A History of Korea (86 page)

The traditional social system was largely preserved throughout South Korea until the early 1970s, but it was increasingly threatened by tha nation’s modernization and urbanization. Modern ideas spread from cities to the rural communities, mainly through continuing close family and clan contacts, shaking up
the traditional value system. Many city dwellers regularly visited their ancestral villages for family reunions or to perform sacrificial rites, particularly on the Lunar New Year and
Ch’us
ŏ
k,
or Harvest Moon Day, on 15 August (by the lunar calendar). Although some Confucian ethical values declined as a living creed, Confucianism as a whole had a lingering impact on social relations, especially the regulation that members of the same surname and the same family cannot marry, which is a law even today.

Americans also contributed considerably to the transformation of South Korean society. As political and economic ties between South Korea and the United States strengthened during the 1950s and the 1960s, so, too, did certain social and cultural ties. Ever since the late 1940s a sizable presence of American citizens remained in South Korea. Missionaries had been replaced by soldiers as the most obvious presence and influence, and “G.I. culture” altered Korean values and living customs.

By the end of the 1960s, with agriculture and rural development consistently neglected and the urban population growing, the stagnant rural economy could not cope with higher food consumption, and thus large amounts of foreign exchange were required for grain imports. The rampant rural exodus imposed great burdens on municipal administrations, particularly in Seoul, and raised the chances of social and political unrest. Cities were terribly overcrowded, rural areas had lost the most youthful and productive members of their labor force, and the 1971 presidential election demonstrated that a substantial erosion of support for the Park regime had occurred in the predominantly rural areas of the southwestern Ch
ŏ
lla provinces.
¹¹
In April 1970 Park responded to these challenges by advocating the
Saema
ŭ
l undong,
or New Village Movement (
NVM
), to increase rural productivity and income. The next year, the movement was launched throughout the country to upgrade the quality of village life by promoting “diligence, self-help, and cooperation.” Although actual government investments in the
NVM
projects were a small proportion of the total budget, the administrative and propaganda effort at both local and national levels was intense. From the start, the highly organized, centrally directed movement had strong political overtones. As the rural areas formed Park’s political power base, he had to take action. He backed the movement with the full weight and prestige of his office and, from 1972 to 1975, its momentum was not only sustained but even intensified. Park termed the New Village Movement a “spiritual
revolution” and stressed the transformation of values and attitudes in the rural community. Thus his government sought to mobilize rural villagers to improve their material lives and discard their backward ways. An agency was created in the central government to oversee the
NVM
, and local officials were instructed to mobilize villagers to actively participate.

Initially the
NVM
targeted improvements in the villages’ physical environments, and in many areas local villagers worked together to improve local roads, bridges, water supplies, washing facilities, and toilets. Many thatched roofs were replaced with more permanent materials such as tile. After 1973 the emphasis gradually moved to increasing agricultural productivity and rural incomes. Cash crops, including certain vegetables, were planted, particularly in new plastic hothouses; boundaries between tiny plots were readjusted; extensive irrigation and flood-control projects were undertaken; and advancements in agricultural science and technology included the planting of “green revolution” rice strains and the mechanization of farm work.

The
NVM
had far-reaching positive effects in rural life, reinforcing the rising expectations of the rural populace. By the mid-1970s rural family incomes had been brought up to the level of urban family incomes, but soon farm incomes fell behind again. The New Village Movement continued into the 1980s, and whatever the Park government’s motive had been for starting the program, it certainly benefited the rural communities. Still, however, the merits of the
NVM
remain controversial.

The most important diplomatic action to result from the Korean War was the
ROK
–U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Current U.S. security arrangements with South Korea are based formally on this mutual defense treaty, signed in Washington on 1 October 1953 and entered into force on 17 November 1954. The bilateral treaty was created in response to the strong demands of President Syngman Rhee for a U.S. commitment to South Korea’s security after the Korean War. Rhee had been uneasy about the end of Korean hostilities, and at the last moment, before the armistice agreement, he threatened to disrupt the peace talks unless the United States made a formal commitment to guarantee South Korea’s future security. Eager to end the war as quickly as possible, the
Eisenhower administration reluctantly met Rhee’s demand, and, in return, Rhee promised not to undermine the armistice agreement.

The six articles of the
ROK
–U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty affirmed that the signatories would regard an armed attack on the other as “dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” With this treaty, the United States assumed responsibility for defending the political and territorial integrity of South Korea. As part of that defense, significant numbers of U.S. ground, air, and naval forces would be stationed in South Korea for decades to come. Backed by the continued presence of U.S. forces in South Korea, and given the tense, even dangerous, situation along the demilitarized zone, the wisdom of the treaty was initially unquestioned in both South Korea and the United States.

The treaty not only helped secure the continued existence of the Republic of Korea, but it also helped ensure that the Korean peninsula would remain divided into two hostile camps. For just as South Korea would turn to the United States for assistance and protection, North Korea would depend largely on the Soviet Union and China to rebuild its economic and military structure, at least in the immediate years ahead.

The Syngman Rhee regime was assisted by the introduction of large amounts of U.S. aid in the 1950s. Between 1954 and 1960 roughly $2.6 billion of economic grants-in-aid poured into South Korea, amounting to some 8.6 percent of South Korea’s total
GNP
during that period. Along with this economic aid, the United States also provided $1.2 billion in military assistance, or 76 percent of South Korea’s total military budget. Although the purpose of the military aid was obvious, much of the economic aid was used to rebuild the country’s badly damaged infrastructure and temporarily feed much of the hungry South Korean population. This U.S. assistance helped create a strong bond between the Korean and American peoples in the years immediately following the war. It also allowed the U.S. government to gain a considerable degree of leverage over the South Korean government.

The United States played a significant behind-the-scenes mediation role in
ROK
–Japan normalization. To achieve its goal in East Asia, the United States pressed South Korea and Japan to open trade and investment contacts, as U.S. officials believed that a rapprochement between the two nations would
strengthen the anticommunist camp in East Asia by forming “maritime civilizations.” Moreover, with growing concerns for its own balance-of-payments problems since the late 1950s, the United States wanted Japan to share the financial burden of assisting South Korea.

During the 1950s, however, little progress was made toward normalization because of President Rhee’s staunch anti-Japanese stance and the Japanese government’s lack of serious motivation in this regard. The Japanese viewed reparations to the
ROK
for Japan’s colonial rule as the most difficult stumbling block. South Korea claimed much larger reparations than Japan was prepared to pay. The South Korean nationalists, whom Rhee represented, still had vivid memories of Japan’s brutal occupation of their country, and they refused to consider normalization of relations. Because any Korean suggestion of normalization talks might cause fierce antigovernment demonstrations that would threaten the government’s existence, Rhee suppressed such efforts throughout his years in power.

During the early 1960s, however, several factors contributed to progress in normalization negotiations. The Park Chung-hee regime, which had come to power in May 1961, was eager to obtain Japanese capital to finance its economic development. Beginning in 1964 the Sato Eisaku government was more enthusiastic than any previous Japanese government to pursue a regional anticommunist alliance as envisaged by the United States. Meanwhile, with its escalating military involvement in Vietnam, the United States increased its efforts to establish a rapprochement between South Korea and Japan. In 1964, when South Korean domestic opposition against “humiliating diplomacy with Japan” seriously challenged the Park government’s negotiations with Japan, the United States exerted pressure on the Japanese government to formally apologize for its “past regrettable history” with Korea and its people.
¹²
Many South Koreans expressed their desire that normalization be preceded by Japan’s sincere apology for its past colonial rule.

Finally, on 22 June 1965, South Korea and Japan established formal diplomatic relations by signing the Treaty on Basic Relations, opening a new era of mutual economic cooperation. The treaty confirmed that past treaties for the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 were void and that the
ROK
was the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula. By signing four related agreements, the two governments also settled disputes over the boundary line for fishing in the East Sea, the legal status of Korean residents in Japan, the status of Korean cultural treasures that Japan had appropriated, and Korea’s property claims.
Regarding the last issue, Japan was to pay South Korea $45 million. Japan was also to offer, as noted earlier, another assistance package of $800 million in grants and loans as a “gesture of goodwill.”
¹³

To attain normalization of relations with Japan, Park Chung-hee ignored the political opposition in the National Assembly, suppressed student dissent on the streets, and stifled newspaper criticism. On 12 August 1965 lawmakers from the opposition Democratic People’s Party resigned their Assembly seats in protest of the normalization treaty. The next day the ruling Democratic Republican Party approved the treaty in the absence of opposition party members in the Assembly. Although this action was technically legal, it clearly demonstrated Park’s disregard and disdain for parliamentary government.
¹⁴

Normalization of South Korean–Japanese relations did not, however, result in a tripartite alliance between the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Normalization also did not resolve the thorny issues that had originated in the “past history” of Japanese colonialism in Korea and were therefore nearly unsolvable. Despite its inherent weaknesses, normalization was characterized as an epochal event in South Korea’s foreign relations, as it opened the way for the future economic relations between the two nations.

Ever since South Korea became a sovereign state in August 1948, the Republic of Korea and the United States have had friendly relations. The United States has assisted South Korea fully in protecting its fragile security and rehabilitating its poverty-stricken economy. Although nominally bilateral, the relationship was actually unilateral: Tthe United States, as the patron, made all the decisions, and South Korea, the client nation, lived with those decisions in terms of military support and economic assistance. After publicly supporting President Syngman Rhee throughout the 1950s, the United States provided him sanctuary in Hawaii when he was removed from power in late April 1960.

When the Second Republic was established shortly after Rhee’s fall in 1960, the United States strongly supported the new government of Prime Minister Chang My
ŏ
n, and U.S. officials applauded the growth of democratic institutions, as well as the government’s efforts to initiate long-term economic planning. But after a bloodless coup, led by Major General Park Chung-hee, toppled the Chang My
ŏ
n government in 1961, the United States also publicly supported Park Chung-hee’s new military regime. When Park displayed unwillingness to return to a civilian government and expressed his intention to extend the
military regime, however, the United States pressured him to transfer power to a civilian government. Eventually Park yielded to this pressure, and in late 1962 a new constitution was promulgated. In December 1963 the Third Republic was inaugurated, and Park gave up his generalship in the army, created his own political party, and successfully ran for the presidency in late 1963. Four years later, in 1967, he was reelected to a second term.

At this time South Korean–U.S. relations entered a positive period. Perhaps the most important elements leading to cooperation between the two countries stemmed from external sources. On 21 January 1968 North Korean commandos carried out an attack on the Blue House, the South Korean presidential mansion, in an effort to assassinate President Park. Although the assault failed, the two nations were shocked that North Korean agents had been within one mile of the Blue House. Then, two days later, four North Korean naval ships captured the U.S. naval intelligence vessel, the USS
Pueblo,
an electronic “spy ship,” off the country’s eastern coast (more on this below), reinforcing the view in South Korea and the United States that North Korea was still menacing, and thus further strengthening South Korean–U.S. cooperation.