Authors: Prit Buttar
Tags: #Between Giants: The Battle for the Baltics in World War II
Outside Leningrad, the German troops still clinging to their defences closest to the city were in desperate danger. Hitler finally relented early on 20 January and authorised their withdrawal. In some cases, the withdrawal threatened to become a rout. The Soviet offensive continued on 21 January with major attacks towards Krasnogvardeisk and Luga. Küchler desperately demanded that he be allowed to pull back to the Panther Line, but Hitler insisted on a fighting withdrawal – otherwise, he argued, the Red Army would arrive at the defensive line with sufficient strength to force its way through.
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In vain, Küchler pointed out that his army, too, would suffer heavy losses in such an attritional withdrawal, and would then lack the strength to hold the Panther Line. Although Army Group North received some welcome armoured reinforcements, in the shape of 12th Panzer Division from Army Group Centre and the 70 Tiger tanks of
Schwere Panzer Abteilung 502
, it remained in a perilous position.
Under heavy pressure in the north, 9th Luftwaffe Field Division lost its commander, Oberst Ernst Michael, on 22 January, and he was replaced by Oberst Heinrich Geerkens, who had commanded the division’s
Jäger Regiment 17
. Two days later, he too was killed in action. Both men were posthumously promoted to
Generalmajor
. Meanwhile, with his forces driven out of their dense defensive positions, Lindemann informed
Oberkommando des Heeres
(the German Army High Command or OKH) that he intended to retreat further. OKH could either accept his decision, he wrote, or send someone to replace him.
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Although Soviet spearheads continued to reach positions before the retreating Germans, the bulk of the German line fell back intact. The rearguard was made up primarily of infantry commanded by Oberst Paul Wengler of 227th Infantry Division, reinforced by several tanks from
Schwere Panzer Abteilung 502
. On several occasions, fast-moving Soviet forces cut the road behind them, but the Tiger tanks were practically immune to any light weapons these units could carry, and were able to reopen the line of retreat. Otto Carius, a Tiger tank commander and one of the greatest German tank ‘aces’ of the war, recalled defending a village during a long, cold night:
Soon the village was under extremely heavy fire. The Russians had noticed that it was occupied and wanted to ‘clean up’ the affair before they advanced further to the west. Their methods showed, however, that they certainly didn’t suspect an entire ‘Tiger’ company in the village.
I saw muzzle fire in the woodline. It moved farther to the right from flash to flash. Those had to be tanks moving along the woodline. They wanted to reach the road at the opposite end of the village. Obefeldwebel Zwetti was in position there.
Behind him was von Schiller’s tank. I radioed to Zwetti. With the help of a flare, I could determine that a T34 was moving no more than 50 metres away from Zwetti. Due to the firing, we couldn’t hear any motor noises. Because of that, the enemy had already made his way to the village. Zwetti shot his neighbour into flames, but we saw in astonishment a second T34 in the middle of the village street, right next to von Schiller.
It often proved fatal to the Russians that they kept completely buttoned up. Because of that, they could scarcely see anything, especially at night. They also had infantrymen riding on the tank, but even they didn’t recognise the situation until too late.
Von Schiller wanted to turn his turret but in the process hit the Russian tank with his cannon. He had to back up first in order to be able to knock it out. I didn’t feel confident enough to shoot. One of the craziest situations I ever experienced!
After Zwetti had finished off another three tanks, the Russians pulled back. Apparently, the losses they suffered were enough. We stayed in radio contact for the rest of the night and could hear the Russians quite well on one channel. That meant they couldn’t be too far from us.
At the break of day, our infantrymen approached the T34 somewhat carelessly. It still stood directly next to von Schiller. Except for a hole in the hull, it was undamaged. Surprisingly, as they went to open the turret hatch completely, it was closed. Immediately thereafter, a hand grenade flew out of the tank and severely wounded three soldiers.
Von Schiller once again took the enemy under fire. Not until the third shot, however, did the Russian tank commander leave his tank. He then collapsed, severely wounded. The other Russians were dead. We took the Soviet lieutenant to division, but he couldn’t be interrogated any more. He succumbed to his injuries along the way.
… I remember how we cursed the stubbornness of this Soviet lieutenant at the time. Nowadays, I have another opinion.
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Carius’ opinions of Soviet tanks and their commanders shed some light on how the numerically inferior German forces succeeded in holding their own for so long during the war:
Our guidelines were: ‘Shoot
first
, but if you can’t do that, at least hit first.’ The prerequisite for that, of course, is fully functioning communications from tank to tank and also among the crew. Furthermore, quick and accurate gun-laying systems need to be present. In most instances, the Russians lacked both of these prerequisites. Because of that, they often came out on the short end of the stick, even though they frequently didn’t lag behind us in armour, weapons, and manoeuvrability.
… The personal aggressiveness of the commander while observing was decisive for success against numerically vastly superior enemy formations. The lack of good observation by the Russians often resulted in the defeat of large units. Tank commanders who slam their hatches shut at the beginning of an attack and don’t open them again until the objective has been reached are useless, or at least second rate. There are, of course, six to eight vision blocks mounted in a circle in every cupola that allow observation. But they are only good for a certain sector of the terrain, limited by the size of the individual vision block …
Unfortunately, impacting rounds are felt before the sound of the enemy’s gun report … Therefore, a tank commander’s eyes are more important than his ears. As a result of rounds exploding in the vicinity, one doesn’t hear the gun report at all in the tank. It is quite different whenever the tank commander raises his head occasionally in an open hatch to survey the terrain. If he happens to look halfway to the left while an enemy anti-tank gun opens fire halfway to the right, his eye will subconsciously catch the shimmer of the yellow muzzle flash.
… No one can deny that the many casualties among the officers and other tank commanders were due to exposing their heads. But these men didn’t die in vain. If they had moved with closed hatches, then many more men would have found their deaths or been severely wounded inside the tanks. The large Russian tank losses are proof of the correctness of this assertion.
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Govorov harried his army commanders forward, ordering 2nd Shock Army to push forward to Kingisepp and the Estonian frontier, while 67th Army advanced south to Luga. At the same time, Meretskov would ensure that Korovnikov’s 59th Army advanced on Luga from the east, in an attempt to catch the German forces in a pincer. Lindemann’s forces, which had withdrawn from the north towards Estonia, succeeded in holding off 2nd Shock Army, not least because Fediuninsky showed little imagination in attacking the German rearguards, often squandering the lives of his men in costly frontal attacks on prepared positions. On 23 January, Govorov’s impatience with his subordinate began to show:
You have not fulfilled your mission of the day … In spite of my orders, the army’s formations continue to mark time in front of the severely damaged enemy forces, neither suffering casualties nor achieving decisive success. As has been the case before, the corps commanders are displaying slowness, are directing combat weakly, and not directing the corps to employ manoeuvre and decisive movement forward. Exploiting our slowness, the enemy, who is conducting cover force operations in small groups, is withdrawing his main forces south and south-west from Krasnogvardeisk and Elizavetino.
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Heavy fighting flared around Krasnogvardeisk, held by General Wilhelm Wegener’s L Corps. In addition to 11th and 170th Infantry Divisions, he had what remained of four other divisions, together with 215th Infantry Division and parts of 24th Infantry Division at Pushkin and Slutsk. The Soviet 123rd and 117th Rifle Corps assaulted Krasnogvardeisk, while 110th Rifle Corps attempted to outflank the German forces still clinging to Pushkin. By 23 January, the town was encircled from three sides, but Krasnogvardeisk continued to hold out. Nevertheless, the situation deteriorated steadily for Lindemann, and by the end of 24 January, he had lost contact with 16th Army to the south. Fediuninsky’s 2nd Shock Army continued to grind forward, cutting the railway between Krasnogvardeisk and Kingisepp on 26 January, but despite repeated requests, Hitler continued to refuse permission for a withdrawal of the hard-pressed formations. The reconnaissance battalion of III SS Panzer Corps,
SS
-
Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 11
– shortly thereafter given the honorific title ‘Hermann von Salza’ – used its mobility and firepower to try to hold off the Soviet forces:
In the pale light of morning, Russian armour broke through the morning grey on a broad front and rattled toward Gubanitsy over the open terrain. At first there were seven. Then, behind them, a whole mass of them. In addition to the T34s, there were all possible types, even old models. The gunners of 5/
SS
-
Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 11
brought the enemy tanks into their telescopic sights. Six out of the seven Soviet tanks in the first wave were knocked out. Then it was the second wave’s turn. It turned into a tank engagement, the likes of which I had never seen. The bark of the cannon filled the air. Round after round was fired from the barrels of the heavy anti-tank guns. The crews worked feverishly behind the gun shields. I had counted 61 tanks, many of which were right in front of us at that point. And the battle raged on. SS-Rottenführer Spork headed for the Soviets at top speed in his
Kanonenwagen
[a half-track with a 75mm short-barrelled gun mounted on the back] and knocked out one tank after another over open sights at short range. I could not even hope to guess how long the fighting had gone on, having lost all sense of time. The surviving Russian tanks turned away. The breakthrough attempt was a failure.
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The battle at Gubanitsy cost the Red Army 48 tanks, 11 of them destroyed by Casper Spork. A little to the south, Wengler’s battlegroup from 227th Infantry Division – with support from a small number of Tiger tanks – held onto the town of Volosovo for several days while stragglers from the shattered front streamed back. In honour of their commander, Wengler’s men nicknamed the town ‘Wenglerovo’.
On 27 January, Küchler was ordered to attend a National Socialist conference in Königsberg, in East Prussia, where he had to endure speeches by Hitler calling for his followers to remain faithful to the belief in final victory. Küchler told the conference that the winter fighting had cost 18th Army 40,000 casualties, and that his men were fighting as hard as could be expected. Hitler publicly disagreed, suggesting that he believed that the army could show more determination.
With Hitler’s admonitions loud in his ears, Küchler returned to the front, calling on his men to show more resolve. Despite this, Generalleutnant Eberhard Kinzel, his chief of staff, took it upon himself to advise Lindemann to begin a withdrawal. Late on 27 January, 18th Army’s forces began to pull back, destroying bridges as they went. The fighting around Krasnogvardeisk came to a head on 25 January, with the Soviet 108th Rifle Corps, reinforced by a tank brigade, pushing into the town from the west. At the same time, 117th Rifle Corps battled forward from the north, and the town fell on 26 January. The German 11th Infantry Division suffered heavy casualties in the fighting, but contrary to the claims of the Soviets, was not destroyed and managed to withdraw. Nevertheless, the pursuit of the retreating Germans posed a constant threat. The mobile elements of III SS Panzer Corps had to fight repeated actions to keep the main line of retreat open. Converging along several roads, the German forces made for Kingisepp and the crossings over the River Luga. It was the intention of the German High Command to attempt to hold the line of the Luga, but Soviet forces were already across the river south of Kingisepp. Any defence of the Luga around the city would be short-lived.
Further to the south-east, Soviet forces advancing from the east showed a lack of urgency in pressing the Germans, allowing Lindemann to complete an orderly withdrawal. Attempts by Sviridov’s 67th Army to envelop the German XXVII and XXVIII Corps from the north were frustrated by 12th Panzer Division, but nevertheless, Govorov continued to edge closer to Luga from the north. Unfortunately for the Red Army, the Volkhov Front, which should have been pushing forward from the east towards Luga, and tying down the two German corps, made painfully slow progress. Küchler had rushed whatever minimal forces he could scrape together to try to maintain the link between his two armies, and created a thin, fragile line of several units.
Kampfgruppe Schuldt
, comprised of elements of 2nd SS Brigade, the remnants of 28th Jäger Division, and elements of three other divisions, lined up alongside
Kampfgruppe Speth
with 1st Luftwaffe Field Division and elements of
SS-Nord
, and
Kampfgruppe Feurguth
with 290th Infantry Division and the rest of
SS-Nord
in the path of Korovnikov’s 59th Army. Despite the weakness of this line, the Soviet 6th Rifle Corps, supported by a tank brigade, almost came to a halt on 24 January, at least partly because the Soviet units had suffered heavy losses in driving the Germans out of their dense fortifications over the previous fortnight; the tank brigade had been reduced to only eight tanks.
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Korovnikov had an additional rifle corps at his disposal, but instead of throwing it at the weak German line, he dispatched it further south, where it ran into difficult terrain and also made little headway. 12th Panzer Division’s battlegroups continued to shuffle back and forth across the front, and although the southern flank of the Soviet Volkhov Front made good progress, 59th Army inched forward, despite receiving substantial reinforcements. Further to the south, the 2nd Baltic Front also showed an inability to prevent an orderly German withdrawal. Consequently, 16th Army was able to pull back to new positions, and released substantial forces – 8th Jäger Division, elements of 21st Luftwaffe Field Division, parts of 32nd and 132nd Infantry Divisions,
Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 303
, and 58th Infantry Division – to the aid of Lindemann’s 18th Army.
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