“America’s and Israel’s responses”;
“Crises can be opportunities”: David Wurmser, “Middle East ‘War,’” American Enterprise Institute (January 1, 2001).
“Who, exactly, was pushing this”: Ron Suskind,
The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House and the Education of Paul O’Neill
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), pp. 75–76.
“The new Jewish activists”; the Jewish organizations: Stephen D. Isaacs,
Jews and American Politics
(New York: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 248–249.
“I think the term has something”: “The Making of a Neoconservative,”
Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg,
PBS (November 14, 2002).
“the quintessential Washington operator”; “a great collector of sensitive information”; “Jackson and Perle have established”: Robert G. Kaiser, “Behind-Scenes Power Over Arms Policy,”
The Washington Post
(June 26, 1977).
“We have a hero”: Peter J. Ognibene,
Scoop: The Life and Politics of Henry M. Jackson
(New York: Stein and Day, 1975), p. 182.
Wohlstetter’s early background: Neil Swidley, “The Analyst,”
Boston Globe
(May 18, 2003).
“To deter an attack”: Albert Wohlstetter, “A Delicate Balance of Terror,” RAND paper P-1472 (November 6, 1958).
“He was a firm believer”: Khurram Husain, “American Dreams: Intellectual Roots of Neo-conservative Thinking,” [Pakistan]
Herald
(March 2003).
“I, at the time, was a graduate student”: Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz at the Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson Distinguished Service Award, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, November 18, 2002.
“Albert Wohlstetter phoned me one day”: “The Making of a Neoconservative,”
Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg,
PBS (November 14, 2002).
effort to pressure the Clinton administration: Hillel Kuttler, “Senators push Clinton to move US Embassy to Jerusalem,”
The Jerusalem Post
(May 28, 1999).
“Feith is a partner of Zell”: Dan Feidt, “Interview with Roundtable participant Rashid Khalidi,”
The Mac Weekly
(October 17, 2003).
“I can bear personal witness”: Larry Cohler-Esses, “One Track Minds on Two-Track Mideast Solutions,
The Forward
(January 24, 2003).
His position was funded: See David Wurmster,
Tyranny’s Ally: America’s Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein
(Washington: AIE Press, 1999), p. xxiii.
“Repudiate Oslo”; “Any strategy for repudiating”: Douglas J. Feith, “A Strategy for Israel,”
Commentary
(September 1997).
“The meeting had seemed scripted”: Ron Suskind,
The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House and the Education of Paul O’Neill
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 76.
“The topic today”: Transcript, Rumsfeld address at Pentagon, September 10, 2001.
“heard good news”; “best info fast”; “judge whether good enough hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at same time”: “Plans For Iraq Attack Began,” On 9/11,” CBS News (September 4, 2002).
“I expected to go back to a round of meetings”: Richard A. Clarke,
Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), pp. 30–31.
“We will have to confront him sooner or later”: Paul D. Wolfowitz and Zalmay M. Khalilzad, “Saddam Must Go,”
Weekly Standard
(December 1997).
“implementing a strategy”: January 26, 1998 letter to President Bill Clinton, located on the website for the Project for the New American Century:
http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm
.
“Many advocates of action were skeptical”: Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Decision On Iraq Has Puzzling Past,”
The Washington Post
(January 12, 2003).
“strike fatally, not merely disarm”: David Wurmser, “Middle East ‘War,’” American Enterprise Institute (January 1, 2001).
“When this writer first heard”: Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Iraq and the Gulf of Tonkin,” United Press International (February 2, 2004).
“Dear Mr. President”:
National Review
website at:
http://www.nationalreview.com/document/document092101b.shtml
.
“isn’t worth the paper it’s written on”: Warren P. Strobel, Jonathan S. Landay and John Walcott, “Some in Bush Administration Have Misgivings About Iraq Policy,” Knight-Ridder Newspapers (October 27, 2002).
“Let me be blunt about this”:
Transcript, Richard Perle interview on “Truth, War, and Consequences,”
Frontline,
PBS (October 2003).
“Are they missile experts?”: Eric Boehler, “Rumsfeld’s Personal Spy Ring,”
Salon.com
(July 16, 2003).
“They’d take a little bit of intelligence, cherry-pick it”: Robert Dreyfuss and Jason Vest, “The Lie Factory,”
Mother Jones
(January 26, 2004).
“I was chatting”; “I came to share”: Karen Kwiatkowski, “In Rumsfeld’s Shop,”
The American Conservative
(December 1, 2003).
“The CIA doesn’t like him”: Transcript, Richard Perle interview on “Truth, War, and Consequences,”
Frontline,
PBS (October 2003).
“silk-suited, Rolex-wearing guys in London”: Robert Dreyfuss, “Tinker, Banker, NeoCon, Spy,”
The American Prospect
(November 18, 2002).
“militarily ludicrous”: Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack and Gideon Rose, “The Rollback Fantasy,”
Foreign Affairs
(January/February 1999).
“A senior administration official, who requested anonymity”: Jonathan S. Landay and Warren P. Strobel, “Pentagon civilians’ lack of planning contributed to chaos in Iraq,” Knight-Ridder (July 11, 2003).
“The arguments against Chalabi”: Transcript, Perle interview, “Truth, War & Consequences,”
Frontline,
PBS (October 9, 2003).
“Israel has not devoted”: Seth Gitell, “Allies of Chalabi Meet Ambassador Gold, Warn of White House Folly,”
Forward
(July 31, 1998).
“The [INC’s] intelligence isn’t reliable at all”: Andrew Buncombe, “US paid $1m for ‘useless intelligence’ from Chalabi,”
The Independent
(London), (September 30, 2003).
“an information warrior and a perception manager”; “They’re very closemouthed”: Stephen J. Hedges, “When U.S. troops go into a war zone, John Rendon is rarely far behind,”
Chicago Tribune
(May 12, 2002).
“When I get their briefings”; “blowback”: Franklin Foer, “Flacks Americana,”
The New Republic
(May 20, 2002).
“The INC was clueless”: Franklin Foer, “Flacks Americana,”
The New Republic
(May 20, 2002).
“He continued to work with the Rendon Group”: “Paul Moran Story,”
Dateline,
SBS Network Television (Australia) (July 23, 2003).
“intimidates Army soldiers”; “Could Chalabi have been using the
Times”
: Howard Kurtz, “Embedded Reporter’s Role in Army Unit’s Actions Questioned by Military,”
The Washington Post
(June 25, 2003).
“I think what you’re seeing”; comments by Scott Ritter: “Paul Moran Story,”
Dateline,
SBS Network Television (Australia) (July 23, 2003).
a shadowy meeting took place: The following account of the Niger document trail was pieced together through interviews with intelligence officials in American and several foreign intelligence agencies as well as a number of news accounts, including most importantly: Carlo Bonini and Giuseppe D’Avanzo, “Ecco il Falso Dossier Sull’uranio di Saddam,”
La Repubblica
(July 16, 2003).
A few of the documents have surfaced or been mentioned. Among the likely genuine ones:
1. February 1, 1999, letter from Wissam al-Zahawiah, Iraqi ambassador to the Holy See, to the Niger Embassy in Rome. In Italian, it confirms al-Zahawiah’s upcoming visit to Niger.
2. February 1, 1999, letter from Niger Embassy in Rome to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Niger announcing Ambassador al-Zahawiah’s proposed visit to Niger.
3. February 1, 1999, telex containing text identical to the preceding letter.
Likely false documents:
1. July 27, 2000, letter from the president of Niger to Saddam Hussein confirming the agreement to furnish 500 tons of uranium. The document contains a comment by the Niger president that the agreement is in accord with Niger’s constitution but it is a constitution long out of date.
2. June 28, 2000 (also possibly dated July 6—see below) “accord” between Niger and Iraq to furnish uranium to Iraq.
3. June 30, 2000, letter from the Niger Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Niger ambassador in Rome requesting him to contact Iraq’s Rome ambassador, al-Zahawiah—who had by then retired—regarding the June 28 agreement. Date and contents appear altered.
4. July 6, 2000, three-page “accord” between Niger and Iraq for 500 tons of uranium oxide. It is supposedly signed by Niger President Tandja Mamadou and “minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Ailele Elhadj Habibou” who actually left that job in 1989.
5. October 10, 2000, letter from Niger Minister of Foreign Affairs to Niger Embassy in Rome referring to an attached agreement to supply Iraq with uranium. The letter is stamped received on September 28, 2000, two weeks before it was supposedly created and signed by “Minister of Foreign Affairs” Ailele Elhadj Habibou who left that job in 1989.
6. February 7, 2001, letter in code from the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
7. June 14, 2002, meeting, referred to in an undated report, between the ambassadors of Sudan, Niger, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, and Iran to establish a highly secret military force to assist nations facing western diplomatic aggression, such as sanctions, embargo, or accusations.
8. July 2001 Confidential deciphered letter from the Secretary of State of Niger to the Ambassador in Rome outlining shipping details for the uranium bound for Iraq.
9. August 28, 2001, letter from the Niger Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Rome confirming a shipment of uranium but no destination is listed.
10. September 3, 2001, letter from “Ambassador al-Zahawiah” (he had actually retired to Lebanon a year earlier) to Niger Embassy confirming a September 2001 visit to Niger. Except for the date—likely altered—it is identical to the genuine February 1, 1999 letter listed above.
“I took it to be a routine assignment”:
Hassan Fattah, “Saddam’s Niger Point-man Speaks,”
Time
(October 1, 2003).
“A whole lot of things told us”: “Follow the Yellowcake Road,”
Time
(July 13, 2003).
“Rather than waste a lot of time”: James Risen, “All Roads Lead to Iraq,”
The New York Times
(October 3, 2003).
“The agency officials asked if I would”: Joseph C. Wilson 4th, “What I Didn’t Find in Africa,”
The New York Times
(July 6, 2003).
“We were instructed at a staff meeting”: Karen Kwiatkowski, “In Rumsfeld’s Shop,”
The American Conservative
(December 1, 2003).
“with more alarmist”; “None of the Israelis”: Julian Borger, “The Spies Who Pushed For War,”
The Guardian
(July 17, 2003).
“Once in Feith’s waiting room”: Karen Kwiatkowski, “Open Door Policy,”
The American Conservative
(January 19, 2004).
“On the eve of the war”: Shlomo Brom, “The War in Iraq: An Intelligence Failure?” Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University (November 2003).
The bad Israeli intelligence also led: “The Iraq Blame Game: Israel,”
Jane’s Intelligence Report
(February 19, 2004).
In March 2004, the panel found: “Israeli Parliamentary Intelligence Probe Misses Focus,”
Debka File
(March 28, 2004).
“Israel didn’t want to spoil”; “The Israeli intelligence reached this conclusion”: Associated Press, “Israel knew Iraq had no WMD says MP,”
The Guardian
(February 4, 2004).
Israel’s military intelligence service, Aman: Israel’s American spy Jonathan Pollard has claimed in legal papers that most of his U.S. intelligence assignments came from Aman. See Jonathan Pollard v. Ehud Barak, Petition No. 6029/99, “Request to Produce Documents,” October 21, 1999.
“We have clear indications”: Transcript, Efraim Halevy address, “On September 11, World War III Started,” before the NATO Council in Brussels, published in
Yediot Aharonot
(June 28, 2002).
The strange arrangement began raising alarms; the single most important intelligence source: Barton Gellman, “Israel Gave Key Help To U.N. Team in Iraq,”
The Washington Post
(September 29, 1998).
hiding poison factories in refrigerator trucks painted in red-and-white “Tip Top Ice Cream”: Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, “Iraqi Defector’s Tales Bolstered U.S. Case for War,”
Los Angeles Times
(March 28, 2004). See also Barton Gellman, “Arms Inspectors ‘Shake the Tree,’”
The Washington Post
(October 12, 1998).
“They just didn’t make sense from a technical”: Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, “Iraqi Defector’s Tales Bolstered U.S. Case for War,”
Los Angeles Times
(March 28, 2004).
“They told us they had the run of Iraq”: Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, “Iraqi Defector’s Tales Bolstered U.S. Case for War,”
Los Angeles Times
(March 28, 2004).