen full backing both to expand his agreement and to overcome any ZVfD opposition in Berlin. That same day, Wolff sent the Reich Foreign Ministry a long memorandum, "Increase of German Exports Against Payment into Sperrkonto [Blocked Accounts] to Palestine for the Purpose of Breaking the Boycott." Wolff's report asked his superiors "to urgently prevail upon the Reich Economics Ministry" to implement their deal with Hanotaiah quickly. Wrote Consul Wolff, "Only through the admittance of exports, as is proposed by Hanotaiah, will it be possible to effectively counteract the anti-German boycott here."
²⁰

Wolff then explained why it was imperative for Germany to break the boycott in Palestine first. "The anti-German boycott is making progress not only in Palestine but in the entire world." But now, argued Wolff, the world Jewish community was looking to Palestine for leadership, instead of the other way around. This political inversion had taken place since April. He added, "[Since] Palestine is now ... calling the tune ... then everything that ... counteracts the boycott in this country [Palestine] would have beneficial effects for us elsewhere, e.g., the United States."
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Wolff's intelligence about the shift in world Jewish affairs was accurate. This view was especially acceptable to Berlin because it fit the Hitler conception of an international Jewish conspiracy headquartered in Jerusalem. Building on this foundation, Wolff's June I5 letter encouraged Berlin to increase the incentive to Zionism by expanding Hanotaiah's license in quality and quantity. Wolff estimated that a RM
I
million ceiling would allow only thirty or forty German Jews to emigrate to Palestine. "In the eyes of the Jews," wrote Wolff, "this is but a drop in the bucket." Wolfl's suggestion: increase the ceiling. "Every day would constitute a gain .... Do it as quickly as possible."
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Consul Wolfl's second idea was the germ of the key financial potential of the entire agreement. The idea called for German Jews "who do not yet wish to emigrate but who would later on wish to settle in Palestine or neighboring areas to pay for exports into the Hanotaiah Sperrkonto [blocked account]."
²³
This was Sam Cohen's answer to Arlosoroff's Liquidation Bank. Cohen's new arrangement would permit masses of German Jews—declared emigrants or not—to deposit their assets for safekeeping. Call it an escape hatch, an insurance policy, or an investment. Thousands of German Jews would surely take advantage of the opportunity. This would create a massive frozen cash pool for Hanotaiah's use.

The resulting extra millions in German merchandise would be too much for Hanotaiah to distribute in Palestine alone, so the firm would establish a re-export system throughout the region. Wolff pointed out that this "could constitute a possibility of breaking the boycott in Egypt and Cyprus" as well, and cut in on French competition in those markets.
²⁴

To countercheck any efforts by Georg Landauer and his circle to discredit Cohen, Wolff sprinkled his memo with assurances of Cohen's authenticity as the syndic of Zionism. "Mr. Sam Cohen showed me a letter ... from the Zionist Central Organization
[sic]
in London, which shows that the Central Organization is effectively working on eliminating obstacles which could arise from Jewish circles against Hanotaiah's plans, insofar as those circles are pushing for an increasingly organized boycott movement." Wolff then referred to the joint telegram sent some days before by Arlosoroff and Cohen to Hanotaiah, instructing that no action be taken until they both arrived in Palestine, at which time Hanotaiah's private deal would be submitted to "national supervision." Wolff referred only to the "national supervision" fragment of the telegram, implying that this proved that Hanotaiah's position was official. Hanotaiah's official status, wrote Wolff, "would take the wind out of the sails of those radical circles which are pressing for continued boycott."
²⁵

Citing Cohen's dedication to eradicating the boycott, Wolff advised Berlin, "Sam Cohen feels that it is urgently necessary to use the local press ... to defeat the boycott," adding that Cohen now controlled
Doar HaYom.
Wolff explained, "Today a contract is to be signed which will provide Mr. Smilansky with decisive influence on the newspaper
[
Doar HaYom
].
Smilansky . . . is prepared to exert all his influence against the boycott movement. I believe this ... will significantly enhance an anti-boycott mood."
²⁶

Lest his unabashed support for Cohen and the upbuilding of Palestine arouse suspicions in Berlin, Consul Wolff was careful to qualify:
"I
need not emphasize . . . that I am not making these statements in the interest of the Jews, but only because I see in this plan a significant means of employment, considering Germany's precarious economic conditions. The Jews would benefit from the implementation of these plans; but in my opinion, our own advantage would be considerable and the best deals are always those which benefit both parties."
²⁷

Consul Wolff's motives were in truth an amalgam of sympathy with Zionism, loyalty to Germany, and efforts to ensure his own survival. He was no Nazi, and no anti-Semite. He did not seek the expulsion of Germany's Jews. But as Weimar Germany's liaison with the Jewish national home, he embraced the basic tenets of Zionism, doing what he could to further a cause sanctioned by the League of Nations. On the other hand, situated in the capital of the mythological Jewish conspiracy, with a Jewish wife, Consul Wolff was in a precarious position. He tried to straddle the fence and stay alive doing it. For this reason, his paragraphs were constantly weighted to the point of literary clumsiness with the words "to break the boycott." Whatever words he chose, they were almost always shown to Zionist personalities in advance, including Sam Cohen. In fact, his June
I
5
memorandum ended with a postscript implying that Cohen was virtually looking over his shoulder. Wolff appends,
"P.S.
Sam Cohen just informs me that the Jewish National Fund, headed in Palestine by Ussischkin, and Baron Rothschild's representative are in full agreement with Sam Cohen's proposed activity, which gives added significance to his work, insofar as it constitutes an anti-boycott measure."
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