Authors: Terence T. Finn
Tags: #History, #Asia, #Afghanistan, #Military, #United States, #eBook
One of the lengthier battles of the Tet Offensive took place at Hue, the old imperial capital of Vietnam. NVA and VC troops initially took control of the city and were thrown out only after fierce fighting, often door to door, by U.S. marines and ARVN troops. Lest anyone think that the Communists were simply freedom-loving Vietnamese seeking to reunite their country, it should be noted that while occupying Hue the Communists rounded up 2,810 individuals they didn’t like and summarily executed them.
Atrocities, however, were not just the purview of the Communists. The U.S. Army also stepped over the line of civilized behavior. In March 1968, a small group of American infantry entered the village of My Lai and massacred more than two hundred civilians. At first the army attempted to cover up the incident. Eventually the truth came out and several officers were disciplined (though not harshly). Rarely have soldiers in American uniforms so disgraced themselves and the army in which they served.
General Westmoreland saw Tet as an American victory. He was wrong.
Shocked by the magnitude of the offensive, the American public considered Tet a disaster. Americans had been led to believe that the war was going well, that the end was in sight. Yet here was the enemy with strength assaulting targets all across South Vietnam. Particularly damaging were the reports and photographs of the VC attack on the embassy grounds. Nineteen VC sappers blew their way into the ambassador’s compound (but never reached the embassy itself). All nineteen were killed, as were several Americans. The repercussions of this attack and of the Tet Offensive in general were enormous. American support for the war plummeted.
Without this support, Lyndon Johnson could not maintain the course he had charted. He thus took a series of steps that drastically altered the military landscape in Vietnam as well as the political landscape in Washington. He turned down General Westmoreland’s request for 206,000 additional troops. He reduced the pace of Rolling Thunder. He convened a group of “wise men” to advise on how to proceed (they recommended he de-escalate the war effort—which he did). He initiated peace talks with the North Vietnamese. And, most dramatically, he announced in a televised speech to the nation on March 31, 1968, that he would not seek reelection.
Tet was a turning point. It caused the United States to back away from the war in Vietnam and forced an American president into retirement. In Hanoi the regime no doubt rejoiced. Total victory, they believed, was within reach.
***
One year after the start of the Tet Offensive, the United States had a new president. This was Richard Nixon, who soon appointed Dr. Henry Kissinger as his National Security Advisor. Together, they made a formidable team. Both were smart, tough, and devious, characteristics that would prove useful in dealing with the North Vietnamese. Their overriding goal was to establish a new balance of power, one in which America played a key role in making the world safer and more prosperous. This meant reaching an accommodation with Communist China and, via the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, with the Soviet Union. The situation in Vietnam they saw as an obstacle to achieving this goal, so they embarked on an effort, often secretly, to bring American involvement in Vietnam to a close.
The president knew he had to bring about the withdrawal of U.S. troops, but he wanted to do so in such a way that America’s honor was intact. This involved ensuring that a viable government of South Vietnam remained independent of the north. It meant also that he secure the release of the American prisoners held captive in Hanoi.
Most of these POWs were aviators, shot down during Rolling Thunder or later air raids. They numbered a little less than six hundred and constituted an important negotiating chip held by the Communists, who skillfully exploited the desire of the Americans to have these men returned. Their release was a political necessity for any diplomacy Nixon and Kissinger were to undertake.
Ensconced in the White House, the president embarked on four initiatives regarding Vietnam. The first was to begin, and then continue, the withdrawal of troops. By the end of 1969 some one hundred thousand soldiers had left. The second step was to build up the armed forces of South Vietnam to such an extent that they could survive once U.S. forces had departed. Consequently, tons and tons of military equipment were dispatched to the ARVN and to the South’s fledgling air force. Next, Nixon had Kissinger begin secret discussions with the North Vietnamese aimed at bringing an end to the conflict. The National Security Advisor went to Paris for these talks, but little was accomplished, for neither side was willing to make concessions the other considered essential. The fourth initiative was military in nature. Despite his Quaker upbringing, Nixon was no dove. He ordered the air force to strike the NVA hard and to strike it often.
One weapon the president wished the air force to employ more forcefully was the B-52. This impressive airplane could carry a large number of bombs, far more than either a Phantom or an F-105. Moreover, the plane had electronic devices on board that helped shield it from enemy missiles. Used extensively in Vietnam, the first B-52 mission took place on April 11, 1966. B-52s were employed tactically hitting targets in the south. They had not been sent north to Hanoi and Haiphong.
On March 18, 1969, Nixon ordered the big bombers to strike NVA troops and supply depots in Cambodia. Hanoi’s forces had long used as a sanctuary Cambodian territory adjacent to South Vietnam. This, of course, violated the country’s neutrality. They also had used the Cambodian Port of Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Siam as a major link for transporting supplies. Lyndon Johnson had denied his generals permission to attack these NVA enclaves. Richard Nixon had no such reservations. He sent the B-52s into action. Nixon kept these attacks secret. Not kept hidden was his next move: he ordered American ground troops to raid NVA bases in Cambodia. Some ten thousand U.S. soldiers joined five thousand ARVN troops in the attack. They killed a fair number of the enemy and destroyed large quantities of supplies, but they did not, as hoped, eliminate the NVA’s presence.
The invasion into Cambodia lasted from April 29, 1970, through June 30 of that year. Militarily, the raid made sense. But at home it created a political firestorm. Why, asked Mr. Nixon’s critics, at a time when the United States was reducing its role in Vietnam, did the army launch a new major offensive against a neutral nation? Students in particular objected. Many protested, some violently. As a result, a total of six students at Kent State University and Jackson State College were killed when fired upon by National Guard troops called out to restore order.
By the end of 1970, approximately 280,000 American soldiers remained in Vietnam. While a large number, it was far fewer than had served when U.S. troop levels peaked in 1969. Clearly, President Nixon was bringing the troops home. As their number decreased, so did their activity. In 1971, for example, General Creighton Abrams, who had replaced Westmoreland as commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, conducted not a single major ground operation. American aircraft still flew combat missions, but on land the G.I.s no longer were on the attack.
Wisely, Richard Nixon believed the North Vietnamese would respect only force. So when the ARVN struck Communist bases in Laos (like Cambodia, an allegedly neutral state) he ordered U.S. air assets to support the South Vietnamese. No American ground troops were permitted to participate. The operation was called Lam Son 719. Involving nine thousand ARVN troops, it began on February 8, 1971. At first they did well. But soon outnumbered, they fell back, many in disarray. On both sides casualties were heavy. As an indication of the ARVN’s readiness to fight on its own, Lam Son 719 was not encouraging.
One positive outcome of the ARVN attack into Laos was to delay the invasion of South Vietnam, planning for which was under way by the NVA. Making such an invasion possible, the Soviet Union had re-equipped Hanoi’s army. No longer a lightly armed guerilla force, by early 1972 the NVA was a powerful and well-trained conventional army. It possessed large numbers of tanks, trucks, artillery pieces, and the like. With such a force North Vietnam reasoned it could at last crush the regime in the south. After all, by the spring of 1972, when the invasion began, U.S. troops mostly were gone from Vietnam and, as importantly, so were American aircraft.
***
The invasion began on March 30, 1972. Employing two hundred thousand troops, the NVA first struck across the DMZ, aiming for Quang Tri. Then, from Laos, they attacked in the Central Highlands, targeting the town of Kontum. Not wishing to exclude southern Vietnam, the NVA also attacked in the provinces northwest of Saigon. Known to Western historians as the Eastertide Offensive, the invasion was planned by Vo Nguyen Giap, Hanoi’s army chief who had triumphed at Dien Bien Phu. Massive in scope, it also was ferocious in character.
Despite having half a million men under arms, the South Vietnamese army was thrown back, in all three sectors. While several ARVN units performed well, many did not, repeating a pattern all too familiar to U.S. advisors. As the NVA troops progressed, their commander was confident of victory.
General Giap, however, had not reckoned on Richard Nixon.
Responding to the invasion, the president decided to assist the South Vietnamese. Sending in U.S. ground troops was not politically feasible, so Nixon turned to one of America’s most potent assets: airpower. He ordered air force and navy pilots back into combat. In one of his more memorable comments, Richard Nixon said, “The bastards have never been bombed like they’re going to be bombed this time.”
The U.S. aerial response to the Eastertide Offensive was code named Linebacker. In numbers alone the operation was impressive. From the Philippines and Guam, from Korea and Japan, and from airfields in the United States, aircraft returned to their bases in Thailand and South Vietnam. Indicative of the scale of the response, 168 airborne tankers participated in the campaign. Adding to Linebacker’s punch were the B-52s, which flew 6,038 sorties attacking targets in the south. Tactical aircraft too were part of the effort: F-4 Phantoms headed north to targets well above the DMZ, as did naval aircraft from the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carriers. To illustrate Nixon’s determination to pound the North Vietnamese, targets around Hanoi and Haiphong, previously off-limits, were now subject to attack. As one historian of the Vietnam War, Dave Richard Palmer, has written, “Linebacker was not Rolling Thunder—it was war.”
In first blunting and then halting the NVA, America’s intervention proved decisive. NVA troops, pounded from the air, gave ground and, eventually, withdrew. Battles, however, took place for a period of six months. Quang Tri, for example, which the Communists had seized, was liberated only in September. When the fighting finally ceased, the NVA had suffered one hundred thousand casualties (a number that seemed to disturb Hanoi not at all) and gained little ground. Clearly, the invasion had failed. It’s architect, Vo Nguyen Giap, was quietly replaced.
As American airpower was demonstrating its effectiveness, the president’s National Security Advisor was in Paris attempting to cut a deal with the North Vietnamese. By November, Dr. Kissinger had announced that the two sides were close to an agreement. But at the last minute the talks broke down. The Americans concluded that the Vietnamese simply were stalling for time, while the north saw revisions to the agreement Kissinger was seeking on behalf of the South Vietnamese government as duplicitous. Regardless of which side was to blame, the talks were deadlocked. No agreement had been reached. Frustrated, Henry Kissinger returned to Washington to consult with Mr. Nixon.
Angry with the North Vietnamese, Richard Nixon once again turned to airpower. In an effort to get the north to sign an agreement, the president ordered his air commander to pulverize Hanoi and Haiphong. And this time the B-52s, symbol of American aerial might, would not be limited to tactical strikes in South Vietnam. For the first time, they were to be sent north. The president wanted the U.S. Air Force to dispatch the big bombers to the two cities and hit them hard. The goal was not to kill civilians (thus, some targets were still off-limits), but to level practically every conceivable military installation.
What followed is referred to as the Christmas Bombings. President Nixon and the air force called it Linebacker II. For eleven days, beginning on December 18, 1972, the B-52s struck the heart of North Vietnam. At first, the Vietnamese put up a stout defense, firing SA-2 missiles at the planes. These brought down fourteen of the bombers. Another B-52 was lost to MiGs, bringing the total number of B-52s destroyed to fifteen. Despite these losses, the air campaign succeeded. Having fifteen thousand tons of bombs dropped on them convinced leaders in Hanoi to resume the peace talks.
Negotiations began again on January 8, 1973, and agreement quickly was reached. That the north had no intention of honoring the terms of the agreement it had signed made little difference. Thanks to Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, the United States had found a way to extricate itself from what had been a long and bloody conflict.
***
Late in February of 1973 a U.S. Air Force C-141 transport plane lifted off the runway at Hanoi’s airport. Aboard were former American POWs, now free. At least one of the conditions insisted on by President Nixon, that Americans held captive be released, had been achieved. The other condition, that South Vietnam be allowed to remain independent of the north, was not to be realized.
Almost immediately after the agreement in Paris had been signed, the regime in Hanoi began planning another invasion. Aided greatly by having thousands of troops already in the south, troops that, by the terms of the Paris Accord, they did not have to withdraw, the Communists assembled men and military equipment for the attack. This took well over a year. By the spring of 1975, they were ready.
The attack began in March. Richard Nixon had pledged to the South Vietnamese that should the north again attack, the United States would come to its defense, as it had during the Eastertide Offensive. But in 1975 Nixon no longer was president. His successor, Gerald Ford, wished to render assistance. However, restrained by an American public tired of the conflict and by the newly enacted War Powers Act that limited presidential discretion in terms of military action, he was unable to do so. Thus Ford allowed North Vietnam’s blatant violation of the Paris Accord to go unanswered. This time no American aerial armada would return to Vietnam.