34
Duke Ai, second year, records that a battle commander riding in a chariot was brought down by a spear.
35
For example, see
Tso Chuan
, Chao Kung, twenty-sixth year.
36
For an example, see
Tso Chuan
, Ai Kung, second year.
37
Tso Chuan
, Ch’eng Kung, sixteenth year. Incidents of pursuit and seizure are recorded in Homeric warfare, and several well-publicized experiments with replica chariots in the West have shown that foot soldiers could have easily surrounded and overtaken chariots in the melee’s chaos.
38
“The Infantry in Battle,”
Liu-t’ao
.
39
T’ai Kung’s assertion attracted T’ang T’ai-tsung’s attention because it contradicted Sun-tzu’s admonitions. (See Book III of
Questions and Replies
.)
40
Examples are found in the
Liu-t’ao
chapter “Certain Escape,” including (in “Incendiary Warfare”) employing the chariots to thwart incendiary attacks.
41
For examples, see “Crow and Cloud Formation in the Mountains,”
Liu-t’ao
.
42
Caltrops, which might be conceived of as primitive land mines, repeatedly proved highly effective in stopping enemy advances and shaping the battlefield. (For examples of the types of caltrops and their modes of use, see “The Infantry in Battle.”)
43
In an odd illustration, Shih Chang-ju, BIHP 40 (1969:11), 666, places the archer on the right side of the chariot. (In the illustration both the chariot’s occupants and the horses are too small in comparison with the diameter of the wheels. However, the occupants are still tightly confined.)
44
For further analysis see Yang Hung’s classic discussion in “Chan-ch’e yü Ch’e-chan.”
45
In the
Tso Chuan
(Hsiang Kung, twenty-third year) a fighter who asks permission to act as the warrior on the right leaps aboard the chariot and, wielding a “sword” in his right hand, grasps the strap (or possibly the traces holding the outer horses) with his left.
CHAPTER 24
1
See Domicio Proenca Jr. and E. E. Duarte,
Journal of Strategic Studies
28, no. 4 (2005): 645- 677. Useful discussions of logistics include Martin Van Crevald,
Supplying War
; John Lynn, ed.,
Feeding Mars
; and Kenneth Macksey,
For Want of a Nail
.
2
The classic study is Donald W. Engels,
Alexander the Great and the Logistic of the Macedonian Army
.
3
The early sixth-century BCE Chou vessel known as the
Tao Ting Ming
records men being locally sent out to confiscate rice and millet.
4
“King’s Wings,”
Liu-t’ao
. This is also the first known description of a general staff.
5
For the nature and history of water denial measures, see Sawyer,
Fire and Water
.
6
The
Art of War
mentions thirst and the
Ssu-ma Fa
includes water among its seven administrative affairs in “Determining Rank.”
7
“Encouraging the Army” in the
Six Secret Teachings
emphasizes that the true general shares “hunger and satiety with the men.”
8
Studies of ancient Chinese logistics are extremely rare, basically limited to Yang Sheng-nan’s fiscally oriented work, LSYC 1992:5, 81-94, and part of the
Hou-ch’in Chih-tu
, edited by T’ung Chao (1997).
9
“Waging War.” A chapter titled “Ch’ing-chung Chia” in the
Kuan-tzu
generally dated to the second century BCE similarly notes that an army of 100,000
chi
bearers will exhaust all the firewood and grass for ten
li
and a single day’s combat will cost 1,000
chin
(units of gold).
10
“Employing Spies.” The “Pa Kuan” (“Eight Observations”) section of the
Kuan-tzu
similarly speaks about the dire impact of having just one-tenth of the populace serve in the military for extended terms.
12
Under Duke Ai’s second year the
Tso Chuan
records the capture of an astonishing 1,000 wagons (
ch’e
) filled with grain that was being transported to another area.
13
“Orders for the Vanguard.”
14
“Nine Terrains,”
Art of War
.
15
See, among several, T’ung Chao,
Hou-ch’in Chih-tu
, 25.
16
The
Ssu-ma Fa
counsels restraint, but “Martial Plans” and “Military Instructions II” in the
Wei Liao-tzu
also advocate not disturbing the farmers. Probably the earliest prohibition against disturbing farmers and their animals is embedded in the “Fei Shih” section of the
Shang Shu
.
17
“Controlling the Army,”
Wu-tzu
.
18
“Crow and Cloud Formation in the Marshes.” “Cavalry in Battle” also refers to the problems posed by an enemy having cut off the supply lines.
20
“Evaluating the Enemy.” Victory is so certain that divination, then a fundamental prebattle practice, was deemed unnecessary.
21
“Fatal terrain,” a well-developed concept in China’s sophisticated martial psychology, is first articulated in “Nine Terrains” in
Art of War
, but “Certain Escape” in the
Six Secret Teachings
advises burning the supply wagons to elicit this sort of unshakable commitment.
22
“Tactical Balance of Power in Attacks,”
Wei Liao-tzu.
23
“Tactical Balance of Power in Defense,”
Wei Liao-tzu
.
24
The
Wei Liao-tzu
stressed the connection in “Discussion of Regulations.” Shang Yang’s reforms are credited with significantly shaping Ch’in’s martial character.
25
“Maneuvering the Army,”
Art of War
. The chapter adds: “If they kill their horses and eat the meat, the army lacks grain.” (For a general discussion of assessment and deception in field reconnaissance, see “Field Intelligence” in Sawyer,
Tao of Spycraft
.)
26
“Military Instructions II,”
Wei Liao-tzu
.
27
“
Military Pronouncements
.” The last section parallels a passage in the
Kuan-tzu
’s “Pa Kuan.”
28
His ingenuity is cited to illustrate the topic of “The Hungry” in the
Hundred Unorthodox Strategies
.
29
For a brief discussion of the growth of animal husbandry, see Yen Wen-ming, SCKKLC, 351-361.
30
The
Art of War
admonishes commanders not to target fortified cities for siege or assault.
31
Ch’en Chien-hua, CKSYC 4 (2004): 3-14.
32
For relevant inscriptions see Chin Hsiang-heng, “San-hang San-shih,” 1974, 7-8.
33
“Waging War.” “Pa Kuan” (“Eight Observations”) in the
Kuan-tzu
notes that having to transport provisions about the countryside due to production and distribution problems will quickly deplete a state’s reserves and ultimately cause famine.
34
See, for example, T’ung Chao,
Hou-ch’in Chih-tu
, 1997, 23.
35
T’ung Chao,
Hou-ch’in Chih-tu,
20-21.
36
T’ung Chao (25) sees them as a sort of early version of the
t’un-t’ien
system.
37
Unfortunately none of the volumes on China’s transport history, including Wang Chan-yi’s massive
Chung-kuo Ku-tai Tao-lu Chiao-t’ung-shih,
does more than speculate on the pre-Chou period.
CHAPTER 25
1
Several books have recently tried to debunk the ardently held view of early societies being tranquil and cooperative, untarnished by conflict and warfare.
2
The tendency to idealize prehistoric societies even within the late Neolithic horizon as matriarchal and thus egalitarian can, for example, be seen in Yen Wen-ming’s 1988 article on Pan-p’o. Pan-p’o already shows strong defensive characteristics and evidence of warfare, yet the article asserts production and consumption were undertaken in common and the society was marked by equality.
3
Conflict is thus thought to have beset the central Hua-Hsia and Yi cultures even in the archaic period, reflecting the basic dichotomization of east and west.
4
“Wei 2.”
Chan-kuo Ts’e
, states that the “Tung Yi populace did not arise.” (For further discussion see Wang Yü-ch’eng, CKSYC 1986:3, 71-84.)
5
To take just one example, P’ei An-p’ing, WW 2007:7, 75-80, 96, traces the origin of (provocatory) privileges and private property to about 4500 BCE, about the time of Ch’eng-t’ou-shan.
6
In addition, as attested by a large number of artifacts but sparse locally available materials, stone weapons production became specialized. (See, for example, Li Hsin-wei, KK 2008:6, 58-68.)
7
T’ai-p’ing Yü-lan
,
chüan
193.
8
Analysts such as Hsü Hung, STWMYC, 286-295, have recently been scrutinizing the ancient period in an attempt to formulate some defining characteristics for different types of sites.
9
Two examples are the prominent but discontinuous 500-meter-long, 10-meter-wide ditch in the northeastern corner of Erh-li-t’ou and a 110-meter-long, 14-meter-wide remnant just north of the Shang capital of Yen-shih. (For a report on the former, see Hsü Hung et al., KK 2004:11, 23-31; for the latter, see SHYCS Ho-nan Erh-tui, KK 2000:7, 1-12.)
10
“Military Disposition.”
11
Some upon being abandoned, though for unknown reasons.
12
“Shih Chih Chieh,”
Yi Chou-shu
. This incident makes up a pair with one previously cited from the
Yi Chou-shu
to illustrate the belief that “one who practices warfare ceaselessly will perish.” An idea that probably originated in the Spring and Autumn period, it is manifestly expressed in the
Ssu-ma Fa
, which states that “even though a state may be vast, those who love warfare will inevitably perish. Even though calm may prevail under Heaven, those who forget warfare will certainly be endangered.” In “Audience with King Wei” Sun Pin similarly said: “Victory in warfare is the means by which to preserve vanquished states and continue severed generations. Not being victorious in warfare is the means by which to diminish territory and endanger the altars of state. For this reason military affairs must be investigated. Yet one who takes pleasure in the military will perish and one who finds profit in victory will be insulted. The military is not something to take pleasure in, victory not something through which to profit.” The
Art of War
is of course particularly known for its assertion that “warfare is the greatest affair of state, the Tao to survival or extinction.”
13
“Audience with King Wei.”
14
For productive distribution see Chen Fangmei, JEAA 2, nos. 1-2 (2000): 228. (The Shang’s fundamentally strong martial orientation is well attested by the high proportion of weapons found in the Anyang area.)
15
See Yen Wen-ming, KKWW 1982:2, 38-41, or Shao Wangping, JEAA 2, nos. 1-2 (2000): 199.
16
Western battle scenes from Sumer and Egypt dating to the third millennium BCE are well-known, so finding evidence for warfare in China of comparable age should not be unexpected. Yet it is frequently explained away as post-death treatment of the body or other benign activity, including accidental death or reinterment. Moreover, one of the main problems in discriminating between combat casualties and sacrificial victims is the tendency to presuppose an absence of conflict and view any skeletons showing the effects of deliberately inflicted violence as “sacrificial victims,” as if the sacrificial character somehow obviates the slaying aspect. (For a discussion see Mark Golitko and Lawrence H. Keeley,
Antiquity
81 [2007]: 332-342, who emphasize that the presence of fortifications should argue for combat rather than sacrifice.) For the purpose
of our investigation we have assumed that conflict has always existed and have interpreted the evidence accordingly rather than dismissing or transmorphing it.
Among the innumerable reports of graves with shattered skeletons, various crushing blows, dismemberment, and other untoward acts committed against the deceased, one puzzling one from Yün-men (radiocarbon dated to 1260 BCE, ± 90 or somewhere around the early Shang when corrected) where 172 stone arrowheads were found is particularly dramatic. Several of the interred had been shot multiple times, two more than ten times, with arrows in their chests, stomachs, and heads, and one woman was bound, suggesting that this was indeed a form of execution or that they had been used for target practice. There is also evidence of turning skulls into vessels and dishonoring the deceased, as well as scalping, in the Lungshan, though the latter has surprisingly not yet been identified as a practice of ancient Chinese warfare. (Scalping has been discussed in two articles: Yen Wen-ming, KKWW 1982:2, 38-41, and Ch’en Hsingts’an, WW 2000:1, 48-55.)
17
Sarah Allen, JAS 66, no. 2 (2007): 461-496, has recently advanced a concept of cultural hegemony derived from the appearance and ascendancy of Erh-li-t’ou culture.
18
A typical overview arguing for multiple origins is Yen Wen-ming, WW 1987:3, 38-50.
19
For examples of this position see Fan Yü-chou, HCCHS 2006:5, 11-15; Hsüeh Jui-che, HCCHS 2006:4, 13-22; and Tai Hsiang-ming, KKHP 1998:4, 389-418.
20
For an overview of the Yi-Luo area’s contribution, see Ch’en Hsing-ts’an et al., KKHP 2003:2, 161-218. Other topographical divisions are possible, including segmentation by river systems. (For example, see Ch’en Hsü, HSLWC [reprint of 1996], 282-292.)