Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814 (32 page)

Whilst these actions were taking place, the engineering services raced to stabilise the crossings across the river. Beresford reported to Wellington on 11 November that the pontoon bridge had not been completed the previous night and was still liable to be swamped by the rising river. Consequently, the bridge of boats that had also been thrown across the river could not be moved downstream to the preferred position at Villefranque. This work was under the command of Captain Henderson who had been in the area for a number of weeks and consequently knew it well. Henderson had recovered his reputation with Wellington after being removed from the repairs at Badajoz in late 1812, partly through his conspicuous gallantry at the siege of San Sebastian. The following day, Beresford was more confident but reported the bridges were still not exactly where he wanted them due to a lack of materials and anchors (to hold the pontoons in place against the fast-flowing rivers). He expected to improve them in the following days. Wellington was keen to get the main bridge at Ustaritz repaired as soon as possible so that these pontoons could be removed and placed in reserve for any new opportunity. Burgoyne recorded on 12 December that three bridges were in place at Herraritz, Ustaritz and Cambo. Anton, who served with the 42nd Foot, noted that ‘our artificers lost no time in making the necessary repairs [to the wooden bridge] for the passage of troops and stores’.
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Frazer also noted that ‘troops were filing over’ the bridge at Cambo ‘which had been hastily and inexpertly repaired’.
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As before, once the situation stabilised, the Allied troops dug in. Cole was ordered to dam some tributaries on the Nive and construct breastworks and redoubts to strengthen his front, the main works to be at Garat’s House.
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The QMG also noted when issuing the orders that Cole would have to do his best as his company of RSM had been removed to work on the bridges. Other engineer officers continued to serve on the general’s staff, Lieutenant Peter Wright noting that ‘he had been drawing all day for Sir Rowland [Hill]’.
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Following these engagements, the army went into cantonments through the worst of the winter, but the work of the engineers continued. Elphinstone was engaged in fortifying the area around the mouth of the Bidassoa as the river was to be used to supply the army and more importantly to deny it to the French. Keeping the various bridges in place was a constant challenge due to the bad weather and the torrents coming down the rivers, Frazer noting on 23 December that all the bridges across the Nive had been washed away but would soon be restored. Captain Wells RE had also been dispatched to Santona to assist the Spanish forces that were blockading the port.

Writing to his brother, Lieutenant Harry Jones gave some idea of the internal politics of the Corps under its new commander:

Oh what a difference in the spirit of our undertaking compared with the time of your Sir R. Fletcher. At the present while my division is busy strengthening its front by field works, he [Fletcher] would have been constantly moving about and giving every assistance required; whereas I suppose Col. Elphinstone does not go around the line once in a fortnight and when he does he is so much in a hurry and is so near sighted that he retains very little more than when he left his house. Ellicombe, upon the strength of Lord Wellington’s answer to Sir R. Fletcher when he recommended him for Brigade Major; still keeps the situation, very much to the annoyance of E————e who wishes to have Boteler and is always complaining of it. Ellicombe told him; unless he ordered him to give up the situation he should not do it.
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Elphinstone himself had little good to say about anyone. He had waited anxiously to see if he would be mentioned in dispatches for the crossing of the Nive and was disappointed when he was not:

I am not seriously disappointed at not being mentioned, but he mentions the bridges and the attack on the Chateau D’Arcangues – therefore according to the old proverb he might have praised the bridge that carried him over … I send home by this pacquet a very fine military sketch of the position, to General Mann, but [I am] afraid it will be putting pearls before swine.

Having had a bit more time to think about it, he wrote home again:

I am not aware upon what occasion Lord Wellington can have said anything in my favour, but I assure you that he is so uncertain and violent with everybody that you are not certain for five minutes of retaining his good opinion. The only person I know of to compare him to in character is Dfezzan Pasha who had always his ante-room filled with people without noses or ears whom he called his marked men. I firmly believe that he sighs for the same power – a peace is necessary if it is only to put an end to his over grown power and dissolve this army, which is a complete mass of corruption.
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Probably his most unpleasant comment was to his wife in January 1814, when he wrote: ‘Don’t you set fire to yourself as poor Dickson’s wife has done – though I don’t know that he would have been very sorry if it had not been put out. It is not being very charitable you will say.’ The only good point about this uncharitable comment is that for the first time he spells Dickson’s name correctly. Dickson’s wife had been involved in an accident in December 1813 and Dickson was receiving updates from the Royal Artillery headquarters on her condition and the care of his children.
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In the days leading up to the crossing of the Adour, Elphinstone described his relationship with Wellington and his position in the army:

I assure you I now fair sumptuously every day, and as it happens at present that I am obliged to see a great many people having even Naval officers under my orders; my splendour has its effect. I have had two or three most extraordinary rows with the Peer [i.e. Wellington], but I believe I have come off the victor. The first arose from his being obliged to dismount his artillery to furnish horses for the pontoon train. He was perfectly furious and like a mad man; however I gave up no one point to him, and he personally asked me to dine with him the next day. The next day following he sent for me and took all the platforms we had, to make a bridge across the Adour by the Staff Corps. However, two days after, I received a letter from General Murray to desire I would make the bridge and that the Staff Corps were to be under my orders. Now that he finds he cannot get the better of me by argument he makes me report to him twice a day the progress of the work. It is really quite ridiculous to see us together; he tries all he can to get me to make him promises as to time and I as resolutely refuse it. I told him plainly yesterday [12 February 1813] I would not deceive him, and that I had no one ground upon which I could say when our preparations would be ready. You may depend upon it I am doing right.

Whether he was right or wrong, his behaviour would not have been appreciated by Wellington. Bridges and pontoons would remain a source of tension until the end of the war.

The Bridging of the Adour

The campaign of 1814 began in February with Wellington pushing east and forcing the French defenders back from the rivers Bidouse and Saisson to the Gave D’Oloron. He left Elphinstone and Burgoyne at Bayonne to organise the blockade and siege, taking Lieutenant Colonel Goldfinch with him. Having firmly attracted Soult’s attention to his left, Hope now started the crossing of the mouth of the Adour on Soult’s right on 23 February. The plan was to put a pontoon bridge in place as a temporary measure, whilst much larger coastal vessels were moved into place to form a more substantial bridge.

However, on the morning of the 23rd it was discovered that it was impossible to move the heavy pontoon carriages over the sand on the banks of the Adour. Larpent recalled that ‘Elphinstone had been quite in despair; the pontoon car sunk so much in the sand, that at last thirty horses would not move them, and for the last five hundred yards they were conveyed on the shoulders of Guardsmen, twenty-six men to a pontoon.’
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Even more worryingly, the Navy reported that they could not get their vessels up the river due to the turbulent water over the bar at its mouth. A small number of troops were ferried across in boats, which, due to the speed and ferocity of the current, was slow and very dangerous, Hope writing to Wellington recognised the risk he was taking in leaving his troops open to a counter-attack but thought ‘as the object is desirable, I have determined to persevere’.
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Fortunately for Hope, there was no serious attempt by the French to resist the crossing. Even the following day it was found that the ferries could only be used when the tidal flow was at its lowest, but by the end of the day the bridgehead was large enough to defend itself. Writing that evening, Admiral Penrose reported that attempts earlier that day to cross the sandbar had failed. However, understanding the urgency, he pushed for attempts to continue and by the evening most of the boats were across but not without the loss of several of them.
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To keep the French off, both troops and gunboats, four Allied gunboats had managed to get across the sandbar and Wellington’s 18-pounder battery was also in place at the bridgehead. By 25 February, Hope had 5,000 troops across and moved off towards the suburbs of Bayonne to keep the French away. He reported to Wellington that ‘every preparation is making for laying down the bridge, and boom, and the former it is hoped will be ready by tomorrow night. It is impossible for me to express adequately my sense of the exertions of the officers of the navy on this occasion.’
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Amazingly, this large construction was complete and passing troops on the morning of the 27th. The crossing of the Adour was a major engineering challenge.

It was also a rare example of good inter-service co-operation, involving Army, Engineer, Staff Corps, Navy and civilian personnel. Wellington had written to Admiral Penrose, the commander of the Royal Navy squadron off the mouth of the Adour on 7 February, informing him of his plan and asking for his support to collect the necessary boats which he described as being ‘from 15 to 30 tons, two masted … to be anchored by head and stern … I propose to lay cables across these vessels from bank to bank’.
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Wellington asked for forty boats to be collected. The letter was hand delivered by Captain Todd RSC ‘who will explain to you the want of a few blocks’. By blocks, Wellington meant pulleys and capstans to tighten up the cables. The boom mentioned above was to protect the bridge from anything that the French might send down the river to try and cause damage. Each boat used in the bridge had modifications made to allow the passing of the five cables across the decks. On one bank of the Adour, the cables were fastened by affixing them to several large siege cannon, while on the other bank, the cables were tensioned using a pulley system. There is little doubt that the bridge design came from Henry Sturgeon of the RSC, there being similarities with his innovative designs used to repair the bridges at Alcantara and Almaraz in 1812. There is also no doubt that Captain Todd RSC was present in the background through the planning and construction.

The bridge over the Adour, by Batty
.

Several engineer officers were engaged in placing the boat bridge. Captain Slade and Lieutenants Savage, West, Robe and Rivers commanded each division of boats. Lieutenant Reid secured the ropes on one bank and Lieutenant Melhuish secured and tightened them on the other. Admiral Penrose recognised their contribution:

That so many Chasse-Marées ventured the experiment [passing the sandbar] I attribute to there being one of more Sappers being placed in each of them, and a Captain and eight Lieutenants of engineers commanding them in divisions. The zeal and science of these officers triumphed over the difficulties of the navigation.
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General Graham, reporting the successful bridging operation, wrote: ‘I am bound to mention to your lordship Lieutenant-Colonel Elphinstone for the arrangements he made, and Lieutenant-Colonels Burgoyne and Sturgeon, and the officers employed under them, for the zeal with which they executed his orders.’ Burgoyne also made special mention in his reports of the efforts of Lieutenant Tapp and a company of Portuguese pontooneers who had been with the pontoon train for many months. The bridge of boats remained in place until the end of the war. Jones noting that ‘it was never broken or injured by the action of the water. It however met with several accidents from vessels but which by the activity of Major Todd, who was left in charge of the infrastructure, were instantaneously remedied.’
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Holding both sides of the river Adour now allowed a complete blockade of Bayonne and this allowed Elphinstone’s engineers to start preparations for the siege. On 25 February Wellington had ordered a survey to be made of the Citadel at Bayonne ‘with a view to an attack upon it’. He also asked for two redoubts to be constructed immediately to cover the exit from the entrenched works around the city. Elphinstone’s initial report did not satisfy Wellington, who wrote ‘it does not give much information, It is desirable to know what quantity of ordnance he will require, and of what description, and to have a general plan according to which he proposed that this place should be attacked.’
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An updated report was sent to him on 4 March.
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We will come back to Bayonne shortly.

Wellington now ordered Marshal Beresford to push north towards Bordeaux, having received a deputation saying the town was willing to surrender. Beresford arrived on 12 March and the town declared for the French King. Unfortunately, the Allies could not access the port or the river Garonne as troops loyal to Napoleon continued to hold the forts at the mouth of the river. On 24 February, Wellington continued his push east across the Gave d’Oloron. Whilst frontal attacks by Beresford and Picton kept the French busy, Hill constructed a pontoon bridge at Viellanave and once again outflanked the French, who retired towards Orthez. Another promising engineer officer, Captain Thomas Pitts, was killed the day before whilst reconnoitring the place to build the pontoon bridge.
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On the 25th, Wellington asked for boats to be sent up the river Adour to make a bridge at Port de Lanne, mid-way between Bayonne and Orthez, to improve his communications as he moved east. The next day he also asked for the twelve pontoons with Hope to be moved to the same place ‘as now that your bridge is laid … you have probably no further use for them’. The pontoon train was again in action a few days later, placing a bridge across the Gave de Pau at Berenx, north-west of Orthez. Other pontoons were with Hill in case they were needed.

Another close-fought battle on 27 February at Orthez saw Soult pushed back, but only after inflicting serious losses on Wellington. The engineers suffered another loss to their numbers when Captain Edward Parker was killed whilst acting as an extra ADC to General Picton during the battle. Picton recorded that he was ‘killed by a cannon shot within a few yards of me’.
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Both sides now halted to regroup, with the French holding the line of the Adour at St Sever for several days. It was raining heavily in the first few days of March and Soult had destroyed all the bridges. Wellington told Bathurst that ‘that the river is so rapid that the pontoons cannot be laid across it’.
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Several days later he says the rise in the rivers had made repair of the bridges nearly impossible and as the various columns of his army could not communicate easily, he remained where he was.

The weather having improved, on 18 March Wellington moved east again and came into contact with the French at Tarbes, who fought a rearguard action to allow the bulk of their forces to retreat, and then headed towards the great French city of Toulouse. Wellington followed slowly, reporting on 26 March that he was two leagues from the city. He was still concerned about the state of the rivers, remarking that ‘the Garonne is too full and large for our bridge’.
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On 27 March, an attempt was made to cross the Garonne near Portet, which failed immediately as the pontoons available were not long enough to cross the rain-swollen river. This event does not appear in Wellington’s dispatches and is the more remarkable as it was only the previous day that he had told Hope that his pontoon train was not large enough. However, there were witnesses, Larpent writing that ‘the 2nd Division that had left this village at ten, was just returning … owing to the bridge of boats having been too short last night … with five more pontoons the whole world would have been affected.’
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Larpent went on to say that the bridge was half-constructed when it was discovered the river was twenty yards wider than thought. He did note that the width should have been checked before the operation started but thought that maybe there was no ‘close observation for fear of exciting [the] suspicion’ of the French. Napier commented that ‘he never saw him [Wellington] in such a rage, and no wonder’. Larpent finished his story saying that ‘it would be a triumph to Elphinstone, though I am sure he will not feel it much … for once [he has] suffered for not attending to the counsel of his more steady and regularly-bred scientific advisors’. Elphinstone had told Wellington he was not taking enough pontoons but was overruled. The story has a ring of truth about it as Elphinstone and Larpent had become friends at headquarters and dined together often. It is also hinted at by Frazer who commented on 30 March that ‘a want of boats in sufficient number to form a bridge has prevented us getting over sooner’.
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Lieutenant Peter Wright RE, who was present that night, sent a detailed description to Burgoyne:

[Captain] English’s pontoons marched from this place, yesterday, around 8 o’clock pm and arrived at Portet at 10 o’clock pm. It was fortunately a fine night and I was in hopes everything would have gone on well. The following arrangements were made. I was to pass with about 400 men and occupy some houses on the opposite side and cover the crossing … English was to have gone on making the bridge in the meantime. The whole of this plan was very shortly knocked on the head. English first sent his jolly boat with the sheer line, whether from mismanagement or from the rapidity of the current the boat went down the river and was about an hour before it could be brought up again; they then tried the thing over again and with the same success. It was then though wise to go higher up the river and at last they fastened it to the other bank. Unfortunately, the rope instead of swimming[?] down the river stuck so fast at the bottom, that it was a full hour before they could get it loose and then it immediately stuck
again
in the same kind of way. When it first got fast at the bottom, I tried to persuade English to place two or three pontoons under it, some distance apart in order that the rope might be floated; however, they were afraid the pontoons might be lost in so rapid a current; at last after sticking at it for two or three hours more they tried this plan and succeeded in stretching the sheer line across, after
five hours
hard labour. My people were stopt [
sic
] until they had ascertained the width of the river. That could not be done until our sheer line was across; at length when they were preparing to measure it, three of four shots from the opposite bank were fired at the boat and obliged them to return; we then sent two boat loads to cover the operation and we could not discover anything on the other side and after having ascertained that the river was 159 yards wide and that we only had 133 yards of bridge the thing was given up and everything taken up. The people who fired at us were two of their cavalry videttes, I think, and who rode away without cutting the sheer line when there was nothing to prevent them. Thus ended this [bungling?] affair; besides a little mismanagement, the darkness of the night and unexpected difficulties greatly contributed to make it so. It is not yet known how we are to cross; Lord W. was not very much displeased but has ordered us to make rafts sufficient to complete the bridge.
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Another pontoon bridge was laid on 1 April at Cintegabelle over the river Arriège and Hill explored north towards Toulouse. Finding the roads impassable, Hill retired and the bridge was withdrawn. Wright again takes up the story:

On 31 March, Lord Wellington determined to make a second attempt to cross the Garonne … English commenced his bridge immediately after dark, but from the rapidity of the current, the clumsiness of the workmen … the bridge was not completed until daylight. Sir Rowland Hill’s corps immediately crossed and … found the roads so excessively bad from the late rains that Lord Wellington was obliged to order the corps back again.
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A few days later, Wellington commented, rather tamely, that ‘all endeavours to lay the bridge below the town have been frustrated’. Lieutenant Colonel Goldfinch, writing to Elphinstone on 2 April 1814, reported:

Below Toulouse, the Garonne is so much wider, that the 18 pontoons English has brought with him cannot reach across with all the assistance we can muster … I believe that Lord Wellington is now decided not to make any further attempts above the town. Wright is making a reconnaissance of the river below, but has not yet returned.
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In the letter, Goldfinch also expressed concern that Dickson had appointed an artillery officer to look after the artillery horses that were with the pontoon train, this artillery officer, Captain Green, being senior to Captain English who commanded the pontoon train. Goldfinch, believed the move was deliberate to bring the pontoon train under the command of the artillery. We will come back to this.

Wright continues the story:

[Lord Wellington] desired me to reconnoitre the Garonne in the neighbourhood of Grenade and Verdun, fortunately the ground was very favourable about ½ a league from Grenade on the road to Toulouse; Lord Wellington was much pleased with the spot and determined to force the passage there; I proposed to him to do it in daylight under cover of forty or fifty pieces of artillery, because the enemy would be just the same time collecting his people to oppose us and we should be able to complete the bridge in two or three hours less time. As it was impossible to throw over the bridge undiscovered and the ground being so extremely favourable for our artillery, Lord W determined to commence at daylight although he had a long battle with Marshal Beresford who was much against it.
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How much Lieutenant Wright had to do with the final decision we do not know, but the plan adopted appears to match what he wrote. Wright drew a sketch of the crossing-point a few days later and it that shows the artillery on the hill overlooking the river. On 3 April, Wellington issued orders for the pontoon bridge to be constructed the following morning. Wright was in charge of laying the bridge, with Lieutenant Colonel Goldfinch RE in overall command of the operations. The bridge was laid where Wright had suggested, north of the city. During the day, about 19,000 of Beresford’s troops were transferred across, but a sharp rise in the level of the river threatened to wash the bridge away and the planks were taken up that night. The following morning, there being concern that items being washed down the river due to the floods could damage the bridge, the pontoons were taken out of the river, cutting the advance guard off completely. Orders were issued for the stranded detachment to post strong pickets, to hold all the high ground in the vicinity and to stop locals approaching Toulouse to try and ensure the French did not find out about the problem.
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It was three frustrating and worrying days before the bridge was back in place. Wright now completes the story:

On the 4th at daylight we began and completed the bridge in something less than four hours, the river was 125 yards wide, the stream rapid, and the approach to it with our pontoons difficult. The enemy did not attempt to interrupt us and not a shot was fired on either side; the 4th, 6th and 3rd Divisions immediately passed over with their artillery and some cavalry; General Freyre’s [
sic
] Spaniards and the Light Division were obliged to halt, the bridge becoming impassable from the swelling of the river and the rapidity of the current; English thought it best to take up everything except the pontoons, which were secured by their lines. The bad weather now appeared to have set in; and on the 5th, the river still continuing to swell, English took away four or five pontoons from the centre, the sheer lines immediately fell in the water and one pontoon was sunk by the weight of the sheer line. Lord W who was on the spot ordered the whole to be taken up; thus Marshal Beresford with three divisions was without any communication with the rest of the army for three days. Everyone was surprised Soult did not attack him. Even Lord W expressed his surprise, but he put a very good face on it, said we must have patience and did not appear to be at all alarmed about it. On the 8th, in the morning the bridge was re-established and Freyre’s Spaniards passed over. Lord W then ordered the bridge to be placed higher up the river near Aussonne to render the communication shorter with Sir Rowland Hill. He expected to have it ready by 9 o’clock in the morning of the 9th, to pass over the light division and to attack the enemy in this position. English was the whole night taking up his bridge and did not reach the spot approved until half past nine. Lord W was in a most violent rage, told English that he had [failed?] his duty, and put him and the whole train under the orders of Captain Green of the artillery, who had previously been placed there to take charge of the artillery horses. English unfortunately had left the jolly boat and sheer line until last, and they unfortunately lost their road and did not arrive until 12 o’clock; the bridge in consequence was not completed until three. The movement of the army was thus stopped until the day following.
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