A Very Expensive Poison (18 page)

Two weeks after that, D3 picked up a copy of either the
Hamburger Morgenpost
or
Bild Zeitung
– he can’t remember which. Splashed across it was the story of Litvinenko’s poisoning and death. Kovtun’s name was mentioned; he appeared to be the prime suspect. D3 read the story and, as he put it, felt the ground give way beneath his feet.

What he’d dismissed as another of Dmitry’s quixotic idiocies had materialised into a cold-blooded international killing. D3 was afraid and confused. He thought about going to the police. But what if this situation somehow rebounded upon him? He decided to do nothing. Perhaps detectives might solve the case on their own.

Then, Kovtun called from Moscow as D3 was out on his bike. The line was poor; they agreed Kovtun would ring again in the evening, which he did. Kovtun asked if
D3 had read the newspapers. D3 asked him: ‘Was that you?’ Kovtun said the story was rubbish, adding that the English police were going to question him. ‘If that wasn’t you, you don’t need to worry,’ D3 replied.

Try as he might, D3 could not banish the poison conversation with Kovtun from his mind. In December, German police interviewed him for the first time. They searched his flat and took away his contaminated mattress. He gave them an account of his meeting with Kovtun. But he said nothing about Kovtun’s confession as they had walked together towards Steindamm.

As D3’s torment grew, Kovtun’s seemingly lessened. On 11 December, Kovtun phoned from Moscow. ‘He was quite jolly. He was in a good mood,’ D3 said. Kovtun said he was fine, apologised for causing inconvenience, insisted he was innocent, ‘marked’ by someone else and the victim of a media smear. D3: ‘I asked him what kind of arsehole he is to do this with Marina and the children? I was very angry but tried to remain calm.’ Upbeat, Kovtun was again talking of the Moscow flat he soon expected to receive.

They didn’t speak again.

D3 wasn’t afraid of Kovtun as such. But he understood that he was now a witness, an important one. And therefore – the logic had a dark certainty to it – a vulnerable one as well. It was a frightening position. Even if Dmitry were not capable of murder, perhaps others around him were? Twelve days passed. Unable to bear it any more, D3 told a lawyer what had happened. The lawyer contacted the police. ‘This awful feeling became
so great that I had to get it off my chest. I had to say it, I could not go on,’ D3 said.

He told detectives the affair had left him uncertain and edgy. And added: ‘I curse him [Kovtun] every day, because of the conversation, because of the whole story, and because of other persons whom he has presumably also contaminated. And perhaps because of the mattress.’ His fear that something might happen to him or his family came and went, he said, adding: ‘I am frightened quite suddenly for no reason.’

Asked what might befall him, D3 gave a simple answer. ‘I may also be killed. I heard something,’ he said, adding that he felt guilty ‘because it then actually happened’. It never occurred to him to go to police immediately after the conversation, he explained, because he didn’t consider what Kovtun told him was actually possible.

German detectives were reluctant to believe D3’s account. They were sceptical for several reasons. First, they thought it unlikely that assassins sent by Moscow on a complex mission would be scrambling around at the last moment looking for a cook. Second, what kind of killer would suggest in the same breath that he and his ex-wife might strip off for a porno mag? It was … well, illogical. And improbable. And therefore dubious.

It wasn’t until 2010 that Scotland Yard – using cellular data and interviews with D3’s colleagues – established he was telling the truth.

In conversations with his friends and ex-in-laws in Germany, Kovtun stuck to the script: he was blameless. He called Eleanora Wall, his former mother-in-law, and
said: ‘Please do not think that I did this.’ She believed him. ‘Dmitry is not a brutal person who kills people. No member of the KGB would have put poison in Dmitry’s hands,’ she told Hamburg detectives. ‘I do not believe when he visited us he knew he was giving off radioactivity.’

Only once did Kovtun let his guard slip – and then in ambiguous terms. Back in Moscow he was receiving regular infusions, he told Wall, as well as other medicines whose names he couldn’t reveal. Kovtun said he’d been exposed to some of the poison that did for Litvinenko. And told her: ‘These arseholes have probably poisoned us all.’ He didn’t explain who the arseholes were.

While Kovtun was calling Germany, the Russian authorities were busy covering up their role in the murder. Similar to the Metropolitan Police, Menzel tried to test the Aeroflot plane Kovtun had taken from Moscow to Hamburg. A team was got ready to ground it as soon as it arrived. Somehow, Russia’s spy agencies learned of the plan and at the last minute Aeroflot swapped planes. Kovtun’s plane never came back.

In Hamburg and London, the threads were coming together. The Met has been the focus of much public criticism but its investigation into Litvinenko’s murder was painstaking and exemplary. Around 100 detectives were involved, together with 100 uniformed officers.

Teams were sent out across the capital. Their job was to collect CCTV, identify potential witnesses and to find members of the public who may have been contaminated.

The public-health picture was a horrifying one. Forensic tests showed the murderers left radioactive traces at every location they visited: offices, restaurants, hotel rooms, toilets and aeroplanes. Scientists revisited each location with specialist detection equipment. They scanned every inch – leaving stickers with radiation readings in different locations.

This information was fed back to Scotland Yard’s computer-aided modelling bureau. It reproduced the findings in graphic form. Scientists also tested hair samples from Litvinenko. The results were revealing: they gave a window of dates for the two occasions on which he was poisoned. These coincided exactly with the dates of his meetings with Lugovoi and Kovtun.

The polonium appears on the hair as an area of darkness – first as a constellation of light dots and then as an intense, banded black region. The hair of a dead man.

I arrived in Moscow in January 2007, as the
Guardian
’s new Moscow bureau chief. My wife Phoebe and our two small children, Tilly and Ruskin, came too. We moved into a cramped temporary apartment in a tower block in the suburb of Voikovskaya. The kids’ new British international school was within walking distance; in the frozen courtyard youths were drinking from tins of beer. The cold felt sharp; it hit you in the face; you breathed it.

It was an inauspicious moment to be a British correspondent in Russia.

When Putin first became president in 2000, relations between Britain and Russia were positive. Putin’s first foreign trip was to London. Russia’s new leader – at this point an enigmatic figure, and the subject of the question ‘Who is Mr Putin?’ – called into Downing Street for talks. The prime minister Tony Blair hailed his guest as a fellow moderniser and defended him in the face of criticism over human-rights abuses and the new war in Chechnya. Putin even met the Queen at Windsor Castle.

The estrangement began in 2003, when a British judge granted Berezovsky political asylum. A court turned down Russia’s extradition request for Zakayev, whom it accused of terrorism. Putin took these decisions as a personal snub.

In the Russian system, judges typically do what the Kremlin expects of them. Putin interpreted the court’s rulings as a betrayal by Blair, who had failed to ensure the correct result. Russia lodged twenty-one applications for the extradition of Russian citizens from the UK. All were unsuccessful. Judges refused them on the understandable grounds that the individuals were unlikely to get a fair trial back in Russia and were, in many cases, being persecuted for their anti-government views.

Relations with the west in general were cooling, too. The Kremlin didn’t perceive the pro-western revolutions in Georgia, in 2003, and in Ukraine, in 2004, as popular movements for democratic reform. They were, it claimed to believe, the product of a US-engineered conspiracy.
And a further sign of America’s insidious encroachment in Russia’s post-Soviet neighbourhood. US president George W. Bush – an early enthusiast for Putin – found that Russia’s president was a prickly and unpredictable adversary, opposed to Bush’s Iraq misadventure and much else.

From these alleged slights flowed a series of hostile actions by the Russian government. The British side did some daft things, too. In January 2006, Russian state TV broadcast footage showing an alleged British intelligence officer retrieving information from an artificial ‘rock’ concealed in a Moscow park. The 30-cm rock looked like a small, innocuous light brown boulder – the kind of boulder familiar to fans of
The Flintstones
. The FSB claimed UK diplomats used the rock to communicate with their Russian ‘agents’. (Jonathan Powell, Blair’s special adviser, later admitted the spy rock was genuine.)

Berezovsky remained a toxic figure for Putin’s administration. Just how toxic I found out for myself in April 2007. Two colleagues interviewed him in London. Berezovsky told them he was plotting nothing less than a revolution. He was, he said, bankrolling people close to the president who were conspiring to mount a palace coup. ‘We need to use force to change this regime,’ he said. Democratic methods were pointless – they wouldn’t work.

Berezovsky acknowledged that such statements were risky: ‘I don’t have any doubts that the Putin regime has become criminal, killing those they calculate as their personal enemy.’ Why? ‘Because they [the regime]
identify themselves as Russia. Putin’s understanding is who is against him is against Russia.’

The oligarch’s latest claims were incendiary. He’d said similar things before but in less vehement tones. My bosses at the
Guardian
asked if I might get a reaction from the Kremlin. I reached Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s spin-doctor, and faxed over the key quotes to his office inside the president’s HQ. I had visited Peskov there before, soon after taking up my new Moscow job; he’d told me it was a sadness that the country’s opposition was weak.

The story appeared on the
Guardian
’s front page the following day, with a photo of Berezovsky and the headline: ‘I am plotting a new Russian revolution’. Peskov’s comments were included: ‘In accordance with our legislation [his remarks] are being treated as a crime.’ My by-line – Luke Harding in Moscow – appeared on the story, placed third, behind that of my two colleagues who’d done the work. At this point I’d never personally met Berezovsky or had any dealings with him.

A more self-assured regime would have dismissed Berezovsky’s claims as self-aggrandising baloney. They were ridiculous. Berezovsky didn’t have a secret army working inside Russian power. The FSB’s purpose, however, was to uncover plots against the state. Here – in lurid black and white – seemingly there was one. Someone inside the spy agency decided to hunt the conspirators. A good place to start, he thought, would be with the
Guardian
’s Moscow reporter.

I woke up the next morning to find myself inside a sort of sub-John le Carré spy novel. Over the next few
weeks a succession of FSB agents followed me round the streets of Moscow. They were easy to spot: unpromising young men wearing cheap leather jackets and brown shoes. Once I met a friend in the deserted basement of a café. Two FSB operatives turned up ten minutes later and, ignoring the many empty tables, sat right next to us. They didn’t order anything; the spy agency doesn’t pay expenses for its officers on duty, I discovered. We laughed, and left.

It became obvious that someone was listening to my phone calls. The
Guardian
’s bureau was a ground-floor apartment in a block close to Moscow’s Belorusskaya train station. Two low-ceilinged apartments knocked into one. From the tiny kitchen you could see a small area of green where locals walked their dogs. I had a large desk with a landline. Whenever I called London and mentioned the word ‘Litvinenko’ or ‘Berezovsky’ the connection was cut. There was an ominous crackling. The same thing happened if I made jokes about Putin.

Other western correspondents experienced eaves-dropping too; the Brits and Americans were routinely monitored, it seemed. The KGB had perfected these techniques during the Cold War. Female agents listened to targets for hours on end in secret chambers dotted around Moscow. (This was tedious low-level work; it took hours to transcribe conversations.) A caller from the presidential administration, meanwhile, asked for my cellphone number. It looked as if someone had hacked my Gmail account too. Emails tagged with Berezovsky disappeared and then reappeared in my inbox.

None of this was perhaps surprising. Litvinenko’s murder had put a deep chill on UK–Russian relations; I was a British correspondent. The KGB taught its recruits that all western journalists were spies. The belief flowed from mirror thinking: in Soviet times, correspondents abroad, like the talented Yuri Shvets, used journalistic cover to conceal their real jobs as KGB operatives.

What was more unusual in my case were the break-ins by the FSB – a series of intrusions into the apartment where I lived with my family. These were sinister and unwelcome. They became a recurring feature of our Moscow life.