Curveball: Details come from senior U.S. intelligence officials not assigned to the CIA as well as a
Los Angeles Times
report by Bob Drogin and Greg Miller: “Iraqi Defector’s Tales Bolstered U.S. Case for War,”
Los Angeles Times
(March 28, 2004).
“They began feeding us information”: Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, “Iraqi Defector’s Tales Bolstered U.S. Case for War,”
Los Angeles Times
(March 28, 2004).
“We didn’t find anything”; “This is the one that’s damning”: Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, “Iraqi Defector’s Tales Bolstered U.S. Case for War,”
Los Angeles Times
(March 28, 2004).
“They pushed an agenda”; “This was creatively produced”; “He spoke out publicly”; “They spent their energy”: Marc Cooper, “Soldier for the Truth Exposing Bush’s Talking-Points War,”
LA Weekly
(February 20–26).
“how to fight Saddam”: Dana Priest, “Pentagon Shadow Loses Some Mystique,”
The Washington Post
(March 13, 2004).
“nonplussed”; “Much of it”: Dana Priest, “Pentagon Shadow Loses Some Mystique,”
The Washington Post
(March 13, 2004).
without notifying the agency: It would be more than a year before Tenet would even learn of the high-level briefings. But in November 2003, the CIA discovered that Feith’s office had sent a memo to a congressional intelligence committee that contained much of that same inaccurate information. As a result, the agency forced Feith’s office to retract it “because of our concerns with what the document said.” But by then the war was long over. See Tenet testimony, United States Senate, Armed Services Committee (March 9, 2004).
gave the same briefing at the White House: Greg Miller, “Pentagon group’s role in shaping White House views about ties between Hussein and Al Qaeda was greater than known, Senate panel hears,”
The Los Angeles Times
(March 10, 2004).
“We have solid evidence”: Dana Priest, “Pentagon Shadow Loses Some Mystique,”
The Washington Post
(March 13, 2004).
“maintain a positive issue environment”; “because from a marketing point of view”: Richard Gephardt, “Defend the Country, Not the Party,”
The New York Times
(September 27, 2002).
“As evidence of Iraq’s weapons building activities”: Jason Keyser, “Israel Urges U.S. to Attack Iraq,” Associated Press (August 16, 2002).
“Israel To U.S.: Don’t Delay Iraq Attack”: CBS News (August 16, 2002).
“Israel Puts Pressure on US to Strike Iraq”: Jonathan Steele, “Israel Puts Pressure on US to Strike Iraq,”
The Guardian
(August 17, 2002).
“No terrorist state poses a greater”: Transcript, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002.
“Senior officials made statements”: Transcript, Thielmann interview, “Truth, War & Consequences,”
Frontline,
PBS (October 9, 2003).
“U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts”: Michael R. Gordon and Judith Miller, “U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts,”
The New York Times
(September 8, 2002).
“It’s now public”: Transcript,
Meet the Press,
NBC News (September 8, 2002).
“We don’t want the smoking gun”: Transcript,
Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer,
CNN (September 8, 2002).
“specialized aluminum tubing”: Transcript, Fox News (September 8, 2002).
mushroom-cloud: Tenet would later claim that he would occasionally correct administration officials when they publicly misstated intelligence, but there is no evidence that this was done. Alternatively, if he had issued such warnings he was apparently too timid to follow them up since they not only continued, they grew both in frequency and degree of deception. See Tenet testimony, United States Senate, Armed Services Committee (March 9, 2004).
“I’ve been covering Chalabi”: Howard Kurtz, “Intra-Times Battle Over Iraqi Weapons,”
The Washington Post
(May 26, 2003).
“It was not a difficult assessment”: Transcript, Thielmann interview, “Truth, War & Consequences,”
Frontline,
PBS (October 9, 2003).
“It would have been extremely difficult to make”: Barton Gellman and Walter Pincus, “Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence,”
The Washington Post
(August 10, 2003).
“We began hearing from sources”:
Michael Massing, “Now They Tell Us,”
The New York Review of Books
(February 26, 2004).
“While President Bush marshals congressional”: Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan S. Landay, “Some administration officials expressing misgivings on Iraq,” Knight-Ridder Newspapers (October 8, 2002).
“there were disagreements over details”: Barton Gellman and Walter Pincus, “Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence,”
The Washington Post
(August 10, 2003).
“Instead of our leadership”: Transcript, Thielmann interview, “Truth, War & Consequences,”
Frontline,
PBS (October 9, 2003).
“Baghdad’s UAV”: CIA, National Intelligence Estimate on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq (Declassified version), October 2002.
“I was one of seventy-seven Senators who voted for the resolution”:
Congressional Record,
January 28, 2004 (Senate), pp. S311–S312.
“Iraq could use these small UAVs”: Transcript, Department of State, Secretary of State Colin Powell’s Address Before the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003.
“The software”: Glenn Kessler and Walter Pincus, “A Flawed Argument In the Case for War,”
The Washington Post
(February 1, 2004).
“We now know”:
Congressional Record,
January 28, 2004 (Senate), pp. S311–S312.
“The British government . . . has learned”: Transcript, The White House, State of the Union address by President George W. Bush, January 2003.
“And he said, ‘You know what’”: Interview conducted in late 2003.
“They were looking for those selective pieces of intelligence”: Edward Alden, “Naming of Agent Was Aimed at Discrediting CIA,”
The Financial Times
(October 28, 2003).
“Analysts feel more politicized”: Greg Miller and Bob Drogin, “CIA Feels Heat On Iraq Data,”
Los Angeles Times
(October 11, 2002).
“After 9/11”: Interview conducted in late 2003.
“He was saying to me”: Interview conducted in late 2003.
“was of little or no value”: Douglas Jehl, “Pentagon Agency Belittles Information Given by Iraqi Defectors,”
The New York Times
(September 29, 2003).
“A huge amount of what was collected”: Jonathan S. Landay, Warren P. Strobel and John Walcott, “Officials: U.S. still paying millions to group that provided false Iraqi intelligence,” Knight-Ridder Newspapers (February 21, 2004).
“Back then we did not have”: Interview conducted in late 2003.
“We had some information”:
Martha Raddatz, “U.S. Missile Strikes in Iraq Hit and Miss,” ABC News (March 19, 2004).
“We did not have enough”; “direct access to Saddam”; “access to senior Iraqi”: Transcript, Tenet’s prepared remarks for an address at Georgetown University (February 5, 2004).
“This is something the analysts”: Walter Pincus, “CIA Alters Policy After Iraq Lapses,”
The Washington Post
(February 12, 2004).
“the single most important aspect”; “How do we ensure”: Walter Pincus, “CIA Alters Policy After Iraq Lapses,”
The Washington Post
(February 12, 2004).
“never said there was an ‘imminent’ threat”:
Transcript, Tenet’s prepared remarks for an address at Georgetown University (February 5, 2004).
“United Nations inspectors have been briefed”; “totally unacceptable”: Douglas Jehl and David E Sanger, “CIA Admits It Didnt Give Weapon Data to the UN,”
The New York Times
(February 21, 2004).
“His drinking was during the day”: Interview conducted in late 2003.
“went around to each of the divisions”: Interview conducted in early 2004.
“The money is incredible”: Interview conducted in late 2003.
“The first contract I was on I left”: Interview conducted in late 2003.
“We were talking to teams”: Interview conducted in late 2003.
“With Afghanistan, the war on terrorism”: Greg Miller, Bob Drogin, “CIA Struggles in Iraq, Afghanistan,”
The Los Angeles Times
(February 21, 2004).
“How do you do your job”: Dana Priest, “CIA faces unexpected hurdles in Iraq,”
The Washington Post
(March 4, 2004).
“Sigint [signals intelligence] was monitoring”: Interview conducted in late 2003.
“We had all the senior leadership of the agency”: Interview with Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, January 20, 2004.
“You are cooperating with the people”: Ewen MacAskill, Blix: “I Was A Target Too,”
The Guardian
(February 28, 2004).
“He should not have had them”: Kim Sengupta and Kathy Marks, “Britain and US shared transcripts after bugging Blix’s mobile phone,”
The Independent
(February 28, 2004).
“I think they had a set mind”: Warren Hoge, “Ex-UN Inspector has harsh words for Bush,”
The New York Times
(March 16, 2004).
“The Americans and British created facts . . . to justify the Iraq war”: Blix,
People’s Daily
(February 24, 2004).
“By the time the inspectors left”; “Inspectors Find Only Ruins at an Old Iraqi Weapons Site,”
The New York Times
(November 29, 2002).
“The U.K. in this time was also getting”: Ed Johnson, “Britain Spied on UN’s Annan,” Associated Press (February 26, 2004).
“They said, ‘You should know that we don’t like the idea’”: Martin Bright, Peter Beaumont and Jo Tuckman, “A joint British and American spy op wrecked peace move,”
The Observer
(February 15, 2004).
“As you’ve likely heard by now”: Martin Bright, Ed Vulliamy, “Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war,”
The Observer
(March 2, 2003).
“I think I just got my orders”: Interview conducted in March 2004.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
With deepest thanks to the many people who gave generously of their time and their courage, to help me tell this important story. Although they must remain unnamed, they will not go unheard.
I am also very grateful to Doubleday's editor-in-chief, Bill Thomas, for all his help, encouragement, and friendship. A warm thanks to my editor, Katie Hall, who deciphered my manuscript with the skill of a first-class code breaker. And my appreciation to Kris Dahl, my agent at International Creative Management, for always pointing me in the right direction. Many thanks also to Doubleday’s Christine Pride and Michael Windsor and to Chris Fortunato and Tina Thompson for their hard work on
A Pretext for War.
INDEX
A
bouhalima, Mahmoud
Afghanistan; bin Laden and; Bush’s war pla; CIA and; FD/Trodpint; U.S. and Najibullah; U.S. Stinger missiles missing
Air National Guard: failure to protect Washington; lack of ordnance; notification plans; shoot down order; Washington free-fire zone
Alhazmi, Nawaf
Almihdhar, Khalid
Alwan, Sahim
American Airlines Flight 11
American Airlines Flight 77
Ames, Aldrich
Andrews AFB
Annan, Kofi
Arestegui, Barbara
Arias, Maj. Don
Arnold, Maj. Gen. Larry
Atta, Mohamed
Azzam, Sheik Abdullah
Baker, James
Barksdale AFB, Shreveport, LA
Berger, Sandy
Binalshibh, Ahmed
Binalshibh, Ramzi
Bin Attash, Khallad
Bin Laden, Osama: Afghanistan training camps; American embassy bombings and; assassination of Massoud; background and associates; call to action, 1996; hatred and threats against U.S.; as her; Khalid Shaikh and; Middle Eastern intercept, 9/11; planning of 9/11; Al Qaeda formed; satellite phone; U.S. attempts to capture; warning to U.S., 6/21/2001
Black, Cofer
Blair, Tony
Blix, Hans
Block, John
Boston, Logan Airport; hijack of AAL 11 and; hijack of UAL 175
Britain: Blair-Bush coalition; Brixton Mosque and terrorists; “doggie dossier”; Iraq and; MI-6, Iraqi uranium purchase and
Bush, George H. W.: assassination attempt by Saddam, 1993; Israel policy; shadow government and
Bush, George W.: activity during terrorist attacks; Air Force One and flight on 9/11; authorization to shoot down passenger plan; Iraq, Saddam’s assassination attempt of father; Iraq, war plan; Iraq, war promoted on basis of imminent threat; Iraqi WMD, administration intelligence on; Johnson compared with; lack of leadership; meeting with Rice, 8/26/01; notified first tower hit; notified second tower hit; NSC meeting, 9/11; nuclear war plan options and; PDB, August 6, 2001, “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in U.S.” and response; PDBs and; reaction to 9/11 attack news; return to White House, 9/11; Sharon, Likud, and; State of the Union address, January, 2003; story of learning about attack; at STRATCOM; Tenet and; unaware of battle stations alert; videotaped address, 9/11; White House and