Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice (12 page)

Despite extensive outreach efforts, unfavorable public perceptions of the Court remain. A significant sector thinks the indictments of
CDF leaders, in particular, are unfair because of the CDF's role in resisting the RUF. In addition, with respect to the CDF trial, some believe that it is unfair that Norman is on trial while
President Kabbah, who was Norman's official superior when Norman allegedly committed the crimes, was not even indicted.
[109]
Others regard the trials as inconsistent with the amnesty provided by the Lomé Agreement. There are also those who believe the trials frustrate the attainment of peace as they will destabilize the nation by bringing back into the spotlight former rebel leaders,
[110]
and by increasing existing tensions between RUF supporters
and CDF supporters who often live in the same communities. In addition, some critics regard the Court as an imposition of the West, complaining that despite presidential and parliamentary approval, Sierra Leoneans were not involved in a South Africa‐like broad‐based consultation process prior to its establishment. Others may be influenced by declarations made by those opposing the Court, that the US$80 million spent so far to support the Court could have been used to compensate the victims, or to rebuild their houses and villages.
[111]
And still others feel the discrepancies between local and international standards in terms of maximum punishment and detention conditions undermine the Court's credibility as an institution of justice.
[112]
Even Sierra Leoneans who currently approve of the Special Court may change their position if the Court fails to successfully try Charles Taylor, or if not enough convictions take place to justify its process.

The public's resistance to the Special Court seems to lessen, however, as the trials proceed.
[113]
This may be a result of the revelations made in the trial against CDF members, which drew attention to the egregious practices of the CDF, or simply due to a form of “critic's fatigue.” Recently conducted regional conferences relating to transitional justice issues, revealed that the Court is generally considered as legitimate by the public.
[114]
They also revealed that those who still oppose certain aspects of the Court's process now tend to consider that the issues they challenge will be resolved within the framework of the Court.
[115]
Opposition based on the funds supporting the Court's operation has also lessened. It is worthwhile mentioning in this context that despite what seems like an enormous budget compared to the national budget of Sierra Leone, or even to the amounts raised by the TRC, the Court has been hampered by budgetary shortfalls. The Court's budget pales in comparison to that of the
ICTY or
ICTR, where the yearly budget exceeds the amount available to the Court for three years of operation.
[116]
The perceived waste of resources by the ad hoc tribunals accounted for the decision to fund the Special Court through voluntary contributions, resulting in the Court's restricted financial resources.
[117]
The Court's limited funds may ultimately pose a greater hurdle to its success than negative public
opinion.

 
Conclusion
 

Despite antagonistic views and financial constraints, even the Court's critics agree that it will send a message of accountability to those who commit mass atrocities. Hopefully, this will remove the threat of further violence and enable Sierra Leone to rehabilitate itself and undergo a
transition towards a more egalitarian rule of law society. Nonetheless, without additional measures employed by the government and the international community to promote sustainable transformation and to put an end to endemic corruption and mismanagement, as effective as the Court may be in conducting the trials, it will be unsuccessful in promoting sustainable peace and reliable justice. The Court's achievements can only constitute preliminary steps towards an improved society where human rights and rule of law prevail. Only a long‐term commitment by the local authorities, coupled with international assistance, can ensure transition from the evils of war and the harms of violence towards an environment in which the development of the individual is encouraged and a high standard of living is attainable.

The international community cannot overlook the fact that for transitional justice mechanisms to have a sustainable effect, attention must be given to fighting poverty and encouraging development. Perhaps international entities (including those in the justice sector) whose presence in the country over the past few years contributed to the local economy should reconsider their approaching mass exodus, which may seriously destabilize the economy, risking further impoverishment and an increase in the already high unemployment level.
[118]
Alleviating poverty will enable the population to engage in social and political reform; it will also mitigate public bitterness which may easily serve to promote the political agendas of opportunistic and corrupt elements within the society.

Justice is about fairness and equality. If the Court can promote a public belief that there is a willingness within the society to treat people fairly and equally, it can assist in advancing transitional justice goals. If its judicial process is transparent, it can demonstrate to the Sierra Leonean society how to operate an impartial judicial system that enshrines due process of law and fairness of proceedings, while also promoting a break from a violent past. If it succeeds in ensuring that Sierra Leoneans feel parties to its process, as opposed to bystanders, it is headed in the right direction towards advancing transitional justice in Sierra
Leone.

The Special Court's judicial process will condemn the dreadful practices Sierra Leoneans have witnessed in the past decade and hopefully deter their reoccurrence and restore respect for the law. The historical narrative established by the Court and the TRC will advance the public's awareness of the gravity of the atrocities committed, which in turn may help facilitate social and political reform consistent with human rights protection and rule of law. The war's root causes have been identified by the TRC. It is now up to the government to ensure that the “justice” in “transitional justice” does not remain “transitional”.

 

[1]
UN Doc. S/RES/1315, August 14, 2000, para. 7. For a critical view see P. Penfold, “Will Justice Help Peace in Sierra Leone?”,
The Observer
, October 20, 2002.

 
 

[2]
Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Abidjan, November 30, 1996, UN Doc. S/1996/1034 (Abidjan Accord).

 
 

[3]
Agreement on Ceasefire in Sierra Leone, May 18, 1999. Available at
www.sierra-leone.org/ceasefire051899.html
.

 
 

[4]
Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Lomé, July 7, 1999 (Lomé Agreement). Available at
www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html
.

 
 

[5]
UN Doc. S/RES/1270, October 22, 1999. UNAMSIL replaced the UN Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), which was established under UN Doc. S/RES/1181, July 13, 1998.

 
 

[6]
M.P. Scharf,
The Special Court for Sierra Leone
, ASIL Insight, Oct. 2000 (Scharf,
The Special Court
), para. 3; Human Rights Watch,
Sierra Leone Rebels Violating Peace Accord
, August 30, 1999 (available at
www.hrw.org
).

 
 

[7]
“Sierra Leone News and Information Archives”, available at
www.sierra-leone.org
(SL News Archives), news of May 8–17, 2000.

 
 

[8]
The Abuja Ceasefire Agreement of November 10, 2000.

 
 

[9]
The Ceasefire Agreement of November 10, 2000 was renewed in Abuja on May 4, 2001.

 
 

[10]
NPWJ Executive Summary, p. 33.

 
 

[11]
Government of Sierra Leone,
Sierra Leone Vision 2025 “Sweet Salone” – Strategies for National Transformation
, August 2003 (Sweet Salone, August 2003), p. 32, a pamphlet published with support from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This is the source of the details in the rest of this paragraph.

 
 

[12]
Lomé Agreement, Article IX.

 
 

[13]
Lomé Agreement, Article V, granted Foday Sankoh the chairmanship of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, and the status of Vice‐President. It also granted four additional cabinet posts and four Deputy Minister posts to RUF members. Johnny Paul Koroma received chairmanship of the government's Commission for the Consolidation of Peace.

 
 

[14]
Lomé Agreement, Article XXVI(1).

 
 

[15]
Reference to this reservation is found in the Seventh Report of the Secretary‐General on the United Nations Military Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/1999/836, July 30, 1999, paras. 7 and 54.

 
 

[16]
SL News Archives, news of July 9, 1999.

 
 

[17]
Press releases available at
www.hrw.org
and
www.amnesty.org
.

 
 

[18]
SL News Archives, news of May 22, 2000.

 
 

[19]
SL News Archives, news of May 26, 2000.

 
 

[20]
The Director of the local NGO “Campaign for Good Governance” called for the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute Sierra Leone's atrocities. SL News Archives, news of May 26, 2000.

 
 

[21]
The British Foreign Secretary supported Sankoh's prosecution, emphasizing that the Lomé Agreement's amnesty provision only applies to acts committed before its signature. US Senator Gregg stated that the United States will “demand that brutal thugs are held accountable for their atrocities.” SL News Archives, news of June 6, 2000.

 
 

[22]
Letter dated June 12, 2000 from President of Sierra Leone to the Secretary‐General, UN Doc. S/2000/786, Annex.

 
 

[23]
UN Doc. S/RES/1315, August 14, 2000.

 
 

[24]
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone dated January 16, 2002 (Special Court Agreement), available at
www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourtagreement.html
. The delay in concluding the Special Court Agreement was due to the instability in Sierra Leone and difficulties in finding funds for the Special Court.

 
 

[25]
The Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act 2002
. In accordance with section 40(4) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991) treaties must be approved by parliament.

 
 

[26]
Consistent with the reservation appended to the Lomé Agreement by the UN representative.

 
 

[27]
Kabbah's August 5, 2003 Statement to TRC, para. 35.

 
 

[28]
Prosecutor
v.
Sam Hinga Norman
,
Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa
, Case No.SCSL–2004–14.

 
 

[29]
Prosecutor
v.
Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao
, Case No.SCSL–2004–15.

 
 

[30]
Prosecutor
v.
Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, Santigie Borbor Kanu
, Case No. SCSL–2004–16.

 
 

[31]
They cannot be tried in absentia, in accordance with Article 17 of the
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(
Statute
).
Statute
available at
www.sierra-leone.org/documents-specialcourt.html
. Taylor was detained in Nigeria and turned over to the Court in March 2006. Subsequent proceedings are beyond the scope of this chapter.

 
 

[32]
Report of the Secretary‐General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/915, October 4, 2000 (SG Report on Court's Establishment, UN Doc. S/2000/915), paras. 25–28. Schabas, in chapter
1
, questions whether this date was not selected because the United Nations had failed to attach a reservation to the amnesty provision in the Abidjan Accord, similar to that attached to the Lomé Agreement. In Penfold,
Will Justice?
para. 16, the author theorizes that the date was chosen because violence in Freetown broke out in 1997 (criticizing the international community's greater concern with Freetown than with the rest of the country).

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