Authors: Edwin Black
The
Journal of Heredity,
formerly the
American Breeders Magazine,
trumpeted one of the movement’s rationales for overseas screening in an article entitled “Immigration Restriction and World Eugenics.” The article declared, “Just as we isolate bacterial invasions, and starve out the bacteria by limiting the area and amount of their food supply, so we can compel an inferior race to remain in its native habitat … [which will] as with all organisms, eventually limit … its influence.”
11
Premier racial theorist Madison Grant, president of the Eugenics Research Association and vice president of the Immigration Restriction League, was a close ally and confidant of Johnson’s. Grant’s influence with Congress on immigration was a recognized asset for the eugenics movement, and was well utilized. Davenport would periodically send him materials, including confidential reports done by social workers on individual New York immigrants deemed defective, “which you may be able to use with Congress.” As far as Johnson was concerned, any immigration was too much immigration. In fact, Johnson had already introduced without success an emergency measure to suspend all immigration for two years.
12
It wasn’t long before Laughlin became the designated eugenic authority for Johnson’s committee. Laughlin began in 1920 by offering Johnson the same definition of the “socially inadequate” previously rejected by the Census Bureau, together with the same flawed data. Unlike the Census Bureau, however, Johnson readily accepted these notions. He invited Laughlin to testify before a full House committee to formally espouse his raceology and lobby for the new legislation.
13
Laughlin enthusiastically testified for two mornings, on April 16 and 17, 1920, invoking a gamut of eugenic arguments, from the history of the Jukes to the Tribe of Ishmael to the high cost of institutionalizing defective stock. At one point, when Laughlin was explaining one of his new terms for mental incompetence, a committee member interrupted and asked him how to spell it. Laughlin replied: “M-O-R-O-N. It is a Greek word meaning a foolish person.
14
To stem the supply of morons and stymie further degeneracy, Laughlin asked Johnson to allow him to enable “testing the worth of immigrants … in their home towns, because that is the only place where one can get eugenical facts …. For example, whether he comes from an industrious or shiftless family.” But just as the terms
feeblemindedness
and
blindness
were vague and fundamentally undefined, the exact nature of
shiftlessness
was also unclear. Laughlin assured Johnson that this could be remedied. “General shiftlessness could easily be made into a technical term,” he explained, “by a little definition in the law. It could be made a technical term by describing it by a 50-word paragraph…. “
15
Laughlin emphasized that the quality and character of the individual candidate for immigration were not as important as his ancestral pedigree. “If the prospective immigrant is a potential parent, that is, a sexually fertile person,” testified Laughlin, “then his or her admission should be dependent not merely upon present literacy, social qualifications and economic status, but also upon the possession in the prospective immigrant and in his family stock of such physical, mental, and moral qualities as the American people desire…. The lesson,” he emphasized, “is that … the family stock should be investigated, lest we admit more degenerate ‘blood.’”
16
Johnson, a proud champion of immigration quotas, was greatly impressed with Laughlin’s expertise and saw its usefulness in drafting any restrictive legislation. The chairman promised to invite Laughlin back as an expert to help the committee deliberate on his proposal for eugenic attaches. Laughlin’s two-day testimony and proposed law were published by the House under the title “The Biological Aspects of Immigration.”
17
When Laughlin came back to consult, an encouraged Johnson created a new title for him: “Expert Eugenics Agent.” Laughlin was now empowered to conduct wide-ranging racial and immigration studies, and to present them as reliable Congressional data. His new authority included the power to print and circulate official committee correspondence and questionnaires, and mail them
en masse
at House expense. The first of these was a survey entitled “Racial and Diagnostic Record of State Institutions.” It was printed on official House letterhead, with the committee members’ names routinely listed at the top, but now with Laughlin’s name added as “Expert Eugenics Agent.” The form asked 370 state institutions-hospitals, prisons, asylums-in the forty-eight states to report the nationalities, races and problematic natures of their residents. Perhaps intentionally, private institutions were not queried, limiting the survey and its resulting data to the most needy and troubled within immigrant groups.
18
Laughlin’s target for the survey data was the 1924 legislative session. This was when temporary immigration quotas, enacted under Johnson’s baton in 1921, were scheduled to be revised. Those restrictive quotas had calculated the percentages of the foreign born nation-by-nation, as enumerated by the 1910 census, and then limited each nation’s new annual immigration to only 3 percent of that number. This had the effect of turning America’s demographic clock back to 1910. But to eugenicists, this restrictive quota was not restrictive enough. Laughlin and his colleagues wanted to tum the clock back to 1890, before mass influxes from Eastern and Southern Europe had begun. Laughlin’s study of “Racial and Diagnostic Records of State Institutions” would statistically prove that certain racial and national types were criminalistic and amoral by genetic nature.
19
But the hundreds of state hospitals, prisons and other institutions spread across the United States all saw their residents’ ancestries through different eyes using different terminology. To guide institutions in standardizing their responses, Laughlin circulated a supplemental Congressional publication entitled “Classification Standards to be Followed in Preparing Data for the Schedule ‘Racial and Diagnostic Records of Inmates of State Institutions.’” His title, “Expert Eugenics Agent,” was printed on the cover. The booklet listed sixty-five racial classifications to be employed. Classification #15 was German Jew, #16 was Polish Jew, #17 was Russian Jew, #18 was Spanish-American (Indian), #19 was Spanish-American (White), #25 was North Italian, #26 was South Italian, #29 was Russian, #30 was Polish (Polack), #61 was Mountain White, #62 was American Yankee, #63 was American Southerner, and #64 was Middle West American. Crimes to be classified for genetic purposes included several dozen categories ranging from homicide and arson to driving reck-lessly, disorderly conduct, and conducting business under an assumed name. The data collected would all go into one mammoth Mendelian database to help set race-based immigration quotas.
20
The Carnegie Institution was no bystander to Laughlin’s operation. Laughlin regularly kept Carnegie president John Merriam briefed on the special Congressional privileges and testing regimens placed at the disposal of the eugenics movement. Merriam authorized Carnegie statistician J. Arthur Harris to validate the reliability of the data Laughlin would offer Congress. However, Laughlin’s derogatory raceological assertions were now becoming more public, and Merriam feared that his views would not be popular with America’s vocal minorities.
21
In November of 1922, Laughlin’s statistics-filled presentation to Congress was published as “Analysis of America’s Modern Melting Pot.” It contained copious racial and ethnic denigrations. Johnson declared that the entire session would be published officially with the pejorative subtitle “Analysis of the Metal and Dross in America’s Modern Melting Pot.” The dross was the human waste in American society. Laughlin’s testimony insisted, “Particularly in the field of insanity, the statistics indicate that America, during the last few years, has been a dumping ground for the mentally unstable inhabitants of other countries.”
22
During his testimony about the melting pot, Laughlin told the House, “The logical conclusion is that the differences in institutional ratios, by races and nativity groups … represents real differences in social values, which represent, in turn, real differences in the inborn values of the family stocks from which the particular inmates have sprung. These degeneracies and hereditary handicaps are inherent in the blood.” Laughlin asked for authority to conduct additional racial studies of “Japanese and Chinese … Indians … [and] Negroes.” He appended a special statistical qualification for Jews, explaining, “The Jews are not treated as a separate nation, but are accredited to their respective countries of birth.” As such, he urged a separate “study of the Jew as immigrant with special reference to numbers and assimilation. “
23
Laughlin’s constant racial and ethnic derogations were no longer confined to scholarly journals, but were now echoing in Congressional hearing rooms. Indeed, a graphic raceological immigration exhibit from a recent eugenics conference had been installed for public examination in the Immigration Committee’s hearing rooms. All these ethnic and racial revilements in turn opened Carnegie and the movement to increasingly vituperative attacks from the large immigrant groups that were becoming ever more entrenched in the country. But Laughlin was unbending. “If immigration is to be made a biological or racial asset to the American people,” he railed, “radical statutory laws must be enforced.” At one point he authored an immigration treatise under the Carnegie Institution’s credential, which concluded that America was being infested by defective immigrants; as its prime illustration, the treatise offered “The Parallel Case of the House Rat,” which traced rodent infestation from Europe to the rats’ ability “to travel in sailing ships.”
24
Incendiary or not, Laughlin’s rhetoric and eugenic data were producing results with Congress. It was exactly the scientific justification Johnson and other government figures needed to implement greater quotas and deploy the overseas network they wanted. Johnson was increasingly becoming not just a congressman favoring racial immigration quotas, but a eugenic organizational leader in his own right. In 1923, while chairing Congress’s House Immigration and Naturalization Committee, Johnson also joined an elite new private entity with a Congressional-sounding name. The new seven-man
ad hoc
panel was called the “Committee on Selective Immigration.” Chaired by Johnson’s friend, raceologist Madison Grant, and vice-chaired by immigration specialist Robert DeCourcy Ward, the body also included Laughlin as secretary and eugenic ophthalmologist Lucien Howe.
25
The Committee on Selective Immigration’s first report concluded that America needed the Nordic race to thrive. “Immigrants from northwestern Europe furnish us the best material for American citizenship and for the future upbuilding of the American race. They have higher living standards than the bulk of southeastern Europeans; are of higher grade of intelligence; better educated; more skilled; better able to understand, appreciate and support our form of government.” In contrast, the committee concluded, “Southern and eastern Europe … have been sending large numbers of peddlers, sweatshop workers, fruit-stand keepers [and] bootblacks…. “
26
Citing the research on “inferiors” produced by Laughlin and other experts, the eugenic committee assured, “Had mental tests been in operation [years ago] … over 6 million aliens now living in this country, free to vote, and to become the fathers and mothers of future Americans, would have never been admitted.” Relying on Laughlin and other commonly accepted eugenic principles, the
ad hoc
committee advocated passage of Laughlin’s overseas surveillance laws and declared that racial quotas “based on the 1890 census [are] sound American policy…. “
27
Because Johnson functioned as both a member of the elite eugenic panel and as chairman of the House Immigration Committee, eugenic immigration quotas based on 1890 demographics now seemed assured.
Suddenly, in June of 1923, Johnson was thrust into new importance within the eugenics movement. On June 16, he was elected president of the Eugenics Research Association. Prior to this he hadn’t even been a member of the organization. Nonetheless, this now positioned Johnson, with all his governmental powers, at the narrow pinnacle of eugenic organizational leadership. At the same time, Secretary of Labor James J. Davis, whose department was responsible for the domestic aspects of immigration, had signaled his willingness to cooperate in creating the overseas eugenic network to investigate immigrant families. The battle for negative eugenics-prevention-could now be waged at its source.
28
No wonder that four days later, on June 20, Merriam anxiously telephoned Davenport. Secretary Davis had just sent a letter to President Warren Harding supporting the eugenic immigration legislation, and Davis was eager to secure any scientific underpinnings to justify it. Davis was due to sail to Europe on July 4, and now he contacted Merriam to ask if Laughlin might accompany him. Merriam answered that the Carnegie Institution would of course cooperate. That was the exciting part of Merriam’s telephone conversation with Davenport. But then Merriam expressed his concerns about Laughlin.
29
Laughlin was unpracticed in politics and was now expostulating scientific conclusions that were provoking reproach. Merriam told Davenport that the Carnegie Institution was quite aware of Laughlin’s shortcomings and wanted to ensure that nothing stood in the way of a quiet success for “the plan” and its incorporation into the expected 1924 immigration refonns. Laughlin did not merely verbalize extremist views; many saw him as a eugenic zealot who would do anything to accomplish his goals. Yet in this situation, some political caution was necessary. “It is understood,” Merriam repeated to Davenport moments later, “that the desire to have Dr. Laughlin associated with the Secretary is not for the purpose of changing our plans but is rather due to the fact that the Secretary recognizes that our work … can be useful to him…. It is not expected that there will be any modification of our plan, but rather that the Secretary will help to carry out the plans which you and Dr. Laughlin have worked out.”
30