* * * * *
The Italian Fleet had not reacted in any way against our occupation of Crete, but Admiral Cunningham had for some time been anxious to strike a blow at them with his now augmented naval air forces as they lay in their main base at Taranto. The attack was delivered on November 11 as the climax of a well-concerted series of operations, during which Malta received troops, and further naval reinforcements, including the battleship
Barham,
two cruisers, and three destroyers, reached Alexandria. Taranto lies in the heel of Italy three hundred and twenty miles from Malta. Its magnificent harbour was heavily defended against all modern forms of attack. The arrival at Malta of some fast reconnaissance machines enabled us to discern our prey. The British plan was to fly two waves of aircraft from the
Illustrious,
the first of twelve and the second of nine, of which eleven were to carry torpedoes, and the rest either bombs or flares. The
Illustrious
released her aircraft shortly after dark from a point about a hundred and seventy miles from Taranto. For an hour the battle raged amid fire and destruction among the Italian ships. Despite the heavy flak, only two of our aircraft were shot down. The rest flew safely back to the
Illustrious.
By this single stroke the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean was decisively altered. The air photographs showed that three battleships, one of them the new
Littorio,
had been torpedoed, and in addition one cruiser was reported hit and much damage inflicted on the dockyard. Half the Italian battle fleet was disabled for at least six months, and the Fleet Air Arm could rejoice at having seized by their gallant exploit one of the rare opportunities presented to them.
An ironic touch is imparted to this event by the fact that on this very day the Italian Air Force at the express wish of Mussolini had taken part in the air attack on Great Britain. An Italian bomber force, escorted by about sixty fighters attempted to bomb Allied convoys in the Medway. They were intercepted by our fighters, eight bombers and five fighters being shot down. This was their first and last intervention in our domestic affairs. They might have found better employment defending their fleet at Taranto.
* * * * *
I kept the President well informed:
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
16.X1.40.
I am sure you will have been pleased about Taranto. The three uninjured Italian battleships have quitted Taranto today, which perhaps means they are withdrawing to Trieste.
And again:
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
21.XI.40.
You may be interested to receive the following naval notes on the action at Taranto which I have asked the Admiralty to prepare:
1. This attack had been in Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean’s mind for some time; he had intended to carry it out on October 21 (Trafalgar Day), when the moon was suitable, but a slight mishap to
Illustrious
led to a postponement. During his cruise in the Central Mediterranean on October 31 and November 1, it was again considered, but the moon did not serve and it was thought an attack with parachute flares would be less effective. Success in such an attack was believed to depend on state of moon, weather, an undetected approach by the Fleet, and good reconnaissance. The latter was provided by flying-boats and a Glenn Martin squadron working from Malta. On the night of November 11/12, all the above conditions were met. Unfavourable weather in the Gulf of Taranto prevented a repetition on 12th/13th.2. Duplex pistols were used, and probably contributed to the success of the torpedo attack.
3. The Greek Ambassador at Angora reported on November 11 that Italian Fleet was concentrating at Taranto in preparation for an attack on Corfu. Reconnaissance on November 13 shows that undamaged battleships and eight-inch-gun cruisers have left Taranto – presumably owing to the attack on 11th/12th.
* * * * *
I now addressed General Wavell.
Prime Minister to General Wavell.
14.XI.40.
Chiefs of Staff, Service Ministers, and I have examined general situation in the light of recent events. Italian check on Greek front; British naval success against battle fleet at Taranto; poor showing Italian airmen have made over here; encouraging reports received of low morale in Italy; Gallabat; your own experiences by contacts in Western Desert; above all, the general political situation, make it very desirable to undertake operation of which you spoke to Secretary of State for War.
It is unlikely that Germany will leave her flagging ally unsupported indefinitely. Consequently, it seems that now is the time to take risks and strike the Italians by land, sea, and air. You should act accordingly in concert with other Commanders-in-Chief.
Prime Minister to General Wavell.
26.XI.40.
News from every quarter must have impressed on you the importance of Compass in relation to whole Middle East position, including Balkans and Turkey, to French attitude in North Africa, to Spanish attitude, now trembling on the brink, to Italy, in grievous straits, and generally to the whole war. Without being over-sanguine, I cannot repress strong feelings of confidence and hope, and feel convinced risks inseparable from great deeds are fully justified.
2. Have asked Admiralty to inquire about part assigned to Fleet. If success is achieved, presume you have plans for exploiting it to the full. I am having a Staff study made of possibilities open to us, if all goes well, for moving fighting troops and also reserve forward by sea in long hops along the coast, and setting-up new supply bases to which pursuing armoured vehicles and units might resort. Without wishing to be informed on details, I should like to be assured that all this has been weighed, explored, and as far as possible prepared.
It seems difficult to believe that Hitler will not be forced to come to the rescue of his partner, and obviously German plans may be far advanced for a drive through Bulgaria at Salonika. From several quarters we have reports in that Germans do not approve of Mussolini’s adventure, and that they are inclined to let him pay the price himself. This makes me all the more suspicious that something bad is banking up ready to be let off soon. Every day’s delay is in our favour. It might be that Compass would in itself determine action of Yugoslavia and Turkey, and anyhow, in event of success, we should be able to give Turkey far greater assurances of early support than it has been in our power to do so far. One may indeed see possibility of centre of gravity in Middle East shifting suddenly from Egypt to the Balkans, and from Cairo to Constantinople. You are no doubt preparing your mind for this, and a Staff study is being made here.
As we told you the other day, we shall stand by you and Wilson in any well-conceived action irrespective of result, because no one can guarantee success in war, but only deserve it.
Tell Longmore that I much admire his calling-in of the southern squadrons and accepting the risk of punishment there. If all is well
Furious
and her outfit should reach Takoradi tomorrow. This should make amends for all the feathers we have had to pull out of him for Greece, where the part played by R.A.F. in Greek victories has been of immense military and political consequence. All good wishes to you both, and to the Admiral, who is doing so splendidly. I rejoice that he should feel Suda Bay “an inestimable benefit.”
Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.
26.XI.40.
I suggest the following to our Ambassador in Turkey:
We have placed before you the various arguments for and against Turkish intervention which have occurred to the Staff officers who have reported upon the matter, but we do not wish to leave you in any doubt of what our own opinion and your instructions are. We want Turkey to come into the war as soon as possible. We are not pressing her to take any special steps to help the Greeks, except to make it clear to Bulgaria that any move by Germany through Bulgaria to attack Greece, or any hostile movement by Bulgaria against Greece, will be followed by immediate Turkish declaration of war. We should like Turkey and Yugoslavia now to consult together so as, if possible, to have a joint warning ready to offer Bulgaria and Germany at the first sign of a German movement towards Bulgaria. In the event of German troops traversing Bulgaria with or without Bulgarian assistance, it is vital that Turkey should fight there and then. If she does not, she will find herself left absolutely alone, the Balkans will have been eaten up one by one, and it will be beyond our power to help her. You may mention that by the summer of 1941 we hope to have at least fifteen divisions operating in the Middle East, and by the end of the year nearly twenty-five. We do not doubt our ability to defeat Italy in Africa.
6
P.M
. The Chiefs of Staffs are in general agreement with the above.
Prime
Minister to First Lord, First Sea Lord, and General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee. C.A.S. to see.30.XI.40.
Furious
should return home at once, and carry another load of aircraft and pilots as reinforcement for the Middle East. Every effort should be made to put off her refit till after she has carried this force. C.A.S. should say what composition of force is best.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
1.XII.40.
Exactly what have we got and done at Suda Bay [Crete] – i.e., troops, A.A. guns, coast defence guns, lights, wireless, R.D.F., nets, mines, preparation of aerodromes, etc.?
I hope to be assured that many hundreds of Cretans are working at strengthening the defences and lengthening and improving the aerodromes.
General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.
1.XII.40.
The continued retreat of the Italians in Albania, and the reports which we have received today of difficulties of feeding and watering their forces in the Libyan Desert, together with other reports of aircraft being moved back to Tripoli to be safer from our attacks, combined with safe arrival at Takoradi of thirty-three Hurricanes with first-class pilots, all constitute new facts entitling us to take a more confident view of the situation, which should be communicated to General Wavell.
The enormous advantage of being able, once an enemy is on the run, to pull supplies and fighting troops forward eighty miles in a night by sea, and bring fresh troops up to the advance guard, is very rarely offered in war. General Wavell’s reply to my telegram does not seem to take any account of this, and, considering how much we have ourselves at stake, I do not think we should be doing our duty if we did not furnish him with the results of our Staff study. It is a crime to have amphibious power and leave it unused. Therefore, I wish the study, if favourable, to be telegraphed. It must, however, be ready by the 3d at latest.
I add the following general observation: The fact that we now have established ourselves at Suda Bay entitles us to feel much easier about Malta. While the Fleet is or may be at Suda, it will be most unlikely that any large landing will be attempted at Malta, which we have already reinforced by tanks and guns from Middle East…. The possession of Suda Bay has made an enormous change in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The story of Suda Bay is sad. The tragedy was not reached until 1941. I believe I had as much direct control over the conduct of the war as any public man had in any country at this time. The knowledge I possessed, the fidelity and active aid of the War Cabinet, the loyalty of all my colleagues, the ever-growing efficiency of our war machine, all enabled an intense focusing of constitutional authority to be achieved. Yet how far short was the action taken by the Middle East Command of what was ordered and what we all desired! In order to appreciate the limitations of human action, it must be remembered how much was going on in every direction at the same time. Nevertheless, it remains astonishing to me that we should have failed to make Suda Bay the amphibious citadel of which all Crete was the fortress. Everything was understood and agreed, and much was done; but all was half-scale effort. We were presently to pay heavily for our shortcomings.
* * * * *
The Italian invasion of Greece from Albania was another heavy rebuff to Mussolini. The first assault was repulsed with heavy loss, and the Greeks immediately counter-attacked. In the northern (Macedonian) sector the Greeks advanced into Albania, capturing Koritza on November 22. In the central sector of the northern Pindus an Italian Alpini division was annihilated. In the coastal zone, where the Italians had at first succeeded in making deep penetrations, they hastily retreated from the Kalamas River. The Greek army, under General Papagos, showed superior skill in mountain warfare, out-manoeuvring and outflanking their enemy. By the end of the year their prowess had forced the Italians thirty miles behind the Albanian frontier along the whole front. For several months twenty-seven Italian divisions were pinned in Albania by sixteen Greek divisions. The remarkable Greek resistance did much to hearten the other Balkan countries and Mussolini’s prestige sank low.
* * * * *
On November 9, Mr. Neville Chamberlain died at his country home in Hampshire. I had obtained the King’s permission to have him supplied with the Cabinet papers, and until a few days before the end he followed our affairs with keenness, interest, and tenacity. He met the approach of death with a steady eye. I think he died with the comfort of knowing that his country had at least turned the corner.
As soon as the House met on November 12, I paid a tribute to his character and career: