Authors: Terence T. Finn
Tags: #History, #Asia, #Afghanistan, #Military, #United States, #eBook
As the marines got close to Baghdad, Iraqi resistance stiffened. Tanks and artillery were employed to stop the Americans. Near Al Aziziyah, forty miles south of the capital, an eight-hour battle took place, which Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales Jr., in their book
The Iraq War: A Military History
,
described as “the most significant battle against enemy conventional forces during the war.” Once again the Americans won the day. It seemed like nothing could stop the marines; at least the Iraqis couldn’t. But as the army’s history of the campaign states, “getting to Baghdad looked easier on the map than it was in practice.”
The marines arrived in the environs of Baghdad on April 6.
.
The next day, under fire, they crossed the Diyala River, a small waterway that flows into the Tigris River just east of the city. Using tanks, amphibious vehicles, helicopters, and artillery, the American force moved into the Iraqi capital, staying east of the Tigris. By then, many in the Iraqi military had taken off their uniforms and, to employ a phrase a number of observers later used, “melted away.”
The marines’ campaign had been a success. Starting at the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, America’s maritime soldiers had fought their way to Baghdad. Skeptics would say they had faced a third-rate adversary. Perhaps, but this adversary was well armed and, more than once, fought tenaciously.
The campaign was not over when the marines crossed the Diyala. There would be several days of combat in the city itself before the marines were able to lay down their weapons. What they had accomplished no longer may be of interest to an American public tired of the quagmire Iraq became. But historians, at least some of them, may take note of the U.S. Marine Corps’ Iraqi campaign. One British observer, as reported by Murray and Scales, called it “one that should be taught in staff colleges for years to come.”
***
The American assault on Iraq in 2003 encompassed six separate military endeavors. These were mutually reinforcing and, in fact, constituted a single, integrated campaign. In no particular order the six were: (1) the U.S. marine advance to Baghdad via An Nasiriyah and the Tigris, (2) the British operations in the south, (3) the naval efforts from warships in the Persian Gulf, (4) the aerial strikes that so greatly aided U.S. and British ground troops, (5) the U.S. Army’s drive to Baghdad along the Euphrates River, and (6) Special Forces operations north and west of the Iraqi capital.
As noted earlier, Special Forces in Iraq had several tasks. They were to shut down Iraqi Scud missile operations, keep enemy army units in the north from reinforcing the defenses of Baghdad, and both assist and restrain the Iraqi Kurds who inhabited much of Iraq’s northern lands. When the war ended, the Special Forces had successfully carried out all three tasks.
The Kurds were an Islamic people who, while Iraqis, enjoyed semi-independence from Saddam’s regime. They lived north of what was called the Green Line. This was a one-hundred-mile-long line of demarcation, the south of which was controlled by Saddam. The Kurds had little love for the Iraqi ruler and, thus, welcomed the presence of U.S. Special Forces. Complicating an already complex political situation were the Kurds living in eastern Turkey. They wished, as did many of the Iraqi Kurds, to establish an independent Kurdish nation. This desire greatly upset the Turks. They saw in American support of the Iraqi Kurds the possibility of consequences that would lead to a new country, Kurdistan, part of which would be carved out of their own territory.
During late March and early April, the American Special Forces, augmented by regular U.S. Army troops and marines, and enjoying firepower delivered by American aircraft, defeated their Iraqi opponents on more than one occasion. At the same time they supported the Iraqi Kurds, providing weapons, medicines, and tactical advice.
Three specific military operations in the north were particularly noteworthy. The first, which began on March 26 and lasted four days, was a successful attack on an Iranian-backed group of al-Qaeda terrorists known as Ansar al-Islam. The Kurds detested this group and, with 6,500 men, supported by U.S. Special Forces and American airpower, assaulted their mountain strongholds, killing many of the terrorists.
The second operation was an all-American action. One thousand soldiers of the 173rd Airborne Brigade parachuted onto an airfield in the Kurdish-controlled portion of Iraq (this was the forty-fourth combat jump in the history of the U.S. Army). The next day, March 27, additional paratroopers were flown in, as were tanks and supplies, the latter for both the Americans and their Kurdish allies.
The airborne operation showcased U.S. military strength in northern Iraq. It also bolstered the morale of the Kurds and reinforced the incorrect belief held by the Iraqis that the Americans would employ paratroopers to seize Baghdad. That the brigade’s drop zone already had been secured by Special Forces did not detract from its value.
The third military operation that deserves mention took place early in April. At that time, U.S. Special Forces and the Kurds were preparing to attack Kirkuk. This city, two hundred miles north of Baghdad, and its environs were rich with oil reserves. Those who controlled the city controlled the oil. The Kurds were eager to seize Kirkuk. However, before the attack occurred, the Iraqi defenders left. The Kurds then occupied the city. For the Americans, this was unacceptable. It constituted a possible prelude to Kurdish independence, which, in addition to bringing about likely action by the Turkish armed forces, jeopardized the territorial integrity of Iraq. The latter possibility concerned the Americans, who, after all, had invaded Iraq to remove Saddam and his regime, not to dismember the country. The U.S. Special Forces acted immediately. Exercising both political skill and military muscle, they persuaded the Kurds to withdraw.
***
Once the great sandstorm—the
shamal—
had subsided, the U.S. soldiers that had reached Najaf were ready to move on Baghdad. The march “up country” was over. The time had come to first surround and then seize the Iraqi capital.
One issue Americans had to consider was where to cross the Euphrates River. Their commanders decided to do so in the narrow gap between the town of Karbala and the large lake to its east, Bahr al Milh. With Karbala just fifty miles south of Baghdad, McKiernan expected the Iraqis to put up a stiff resistance. And if Saddam was ever going to employ weapons of mass destruction, the American general assumed he would do so as they approached the Iraqi capital.
To confuse the Iraqis and to have their focus on somewhere other than the Karbala Gap, the Americans conducted a series of feints. These were five simultaneous attacks each of which McKiernan wanted Saddam to conclude might be the principal attack. One of the feints was at Hindiyah. Another was at Kifl, a town north of Najaf but east of the great river. Kifl was full of fedayeen who used it as a transit point for deployment farther south. The resulting battle in and around Kifl turned out to be more of a fight than the Americans had expected. But the outcome was similar to other battles in Iraq: U.S. troops carried the day.
The drive through the Gap began at midnight on April 1. Abrams tanks and Bradley armored personnel carriers led the way. Their immediate objective was the bridge at Yasir al-Khuder. This spanned the Euphrates and was just twenty miles from Baghdad. The Iraqis, who had repositioned troops away from the Gap in response to the feints, nevertheless fought hard. Using T-72s, Russian-built main battle tanks, and artillery, Saddam’s soldiers made a determined effort to halt the Americans. They failed, but punctured the belief now held by many that the Iraqi army was incapable of striking back.
By April 3, McKiernan’s troops were closing in on Baghdad’s main airport, which lay to the west of the city. The next day, a fierce battle took place as the Iraqis attempted to repel the invaders. When the fight was over, thirty-four T-72 tanks had been destroyed and many Iraqis killed. The Americans controlled the airport and, with the marines approaching the Diyala, the encirclement of Baghdad had begun.
To prevent Iraqi troops from either reinforcing or leaving the capital, McKiernan’s soldiers established five operating bases south and west of Baghdad. These also placed the Americans in position to take control of the city. Each of the five were named after an American professional football team. Thus, Objectives Bears, Lions, Texans, Ravens, and Saints ringed much of Baghdad. Objective Saints was an area where two key highways intersected. The Iraqis fought hard to keep the Americans from securing this pivotal location. Employing tanks and artillery as well as commandos, Saddam’s men attacked. But to no avail. The battle took place on April 3 and 4, and when it was over, Objective Saints was in American hands.
Throughout the war the news media covered the Americans’ advance. To make possible more accurate and extensive coverage, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld permitted reporters to be embedded in U.S. combat units. These media personnel shared the hardships endured by the American troops. They also faced the dangers inherent when the shooting started. One of the embedded reporters was Michael Kelly of the
Atlantic Monthly.
He died during the attack on Baghdad’s airport, when the Humvee in which he was a passenger plunged into a canal, landing upside down.
While the American public and others were kept informed of the war’s progress by these reporters, Iraqi citizens had to rely on information provided by Saddam’s government, particularly by the Ministry of Information. Heading up this organization was Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf. He gave numerous briefings to the many journalists still stationed in Baghdad. These always were upbeat, positive accounts of the war in which Iraqi forces were triumphant. That they were fanciful in the extreme al-Sahhaf seemed not to realize. In fact, the minister was living in a fantasy world. “Yes,” he stated as U.S. forces moved through the Karbala Gap, “the American troops have advanced further. This will only make it easier for us to defeat them.”
The U.S. troops in Iraq nicknamed al-Sahhaf “Baghdad Bob.” To them, he was a source of amusement as he made pronouncements they knew to be untrue. But the minister and his comments also were an irritant. The words he spoke received attention worldwide. They challenged the American account of the war and gave heart to many in the Arab world who wished to see the United States defeated by one of their own.
By April 5, with the marines at the Diyala and the army’s five operating bases secured, the Americans were poised to take control of Baghdad. Generals Franks and McKiernan believed that once the U.S. military controlled the city, Saddam and his regime would be finished. They also believed that the effort to seize Baghdad could lead to protracted urban warfare. This they wanted to avoid. Such combat would be extremely destructive and, more important, would result in numerous casualties, both American and Iraqi.
The two generals knew that the number of troops they had available to assault Baghdad was not large. The capital, after all, was a city of six million people spread out over 440 square miles. How then would the Americans proceed? What was their plan of attack?
They decided to act with caution. There would be no frontal assault, by either the marines or the army troops. Instead, like the British at Basra, the Americans planned a series of raids into the city. These would increase in scale and tempo, gradually wearing down the Iraqis. But before they were to begin, the U.S. Army conducted an operation that became one of the war’s most celebrated episodes.
The operation was called “Thunder Run.” Carried out by a small armored task force, it was a mission of reconnaissance the purpose of which was to ascertain how the Iraqis would fight within the confines of Baghdad. But Thunder Run had more than one purpose. “The task,” said Colonel David Perkins, who commanded the unit to which the task force belonged, “is to enter Baghdad for the purpose of displaying combat power, to destroy enemy forces—and to simply show them that we can.”
U.S. Army doctrine said tanks were not to operate in cities. Urban areas limited their maneuverability, restricted their lines of fire, and exposed tanks to attacks from above. Thunder Run proved the doctrine wrong.
At 6:30
A.M.
on April 5, twenty-nine Abrams tanks and several other combat vehicles drove into the city. They traveled up Highway 8, a modern roadway much like an American interstate. What followed, according to Mark Bowden, author of
Black Hawk Down
, was “the most bitterly contested moment of the war.” It ended two hours and twenty minutes later when the task force, as planned, arrived at the Baghdad airport. One American was dead and one Abrams was destroyed. Estimates of Iraqi losses vary, but at least a thousand men—many of them fedayeen—no longer were alive.
One amusing event occurred during Thunder Run. An Iraqi brigadier general, a staff officer, was driving to work that morning, as he did every workday. Unaware that the Americans were nearby (apparently, he listened to al-Sahhaf’s broadcasts), he turned the corner and promptly drove his Volkswagen Passat into the side of an Abrams M1A1 tank. Needless to say, the car fared poorly and the general, one very surprised Iraqi, became a prisoner of war.
Two days later, a second Thunder Run was conducted. But this was a different kind of mission. The tanks were to drive to the center of the city, a distance of eleven miles, and then remain in Baghdad. The tanks and Bradleys would deploy in a circle, in the middle of the city, and challenge the Iraqis to dislodge them.
Whether the Americans, who reached the city center at 8
A.M.
on April 7, would be able to stay in the city depended on the army’s ability to deliver supplies to the task force. This force consisted of 570 soldiers in sixty tanks and other vehicles, and their requirements were substantial. Food, ammunition, and fuel had to be trucked to them. The supply route was up a highway on which three overpasses gave the Iraqis strong positions from which to fire on the convoys. For the U.S. troops, these overpasses had to be taken and held. Given the names Larry, Moe, and Curly, they all saw ferocious firefights. The Americans prevailed, but at times, it was, as the British would say, “a near thing.”