The Whale Has Wings Vol 1 - Rebirth (2 page)

First, the FAA will revert to RN command and control, as it was pre 1918, on 1st April 1933

The FAA will be funded by the navy, and the funds currently spent on it in the RAF will be added to the appropriate navy vote. So this won't involve any extra funding, which I am sure will please the treasury.

The Navy will cooperate with the RAF in funding development of planes and equipment. While we realise the FAA will require carrier planes that have different requirements for those used by the RAF, we
understand that many of the expensive developments such as engines, armament and controls can be to a very considerable extent common. Where they are, the RN will fund an appropriate proportion of the development costs. Where the requirements are purely for the RN, we will fund them ourselves.

It will take some years for the FAA to build up a satisfactory pilot base. Until that time, the RAF will continue to lend pilots until we can replace them with RN personnel. RN and RAF pilot training will be in common, except for the final stage of carrier training, as it would be uneconomical to duplicate the training commands, and this will continue to be under RAF control.

This solution covers all the arguments we have been making, and the RAF can now concentrate on its land-based aircraft and heavy bombers. We will of course continue to cooperate fully, and indeed it has been suggested that some committees, like the ones to research future aircraft and needs, be made common ones.

We consider the proposals sensible, and they will stop this infighting which is, we agree, reaching unacceptable proportions.

"The RAF are not going to be happy at losing control of some of their planes, Chatfield."

"With respect, it
's the only sensible solution. No-one realised in 1918 that the issue of naval air would end up being so specialised and controversial, this way we cut the Gordian knot of what the RAF has to do to keep us happy.

The undersecretary did not look happy, but this did, as the Admiral said, cut the knot.

"Very well, Chatfield, I feel compelled to agree with you. Unless the RAF can come up with some very compelling reasons why not to, I intend to present this to the Prime Minister as a solution. If I do, I expect the navy to stop this mutual war at once. Is that clearly understood?

Admiral Chatfield nodded, hiding his smile.
"Of course."

May 1933

The Defence Requirements Committee report laid out the
problems with the FAA and the carrier force in blunt language.

First, the two other powe
rs operating fleet carriers both had two large, capable ships modified from WW1 battlecruisers. Of the experimental carriers the Royal Navy operated, only two of them, Courageous and Glorious, were considered anything more than experimental (the Furious was considered useful in limited circumstances), and both Japan and the USA had plans to build new, purpose built carriers in their next annual building programs, which would leave the RN even more at a disadvantage. The aims of Germany and Italy were unclear, and in the case of Germany they had of course no sizeable navy, but future threats needed to be considered.

The conclusion was simple; at least one new design carrier, the building of which had been proposed - and put back - since 1925, must be set in motion as soon as possible. The shipbuilding capacity was more than adequate, indeed the construction of such a ship would help alleviate the terrible unemployment in the North of England. A carrier, it was pointed out, was considerably cheaper than a battleship, and not subject to supply bottlenecks like its main guns.

Second, if a new carrier (and ideally more than one carrier) was to be built, it would need suitable planes. It was clear from looking at the ongoing designs and requirements for the RAF that a new generation of carrier planes based on the all-metal monoplane design would be needed. Granted, that would be expensive, but their development would take four years to maturity, so a specification should be offered to the usual aircraft manufacturers for some suitable designs.

Getting additional funds for aircraft development and carriers would not of course be easy, but it was pointed out that the threat in the Far East was only getting greater with each year, and the aims of Germany were looking wor
rying in the long term. Also, Britain had ample tonnage available under the London treaty, so it would hardly be warmongering to build a carrier or two to replace the old and obsolete conversions.

Discussions with the treasury took time, but the Admiralty was quite adamant about their needs (neglecting to mention that they also wanted to get the carriers underway before they needed more money for new battleships). In the end they didn't get all they wanted. One carrier was approved for the 1934 program, and new fighter, dive bomber and TBD models were authorised for development. To reduce costs, engines and all other equipment (where possible) was to be either existing or commonly developed by the RAF. The Admiralty had hoped for two
carriers, to at least match the Americans, but one was better than nothing.

There had been considerable argument over exactly what the new carrier would look like, and in the hope of getting approval the Admiralty had, after many, many meetings, decided on a design. It didn
't please everyone, but at least no-one hated it enough to resign over it.

Since the
maximum displacement allowed under the treaty was 27,000t, the DNC had been told to look at a number of proposals in the 25,000t range, to allow some additions if necessary and to keep the displacement to a level that the government would be pressing for in the next naval armament talks. The politicians were still hoping that a general naval (and indeed overall) international disarmament program was possible, although privately the navy disagreed. The big arguments had been over the armour scheme and the hanger size and arrangements. There had been a suggestion of copying the Americans with an open hangar, but the conditions that RN carriers would usually be operating under were different from those faced by the USN. In the end it was decided that the advantages of a closed hanger, with its ease of protection against gas, easy blackout and warmth in winter conditions outweighed a few more aircraft and a cooler condition in the tropics.

The armour had caused a lot more argument, added to which was the fact that armour production was currently quite limited, and while expansion of the plant was being arranged, there wasn
't an infinite amount of armour to play with. It was first of all agreed that deck armour of some sort was necessary; the carrier would certainly be used in the North Sea and Mediterranean, where land based air would be found, and the carrier needed to survive direct attack. This was considered less likely in the Pacific, where the distances involved meant only naval air was likely to be encountered, but it wouldn't hurt to have it. In the end it came down to three main choices

A heavily armoured deck to keep out 500lb bombs

An un-armoured deck, with a protected hangar deck

A flight deck thick enough to initiate a bomb
s fuse, plus a protected hangar deck sufficiently thick to protect from 1,000lb bombs.

It was pointed out that while on paper th
e flight deck armour looked promising, it would involve a lot of weight high up, and probably limit the hangar height from the 16' currently under consideration for the new planes. While stopping 500lb bombs would be good initially, bombers were steadily increasing in performance, and once the 1,000lb bomb was a threat the heavy armour would be rendered useless.

In the end it was decided to compromise and go for the initiating flight deck and a fully armoured hanger deck to protect the magazines and machinery spaces. To reduce the weight, the side armour was reduced to 2" from the 4.5" necessary to defeat heavy shells, as it was felt that the whole point of a carrier was NOT to get close to enemy heavy ships in the first place! However protection sufficient to stop splinter damage and aircraft cannon fire was considered essential. A flight deck an inch thick would be laid down - this would also handle the planes currently being designed, as well as future planes which would certainly be heavier, and a 4 1/2" thick hanger deck protecting the machinery and the magazines. Since this effective
ly 'wrote off' the hanger in the case of bombing, it was decided to fit a horizontal armour plate (with opening door to transfer aircraft if necessary) so that a single bomb hit would only take out half of any aircraft stored below. Since the structure above the hanger deck was (relatively) light, it was expected this would make repairs in case of a successful attack take less time.

DNC reported that on 25,000t with the suggested armour scheme he could provide space for about 45 aircraft in a single hanger, depending on the type. This was looked on unfavourably, particularly compared to foreign carriers current or building, and in fact Courageous already carried 48 (admittedly slightly smaller) planes. DNC offered to carry another 20 aircraft as a deck park, but the feeling was that while a deck park was fine in the Pacific, it made less sense in the North Atlantic in winter, as well as leaving more aircraft out in the open and vulnerable to attack.
It also caused aircraft to deteriorate faster, and the Treasury was already complaining at the cost of the carrier. Again a compromise was reached with what was called the 1 1/2 hanger carrier - a full length upper hanger, 16' high, and a half length lower hanger, again 16' high. This would carry 64 aircraft, comparing much more closely to foreign designs, and the rest of the space at the lower level would allow the necessary crew quarters and to allow some maintenance to be undertaken on long deployments. And if for some reason it became necessary to carry more aircraft, the deck park was still an option.

To reach the necessary speed of over 30kt, it was felt a 4-shaft ship was necessary, on about 148,000hp.While trunking
the exhaust gases for 4 shafts required more weight than for three, the arrangement was actually a bit simpler, as the design displacement and hangar size allowed more flexibility in the disposition of the necessary trunking. The Torpedo Defence System would have a depth of about 15' given the hull width necessary to carry the weight of the armour, slightly more than had been originally intended, but this also allowed more oil to be carried inside it.

Fina
lly the ship would carry 8 twin 4.7" guns for high altitude defence, and 6 octuple 2pdr pompoms for close defence. It had originally been hoped that the 5.1" gun currently under development would prove suitable, but it had been found that the shell was simply too heavy for use at sea without power assistance (in fact the 4.7" gun proposed wasn't developed, and the ship completed with 8 twin 4.5" AA guns) While conversations with the Americans had consolidated the internal opinions that the air group was the most efficient defence, no defences were perfect and defence in depth would give far more security. Hence the heavy AA and the armour, in view of the need to operate in the Mediterranean and the eastern parts of the North Sea. While these arrangements in fact reduced the size of the air group, it was felt that overall it gave the best chance of the carrier surviving air attack. There were concerns and discussions about surface attack, but it was pointed out that even in the worst case of surface attack during bad weather, the carrier could run away from anything big enough to damage it (and in that bad weather, even destroyers were unlikely to be able to catch it)

The design displacement was 24,800t (although the complete ship would actually come in at over 25,000t)

The Ark Royal would be laid down on 1st June 1934 for commissioning in July of 1937.

Of course, both the new carrier and the existing ones would need aircraft. Under the RAF's control, supply of aircraft had been kept to a minimum, indeed there was a serious shortage of aircraft. While the international scene was darkening, it was not felt there was a serious chance of a major war within five years, so the decision was taken to go with a larger purchase of new aircraft rather than more of already obsolete types. This was a calculated risk, but one it was felt worth taking to get better aircraft.

The RN had for many years been proud of the quality of its ships and weapons - not always deservedly so. It was felt that the 'armament' of a carrier should be equally capable, bearing in mind the Royal Navy's unique commitment to arriving anywhere in the world at any time on short notice.

Admiral Henderson chaired a committee that reviewed both the likely existing opposition (particularly with carrier based planes in mind), with an aim to specifying development and purchasing of planes, and also looking at the requirements for the next generation to follow them. It was decided that while it was useful to minimise the number of type of planes to be supported with a carriers limited maintenance facilities, three different types of planes would be needed. These would be a fighter, a dive bomber (which would also have a reconnaissance role), and a torpedo bomber (TBR) that would also be able to level bomb. This plane also would be used for reconnaissance, and would serve as both a shore and sea based antisubmarine aircraft.

The fighter would have a single pi
lot, the dive bomber a crew of two and the TBR plane a crew of three. It was reluctantly decided that a common engine wasn't practical at present, although it was seen as a very useful development for the future. It was expected that a radio suitable for single-person operation to allow the fighter to find its carrier would be bought or more likely licensed from America, where there was considerable experience of operating single-crew fighters.