At Bentley Priory a grim-faced Dowding spoke to each of his group commanders on the telephone. Not surprisingly, his longest conversation was with Park. The situation that the AOC Group 11 painted was a gloomy one. Almost all his airfields were damaged to a greater or lesser extent. Repairs were being hampered by the lack of plant and the refusal of the civilian work teams to endanger themselves. His communications had also been seriously degraded and it was becoming difficult to communicate with the fighters in the air. Brand, who had already handed over two squadrons to Park, remained bullish, confident that he could hold his own as long as he was not forced to hand over more squadrons. Leigh-Mallory, on the other hand, was frustrated. Since all the Luftwaffe attacks were to the south of London, Group 12 had been little more than a bystander. As for Saul, there was not much he could add. He needed all of his slender fighter strength to face the threat posed by Luftflotte 5.
Dowding next spoke to RAF Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, chief of the Air Staff. To sustain Group 11 in its desperate fight, Dowding needed help from the other RAF commands, as well as from the Royal Navy and Army. He asked Newall to arrange for Park to use the Coastal Command bases at Eastchurch and Gosport, and the Fleet Air Arm airfields at Ford in Sussex and Lee-on-Solent. Dowding also requested army manpower to fill the vacuum created by the civilian airfield repair teams. The AOCinC also stated that he needed Bomber Command to launch retaliatory attacks on Luftwaffe bases in France and the Low Countries.
Newall asked Dowding how he intended to fight off the inevitable German attacks that would come on the morrow. He replied that Group 11 would battle on as best it could and that Group 12 would provide standing patrols over London, which could be sent to reinforce Park as the attacks materialized. In the meantime, RAF technicians were working throughout the night to make good the damage to the Chain Home stations. Newall was satisfied and came back to Dowding within the hour, telling him that Park had permission to use the Coastal Command and Fleet Air Arm bases and that the army would cooperate over airfield repairs. Bomber Command would attack Luftwaffe bases the following night. Its AOCinC, “Peter” Portal, was, however, reluctant to mount attacks by day without a fighter escort, which he knew would be difficult to provide. Newall told Dowding he’d warned Portal that he might well have to do this. It was not the end of Dowding’s day. At midnight he had a personal telephone call from the Prime Minister, who needed reassurance that Fighter Command could hold out against the German onslaught. Dowding put a brave face on the day’s events and Churchill appeared to be satisfied.
Wartime censorship ensured that the BBC put out noncommittal reports on the day’s fighting. It merely reported that there had been fierce air battles over southern England and claimed that fifty German aircraft were shot down. In contrast, the German radio stations adopted a triumphal tone to their reports, claiming that the final battle in the West was now being fought and that peace would soon return to Europe. William Joyce (whom the British nicknamed Lord Haw Haw) made a propaganda broadcast to the British people warning them that worse was to come and blaming Churchill for the continuation of the war. On the evening of July 2, Adolf Hitler received a telephone call from his fellow Axis leader, Benito Mussolini, offering the services of the Regia Aeronautica to assist in the destruction of Britain. Hitler told him that he would bear this in mind.
Throughout the night the nuisance attacks by the German bombers forced many on the airfields of Group 11 to spend much of their time in the air raid shelters, robbing them of much needed sleep. At dawn the squadrons went over to instant readiness, while Group 12 set up its standing patrols over the capital. But not until mid-morning did the expected German attack materialize. The Luftwaffe commanders had sensibly given priority to allowing their men some rest. Besides, delaying the first attack of the day also helped encourage uncertainty among the British. Sperrle and Kesselring also altered their tactics. Instead of trying to attack groups of airfields and radar stations simultaneously, they staggered their strikes, drawing out the assault to over two hours, in the hope that the RAF fighters would run low on fuel.
The initial strikes did suffer casualties because the British planes were able to concentrate to a degree against them. An attack against Hornchurch resulted in eight out of forty German bombers shot down, some of them falling victim to the Group 12 standing patrols. But as the attacks built up, they began to swamp the defenses and, as the Luftwaffe had planned, the RAF planes had to pull out of the battle to refuel. In one or two cases they did so too late and were either shot down or crash-landed. Two major assaults took place during the day, the second during the early evening. The Luftwaffe lost a total of thirty-five aircraft, while the RAF had 45 destroyed in the air and on the ground. Further airfield damage was inflicted and Home Chain received another battering. Indeed, the gaps in its coverage by the end of the day meant that some Luftwaffe groups were slipping through undetected.
While replacing his aircraft losses was not a problem, given the excellent rate of fighter manufacture, Dowding was now concerned about his pilot casualties. In two days of air fighting, Fighter Command had lost 25 pilots killed and another twenty wounded. This equated to three squadrons’ worth. Intense combat and little sleep during the past thirty-six hours were beginning to tell on the remaining pilots of Group 11. The only solution, as Dowding saw it, was to swap the more battered squadrons with fresher ones from Groups 10 and 12. He gave orders that night for four Group 11 squadrons to interchange with two each from Groups 10 and 12 at first light on the following day.
A telephone call from Newall added to his concerns. The chief of the Air Staff told him that the War Cabinet was beginning to ask him searching questions over the RAF’s ability to hold out. Furthermore, there were indications that people were beginning to leave London for the countryside, as well as absenteeism from work places, especially factories, in southern England.
Convinced that the Luftwaffe’s road to London was almost clear of obstacles, the Führer made a radio broadcast on the evening of July 3. He addressed his remarks to Britain, pointing out that the RAF was rapidly being destroyed, leaving London and other major cities defenseless. He reminded the British of what had befallen Warsaw in September 1939 and Rotterdam in May 1940, and warned that British cities would suffer the same punishment if the government did not come to its senses and accept that it was pointless attempting to continue the war. He was still prepared to offer generous terms, but only if the British government made an immediate response.
No sooner had Churchill read the English transcript to the speech than he summoned his War Cabinet to a late night emergency meeting. He realized that he would have to make some reply, but needed the backing of his ministers. The meeting took place at 10 Downing Street—Churchill could have held it in his underground war room, but believed that this would indicate defeatism. Again, Chamberlain and Halifax intimated that the British people could not be allowed to endure unnecessary suffering. Churchill retorted that the results of standing up to Hitler would be nothing compared to the suffering Britain would endure under the Nazi thrall. Once more he dominated the cabinet by his strength of character. They agreed that Britain would fight on and Churchill would make this plain when he addressed Parliament the following day.
During the night of July 3-4, Bomber Command mounted a series of attacks on airfields in northern France and Belgium. While most bombers found their targets, the bombing was inaccurate and caused little significant damage, although it did interrupt rest. Luftwaffe bombers continued their nuisance raids on RAF airfields.
With the coming of daylight, the Luftwaffe resumed its offensive with dawn raids similar to those of July 2. The RAF reaction was noticeably more sluggish than on previous days, and it was clear that Group 11 was beginning to buckle under the pressure. Receiving little guidance from their ground controllers, the British fighter pilots were growing frustrated and desperate, especially since the radar system, now in tatters, was unable to provide much early warning. There were even two reported incidents of Hurricanes literally ramming German bombers. Group 11 had also been forced to abandon its forward airfields—Manston, Lympne, Hawkinge, and Tangmere, as well as the Fleet Air Arm Station at Ford. None of its remaining bases was fully operational, and Dowding was increasingly relying on Group 12.
On the afternoon of July 4, as Churchill addressed a subdued House of Commons, Luftflotte 5 made its first appearance. Fifty bombers, escorted by Me 110s, were picked up by radar approaching the River Humber. Their target was the port of Hull. The object of this raid was to distract the RAF from the main battle being waged in the south. Hull lay in the northern part of Group 12’s area, but because most of its squadrons had been drawn toward London, it could only put up one Hurricane squadron to intercept the attack. Group 13 was able to get another airborne, and these met the raiders as they reached the coast. They managed to shoot down five bombers and three of their escorts, with the loss of three Hurricanes, but could not prevent the Germans from pressing home their attack, which caused damage to the docks and inflicted a number of civilian casualties.
Simultaneously, Luftflotten 2 and 3 made their second major attack of the day in the south.
Churchill’s speech was full of defiance and optimism, but he failed to convince many of his listeners. Afterward, anxious groups of MPs gathered in the lobbies. There was talk of forming a fresh administration, and many buttonholed Lord Halifax, whom they regarded as a natural successor to Churchill. The Prime Minister himself went back to Downing Street and made a transatlantic telephone call. It was to President Franklin Roosevelt. Churchill told him that only an immediate U.S. declaration of war could save Britain. Roosevelt was sympathetic, but explained to Churchill that the American people would not countenance it. He pointed to recent opinion polls in which nearly 90 percent of those questioned were firmly against entering the conflict. Churchill then went to Buckingham Palace to brief the king. He told the monarch that London was now virtually defenseless against air attack. The unthinkable might come to pass in that Britain might be forced to seek peace. If this was the case, the war would have to be continued by the British Empire. Churchill advised the king that this could only happen if the Royal Family raised its standard outside Britain. To this end, he had arranged for a cruiser to wait at the port of Liverpool to take the Royal Family to Canada. The king acquiesced and agreed to make preparations for a hurried flight from London.
Churchill then chaired a meeting of the War Cabinet, which was attended by the Chiefs of Staff. Halifax warned Churchill that he was losing support in the Commons and that he should make some form of conciliatory reply to Hitler’s speech of the previous evening. Churchill turned to Newall. What could the RAF do to prevent the situation from worsening still further? The chief of the Air Staff gave a gloomy reply. Fighter Command had lost half its strength, and many of its forward airfields were out of action. The radar coverage along the south coast was virtually nonexistent. All he could suggest was a massive daylight strike by Bomber Command against the German airfields, which he proposed to mount the following day. Churchill agreed that this should take place, and with that the meeting broke up.
In Berlin, Hitler had summoned Göring to see him. They met that evening in the Reichs Chancellery. Hitler made it plain that the problem of British intransigence could not be allowed to drag on, especially after Churchill’s speech. There must be a speedy resolution. Göring replied that the way to London was now open. He proposed an attack on the British capital the following day. Hitler agreed, but said that he would first give Britain one final ultimatum. It was broadcast late that same evening. Unless the British made peace overtures by noon on the following day, July 5, the attack on their cities would begin.
During the night, both the Luftwaffe and RAF Bomber Command carried out further nuisance raids against airfields. At 0800 the first Luftwaffe attacks of the day began. It happened that simultaneously RAF Bomber Command launched its assault against the German airfields. Some 150 bombers took part, principally the Blenheim day bombers of Group 2, but also Wellingtons, Hampdens, and Whitleys. They had been provided with an escort of three squadrons of Spitfires, drawn from Groups 10, 12, and 13, but these were diverted to deal with the latest German attacks. The British bombers flew on alone in what became known as the “aerial charge of the Light Brigade,” an allusion to the disastrous action during the Battle of Balaclava in the Crimean War. While some reached their targets and did cause some damage, German fighters hacked many out of the sky. Others fell victim to the extensive flak defenses around the airfields. All in all, forty-three bombers were destroyed and many others damaged. Churchill had been pinning his hopes on this attack. Consequently, Hitler’s noon deadline passed without any response from him. Göring therefore issued orders for the attack on London to be mounted later that afternoon.
At 1400 the British War Cabinet reconvened at Downing Street. They realized that the bomber attack had failed. A heated debate took place. Churchill found himself defending his position on his own. The remainder of the cabinet members banded against him, reinforced by the knowledge that a motion of no confidence in Churchill was to be debated in the Commons later that afternoon. Britain had to seek peace. Churchill stated that he would defend himself in the House. The debate opened at 1530. At that very moment the planes of Luftflotten 2 and 3 were taking off from their airfields. Forty-five minutes later, massed phalanxes of bombers, accompanied by Bf 109 and Me 110 escorts, were crossing the south coast—their target, the heart of London.