Do not force the establishment of liaison with the [intelligence] service in Chile. Arouse their interest by passing them intelligence of a topical nature through LEADER.
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In the course of 1972 Moscow substantially downgraded its assessment of the prospects of the Allende regime. In July a leading Soviet journal was still maintaining, ‘The record of Chile shows that a number of Latin American countries can adopt a form of socialist construction.’ In October, however, the ‘Truckers’ Strike’, allegedly backed by CIA funding, virtually paralysed the economy for three weeks, providing dramatic evidence of the weakness of the Popular Unity government and the power of its opponents. At a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in November, Chile was officially said not to be building socialism but merely to be seeking ‘free and independent development on the path of democracy and social progress’. The mounting evidence of chronic economic mismanagement also made Moscow reluctant to provide large-scale support. Allende returned from a visit to Moscow in December with much less than he had hoped for. Simultaneously the
Sunday Times
published a report by its leading foreign correspondent, David Holden, headlined ‘Chile, Collapse of a Marxist Experiment?’ ‘Allende’s own survival is in doubt’, predicted Holden. ‘. . . Anger, fear and a determination to fight are now more evident on the Right as well as the Left.’
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Andropov was anxious none the less that the KGB should do what it could to prevent the defeat of the Allende regime either at the polls or by military coup. On 25 December 1972 he sent the Politburo a memorandum giving a rather exaggerated impression of the KGB’s ability to influence Chilean politics:
The KGB maintains confidential relations with Allende and [a left-wing senator], and also with prominent individuals in the Socialist, Radical, and Christian Democratic Parties.
Parliamentary elections will take place in March 1973.
Considering the situation during the pre-election period, it is planned to take measures to strengthen relations with the above-mentioned people, and also to make new contacts in government, party, and parliamentary circles, including certain representatives of the right-wing opposition and the extremist organization, the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR).
Through unofficial contacts with the country’s influential people and other ways, it is planned to concentrate [the KGB’s] efforts on the following: helping to consolidate the forces supporting Chile’s government; creating obstacles to any co-operation between the Christian Democratic and the National parties within the framework of the opposition; exerting an influence on the armed forces in order to prevent them from being used against Popular Unity.
The KGB also is planning to use its capabilities to carry out a series of active measures in Latin American and other countries for the purpose of exposing the imperialists’ interference in Chile’s internal affairs, and to exert the necessary influence on public opinion, thus inducing the anti-imperialist and progressive elements to support Popular Unity more actively.
In order to finance these measures, in addition to operations against government and political figures (including influencing some of them through financial means), the sum of $100,000 is required. Part of this money is to be given to Allende for work with his own contacts in political and military circles.
Approval for the payment of $100,000 from the Council of Ministers reserve fund for KGB ‘special measures’ in Chile was given by the Politburo on 7 February 1973.
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An additional ‘monetary reward’ of $400 was made to Allende for unspecified ‘valuable information’ he had provided.
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A further report to the Politburo by Andropov in February 1973 gave an optimistic assessment of the KGB’s influence on Allende during his meetings with Kuznetsov:
Allende set this channel apart from the usual unofficial governmental contacts and used it for handling the most confidential and delicate matters (establishing contact between Chile’s and the USSR’s armed forces, consulting on the use of Chilean atomic raw materials, organizing co-operation between the Chilean and Soviet security services, and other matters) by handing over information and discussing current political issues. [The KGB] is succeeding in exerting a definite influence on Allende. This is aiding, in particular, a more correct understanding on the President’s part of China’s policies, as well as a decision on his part to strengthen contact between the Chilean and Peruvian military for the purpose of exerting a positive influence on the leadership of Chile’s armed forces. In turn, Allende is systematically informing us on the situation in the country and in Popular Unity, on his own personal plans, and so forth.
Our officer’s meetings with Allende, during which they discussed business matters, were conducted in private. The President invited him to pay a visit at any time - either at work or at his home - without prior notice, whenever there was an urgent necessity for this.
The strengthening of our officer’s relations with Allende was facilitated by material aid given to him, personal attention, and the fulfilment of his personal requests.
In order to make more effective and beneficial use of our contact with Allende, the following is suggested:
• help in strengthening Allende’s position and authority both within the country and on the Latin American continent through the unofficial channels available to us;
• broader use of Allende’s ability to assess the situation in Latin American countries, bearing in mind that he can send his own emissaries to several of them;
• measures to obtain information through Allende on the policies of the Chinese government, including the use of the President’s trusted persons, whom he can send there;
• material assistance to Allende for his work with contacts in political and military circles, especially during the pre-election period, up to the sum of $50,000 - taken from funds allocated to the KGB via CPSU Central Committee Resolution No. P-78/31, dated 13 February 1973.
The flaws in Andropov’s report were characteristic of many similar documents. Its chief purpose was to impress the Politburo with the KGB’s ability to gain clandestine access to a foreign leader and exert influence on him. Characteristically, it avoided mentioning any problems which might take the gloss off the KGB’s success. Privately, the Centre was increasingly worried about Allende’s prospects of survival. Andropov, however, gave no hint of those concerns to the Politburo. His memorandum, including the request for additional funding, was duly approved.
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Privately, the Centre was worried by the deficiencies of Allende’s security and intelligence system, which increased his vulnerability to a military coup. Once again, it gave the political leadership a rose-tinted view of the improvements which were under way. The Centre reported to Brezhnev that on 17 February 1973 the KGB operations officer responsible for liaison with the Chilean security services (not identified in Mitrokhin’s notes) met Allende secretly at a villa in the suburbs of Santiago:
Allende expressed certain of his views regarding the reorganization of the security services. According to his plan, an efficient apparatus with both intelligence and counter-intelligence functions would be created to report directly to him. As the basis for this apparatus, he planned to use one component of the Servicio de Investigaciones [the Chilean security service] and recruit reliable personnel from the Socialist and Communist parties. The main efforts of this organ would be directed at uncovering and suppressing subversive activity on the part of Americans and local reactionary forces, and in organizing intelligence work within the armed forces, since the position taken by the armed forces was a decisive factor that would determine the fate of the Chilean revolutionary process.
Allende is very much counting on Soviet assistance in this matter.
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The attempted reorganization achieved little. The Servicio de Investigaciones successfully intimidated some of the regime’s opponents and gained a reputation for turning the cellars at its headquarters into torture chambers. Nathaniel Davis, the US ambassador, noted, however, that the Servicio ‘was consumed by personal squabbles between the Socialists and the Communists’. Any attempt to strengthen the civilian intelligence community faced an almost impossible dilemma. The measures necessary to forestall a coup - in particular, any attempt to gather intelligence on plotting within the armed services - were likely to provoke the military into the very action they were designed to prevent.
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In the March congressional elections Allende’s Unidad Popular won 44 per cent of the vote as compared with the opposition’s 56 per cent. Nathaniel Davis summed up the result as ‘discouraging for both sides . . . Unidad Popular found itself a continuing minority for the foreseeable future, and the opposition found its majority insufficient to force legitimate change’ .
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There is no evidence that the KGB tried to explain to the Politburo why its ‘confidential relations’ with leading Chilean politicians across the political spectrum had failed to produce the UP victory which it had led the Politburo to expect three months earlier. Preferring as usual to concentrate on its successes, it emphasized instead the President’s willingness to provide further assistance to its operations. Andropov wrote to Brezhnev to request approval for funding intelligence collection by Allende in other South American countries on the KGB’s behalf:
Our officer had a discussion with [Allende] about receiving information on Latin America by enlisting the President’s assistance. Allende showed an interest in this matter and expressed several specific ideas of his own. In particular, he expressed a willingness to send his own trusted people to Latin American countries, where they would be able to establish contacts with his friends and political supporters, and obtain useful information from them.
In the near future the President will be able to send his emissary to Venezuela for the purpose of ascertaining the situation in that country on the eve of the presidential elections coming up in November of this year. Among his trusted personal contacts, Allende named [Luis] Beltrán Prieto [Figueroa], the leader of the progressive Venezuelan party called the People’s Election Movement [Movimento Electoral del Pueblo].
In addition, the President is willing to co-operate in obtaining information on Argentina and Ecuador, where the situation is characterized by complexities and contradictions.
Brezhnev wrote ‘Approved’ at the bottom of Andropov’s request.
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Andropov, however, was increasingly pessimistic about Allende’s prospects of survival. One day in the spring of 1973, he made an unexpected visit to FCD headquarters at Yasenevo. According to Nikolai Leonov:
He summoned everyone who had anything to do with Latin America and put a single question to us: How did we view the Chilean case? Did it have a chance or not? Should we commit all our resources, or was it already too late to risk them? The discussion was quite profound . . . We came to the conclusion that the measure being planned for making a cash loan - I believe 30 million US dollars was being talked about - would be unable to rescue the situation in Chile. It would be like putting a patch on a worn-out tyre. In the KGB’s view, Allende’s fundamental error was his unwillingness to use force against his opponents. Without establishing complete control over all the machinery of the state, his hold on power could not be secure. ‘All our sympathies were with [Allende’s] experiment’, recalls Leonov, ‘. . . but we did not believe in its success. ’
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Over the next few months the Santiago residency reported what it considered ‘alarming signs of increased tension’.
109
The first attempt to overthrow the regime was made by activists of the extreme right-wing Patria y Libertad movement, who hatched a plot with disaffected officers of the Second Armoured Regiment to kidnap Allende on 27 June. The Santiago residency informed the Centre that it had obtained intelligence on plans for the coup and warned Allende.
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Its achievement, however, was rather less impressive than it probably appeared in Moscow. The security of the coup plotters was so poor that their plans leaked and the coup planned for the 27th was postponed. On the 29th, however, three combat groups of tanks and armoured cars with about a hundred troops left their barracks and headed for the centre of Santiago. The coup petered out in farce. As Nathaniel Davis noted, ‘the column obeyed all the traffic lights and at least one tank stopped to fill up at a commercial gas station’. The most significant aspect of the failed coup was the apathetic response to it by Chilean workers, the supposed bedrock of Allende’s support. Allende broadcast an appeal for ‘the people . . . to pour into the centre of the city’ to defend his government. They did not do so. That highly significant fact was duly noted by the Army Chief of Staff, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte.
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