Belisarius: The Last Roman General (34 page)

With their repeated defeats (after the arrival of the wages at the spring equinox, Procopius states that there were sixty nine more skirmishers between the Byzantines and the Goths –
Wars,
VI.ii.37), the onset of famine, disease and the news that an unknown number of Byzantine reinforcements were now approaching the city, the Goths finally lost heart. They sent envoys to Belisarius to arrange for an armistice with a view to negotiating peace.

Declaring that the Byzantines had no right to invade Italy, Witigis offered Sicily to Belisarius in return for an end to the war. When Belisarius asked about those areas of the mainland currently under his control and declared that he did not have the authority to negotiate such a treaty, the Goths agreed to send envoys to Justinian to arrange a peace settlement. The date was now early to mid-December 537. In the meantime, a truce of three months was negotiated to allow the envoys time for their journey. This was good for Belisarius, as it would allow him to billet his troops for the winter and attempt to gather supplies for the coming campaign season.

Constantinus

It was during the time of the truce that Belisarius and Constantinus quarrelled; the second time that Belisarius was to be touched by the hand of scandal during the siege.

The affair was initiated when Constantinus was at Spoletium and, as previously related, confiscated two daggers from a Roman citizen. The citizen was called Presidius and was a Roman living in Ravenna at the outbreak of the war. Rather than face the Goths, he chose to go into exile, carrying with him two daggers with scabbards adorned with gold and precious stones. These represented the remains of his wealth, since he had been unable to take anything else of value with him. He arrived in Spoletium, and, hearing of the daggers, Constantinus sent his guard, Maxentiolus, to take them.

Presidius had travelled on to Rome and, during the course of the siege, had remained quiet about the affair. With the outbreak of peace, he had complained to Belisarius about the theft, which was against Belisarius’ instructions concerning the treatment of native Italians. Consequently, Belisarius ordered Constantinus to give the daggers back, but he refused. A stalemate then ensued, most likely because Belisarius left the city and travelled to Campania to collect supplies (Marcellinus Comes.
Additions to the Chronicles,
538). Upon Belisarius’ return, Presidius accosted him in the street and embarrassed him by holding his horse’s reigns and explaining the injustice to all within hearing.

Humiliated, Belisarius now called Constantinus and ordered him to relinquish the daggers. When Constantinus again refused, Belisarius summoned his guards. Thinking that he was about to be executed out of hand, Constantinus drew a dagger and attempted to strike Belisarius. He was restrained by Ildiger and Valerian before the guards arrived and he was placed under arrest. According to the
Anekdota,
Procopius claims that Belisarius was willing to release Constantinus once the daggers had been returned, but was persuaded by Antonina to execute the general because she had a grudge concerning remarks Constantinus had made against her
(Anekdota,
1.22–5 for the cause of animosity; 1.28–30 for the execution). Procopius declared that this was the ‘only unholy deed done by Belisarius’ (Proc,
Wars,
VI.viii.18), and that it earned him the enmity of Justinian and the Byzantine notables
(Anekdota,
1.30).

The End of the Siege

As the talks progressed, the reinforcements and supplies arrived at Ostia. Under cover of the non-aggression agreement, Belisarius now transferred all of the supplies to Rome using the river to help in the transportation of the goods. The Goths watched from their vantage point at Portus and the transfer was completed by the winter solstice.

Byzantine command of the sea now began to affect the situation. Unable or unwilling to risk transporting supplies to their garrisons by boat, the Goths were forced to withdraw their troops from Portus and Centumcellae. Due to famine, they were also forced to leave the city of Albanum. Belisarius quickly sent troops to occupy all of the vacated positions. Although the Goths protested that this was in violation of their non-aggression treaty, Belisarius laughed and refused to withdraw his men.

Since he had been reinforced, and confident that he could defend the city, he dispatched some troops further afield in order to put pressure on the Goths. John, nephew of Vitalianus, who had recently arrived with 800 Thracians, along with 400 men from Valerian’s command under Valerian’s nephew Damianus, and 800
bucellarii
under Suntas and Adegis, were sent to set up a camp in the vicinity of Alba. John was ordered not to act aggressively or commit any warlike act unless the Goths had broken the armistice first. However, when the Goths did, he was to take control of the district of Picenum, so pushing Byzantine control further to the northeast.

At the same time, Datius, the priest of Milan, along with envoys, arrived and offered to surrender the city and the whole district of Liguria to Belisarius, requesting troops to act as a garrison. In light of the armistice, Belisarius decided to agree but then detained the envoys over winter, thus gaining time and so not being seen as the man who broke the truce.

Unhappy with Belisarius and his deployment of troops around Italy, Witigis decided that the capture of Rome was still possible, given the more relaxed conditions now prevailing. He sent scouts into the Aqua Virgo aqueduct at night to establish whether it could be used for access to the city. The lights of the torches they carried were seen by the guards, and, when it was reported to Belisarius, he ordered an investigation. The Byzantines found extinguished torches in the aqueduct and so posted guards. Consequently, the Goths gave up on the attempt

Instead, Witigis decided upon a frontal assault on the Pincian Gate. Unfortunately for the Goths, Ildiger and his men, who happened to be on duty at the time, saw the Goths forming up for the assault and mounted a preemptive attack. Many of the Goths were killed, and the noise of the fighting alerted the rest of the Byzantines to the danger. The Goths withdrew and Witigis considered his options.

He determined that the final attempt on the city would be made against the walls that ran alongside the Tiber. Here, the ancients had relied upon the river to do most of their work and so had erected only a small wall with no towers. Witigis bribed two Byzantines to move along the wall distributing drugged wine to the guards, so allowing the Goths easy access. However, one of the men – probably after taking the money – went to Belisarius and told him of the plot, naming the second man. This individual was arrested and, under torture, revealed the full details of the plan. He was then mutilated, but not killed, mounted on an ass, and sent into the Goths’ camp.

At this point, Witigis realised that the siege could not be won. Furthermore, disturbing news now reached him from Ravenna. For with the Goths’ breaking of the armistice, Belisarius had sent a message to John in Picenum, ordering him to take control of the area. John with 2,000 cavalry had travelled throughout Picenum, enslaving Gothic women and children, but, following Belisarius’ policy, leaving the native Italians unharmed. He was brought to battle by Ulitheus, Uncle of Witigis, but the Byzantines won a resounding victory, killing most of the Goths, including Ulitheus himself.

Procopius records that John was a daring, efficient and experienced officer who used his expertise to help bring the siege of Rome to an end. With nice strategic insight, John had bypassed Auximus and Urbinus, since they both had garrisons and were difficult to assault, and instead had accepted the invitation by the citizens of Ariminum to occupy their city. John recognised that, since the city was close to Ravenna, the Goths were likely to lift the siege of Rome and return to Ravenna to protect their city from the threat of being captured. He was correct: upon hearing the news, Witigis ordered the army to leave Rome and march on Ravenna.

As the Goths withdrew, Belisarius planned one more action against them. Since most of his cavalry was away from the city, Belisarius decided to use his infantry alongside his remaining cavalry. Deciding that if he faced the entire Gothic army he would likely suffer a heavy defeat, he decided to focus the attack on the Gothic troops that had been encamped west of the Tiber. He waited until over half of the Goths had crossed the Milvian Bridge and then assaulted the rear of their retreating columns. The ensuing battle was quick and decisive. Although the Goths resisted manfully at first, they soon broke and fled across the bridge, many being killed or wounded in the crush while more were pushed over the bridge and so drowned in the Tiber. It was now the middle of March 538, and the siege of Rome was over; it had lasted for one year and nine days.

Belisarius and Witigis

The question remains as to why the siege of Rome failed and whether the failure was due to the incompetence of Witigis or the superior generalship of Belisarius.

In one respect Belisarius was extremely fortunate: having recently defeated the Vandals and witnessed their inability to resist his horse archers, he was now facing an army with the same weakness. He had recognised the similarity very early in the campaign and so been confident throughout that he would be victorious (Proc,
Wars,
V.xxvii.28-29). Consequently, during the siege he had used the horse-archers’ superior abilities in order to wear down the Goths slowly, constantly defeating them in small-scale encounters and so reducing their morale. However, when he changed his tactics – allegedly under pressure from his own troops, whose morale had been correspondingly increasing – he risked losing control of the battlefield and allowing the Goths the chance to fight the battle on their own terms. The Goths seized their chance and defeated the Byzantines in the only open battle of the siege. Recognising his mistake, Belisarius did not repeat the attempt at facing the Goths in the open, even when pressed by the Romans to do so. It is the sign of a good commander that, if he makes a mistake, he does not repeat it and so suffer unnecessary casualties amongst his men.

Finally, when he realised that the Goths’ endurance was waning, Belisarius took positive action and so placed the Goths themselves under the pressures of a siege. By almost continuously retaining the initiative, Belisarius controlled most of the encounters that took place. Apart from the battle, his strategy and tactics utilised the innate superiority of his troops in a specific style of warfare. Overall, he displayed a high level of military competence.

Witigis does not fare as well in the analysis of the siege. Having failed to take the city in the traditional manner, using battering rams, siege towers, and so on, he recognised the importance of the port of Portus in the supply of Rome, and its capture must rate as one of the high points of the Gothic siege. Although the Goths did not entirely surround the city, the large population depended upon vast amounts of goods being transported by ship; the roads did not have the same capacity and so the city faced famine and disease.

Witigis’ control of his troops during the Battle of Rome is the other high point of the Gothic siege. Despite losing many casualties without being able to reply, the Goths maintained their discipline and formations until the decisive point of the battle. The timing of the charge caused the Byzantine wing to panic, and the panic spread throughout the army. Without the cover of a small group of infantry, the defeat could have been far worse.

However, in other areas Witigis’ strategy does not stand up to inspection. Time and again he failed to take the initiative or respond to the Byzantine hit-and-run tactics with a tactic of his own to nullify the effects of the Byzantine horse archers. Furthermore, he totally failed to grasp the purpose of the tactic and his own attempts to emulate it ended in dismal failure as his troops were incapable of long-distance missile fire.

Finally, the free movement allowed to the Byzantines towards the end of the siege, and the lack of response by the Goths, illustrates that Witigis was a general of average, but limited qualities. He did not maintain the pressure upon the defences that would have allowed the Goths a chance of victory. His lack of forward planning proved to be his downfall.

Chapter 10

The Victory of Belisarius

With the siege over and the Goths defeated, Belisarius now had enough troops to begin the conquest of the rest of Italy. His first act was to accede to the Milanese envoys’ demands and send a force of 1,000 men, comprised of Isaurians under Ennes and Thracians under Paulus, to occupy Milan. The whole force was under the command of Mundilas, who had a few of Belisarius’
bucellarii
to act as a personal bodyguard. With the troops went Fidelius, who had been appointed praetorian prefect by Belisarius. He was a native of Milan and was sent to act as personal proof of Roman efficiency and good intentions.

The army travelled by sea from Portus to Genoa, before arriving at Ticinus. Here, the Goths of the region had deposited their wealth for safekeeping, leaving a strong garrison of efficient troops as guards. As the Byzantines approached, the garrison left the city and a pitched battle was fought. The Byzantines were victorious, and in their pursuit came near to capturing the city itself. Shortly afterwards, Fidelius went alone to a church to pray. Upon leaving, his horse stumbled and he fell. This was within sight of the city walls, and a small group of Goths came out and killed Fidelius.