1
For representative viewpoints see Ku Chieh-kang and Yang Hsiang-k’uei, 1937, 39-54; E. L. Shaughnessy, “Historical Perspectives,” 199, 213-221; Herrlee G. Creel, 1970; or Hayashi Minao,
Toho Gakuho
29 (1959): 278.
2
“Obligations of the Son of Heaven.”
3
See Shaughnessy, “Historical Perspectives,” 220-224.
4
See Shaughnessy, 216. As noted, the term for horses,
ma
, is generally understood as referring to chariots. Ironically, the inscription refers to the king (rather inauspiciously) falling out of his chariot.
5
“Determining Rank,”
Ssu-ma Fa
.
6
For example, see “The Army’s Equipment,”
Liu-t’ao
.
8
“Determining Rank,”
Ssu-ma Fa
.
9
“Equivalent Forces,”
Liu-t’ao
.
10
“Equivalent Forces,”
Liu-t’ao
.
11
“Planning for the Army.”
12
“The Army’s Equipment.”
13
“The Army’s Equipment.”
14
“Equivalent Forces.” The text includes ratios for cavalry as well, noting that when “not engaged in battle one cavalryman is unable to equal one foot soldier” and considers one chariot to be equivalent to ten cavalrymen on easy terrain and six on difficult ground.
16
Questions and Replies
. This aspect continued to be emphasized in the chariot warfare section of the
Ts’ao-lü Ching-lüeh
, which quotes Li Ching in this regard.
17
For an overview see “Yung Ch’e” in the
Wu-ching Tsung-yao.
(Li Ching also discusses this aspect with regard to his own campaign against the Turks.) In “Military Instructions II” the
Wei Liao-tzu
mentions employing “a wall of chariots to create a solid defense in order to oppress the enemy and stop them” and “‘arraying the chariots’ refers to making the formations tight with the spears deployed to the front and putting blinders on the horses’ eyes.”
18
Wu-ching Tsung-yao
,
Ch’ien-chi
,
chüan
4.
19
The
Tso Chuan
contains accounts (such as Hsiang Kung, eighteenth year) in which
ta ch’e
(great vehicles) are connected together to block a defile.
20
“Employing Chariots,”
Wu-ching Tsung-yao
.
21
For an example of four occupants, see
Tso Chuan
, Chao Kung, twentieth year. At Kuo-chia-chuang only two people were buried with the chariot; many other interments have only one.
22
“Five Instructions,”
Military Methods
.
23
“Martial Chariot Warriors,”
Liu-t’ao
. The Chinese foot at the time of the
Liu-t’ao
’s compilation was about eight inches. (The passage reflects the inception of cavalry.)
24
For an example see
Tso Chuan
, Hsiang Kung, thirty-first year.
25
Tso Chuan
, Ch’eng Kung, second year. Prior to the battle Han dreamt his father told him not to stand to the side.
26
In 251 BCE, Yen, despite being a peripheral state, attacked Chao with 600,000 men and 2,000 chariots, one of the rare instances of a 300:1 ratio.
27
A
Tso Chuan
passage on Ch’u’s organization (known as the “double battalion of King Chuang”) gave rise to considerable confusion over the centuries and prompted a pointed discussion in the
Questions and Replies.
(See Sawyer,
Seven Military Classics
, 331.)
29
“Ta Ch’en,” “Hsiao K’uang.”
30
“Sheng Ma.” “Shan Chih Shu” also refers to a chariot having twenty-eight men.
32
In his discussion of the
Hsin Shu
’s chariot methods Li Ching concluded that troops were attached only to the attack chariots.
33
See “The Army’s Equipment,” which allocates fixed numbers of infantry to the roughly 600 specialized chariots integrated into the ideal 10,000-man army.
34
The reconstruction discussed above, advanced by Yen Yi-p’ing, NS 7 (1983): 16-28, is based on extensive reports from Yin-hsü and suggestions made by Shih Chang-ju. (See KKHP 2 [1947]: 1-81, especially 15-24 on chariots, weapons, and personnel, and BIHP 40 [1969:11]: 630-634, as well as Shih’s response to various criticisms, BIHP 58:2 [1987:6]: 273-276.)
35
Shih Chang-ju arbitrarily explained away one potential problem—the apparent existence of two chariots in each of the two graves at the top—by deeming the second one an auxiliary vehicle because it lacked any “occupants.” However, other explanations are possible, including that the fundamental unit should be seven chariots rather than five or that the other two were scout or reconnaissance vehicles.
36
The issue of five—whether the base of five included the respective unit-level leaders or they were additional—plagues historical reconstructions of Chinese military organization. If the rule of five is rigorously carried out, 5 men comprise a squad, 5 squads a company of 25, 5 companies a battalion of 125, 5 battalions a regiment of 625, 5 regiments a
shih
or army of 3,125, and 5 armies a division or
chün
of 15,625, numbers that do not cohere with the commonly discussed 2,500 for an army or
shih
and 12,500 for a division or
chün
. Moreover, there is always the question whether the officers constitute additional personnel or are to be subsumed within the respective units, posing insurmountable problems at the highest level because squad members suddenly have multiple ranks. (One ad hoc explanation envisions the lower leaders coming from within the unit but the higher ones being additional.)
37
Yen Yi-p’ing, NS 7 (1983): 28.
38
See E. L. Shaughnessy’s comments, HJAS 48, no. 1 (1988): 194-199. Shaughnessy notes that half the graves have been ignored.
39
Tso Chuan
, Chao Kung, twenty-first year. According to “Ming Kuei” in the
Mo-tzu
, King T’ang employed the goose formation when attacking Chieh, the Hsia’s last tyrant.
40
Texts such as the
Wei Liao-tzu
(“Offices, 1”) state: “The Whirlwind Formation and swift chariots are the means by which to pursue a fleeing enemy.”
41
“Equivalent Forces.” Further discussion of how the vastly increased number of chariots and infantry seen in the Warring States period actually functioned must be deferred. However, larger numbers simply exacerbate problems of coordination and the overall congestion, particularly if the chariots and infantry are not segregated and employed in distinctly different modes.
42
“Ten Questions,”
Military Methods
.
43
Tso Chuan
, Hsi Kung, twenty-eighth year. The Battle of Ch’eng-p’u, included among the examples in the
Wu-ching Tsung-yao
’s “Ch’üan Ch’i,” has been the subject of innumerable articles over the years and is extensively discussed in the two major Chinese military histories. Further explication in English may also be found in Frank A. Kierman Jr., “Phases and Modes of Combat in Early China.”
45
“Stimulating the Officers,”
Wu-tzu
. The passage states: “Marquis Wu assented to his plan, granting him another 500 strong chariots and 3,000 cavalry. They destroyed Ch’in’s 500,000 man army as a result of his policy to encourage the officers.” However, it should be noted that the mention of cavalry, adamantly said not to exist in Wu Ch’i’s era, has raised doubts about the passage’s veracity.
46
For a theoretical example see “Responding to Change” in the
Wu-tzu
, where 1,000 chariots and 10,000 cavalry are to be divided into five operating groups supported by infantry. Similarly, when encountering the enemy in a confined valley, the chariots are to be divided into operational groups, four of which should conceal themselves on the sides to constrain the enemy’s options and mount ambushes. In “Eight Formations” Sun Pin also stressed dividing the chariots into discrete operational contingents (though without mentioning infantry) and suiting their numbers to the terrain’s characteristics.
47
“When the Three Armies are united as one man they will conquer. There are drums (directing the deployment of ) the flags and pennants; drums for the chariots; drums for the horses (cavalry); drums for the infantry; drums for the different types of troops; drums for the head; and drums for the feet. All seven should be properly prepared and ordered” (“Strict Positions,”
Ssu-ma Fa
). Sun-tzu also speaks about multiplying the drums to ensure strong control.
CHAPTER 23
1
Herrlee G. Creel, 1970, 262-282, was among the first to question the chariot’s capabilities. Studies of the chariot’s history and impact in the West by noted historians such as John Keegan and others have similarly debated its real combat role.
2
For a discussion of poisoning water supplies in Chinese warfare, see Sawyer,
Fire and Water.
3
“Wen” in the
Kuan-tzu
discusses the importance of enumerating the state’s resources, including the artisans who can be employed on expeditionary campaigns.
4
In addition to various grooms and ordinary stable hands, designated personnel were responsible for lubricating the axles in the Spring and Autumn. (See
Tso Chuan
, Hsiang Kung, thirty-first year and Ai Kung, third year.) A few oracular inscriptions suggest the Shang experienced some of these problems.
5
Tso Chuan
, Ai Kung, second year.
6
Tso Chuan
, Hsi Kung, fifteenth year.
7
For example, see the incident preserved in
Tso Chuan
, Chao Kung, twenty-first year.
8
Tso Chuan
, Ch’eng Kung, sixteenth year.
9
“Waging War.” He also states that seven-tenths of the people’s resources will be consumed.
11
Tso Chuan,
Ch’eng Kung, second year.
12
Tso Chuan
, Hsiang Kung, twenty-third year.
13
Tso Chuan
, Ch’eng Kung, second year.
14
Tso Chuan
, Hsüan Kung, twelfth year.
15
“Responding to Change,”
Wu-tzu
.
16
As recounted in
Judges
4 and 5. (Since Barak’s troops came down from the mountain, it wasn’t the hilly terrain that proved inimical, but the rain, noted only in the poeticized account in
Judges
5.)
17
“Ten Deployments,”
Military Methods
.
18
For example, as when the state of Chin attacked Cheng at T’ung-ch’iu in 468 BCE.
19
Ch’eng Kung, sixteenth year. In the incident already discussed in which horses unfamiliar with the terrain were employed, the chariot turned into a mire and was halted. (
Tso Chuan
, Hsi Kung, fifteeth year.)
20
The identification of terrain-imposed limitations certainly dates back to the Western Chou, but the first articulation is found in the
Art of War
.
21
“Ti T’u,” presumably a late Warring States chapter.
22
“Hsiao K’uang,”
Kuan-tzu
.
23
“Ten Questions,”
Sun Pin Military Methods
.
24
For a brief retelling of the incident, see Sawyer,
Tao of Deception
, 189-191.
25
Tso Chuan
, Ch’eng Kung, seventh year. The Sichuan area similarly lagged behind in their employment. (The
Pei-cheng Lü
[
chüan
7] makes the point that environment shapes natural tendencies and that skills in riding or using boats best derive from familiarity from an early age rather than from instruction. Thus Wu naturally inclined to boats and Chin to cavalry.)
26
“Battle Chariots” states: “The infantry values knowing changes and movement; the chariots value knowing the terrain’s configuration; and the cavalry values knowing the side roads and the Tao of the unorthodox.”
28
They essentially replicate a series found in the
Wu-tzu
’s “Responding to Change” in which victory is inevitable. (Generally speaking, the
Wu-tzu
is less concerned with tactics than with the essential principles governing chariot operations that have already been discussed for the horses, and it is only in the
Liu-t’ao
that their battlefield exploitation becomes apparent.)
29
Sun Pin, for example, asserted that in a dispersed deployment the “chariots do not race, the infantry does not run” (“Ten Deployments,”
Military Methods
).
30
If a chariot with wheels about 3 feet in diameter (and therefore with a circumference of nearly 9.5 feet) was moving at the still-significant speed of 5 miles an hour or about 440 feet per minute, the wheel would be turning at about 46 rpm. One revolution per second would have been slow enough for the most unskilled warrior to insert a spear near the outer rim between the spokes. Larger wheels would have been even slower, but higher speeds of 10 mph would still have been feasible.
31
Tso Chuan
, Yin Kung, ninth year. Even if a late fabrication, it no doubt reflects concepts common at the time of compilation in the Warring States period.
32
For further discussion see Sawyer,
Tao of Deception
, 23-24.
33
Tso Chuan
, Chao Kung, first year. Li Ching cites this episode as an example of the unorthodox in
Questions and Replies
. However, Li Ching thought they still represented chariot tactics even though they were deployed as infantrymen. (For further discussion, see Sawyer,
Tao of Deception
, 38-40.)