A History of Korea (99 page)

The fourth round of the prime ministers’ meeting resumed in Pyongyang in October 1991 and produced a joint commitment to work toward the “Basic Agreement on North-South Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange, and Cooperation.” The document was adopted and initialed on 31 December 1991, when the fifth round of meetings was held in Seoul. With the agreement, both Koreas seemed to come closer than ever before. Each Korea accepted the other’s regime as a legitimate government with a right to exist. Both Koreas also signed the six-point “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” in which they pledged to use nuclear power only for peaceful purposes and not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons in any form, and to permit mutual inspection of nuclear facilities.
²³
In a further encouraging development, on 30 January 1992 North Korea signed the Nuclear Safeguard Agreement and allowed
IAEA
inspections of its nuclear facilities during June 1992 to February 1993.

Inter-Korean talks of the 1980s, unfortunately, followed the pattern established in the 1970s. All bilateral negotiations between the two countries soon came to a standstill, and all previous agreements were abandoned. Despite its promising appearance, the prime ministers’ meeting did not insure any substantial gains, as North Koreans continued their nuclear weapons program and the denuclearization declaration ended as scrap paper even before the ink on the protocol had dried.

In the early 1970s the fortunes of both Koreas reversed in favor of South Korea. South Korea’s continuing economic growth, engineered by President Park Chung-hee’s developmental dictatorship, was chiefly responsible for the reversal. In the 1970s and 1980s, while North Korea, shackled by its hallmark doctrine of juche, continuously declined economically, South Korea was on
the road of rapid economic development. South Korea’s astonishing economic growth inevitably fanned the flames of democratization in the 1980s, and, as a result, South Korea finally embarked on the path to democracy in mid-1987. North Korea, in contrast, was increasingly transformed into an isolated totalitarian state reminiscent of the state in George Orwell’s
1984.

President Kim Young-Sam, sworn in on 25 February 1993, was the first civilian president in a country that had been ruled by former military men since 1961, and he proudly named his administration the “civilian government.” His successors, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, followed suit, defining their administrations, respectively, as the “national government” and “participatory government.”

Portraying himself as a reformer, Kim Young-sam suggested a new politics that would address the chronic “Korean disease,” the corruption that infested every level of society. Indeed, South Koreans derisively called their country the “
ROTC
,” or Republic of Total Corruption. In his inaugural address he vowed to build a “new Korea,” pledging to fight corruption in the public sectors and to revitalize the already strained economy. During his first months in office, he forced the disclosure of his own property as well as that of his cabinet, members of the National Assembly, and high-ranking public servants, a practice still in place today. Within a few weeks a number of prominent figures, including the Speaker of the National Assembly, the mayor of Seoul, and three cabinet ministers, resigned because of public allegations of past corruption.

Kim’s anti-corruption drive peaked on 12 August 1993, when he enacted the Act on Real Name Financial Transactions, which ended the traditional practice of shielding money in accounts under false names to cover up illegal profiteering. The implementation of a real-name system formed a vital cornerstone of financial reform, and the new institution was well received by a majority of South Koreans.

A representative of the “democratization forces,” Kim wanted to end the coexistence with the “Fifth Republic forces” by purging key military officers with close ties to Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo. In March 1993 he replaced both the army chief of staff and the commander of the Military Security Command with successors who had no links with the quasi-secret military fraternity called Hanahoe, or One Society, which had been formed by Chun and Roh in the 1960s and monopolized senior military appointments during the Fifth Republic. The purification of the military was followed by a reshuffling of the ruling party. The monopoly of party hegemony by the Kim Young-sam faction prompted the Kim Jong-pil faction to break away from the party on 30 March 1995 to form a new party, the United Liberal Democrats (
ULD
). The arrest and trial of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo on charges of mutiny, treason, and corruption, in 1995–1996, completely destroyed the influence and power of the Roh Tae-woo faction. The Democratic Liberal Party opened its doors to professionals and moderate dissidents, changing its name to the New Korea Party (
NKP
) on 5 December 1995. On 5 September 1995 Kim Dae-jung, who had taken an extended break at home and abroad before gradually returning to active political life, formed another opposition party, the National Congress for New Politics (
NCNP
). This marked the return of the “period of the three Kims” in the mid-1990s.

On 27 October 1995 former president Roh Tae-woo admitted that he amassed a “governing fund” of 500 billon w
ŏ
n (U.S. $625 million) during his tenure. This money was originally deposited in accounts under a false name, but the truth was brought to light by the real-name financial transaction system. The same day Kim Dae-jung voluntarily confessed that he had secretly received two billion w
ŏ
n (U.S.$2.5 million) from Roh as a “gift” during the 1992 presidential campaign, and he charged the incumbent president, Kim Young-sam, with accepting much more money than he did, but Kim denied receiving any money at all from Roh. Around the same time many South Koreans clamored for a definite resolution of the lingering doubts about Chun Doo-hwan’s December 1979 takeover of the military and the May 1980 Kwangju massacre. Some civic groups
filed lawsuits against Chun and his colleagues involved in the critical events of 1979–1980, demanding that they be brought to justice. Earlier Kim had argued that a successful coup was not a crime punishable by the court, thus claiming that the 1979 coup and the 1980 killings should be left for history to judge. Kim’s reluctance to press the legal case against the Chun-Roh camp was undoubtedly a by-product of his unnatural coalition with the Fifth Republic forces to form the Democratic Liberal Party in early 1990. As the South Korean public increasingly questioned the amount of money he or his party accepted from Roh, however, Kim abruptly reversed his stand. A special law authorizing legal action against those responsible for the 1979 military takeover and the 1980 Kwangju killings was enacted in the National Assembly on 19 December 1995. By its terms, Kim could try Chun and Roh after the statute of limitations expired. Even before the law was passed, on 3 December the prosecution arrested and jailed Chun after he defiantly refused a subpoena to appear for questioning.

Starting in March 1996 Chun and Roh, their former aides, and the heads of leading chaeb
ŏ
l, including the Samsung Group, stood at the bar in the bribery trial. Along with Chun and Roh, 14 former military officers, 8 of whom had retired from service as four-star generals, stood trial in the insurrection case. On 26 August 1996 the Seoul District Court sentenced Chun to death for the 1979 military mutiny, treason in 1980, the Kwangju massacre, and corruption in office. Roh was sentenced to 22 and a half years in prison. The other defendants were given lesser sentences. On 16 December 1996 the Seoul High Court commuted Chun’s sentence to imprisonment for life and reduced Roh’s sentence to 17 years. The court also reduced the sentences of all the other military and civilian defendants.
¹
A year later, on 22 December 1997, President Kim Young-sam pardoned Chun and Roh, along with 17 other persons, under a special amnesty agreement with president-elect Kim Dae-jung.

In his first few months in office, Kim Young-sam’s approval rating was as high as 97 percent, mainly because of his anti-corruption drive. Then he experienced growing unpopularity, largely because of the increasingly aggravated economic conditions. Furthermore, his judicial punishment of Chun and Roh cost him a considerable loss of popular support in the Taegu–North Ky
ŏ
ngsang (T-K) region, where he had obtained an overwhelming majority of the vote in the 1992 presidential election. Under these circumstances, Kim’s ruling party made poor showings in the 1995 local elections and the 1996 National Assembly elections.

Kim’s Democratic Liberal Party reeled from its severe losses in the local elections held on 27 June 1995. The ruling party elected only two metropolitan
city mayors and three provincial governors, just one-third of such posts. The DLP completely collapsed in the fall of 1995 and was forced to reorganize its remnants as the New Korea Party (
NKP
) in December 1995. Then the
NKP
suffered a virtual defeat in the National Assembly elections held on 11 April 1996, securing 139 of 299 seats. Kim Dae-jung’s National Congress for New Politics elected 79 seats, and Kim Jong-pil’s United Liberal Democrats won 50 seats. A minor party and the independents obtained 31 seats. Just a week before the elections, on 5 April, North Korea announced that it would no longer accept the duties and limitations of the armistice agreement and sent 130 soldiers armed with AK-47 semiautomatic rifles, light machine guns, and antitank recoilless rifles into the Joint Security Area (
JSA
) at P’anmunj
ŏ
m, in deliberate violation of the armistice. The
JSA
incursions, part of the “North wind,” or threat from North Korea, alarmed the electorate and allowed the
NKP
, which had been expected to lose because of President Kim’s growing unpopularity, to do far better than expected. Apparently as a result of the
JSA
incident, the ruling party obtained 20 to 30 additional seats, particularly in the metropolitan constituencies. The opposition argued that the ruling party had made a secret deal with North Korea to bring about the “North wind,” an allegation flatly denied by the government party.

By early 1997 Kim Young-sam’s inner circle, his second son in particular, became embroiled in a financial scandal known as the Hanbo case, where Kim’s close circle used political influence to prevent the bankruptcy of the Hanbo Iron and Steel Company, the 14th largest business in South Korea that owed an estimated $5 billion to banks.
²
With his son arrested and imprisoned on charges of corruption on 17 May 1997, Kim’s popularity plummeted.

Since his inauguration in February 1993, Kim’s management of the economy had always been sharply criticized. The Asian financial crisis that spread to South Korea in October 1997 by itself betrayed his incompetence in managing economics. Kim left office amid an unprecedented economic crisis and scandal, with an embarrassingly low approval rating of just 3 percent.

While South Korean political parties prepared for the coming presidential election, Kim’s popularity took a nosedive. The ruling New Korea Party elected former prime minister Yi Hoe-ch’ang as its presidential candidate in a free primary on 21 July 1997. After having been defeated by Yi Hoe-ch’ang, however, Yi In-je, governor of Ky
ŏ
nggi province, left the party to declare his own candidacy. His running for the presidency would decisively serve Kim Dae-jung’s election to the presidency. In contrast to the ruling party that fell into
disorder, the opposition formed a coalition for the election. Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil joined forces and agreed, in October, that Kim Dae-jung would become their presidential candidate. Then the ruling New Korea Party merged with the minor Democratic Party to form the Grand National Party (
GNP
) on 21 November 1997.

As the South Korean economy was on the verge of collapse in November– December, the ruling party rapidly lost popular support and the electorate wanted a change in government. As a result, on 18 December 1997, Kim Dae-jung was elected to the presidency by a narrow margin, with 40.3 percent of the vote against Yi Hoe-ch’ang’s 38.7 percent and Yi In-je’ 19.2 percent. This was the first peaceful change of regime ever between a ruling party and an opposition party. Three weeks after his announcement that he was entirely responsible for the economic crisis, on 25 February 1998 President Kim left office.

Kim Young-sam is remembered as a failed president, for both personal and systemic reasons. He is blamed for allowing the collapse of a once prosperous economy during the East Asian financial crisis and, by a majority of South Koreans, for having humiliated the nation when he presided over South Korea’s bailout by the International Monetary Fund (
IMF
). His populist politics, such as his judicial attacks against Chun and Roh, distracted popular attention from the deteriorating economy only for a while. Widely considered a man of limited intellect, he lacked other qualities required for top leadership. He excessively relied on intuition and instinct to make decisions rather than rational consideration and expert knowledge about public policy. An egoist, Kim was obsessed with public opinion and attached importance to superficial display rather than genuine accomplishments. His North Korea policy, which was replete with inconsistency, is a good example. Overly sensitive to public opinion, his confused and conflicting policy making helped lead his presidency to an anticlimactic end.

Though Kim proudly defined his administration as a “civilian government,” in practice his government was cohabited by “democratic forces” and former “military influences.” Under his presidency the “street fighters” for democratization, who lacked experience in national administration, became merely props of the ruling elite. Although Kim was proud and self-confident at first, and the people placed great hopes in him, such expectations were short-lived. One of his main accomplishments as president was his strong anti-corruption campaign in public service, but when his second son, often called the “little president,” and those in his close circle were implicated in a corruption scandal,
public confidence in him was fractured. Ultimately he even lost moral legitimacy.