War Stories II (60 page)
Authors: Oliver L. North
The battle against Kurita's Center Force lasted more than two hours. During that time the aircraft from all three Taffy units arrived on the scene to help out. Some of them had already spent their munitions on land-based targets, but although they had no bombs or ammunition for their guns, they still dove and swooped menacingly at the Japanese ships. It was an effective feint that caused the ships to swerve and retreat in evasive maneuvers.
Some of the planes still had armaments and were able to inflict mayhem on the enemy ships, bombing and strafing them with great success. The Taffy units' planes sank three Japanese heavy cruisers and damaged a number of other ships.
By the time the two-hour battle was over at 0945, the
Hoel
and
Johnston
and the destroyer escort
Samuel B. Roberts
had been sunk by gunfire from the Japanese ships. And though at least one torpedo struck one of the
Japanese ships, the Japanese finally succeeded in hitting the American carrier escort
Gambier Bay
. Hammered by enemy gunfire, the little carrier became dead in the water, and finally sank at 0907. And then, just minutes later, the little carrier escort
St
.
Lo
was struck four times in the first organized kamikaze attack of the war.
Hoel
and
Johnston
and the destroyer escort
Samuel B. Roberts
had been sunk by gunfire from the Japanese ships. And though at least one torpedo struck one of the
Japanese ships, the Japanese finally succeeded in hitting the American carrier escort
Gambier Bay
. Hammered by enemy gunfire, the little carrier became dead in the water, and finally sank at 0907. And then, just minutes later, the little carrier escort
St
.
Lo
was struck four times in the first organized kamikaze attack of the war.
At 0925 one of the sailors aboard Sprague's flagship yelled, “They're getting away!” Unexpectedly, Kurita ordered his ships to break off action against the Americans and retire to the north. The destroyer escort torpedo attacks on the
Yamamoto
had effectively slowed Kurita's flagship, and it trailed sluggishly behind the other ships. Finally, it was so far back that Kurita couldn't plan a strategy. He was still confused, thinking that the little Taffy units were Halsey's Task Force 38.
Yamamoto
had effectively slowed Kurita's flagship, and it trailed sluggishly behind the other ships. Finally, it was so far back that Kurita couldn't plan a strategy. He was still confused, thinking that the little Taffy units were Halsey's Task Force 38.
Admiral Sprague was incredulous. Kurita's cruisers and destroyersâpoised to destroy the American shipsâturned and headed back out to the open ocean.
The sinking of the
Gambier Bay
carrier escort affected Lieutenant Dick Roby, a twenty-four-year-old pilot of Taffy 3. He'd flown cover for the 20 October landings at Leyte and had taken part in the Battle of Surigao Strait and other action of that week. He was assigned to a different mission when his Taffy unit came under attack.
Gambier Bay
carrier escort affected Lieutenant Dick Roby, a twenty-four-year-old pilot of Taffy 3. He'd flown cover for the 20 October landings at Leyte and had taken part in the Battle of Surigao Strait and other action of that week. He was assigned to a different mission when his Taffy unit came under attack.
LIEUTENANT RICHARD ROBY, USN
Battle of Leyte
25 October 1944
Battle of Leyte
25 October 1944
My plane was a Grumman FM2 built by General Motors, the successor to the original F4F. It had a single-row, nine-cylinder, 1,350 horsepower engine.
We'd provide combat air patrol either over the ships or over the island, and we'd also escort the bombers on bombing missions.
On 21, 22, and 23 October I led eight planes to predawn combat air patrol over the Tacloban airstrip on Leyte Island. On 24 October, I had been
relieved at about 7:20 in the morning and started back to the ships. All of a sudden they said, “Hold up, we've got Japanese bombers coming in!”
relieved at about 7:20 in the morning and started back to the ships. All of a sudden they said, “Hold up, we've got Japanese bombers coming in!”
When they radioed me that these planes were coming in, I was about probably 10,000 or 11,000 feet, and they were a little below me, so it was easy to pick up speed and go down and make a run.
I made what they call a semi-high side run and I shot the right wing off the first one. Then I pulled up and shot another one. I went after the third one and chased him from about 6,000 feet down to sea level. I got two plus a probable that day.
On the morning of 25 October they woke me up about one o'clock in the morning and we started loading five torpedoes.
We were going to go chase the survivors of the Battle of Surigao Strait, which was fought the night before south of Leyte. So they expected us to go down there and bomb the second group. The battleships and cruisers had started after them, too. But then they cancelled us.
Approximately ten minutes to seven the word came out that the Japanese fleet was twenty-five miles away. So Sykes, Dugan, a fellow named Rocky Phillips, and I got off. We were vectored northwest to take on two destroyers that were approximately twenty-five miles from the task force. We were over a thin overcast at about 2,000 feet, and they didn't have any radar fire control and didn't see us coming. And interestingly enough, you can sink a destroyer with .50-caliber machine guns, because every round we had was an armor-piercing round. In every three rounds, one was armor-piercing, one an armor-piercing tracer, and one an armor-piercing incendiary.
When the four of us went down in our first run, they didn't start to shoot at us until we were recovering because they couldn't see us coming. All four of us made two runs.
But when I came back up on top, I was above this 2,000-foot layer of clouds, and I couldn't find anybody. Not a soul. I knew where the Japanese fleet was supposed to be so, I headed in that general direction.
I ran into Fowler, the skipper of VC-5. He had about five torpedo bombers and a whole bunch of fighters. He was going to fly right by them;
he didn't see them. I finally got his attention and indicated, “They're over that way.”
he didn't see them. I finally got his attention and indicated, “They're over that way.”
He then turned and we went over. I probably had 1,000 rounds of ammunition left, maybe 1,200, in my four guns. I made a lot of runs after I didn't have any more ammunition, because if I'd see one of our torpedo bombers, and he had his bomb bay doors open, I'd fly in front of him to give him coverâdrawing fire to me rather than to him.
On a combat ship, you know the destroyer is armed, but they've got basically no armor. So, our fifties go right through them. But, on the cruisers and battleships, you're talking armor. They've also got a lot of guns on the flight decks. So you aim for those. By the time that day was over we had sunk three cruisers.
USS NEW JERSEYBATTLE OF CAPE ENGAÃO
25 OCTOBER 1944
0845 HOURS LOCAL
25 OCTOBER 1944
0845 HOURS LOCAL
Halsey's race to the north wasn't a total waste. Though he had taken the bait and left his station to chase after Ozawa's flattops, he did manage to catch the Northern Force early in the morning of 25 October. At 0540, his dawn patrol found the Japanese carriers and their escorts about 200 miles east of Cape Engaño, on the northern coast of Luzon.
The first American aircraft appeared over Ozawa's fleet shortly after 0710. The Japanese admiral had no intention of trying to wage a serious battle against waves of American dive- and torpedo-bombers. But, in hopes of delaying Halsey as long as possible, he sent up his last twenty-nine fighters. In a matter of minutes they were all downed.
While the futile aerial battle was being waged, Ozawa, unaware that Kurita's badly battered First Attack Force had retired, desperately tried to summon help. There was no help available. The land-based Japanese air armada on Luzon had been all but destroyed in four full days of aerial combat with the U.S. Navy pilots.
At 0820, just as Halsey's pilots were lining up to make their first dive-bomb and torpedo runs on Ozawa's now undefended carriers, he received a message from Kinkaid informing that Kurita was at that moment engaging the Taffy carrier escorts. The crusty admiral was stunned. But before he could act, his pilots were engaging Ozawa's carriers.
They first clobbered the Japanese aircraft carrier
Chitose
with bombs and torpedoes and then went after the destroyer
Akatsuki
, which exploded and sank. Next, they hit two more carriers, the
Zuiho
and the
Zuikaku
âOzawa's flagship. Then, at about 0900, shortly after
Zuiho
was struck by an American torpedo, damaging her rudder, Halsey received another urgent message from Kinkaid: “OUR CVES BEING ATTACKED BY 4 BBS PLUS 8 CRUISERS AND OTHERS STOP REQUEST LEE COVER LEYTE AT TOP SPEED STOP REQUEST FAST CARRIERS MAKE IMMEDIATE STRIKE.”
Chitose
with bombs and torpedoes and then went after the destroyer
Akatsuki
, which exploded and sank. Next, they hit two more carriers, the
Zuiho
and the
Zuikaku
âOzawa's flagship. Then, at about 0900, shortly after
Zuiho
was struck by an American torpedo, damaging her rudder, Halsey received another urgent message from Kinkaid: “OUR CVES BEING ATTACKED BY 4 BBS PLUS 8 CRUISERS AND OTHERS STOP REQUEST LEE COVER LEYTE AT TOP SPEED STOP REQUEST FAST CARRIERS MAKE IMMEDIATE STRIKE.”
Halsey, preoccupied with the battle against Ozawa, replied to Kinkaid's plea for help with a position report for TF 38 reasoning that Kinkaid, once he knew their location, would know that it was impossible to come to Sprague's aid in time.
Kinkaid replied with a message he didn't even bother to put into code. In plain English, he asked, “WHERE IS LEE? SEND LEE.” But Admiral Lee was with Halsey, doing battle with the Japanese Northern Force.
By now Halsey's second wave of American attack aircraft were attacking the carrier
Chiyoda
. It was dispatched later in the day by the guns of closing American ships. The Japanese cruiser
Tama
was also struck and later sank.
Chiyoda
. It was dispatched later in the day by the guns of closing American ships. The Japanese cruiser
Tama
was also struck and later sank.
About 1000, there was a lull in the one-sided battle and Ozawa decided to move his flag to the
Oyodo
, a light cruiser. He knew that staying with
Zuikaku
was dangerous as well as pointless. His flagship aircraft carrier was already a main target of the persistent 3rd Fleet aircraft. His intuition was correct: Moments after he moved over to the
Oyodo
, two more carriers were sunkâthe
Zuiho
and
Zuikaku
.
Oyodo
, a light cruiser. He knew that staying with
Zuikaku
was dangerous as well as pointless. His flagship aircraft carrier was already a main target of the persistent 3rd Fleet aircraft. His intuition was correct: Moments after he moved over to the
Oyodo
, two more carriers were sunkâthe
Zuiho
and
Zuikaku
.
But the aircraft of the 3rd Fleet couldn't do it all. Some of the remaining Japanese ships were heavily armored, and American bombs seemed to bounce off their decks. Two Japanese battleshipsâthe
Ise
and
Hyugaâ
became the targets of the U.S. Navy's big guns.
Ise
and
Hyugaâ
became the targets of the U.S. Navy's big guns.
In the heat of battle, Halsey continued to ignore Kinkaid's requests for help, not viewing it as his responsibilityâhe'd already advised the 7th Fleet that he was exercising his prerogative of going after the Northern Force.
At 1000 hours, Halsey received a message from Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii, who had been monitoring the two different battles taking place around the Philippine Islands. Anxious to know the answer to Kinkaid's question regarding the whereabouts of Lee's Task Force 34, he sent a dispatch to Halsey: “WHERE IS REPEAT WHERE IS TASK FORCE 34 RR THE WORLD WONDERS.”
The message delivered to Halsey contained the usual “nonsense” padding at the front and back of the actual message. These short, frivolous phrases were intended to confuse enemy code specialists. The radio operator aboard the
New Jersey
removed the one at the front of the message, but left in the phrase following the double consonants, which indicated where the padding started. So, the message delivered to Halsey contained the added words of padding: “THE WORLD WONDERS.”
New Jersey
removed the one at the front of the message, but left in the phrase following the double consonants, which indicated where the padding started. So, the message delivered to Halsey contained the added words of padding: “THE WORLD WONDERS.”
Halsey interpreted it as a harsh rebukeâwith the “REPEAT” intended for great emphasis and “THE WORLD WONDERS” intended as sarcasm. He was infuriated. To comply with Kinkaid's request for help meant that he'd have to break off his attack on Ozawa and let him get away rather than finishing him off right there.
But Halsey also sensed that Nimitz was alarmed about the fate of Kinkaid's Fleet and was convinced that the 3rd Fleet battleships ought to be in action off Samar with Sprague. So just before 1100, Halsey ordered Admiral Lee's Task Force 34 and Rear Admiral Bogan's carrier group to withdraw from the attack on Ozawa's force and race south to provide support for Sprague.
Four hours into the battle, Halsey's Task Force 38 turned away. The only capital ships Ozawa had left were the six battleships that Halsey wanted to destroy. But now, to the Japanese admiral's surprise, the attackers were turning around and retiring.
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