‘Will we fight?’
Qin didn’t reply. He had no better idea than Zhang. The aircraft carrier fleets were loyal to Xu. The defense minister was playing his usual game, going along with both sides for as long as he could. He was keeping Fan happy by sending the fleets to Kenya. What he would do when they got there would depend on what he thought the carrier fleet admirals were prepared to do and what would be in his own interest at the time.
There was a knock on the door. One of Zhang’s aides came in.
‘President Zhang,’ he said, ‘it is time to leave for the meeting of the Central Military Commission.’
THE MORNING DAWNED misty and grey in Washington. At 8am a feeble light was filtering in through the windows of the White House. In southern Sudan, it was four in the afternoon of a hot, tense day. The American marines holed up in the compound gazed out at the remains of three blackened Chinooks in a clearing outside and looked for signs of the forces encircling them beyond. Five hundred miles away, off Lamu Bay, a swell had risen and a squall was approaching from the southeast. The two Chinese destroyers rode the waves, surrounded by four of the ships from the
Abraham Lincoln
strike group. Through binoculars, far off, the Chinese captains could see the long, grey bulk of the carrier itself. Further distant, across hundreds of miles of open ocean, the carrier strike groups of the
Mao Zedong
and
Chou Enlai
and the
John F Kennedy
and
George HW Bush
were converging.
In the Situation Room, Admiral Tovey projected charts to show their positions. Running slightly slower than projected, but with calm conditions predicted for the route, the arrival of the Chinese carriers off the coast of Kenya was now estimated to coincide roughly with that of the
Kennedy
, in approximately fifty hours. The head of defense intelligence gave an update. He showed images taken from drones above the compound in Sudan to demonstrate the disposition of forces, highlighting features that appeared to be emplacements of surface to air missiles and concentrations of military vehicles. The wider world was still unaware of what was happening but military intelligence communities in a number of countries had detected the movements of the Chinese and American carriers through their own satellite surveillance. The Russians had started to move a carrier strike group that was at sea off Kamchatka southwards east of Japan. In an apparent response, the Chinese had sent one of their remaining two carrier groups north. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, as the Japanese navy was called, had mobilized two groups of destroyers and destroyer escorts. If the Russians and Chinese kept moving, the Sea of Japan was set to get uncomfortably crowded. The small but efficient Taiwanese navy was fully mobilized around Taiwan. The Japanese and Taiwanese had been told there were US maneuvers taking place in the Indian Ocean. The same message had been given to other Nato allies who had become aware of the movements of the US fleets. The British and French, with their own satellite imagery, must have realized that something more was happening.
General Hale outlined four plans for the president to consider. The going-in assumption was that, in the event of a major Chinese defeat, action by the Chinese military would likely be initiated elsewhere against the US or its allies and that action against China might be initiated by Russia or India in disputed border areas.
The first plan was for an immediate repulse by the
Lincoln
strike group as soon as the Chinese carrier groups were within range, preceded by the pre-emptive neutralization of the
Kunming
and
Changchun
. The logic was that an aggressive posture and early hits would strike a psychological victory. The second plan, a variant of the first, was for a repulse by the combined
Lincoln
and
Kennedy
strike groups once the
John F Kennedy
arrived. In the event that the Chinese forces arrived before the
Kennedy
, Pressler would hold off on action unless the Chinese admirals chose to try to take advantage of their temporary superiority in numbers and he was forced to defend. The third plan called for the US force to adopt a watchful posture with an overwhelming response if the enemy opened hostilities. The risk in this plan was the high probability of an incident setting off a confrontation at a time and disposition not of US choosing. The fourth plan, and the most aggressive, was a pre-emptive aerial attack on the Chinese strike groups while en route in the Indian Ocean, delivered by stealth B3 bombers out of Diego Garcia.
‘If we take that course of action,’ said John Oakley, who had scrutinized the plans in detail with the Joint Chiefs before the meeting, ‘we would need to issue an ultimatum and define the no go line at which we will take action. This would be in international waters. We would have to say that crossing that longitude towards a US force of lesser capability with belligerent intent would constitute a hostile act and would justify our pre-emptive action in self defense.’
‘We’d need to get legal advice on that,’ said Rose.
Hale nodded. ‘It’s clean operationally but that’s when the complications start. In our opinion, Mr President, this is the course of action most likely to lead to a widening of the conflict. We would anticipate retaliation by the Chinese against our forces anywhere they could reach them, which is principally the East Pacific area. Attacks by submarine on our navy in international waters should also be expected. We see a good chance of an escalation to a short but vicious naval war fought anywhere our forces are in contact. We should remember also that China has the capability to go nonconventional. It could strike at our satellites, with a probability we estimate of thirty to fifty per cent of taking one or more out. It could also launch a nuclear strike against us. The Chinese military know that a nonconventional attack would lead us to retaliate in massive force. We don’t think they’d be that dumb.’
‘We can’t be sure though,’ said the president. ‘That’s right, isn’t it?’
Hale didn’t reply.
There was silence.
‘In a naval war, sir,’ Hale continued, ‘Taiwan would be a likely target for Chinese aggression and they would be able to mobilize an overwhelming superiority of force in that theater. We would likely lose Taiwan.’
The president nodded.
‘Coming back to our plans, from the military perspective, focusing narrowly on this one engagement off Lamu Bay, a pre-emptive aerial attack is the most attractive in the sense that it deals with the threat to the
Abraham Lincoln
before the enemy gets anywhere near our ships. In relation to the wider picture, however, in that it’s most likely to lead to a scenario where there’s an immediate widening of the conflict, it clearly has drawbacks. Mr President, we should talk through the follow-on scenarios in more detail.’
Hale went through them. The scenarios didn’t vary greatly from one plan to the next. The differences were largely in the probabilities, with the last plan, as the general had explained, creating the greatest risk of a wider conflagration. But apart from the varying details of the local battle off Kenya, each plan involved scenarios with escalation spreading to other potential fronts of confrontation, involving the US, Taiwan, Japan and Nato allies, as well as the risk of opportunistic action by China’s regional rivals at a moment when they considered China to be vulnerable. The greater the scale of the defeat imposed on China, the more likely, it was assumed, that China would retaliate elsewhere and the more likely would be its rivals to try to exploit the opportunity. There was also the risk of internal unrest in China caused by military failure and dramatic loss of prestige to the regime. Zhang’s instinct would be to launch a severe pre-emptive crackdown. Paradoxically, if this failed to eliminate the opposition at the first sweep, it might worsen the unrest, which would provoke further repression and possibly a military takeover, which was only narrowly avoided in 2014.
The president listened silently.
‘As you can see, sir,’ said General Hale when he had covered the scenarios, ‘there are a large number of military implications here and we’re working to develop plans to deal with each of them, both in terms of pre-emption and retaliation. These will have implications for the disposition of our forces in various theaters and if I could I would like to discuss those with you this afternoon after we’ve had time to do a little more work.’
‘As far as your four options for the immediate situation are concerned, what’s your recommendation, General?’
‘Militarily, sir, I would opt to hit them early.’
‘That’s with the bombers out of Diego Garcia?’
‘No, sir. I wouldn’t use aerial power to interdict them because, as I’ve said, the risk of an escalation in that instance is extreme. We would hope we can get this done by knocking out one or two of their ships when they arrive in theater and making them think again. So we would launch early and aggressively when they come within range to take out a couple of ships in an exemplary fashion and stop them in their tracks. If we can bring it to an end by taking out just a couple of their ships, they may be less likely to widen the conflict.’
‘Admiral Tovey? Is that realistic, to expect to be able to knock out a couple of their ships in an early attack?’
‘If they arrive expecting us to watch and wait, yes. There will certainly be a psychological effect. If they arrive expecting to fight, then we’re in a fight.’
‘Psychology wins battles,’ said one of the military men in the room.
‘And if the psychological effect isn’t as powerful as we think?’
Tovey shrugged. ‘We’re in a battle, just like we would be anyway. But we have superior operational capability and should realistically expect to prevail.’
‘But not without taking some hits?’
‘No, sir. I don’t think we could guarantee that.’
‘Do we know anything about who’s commanding their strike groups?’ asked Gary Rose.
Tovey nodded. ‘We know something about the individuals. We’re trying to get better insight into the psychologies.’
‘Who’ll make the operational decisions? Will it be them or Beijing?’
‘Beijing,’ said General Hale, ‘to the extent that they can. They have a rigid control structure. If the fleet comes under immediate attack the commanders in theater will take action while involving a higher commander in Beijing who’ll be working with an operational staff. We believe that makes them vulnerable. If we go in hard and hit them, that exploits the rigidity. Any ambiguity or confusion in the orders coming back from Beijing will reduce their effectiveness.’
‘And who makes the overall decisions about their strategic objectives?’ asked the president. He had been briefed on this at some point, but he wanted to be sure he understood.
‘That would be the Central Military Commission,’ replied the head of defense intelligence. ‘It’s a combined army and party body consisting of thirteen members. In a situation like this they’ll be meeting daily. President Zhang chairs the commission. Defense Minister Xu sits on it as well. General Fan is the leading military figure. The rest just make up the numbers.’
‘To what extent does Zhang control it?’
‘We can’t be sure. In principle he does. In reality …’
‘Whatever happens,’ said Tovey, ‘we’ve got to be prepared to find ourselves in a shoot-out. I know Pete Pressler. That happens, we’ve got a good guy out there.’
‘General Hale,’ said the president, ‘you said the plan you recommended was the right choice militarily. What did you mean by that?’
‘Sir, you want to win a battle here, this is the best way to do it. Go hard and achieve an immediate impact with a robust assault by the US navy. If we adopt a watchful attitude, which is one of the alternatives, that takes the initiative away from us. Chances are some incident will start the shooting when neither side is ready and once it goes from there it’ll be a free for all, and when a free for all starts, it’s almost impossible to shut it down before a whole lot of damage is done. I don’t want to have a hundred some ships milling around in a few square miles of water, I really don’t.’ The general paused. ‘Now, that’s militarily. For political reasons you may want to take the chance on a battle not breaking out and being able to resolve this thing without a shot being fired. So there’s a non-military judgment here, sir. And if you say to me, General, I want to hold the military option back while I see if I can settle this, that’s a judgment. If I thought we couldn’t win the confrontation in those circumstances then I’d be saying, militarily, as your military advisor, that’s not an option. But we will win it. The issue is it’ll cost more American lives and more American hardware. So the question, I guess politically, is how do you weigh those lives, and that hardware, against the chance that you can talk this thing down? Which is not a question for me to answer.’
‘Admiral Tovey, do you agree with that? As a naval officer? Do you agree we’d win the battle if it broke out in earnest?’
‘Yes, sir. I do. But it would be a fearsome battle. In naval terms, it would be an era-defining battle, sir. I’m a navy man, and I have my share of interest in naval history, but I don’t look forward to having Lamu Bay in that particular record.’
There was silence.
Rose spoke. ‘Can I ask what we do about the men in Sudan?’
‘We go in and get them,’ said John Oakley.
‘Once our ships start firing,’ said Hale, ‘their lives aren’t worth anything. I’d rather go in there with as much force as we can and see if we can get any of them out.’
‘When would we launch this attack?’ asked the president.
‘We want to be in there at the same moment we open fire on their ships. That’s our best chance to get anyone out of there alive. To be honest, I don’t think it’ll be many, but it’s our best chance.’
The president nodded.
‘I’d like to brief you later today, Mr President, on the plans for dealing with the escalations we envisage. We’ll need to make some decisions on force dispositions.’
The president nodded again.
There was silence.
Tom Knowles stood up. ‘Thank you,’ he said, and walked out.
KNOWLES SAT IN the Oval Office, contemplating what he had heard.
Every one of the plans Mortlock Hale had presented to him led to more confrontation. Now the military men were working away at plans to deal with counter-plans for escalation. And this was against a nuclear-armed state.
They were military men. Ask them for a plan and they’d come back with a battle. But Knowles didn’t want to know how to fight this thing. He wanted to know how to shut it down.