Tom Barry (21 page)

Reaching the rendezvous outside Bandon, Barry found the two other sections waiting. John Lordan captured two naval officers and following interrogation, Barry allowed them to go free ‘as they were not guilty of any murder of unarmed Irishmen'. But he gave them a note for Percival. He named unarmed IRA men who were tortured to death and warned him of dire consequences. ‘Henceforth your unit, in common with other terrorists, will be subject to reprisals for every outrage committed by it … The Essex Regiment has burned and destroyed nearly 50 West Cork homes, long before such burnings had become the official policy of the British military government in Ireland.'
[1]

Major C. J. Street, British intelligence officer downplayed the lawlessness of the Auxiliaries as ‘a few bad apples' within the force. However, Lloyd George and his cabinet acknowledged their ruthlessness in December 1920 when Archbishop Clune was negotiating a settlement between both countries. In a three-point plan that included the surrender of arms, etc., government knowledge of a vendetta was exposed. Point No. 3 recorded:

Sinn Féin to order the cessation of all violence in return for which the government to stop reprisals of shop looting, raids, burnings, floggings, execution without court-martial (not admitted) and people only to be executed after due court-martial.
[2]

Lord Russell acknowledged that some of the Auxiliaries ‘exploits were shameful and the army's reputation suffered through them.'
[3]

Fire-raising gangs accompanied raiding parties and roved over West Cork. Farmhouses, labourers' cottages and shops went up in flames leaving desolation and misery in their wake. Over 50 years later the harrowing scenes of ‘mothers with young families out under a tarpaulin tent or in a hen house on a bitter winter's night' after their home and belongings were gutted was etched in Barry's memory. This was ‘mostly always done with glee'. Dan Cahalane recalled many families who ‘suffered this terrible torture. It had to be stopped.'
[4]

To counter this terror, GHQ sanctioned the burning of British Loyalist homes in retaliation. ‘The West Cork Brigade was slow to commence a campaign of counter-burnings', said Barry. ‘They [British military] started the burning, as they did with the Boers in South Africa. We found it necessary to react'.
[5]
When the threat was ignored, the IRA burned two Loyalist houses for each Nationalist house burned. This created an outcry from the British Loyalists in West Cork. Now caught-up in terrorism they demanded that British forces should cease destroying Republican homes. Members in the House of Commons pleaded on behalf of their constituents, stating that two small farmhouses were worth less than £1,000, whereas four large British Loyalists houses were worth over £20,000. Bill Hales, whose home was burned to the ground, said ‘the counter-terror worked'. Though many Republican homes had been destroyed, many were now saved ‘from destruction'.
[6]

Michael Collins wrote: ‘for myself my conscience is clear. There is no crime in detecting and destroying, in war time, the spy and the informer'.
[7]
So orders went out from GHQ to the brigades of the IRA. In the Third West Cork Brigade orders were transmitted in a memorandum by the brigade intelligence officer to battalion commanders to procure evidence of suspected spies and to intensify raids on mail carriers and post offices, thus obtaining further evidence. Women helped in this process.

Barry with Liam Deasy, Charlie Hurley, Seán Buckley and other officers in the brigade area turned their attention to spies. It was evident that the British forces had an extensive espionage service in the West Cork area and it was felt that the IRA and their activities would be short-lived unless this was broken. May Twomey, who worked in Bandon post office with Anna Mulqueen intercepted corre-spondence which was passed on to Seán Buckley, intelligence officer and his team. ‘We knew that men were being sold; we knew that there were several types of spies and informers.' Between 17 January and 16 February 1921, Barry said that ‘as a result of information given to the enemy, nine IRA within a 12 mile radius of Bandon were captured and murdered'.
[8]

Barry regretted the turn events were taking but spies had to be dealt with ‘coldly and ruthlessly to ensure the survival of the IRA'. He said that every national movement in Ireland had failed because of spies and informers – ‘the only source of enemy intelligence … we had hesitated too long to strike ... we, the brigade officers, must always bear a certain responsibility for the needless deaths of many of our own Volunteers'. There were ‘spies who took blood money' and ‘unpaid informers from the wealthier land-owning class who hated the Republican movement – were the worst'.
[9]

Major Percival noted that in some districts all civilians were treated as hostile. It was the IO's duty to find out ‘the political sympathies of every civilian … if friendly whether they are prepared to give information and if so what is their information worth.' He kept a largescale map on the wall where every farm and house was marked and there was a note on the sympathies of the occupier, therefore ‘before any officer went on a raid,' he wrote, ‘we had all available information'.
[10]
Lieut Gen. Hugh Jeudwine, GOC Fifth Division, said that ‘in intelligence … every raid, every search, every encounter, successful or unsuccessful provided information.'
[11]

Percival ordered that the IO ‘must keep in close touch with the Loyalist especially those who were are not afraid to tell him what they know … if the IRA suspected a Loyalist of giving information or being too friendly with the crown forces, it meant certain death to him,' Percival noted. Usually, visitation to these houses ‘took place after dark'. Percival tells how he blackmailed a local company officer into giving information in return for immunity. The officer was ‘convicted of some small offence and sentenced to six months' imprisonment'. Percival wrote that ‘he proved very useful'.
[12]

There is no indication that Barry or any of the senior officers were aware of this man's activities at this time. However, when a man was either ‘captured or surrendered voluntary whilst armed with a rifle' at the Upton train ambush, their suspicions were roused. Flor Begley notes that ‘the column could have been wiped out as a result of this man's betrayal of many vital facts relating to brigade H. Qrs. and the movements of senior brigade officers'. Though with the IRA, he did not participate in any engagement for some time before Upton, but ‘turned up that day with a rifle'. Afterwards Charlie Hurley investigated his actions, discovered ‘he hid in a house, never fired a shot but remained there to be arrested, waiting!' Within a week of this arrest the IRA were ‘tipped off by a friendly RIC sergeant to be careful as he had given the game away, meaning he had talked a lot.' Upon general release this ‘Coy. Captain volunteered a statement' said ‘that he gave information whilst under the influence of drugs, etc.' He was court-martialled, sentenced to death which was ‘commuted to exile for life'. Neither Tom Barry nor any of the Cork No. 3 Brigade men were aware at the time that it was due to his information that Charlie Hurley was killed and ‘several other captures were effected in this neighbourhood'.
[13]

‘Every civilian should be looked on as a potential enemy,' Percival emphasised to his regiment. ‘It would have been impossible to carry out any operations without having a reasonably good intelligence service,' he wrote. With this in mind he used ‘Loyalist sympathisers' to the fullest extent.
[14]
Strickland's division found that ‘information obtained from civilian agents' helped the 6th Division track down ‘arms dumps' and ‘rebels'.
[15]

‘Some were ready to tell what they knew, frequently without asking for payment … small presents were more acceptable ... Most informants, preferred to tell verbally what they knew … A method frequently employed was to carry out a raid on and search the house of an informer, and during the course of it an opportunity could be found to speak to him or her.' Occasionally, ‘an informant' would be ‘arrested' during ‘curfew hours', and in the security of barracks impart with ‘valuable' information.
[16]
Some ‘loyal inhabitants' who ‘have incurred the displeasure of the IRA and are therefore unable to reside in their homes' were ‘recompensed out of a special intelligence fund and transferred to England,' according to Strickland's records. It was considered ‘the duty of the government, to help loyal citizens of the United Kingdom.'
[17]

Barry and the officers of the Third West Cork Brigade knew they had a difficult task, and they knew some though not all of their enemy's methods of seeking information, such as putting ‘stool pigeons' into jail to mingle with IRA prisoners. ‘Stool pigeons' pretended to be in sympathy with the IRA and tried to obtain information.
[18]

IRA officers implemented various forms of interrogation. But ‘a tight rein was kept on all battalions, no spy was executed without the sanction of a brigade officer,' according to Liam Deasy.
[19]
Barry dressed in leggings and trench coat and sporting a captured Auxiliary's tasselled beret visited houses of suspected informers. Speaking with a British accent, he questioned them about the IRA. Information was given freely as they believed they were speaking to a member of the British forces.

He told of one occasion, wearing the captured Auxiliary's tasselled beret, when he was readily admitted into the home of a ‘a Loyalist informer'. Three armed IRA officers waited outside. The man was not on their list until they were freely given his name when on another ‘visitation'. This ‘visitor' was ushered into the drawing-room where the man drinking whiskey asked him to join him in a drink. Barry refused. He never drank spirits until after dinner! The man grumbled because the authorities took so long to respond to his call. In explaining the reason for his message, he named two IRA men he had tracked to a barn, gave their names and how best to trap them. He produced a notebook, and again complained about delays in acting on his previous messages. ‘If you people were quicker to act on information the IRA would be finished in the locality long ago.' He poured out details of IRA movements and activities in the area. As he warmed to his subject he also poured himself another glass of whiskey, asked his ‘visitor' was he sure he wouldn't have one. ‘No thanks!' Barry politely declined. He correctly named the local IRA officers, and the names of senior officers whom he called ‘The Big Shots'. He went on to name ‘reliable men' who like him were helping the authorities.

‘In vivid detail he boasted about information which led to the murder of two of my men,' said Barry. ‘This was proof. My blood began to stir as the maid brought more water for the whiskey, and he poured himself another. Again I refused. “He'll have tea,” he said. I said, “No.” She brought it anyway and left. My pulse beat faster, I knew I was going to kill him.'

‘“Don't move,” I said. “Keep your hands on the table.” I drew my companion from my pocket, blew the whistle, told him who I was – one of “the Big Shots” he named. The whiskey glass fell from his hand …' Hearing the sound of the whistle, Barry's fellow officers came in. The man was court-martialled. He admitted making the statements and his incriminating activities. A few hours later he was shot.
[20]

One informer in Innishannon, according to Barry ‘was not only an important organiser of espionage against the IRA, but guided in person raiding parties of the Essex Regiment.' It was well known from inside information that he wore a mask. But one night in a victim's house, his mask slipped. From that December night in 1920, he was guarded by four Black and Tans. On the night he was shot the Tans failed in their aim on the IRA raiding party.
[21]

‘We cleared thirteen spies out in one month … Spies got no mercy. The spy is the paid man; he's the blood-money scoundrel, but he's not as dangerous as the informer. The spy takes his chance ...'
[22]
The ‘unpleasant duty of dealing with spies and informers' Liam Deasy believed was ‘necessary' as ‘British gold and Irish greed' would outstrip the Volunteer efforts to secure ‘freedom'. ‘Incidents convinced us beyond all possible doubt that information was being supplied to the enemy'.
[23]

On the rare occasion when a man tried to take advantage of the situation for his own reasons, Tom was unbending; his capacity for sizing up facts and motives was said to be extremely accurate. When he decided that a spy deserved to be shot following a court-martial, if circumstances permitted he either ordered the execution to be done or performed it himself. Occasionally the spy was asked to leave the country.

There was the odd occasion when a member tried to take advantage of the situation. One man in an effort to have his neighbour shot because of some disagreement told Barry more than once that he was a spy. Having put some preliminary questions to the Volunteer, Barry decided that his motives were other than honourable. Barry was writing at a table when the Volunteer again approached him. ‘Look,' said Barry, placing his own gun on the table, ‘go away and shoot him.'

The man knew that Barry didn't believe him. He looked at Barry, then at the gun, and walked away.'
[24]

As Barry was writing his book he had the names of those involved in espionage and the details of their activities. ‘At first I listed the names and addresses of those sixteen British agents who were shot by the West Cork Brigade of the IRA Then the thought came of the pain such a listing would bring to those traitors' descendants and relatives … Innocent men and women should not suffer for the sins of their fathers,' he wrote. The daily press ‘of the first six months of 1921 will supply all particulars' of those ‘executed including the official British announcements of the deaths of their agents,' he wrote to the editor of the
Irish
Press
. Mr Sweetnam was happy with Barry's omission of names, but he also wanted Lord Tom Kingston's name omitted, as ‘it might be embarrassing to other Kingstons'. Barry disagreed with that one, as Burgatia House would identify it in any case.
[25]