Such reasoning—which had as its outcome a deliberate
reduction in the strength at the tip of the Russian salient—
played into Guderian's hand. Or, it would be more accurate to say,
into the hand which he still hoped that Hitler would deal him. For
Guderian's aims were strictly limited. To strike off Zhukov's
spearhead; and to teach a cautionary lesson, gaining not territory so
much as time; a couple of months, perhaps, in which the Eastern front
might be regrouped, the Western Allies might "come to their
senses." This was what he hoped to achieve.
During the first week of February the means to achieve this came
tantalisingly close to the Chief of Staff's grasp. Two more weak
Panzer divisions were drawn off the Western front and concentrated at
the training barracks at Krampnitz. Here they were equipped with
sufficient Tigers and even a few
Jagdtiger
, to make up an
extra company in each battalion. Each division thus had a strength
of four Panther and two Tiger companies in addition to a large number
of self-propelled artillery attached to the
Panzergrenadier
battalion. Furthermore, the SS divisions of Sepp Dietrich's 6th
Army had not yet been definitely committed to the Hungarian sector,
but were "resting" at Bonn and in the Witt-lich,
Traben-Trarbach areas.
Whether Guderian believed that he could wear Hitler down by
argument into changing his mind over Sepp Dietrich's assignment or
whether he wished to strengthen his reserves from the most obvious
source, he began to return to his favourite grievance, the continuing
purposeless and costly occupation of Courland. On 8th February there
was another disorderly scene, taking its occasion, as was usual at
the Fiihrer's evening conference.
Guderian claims that he spoke to Hitler as follows: "You must
believe me when I say it is not just pig-headedness on my part that
makes me keep on proposing the evacuation of Courland. I can see no
other way left to us of accumulating reserves, and without reserves
we cannot hope to de-fend the capital. I assure you that I am acting
solely in Germany's interests."
Thereupon Hitler, "trembling all down the left side of his
body," jumped to his feet and shouted, "How dare you speak
to me like that? Don't you think that I am fighting for Germany? My
whole life has been one long struggle for Germany."
He still continued to scream at his Chief of Staff in such an
"unusual frenzy" that Goering was compelled to separate
them, which he did by taking Guderian by the arm into another room
and giving him a cup of black coffee. While they were sitting there,
with the door open, Guderian caught sight of Doenitz passing in the
corridor and called to him. The Grand Admiral had his own reasons for
discouraging the evacuation of Courland, but Guderian managed to
extract from him the admission that the shipping space was available.
However, Doenitz insisted that the heavy equipment would have to be
abandoned (which he knew Hitler would refuse to sanction). While they
were arguing, Hitler, who had been left in the conference chamber
with Jodl, Goebbels, and two SS adjutants, but could hear Goering's
voice in the adjoining room, began to shout that he wished the
company to reassemble. This they did (but with some reluctance, it
may be thought), as it was plain that the Führer's ill temper
showed no sign of abating.
Sure enough, the moment that Guderian returned to the subject of
the proposed evacuation there was a new outburst of rage: ". .
. he stood in front of me shaking his fists, so that my good Chief of
Staff, Thomale, felt con-strained to seize me by the skirt of my
uniform jacket and pull me backwards lest 1 be the victim of a
physical assault."
Thus was the Nazi hierarchy reduced: shouting, pulling and
shoving, comforting one another with hot drinks; they seem to
resemble less the myrmidons of a despotic court than inmates of the
Servants' Hall on an off day. But the image is deceptive. These were
the same men who had held, and still held, positions of absolute
power; the gift to steal or "liquidate" at the lightest
whim. Now they were frightened. A chill draught could be felt and it
blew from the grave.
"Wenn wir diesen Krieg verlieren, dann
möge uns der Himmel gnädig sien."
The worsening of his relations with Hitler had precluded the
possibility of Guderian's being allowed to use the 6th SS Army for
his counteroffensive, and during the second week of February, Koniev
and Zhukov had jointly completed the encirclement and isolation of
Glogau and driven Army Group Centre back to the line of the Neisse.
Guderian therefore decided to give up for the time being his
scheme for a convergent attack, and to concentrate on a single blow
from the Arnswalde forest area against Zhukov's long right flank. The
quadrilateral between the Neisse, the Oder, and the Carpathians was
only lightly held, and Guderian may well have thought that Koniev's
intrusion there could be turned to the German advantage. For if the
Arnswalde attack should prosper, he would find it easier to get
permission for the employment of Sepp Dietrich's army on the southern
flank and the Soviet retreat would be confined at the Oder by the
garrisons of Glogau and Breslau. Here, too, the pattern of the
Russian dispositions seemed temptingly vulnerable.
For the Arnswalde attack Guderian had managed to assemble, in
spite of all his difficulties, a formidable reserve. Rauss,
together with three and a half divisions of the 3rd Panzer Army and
most of the staff, had been evacuated from Pilau. Into this command
were placed the two reformed Panzer divisions from Krampnitz. At
the same time the National Leader and his staff had been scouring the
country for Waffen SS in obedience to Hitler's order that the army
group should be an exclusively SS formation. Helped by the lull which
had descended on the battlefield since the end of January, they had
accumulated sufficient to constitute a new SS "army" (the
11th), which was placed under the command of Obergruppenführer
Steiner.
But time was still of the essence. If the phasing of the German
attack was right, it would catch Zhukov before his reserves were in
position. At the same time it would achieve a double delaying effect
because when the Russians had recovered their balance the first
thaws of spring could be expected to impede their recoil.
The Russian front opposite the Arnswalde was now held entirely by
infantry (the 47th Army) for the tank brigades of Bogdanov's 2nd"
Guards Armoured Army had been pulled back to, and south of, the
railway between Landsberg and Schneidemühl for rest and refit.
The Soviets were also replacing their tank formations with infantry
along the Oder from Küstrin up to the confluence with the
Neisse. (OKH estimated the rate of arrival at four divisions per day
in this sector, but was probably a substantial overestimate. Certainly their supporting artillery would not have been arriving at
that rate.)
When Guderian went to the Führer's conference on 13th
February, he had in his mind two objectives, mutually dependent,
whose achievement he regarded as vital if the war was to continue at
all. The first was that the attack should start no later than the
following Friday (15th February). The second was that he exercise
some measure of personal control over its course. This he proposed to
achieve by the attachment to army group headquarters of his principal
assistant, General Wenck, who was "to be in charge of the
actual carrying out of the attack."
The conference was held in the principal assembly room of the New
Chancellery. As well as Keitel and Jodl, there were present Himmler
and Sepp Dietrich and the usual sprinkling of Party hangers-on, SS
messengers, and so forth. At one end of the room Lenbach's portrait
of Bismarck looked down from the mantel, opposite stood a bronze bust
of Hindenburg, larger than life. Instead of Thomale, Guderian had
brought with him his protégé, Wenck. They were not long
in discovering that, as Guderian shrewdly observed, ". . . both
Hitler and Himmler opposed [the plan] . . . since they were both
subconsciously frightened of undertaking an operation which must make
plain Himmler's incompetence."
Himmler maintained that the army group was not ready to go over to
the attack as the necessary fuel and ammunition had not yet
arrived. (In his memoirs Guderian claims that this was true of "a
small portion" only.) Hitler took the side of
Treuer
Heinrich
, and the following exchange took place:
Guderian. We can't wait until the last can of gasoline and the
last shell have been issued. By that time the Russians will be too
strong.
Hitler. I don't permit you to accuse me of wanting to wait.
Guderian. I'm not accusing you of anything. I'm simply saying that
there is no sense in waiting until the last lot of supplies have been
issued and thus losing the favourable mo-ment to attack.
Hitler. I just told you that I don't permit you to accuse me of
wanting to wait.
Guderian. General Wenck must be attached to the National
Leader's staff, since otherwise there can be no question of the
attack succeeding.
Hitler. The National Leader is man enough to carry out the attack
on his own.
Guderian. The National Leader has neither the requisite experience
nor a sufficiently competent staff to control the attack
singlehanded. The presence of General Wenck is therefore essential.
Hitler. I don't permit you to tell me that the National Leader is
incapable of performing his duties.
Guderian. I must insist on the attachment of General Wenck to the
army group staff so that he may ensure that the operations are
competently carried out.
Soon Hitler had completely lost his temper. Guderian has described
how after each outburst of rage "Hitler would stride up and down
the carpet edge, then suddenly stop immediately before me and hurl
his next accusation in my face. He was almost screaming, his eyes
seemed about to pop out of his head and the veins stood out on his
temples." The "conference" continued in this way for
two hours. No one else spoke, except Guderian, who had "made up
my mind that I would let nothing destroy my equanimity, and that I
would simply repeat my essential demands over and over again. This I
did with an icy consistency."
Then, quite suddenly, Hitler stopped in front of the National
Leader (who had remained silent throughout the scene) and said to
him, "Well, Himmler, General Wenck will arrive at your
headquarters tonight and will take charge of the attack." He
then walked over to Wenck and told him that he was to report to the
army group staff forthwith. Returning to his usual seat, Hitler took
Guderian by the arm and said, "The General Staff has won a
battle this day," and smiled "his most charming smile."
The conference then picked up its normal course, but Guderian had
been so exhausted by his victory that he was compelled to retire to a
small anteroom. Here, seated at a table with his head in his hands,
he was found by Keitel, who at once began to reprove him. How could
he contradict the Führer in such a manner? Had he not seen how
excited the Führer was becoming? What would happen if as a
result of such a scene the Führer were to have a stroke? Soon
other members of Hitler's entourage started to come in and add their
voice to Keitel's. The Chief of the General Staff found himself in a
minority of one, and "had a further hard passage before these
anxious and timorous spirits were calmed." He then issued orders
by telephone to Army Group Vistula, confirming that the preparations
for an attack on the 15th were to go ahead, and without waiting for
Wenck, left before Hitler could change his mind.
Now the hour had come for the last offensive the German Army was
to undertake in World War II.
The weight of the
Schwerpunkt
, six Panzer divisions in
Rauss's reconstituted 3rd Panzer Army, was but a shadow of Wehrmacht
strength in earlier, less critical battles or, indeed, of the force
it represented on paper. For none of the Panzer divisions were above
"two-battalion" tank strength, and only three of them were
predominantly Panther-equipped. The other three were made up of
PzKw IV's with a stiffening of wornout Tigers.
[The SS divisions also had a tank element, usually about two companies of fourteen to seventeen Panthers.]
There was no air support whatever—the Panzers needed all the
fuel available. Crews had standing orders that when a tank was
disabled their first task was to drain off its fuel "as soon as
enemy fire slackens." Although some of the equipment was new,
many of the crews had been continuously in action for weeks. Others,
those who had come from the West, had been so conditioned to
perpetual air attack that they showed "a marked aversion to
operating in masses during the daylight hours." Still others,
replacements hurriedly drafted from Luftwaffe or police duties, had
neither com-bat experience nor the technical ability to keep the
machinery in service under battle conditions. Nonetheless, their
morale, if not "high" in the conventional sense, had that
element of final desperation which can produce a superb élan—and,
just as suddenly, a complete fragmentation.
The Russians opposite them had been told to expect an attack, but
this warning had already been current for ten days and during that
time several units had been changed over. Their line was lightly held
by infantry with a thin screen of antitank guns. The main mass of
the 47th Army was held farther back with its tank element (T 34),
while the T-34/85 and JS tanks of the 2nd Guards Armoured Army were
concentrated at Meseritz and Schwiebus. Two of Bogdanov's armoured
brigades had been pulled back as far as Poznan. Of the majority of
Soviet soldiers it was true to say that, after their achievements and
losses of the previous month,
"Ils . . . prenaient possession
du pays con-quis, s'adonnant sans retenue à la récupération
individuelle."