Read Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland Online
Authors: Ed Moloney
…
it actually wasn’t a mortar. There was an Armalite and an
imitation mortar that we were using in lectures. Actually there’s
a photograph of me giving one of the lectures, and I think there’s
a photograph of the mortar [as well]. The mortar was so realistic-
looking that the camp authorities believed it to be real and there
was a panic and everybody was moved out and the cage was pulled
apart. But it was excellent workmanship … but it was not a real
mortar, it could never have fired
.
The divisions in the IRA’s ranks in Long Kesh deepened with time with Gerry Adams leading the assault, courtesy of the
pseudonymous ‘Brownie’ articles in the Belfast Brigade’s weekly newspaper, Republican News.
…
as I say, the only avenue we had … was through the ‘Brownie’
articles. And if you read the ‘Brownie’ articles they had hidden
messages in them which tried to explain exactly what was going on,
that the British had tried this in 1972 and the ceasefire lasted only
two weeks but this time the British were getting away with it. And I
believe that the ‘Brownie’ articles were first to highlight the Ulsterisation,
criminalisation, normalisation policies
.
The camp had practically split in two: you had the Morley camp
and you had the Adams camp. Gerry and myself were, most of the
time, in the same cubicle; at the start the huts used to be just open
but they were then converted into cubicles, two main cubicles. They
weren’t cells; there were no doors, just curtains … And myself and
Gerry would have had debates about what was going on outside the
jail; about the cell system, about the leadership, about our opposition
to the leadership. Gerry would, most nights, be writing the
‘Brownie’ articles for the paper … The ‘Brownie’ articles … weren’t
allowed to go out unless they were passed over to Morley for censoring.
And there were great arguments over that. Many a night or day
Gerry would be called to the wire by Davy Morley and there would
be arguments and disputes … between the two … There was no
physical contact, but a lot of shouting at each other … There was a
great deal of tension, a great deal of hostility. At that time Gerry
was O/C of Cage 11. Morley was under instructions from the outside
to censor anything … coming out of Cage 9 or Cage 11, especially
Gerry’s articles. And Gerry was the most prolific writer at the time.
And … by and large, he was seen as the person leading the criticism.
And by and large he was
.
Up until that point of his release he was responsible for all the
‘Brownie’ articles … all the ‘Brownie’ articles were his. Then when
he got released Hugh Feeney wrote under the ‘Salon’ byline
.
Q.
Were the ‘Brownie’ articles a collective effort or were they simply
the product of Gerry alone which he would then give out to others to assess, evaluate, etc.?
A.
No. They were totally his baby, totally Gerry’s baby. Every time
he wrote one he would show it to me to read and to go over. Often
we would have arguments … because most … times … I would
just glance through it and he would say that he wanted [proper]
feedback from me and … I really didn’t. Often I would have to read
[the article] two or three times. But the ‘Brownie’ articles were
aimed at the rank and file on the outside and to a large extent they
were coded in such a way that they would get out [past Morley].
Some of them were just … very funny articles based [about] life
within the camp … But the main aim of the Brownie articles was
…
to get the message out that … the war was going wrong and
calling on people to re-involve themselves
…
Q.
The point that I would raise is that in the book which you, yourself,
are reading at the moment, on Gerry Adams: Man of War,
Man of Peace?, by Mark Devenport and David Sharrock, Adams
is quoted as denying that he was ‘Brownie’ and he has said that
‘Brownie’ was actually a number of authors. Although Devenport
and Sharrock convincingly, compellingly refute that argument with
decent evidence. I’m just wondering what you feel about that denial
by Gerry
.
A.
That’s a lie, I mean, I know what ‘Brownie’ means. And not
many people know what ‘Brownie’ means. Do you know what it
means? [It was a code] for making love [to his wife]; that’s right,
that’s what it was. And it was purely his baby. Certainly, after Gerry
got released, the ‘Brownie’ articles went out under different bylines –
Joe Barnes was one who wrote some ‘Brownie’ articles … but
during that whole period Gerry was exclusively Brownie.
With the IRA Commanders in Long Kesh accusing the Cage 11 and Cage 9 rebels of fomenting a rebellion against the national leadership, Gerry Adams was careful not to give the Morley camp
any more ammunition, displaying the great caution that has characterised his career in, and later leadership of, the IRA. Hughes and Ivor Bell wanted openly to involve other key players such as Martin McGuinness and Brian Keenan in their developing conspiracy, but Adams wouldn’t hear of it, insisting that they communicate only through the ‘army lines’, the authorised lines of authority which meant communications to other IRA figures had to go through Morley, who would read everything.
…
you couldn’t have a line to anybody outside the [recognised]
structures. And that was a rule that we had to stick by, myself, Ivor
and Gerry. And we did stick by it because if … someone had sent
an unofficial comm. [communication] out and it was reported, then
the person would be suspended. And I believe that happened to …
Martin McAllister. Gerry was emphatic about this, that we had to
stay within the Army [IRA] line, the same cliché. And they would
have loved it if anybody had been caught. We were constantly
warned about it. There was no direct line to Twomey, no direct line
to anybody. There were communications coming in to us complaining
about what was happening on the outside, mostly [sent] to
Gerry, but he would not respond. If my memory serves me well, I
think there was contact with Brian [Keenan] and I think that was
because myself and Ivor were putting on the pressure. Gerry was
adamant that we should not go outside the army line, always. Was
he right to be cautious? Yes, because he realised that until we had
some sort of hold on the reins of power in the camp, it would have
sunk us all. We would have lost our ability to oppose them because
they would have been in a position to court-martial us and then we
would have no voice. Once you’re court-martialled and suspended –
you didn’t even have to be court-martialled – once you were
suspended you lost all your rights. So there was great caution
over that
.
I do believe there was unofficial contact with Keenan; we didn’t
collectively decide to do it but I believe it was Ivor. I remember Terry
Crossan being pulled in and interrogated [about communicating to
McGuinness]. Terry Crossan would have been trusted at that time. I
don’t believe there was any written communication. That’s what
saved the day, I believe, because … they had no proof, they [just]
had Terry Crossan’s word against Gerry’s. And I don’t think it was
enough to suspend or court-martial … it was a conversation and it
was argued that there was no conspiracy taking place. There was, I
think, an attempt to make contact on a friendly basis [with
McGuinness] not on an official basis. McGuinness was seen as
probably the one person on the outside who could make any …
difference. He was held in high esteem by our group. Certainly he
was one of the people who was always taken into consideration
regarding the replacement of the leadership on the outside. McGuinness
would have been seen as a potential ally, even a certain ally in
this whole thing. I knew McGuinness reasonably well; Gerry knew
him very well. But I don’t think there was a great relationship
between McGuinness and Ivor
.
By the end of 1976 and the beginning of 1977, the Morley era in Long Kesh was drawing to a close. Morley himself was due for release at the start of 1977 and he stood down to become Adjutant to his replacement, Jim Scullion, a close ally. Gerry Adams was due for release in February 1977, and as his release date approached, he and Brendan Hughes plotted and planned the IRA’s future, both inside the jail and outside.
…
the last thing that Gerry and I did was to walk the yard [on]
the day he was getting out … discussing what needed to happen
inside the prison and outside the prison; the whole organisation,
the whole movement on the outside needed to be reorganised. And
the last words that Gerry said to me as he walked out the gate with
his bag was that I was the lucky one staying behind; that he had a
much, much harder job than me on the outside. So at that stage,
obviously, Gerry was very confident that he was going to reorganise
on the outside and my job would be to reorganise on the inside and
that was a clear indication of intent. Gerry wasn’t going out to go to
cross the border; he was going to go straight back into the movement
and start reorganising. And that’s what … we’d been talking about
from 1975 until 1977 when Gerry was released
.
…
by that stage the movement on the outside was in disarray.
Most of the operators were in jail. The British government had
moved so heavily and closed down all the incident centres which
had become the Army’s [the IRA’s] wee base of power. And it was
quite obvious that [there was a chance] the whole struggle was going
to be called off; I think the British actually expected this … I believe
many of the leadership were quite happy to walk away because the
whole thing had been brought to such disarray and such a mess …
I believe there were people there in that leadership who would have
been quite happy to hand over the reins because none of them were
capable of taking the Army anywhere … so it was quite obvious
that a new leadership would emerge
.
…
by 1977 before Gerry got out, we knew that Sinn Fein and the
Army [the IRA] needed to run in tandem. That was the intention,
that was the strategy, that was the policy, [creating] a politically
educated rank and file, that politicisation had to take place on the
outside and politicisation had to take place on the inside and there
was going to be a massive reorganisation on the outside … there
were people on the outside doing nothing except waiting on people
like Gerry and Ivor getting out and perhaps myself as well. Except
I would have had to escape. I wasn’t getting out for a long time. But
when Gerry got released I saw myself fitting into that role, because it
was quite obvious that once Gerry got out then the leadership in the
prison was going to be changed
.
Within a week he contacted me and we had a direct line of
communication. He hadn’t moved into any sort of leadership
position but certainly it was only a matter of time. I can’t remember
exactly how long it was but elections were due within the cage and
I believe that Keenan was a main mover here, Twomey and Gerry
and Keenan. Within a short period of time we got a request to send
out nominations for the Camp O/C
.
It was actually seven or eight months before Adams moved to change the IRA regime in the prison, which Republicans still stubbornly called Long Kesh rather than the British name, the Maze. In a sign that the poacher was about to become gamekeeper, the method of choosing the Camp Commander was changed in a significant way. In the past an election would have to be held if there was more than one nomination for the job, meaning that candidates could also propagandise and make trouble among fellow prisoners; the Cage 11 rebels had used this procedure to advance and articulate their opposition to Billy McKee and his allies. But the change introduced after Adams rejoined the national leadership closed off this route to future rebels. Any prisoner could be nominated as Commander, to be sure, but from thereon the IRA leadership outside the prison would choose which of the nominees would get the job. Cage 11 and Cage 9 had been preached to about the need to democratise, to educate politically and empower the rank and file to curb an errant, arrogant leadership. But in this move could be seen a hand that relished the dictatorial powers that military leadership always brings. It was the IRA’s version of democratic centralism, the Army Council being the equivalent of the Soviet Politburo. By the end of 1977, courtesy of his friend and long-time comrade, Gerry Adams, Brendan Hughes was appointed Commander of the special-category prisoners in Long Kesh, those who had not yet been moved over to the new H-blocks and still represented the bulk of all IRA prisoners. This, as much as anything else, marked the beginning of the Adams era in the IRA.