Between Giants (33 page)

The Krivasoo bridgehead had also received reinforcements, with 109th Rifle Corps joining 122nd Rifle Corps. The combined force struggled forward about seven miles to the north-west in a futile attempt to envelop Narva from the south, suffering heavy casualties at the hands of
SS-Panzergrenadier Division Nordland
, 170th Infantry Division, and the fresh troops of
Feldherrnhalle
. However, 30th Guards Rifle Corps, deployed a little to the south-west, made better progress. The railway station at Auvere changed hands several times before the Soviet troops were able to secure it on 17 February, but a counter-attack by
Feldherrnhalle
brought the advance to an abrupt halt. Like the attempted naval operation on the Baltic coast, there was an attempt to bypass the German defences to the south with an attack across Lake Peipus. The 90th Rifle Division seized the island of Piirissaar on 12 February and went on to establish a small bridgehead on the western shore two days later near Jöepera. An immediate counter-attack by two regiments, one Estonian and one German, eliminated both the bridgehead and the troops on Piirissaar.

There was a palpable sense of frustration in the Soviet command. The terrain – the relatively narrow corridor of land, much of it swampy, between the northern shore of Lake Peipus and the Baltic coast – left limited room for manoeuvre, and the Red Army was reduced to trying to batter its way through the German defences. Govorov complained that Fediuninsky’s 2nd Shock Army made poor use of reconnaissance and failed to plan properly, particularly for artillery support after the onset of an attack. Coordination between infantry, armour and other arms was also weak.
²⁷
Aware of the effect of the fighting on the ceasefire negotiations with Finland, Stalin ordered STAVKA to issue a blunt instruction on 14 February:

Fediuninsky had received additional reinforcements, in the shape of 124th Rifle Corps as well as small units of tanks, and these were added to the southern bridgehead. In conjunction with 122nd Rifle Corps, these forces attacked again, though to little avail. 30th Guards Rifle Corps suffered further heavy casualties, and was almost wiped out as a functional combat unit. In combination with 61st Infantry Division and
Schwere Panzer Abteilung 502
, Panzergrenadier Division
Feldherrnhalle
succeeded in driving 124th Rifle Corps back to its start line. Although the Red Army continued to hold a dangerous salient projecting north towards the rear of the Narva position, its divisions were unable to press home their advantage and envelop the German defenders. Perhaps the only crumb of comfort was that a brigade of Estonian troops disintegrated on its march to the front and withdrew in confusion, with many of its men taking the opportunity to disappear back to their homes.
²⁹

It had been Model’s intention to fight the main battle to the east of the Narva valley, but his ‘sword and shield’ plan proved to be impossible to implement. Soviet forces continued to bear down towards Luga from the north, and the mobile forces deployed for Model’s sword – 126th Infantry Division, 12th Panzer Division, and 12th Luftwaffe Field Division – ran headlong into the attacking 42nd Army in the area east of Lake Peipus. In confused, heavy fighting, the Germans could make no headway, and with the line under pressure elsewhere, Model had to abandon his plans. Luga was abandoned on 12 February, and Lindemann’s 18th Army fell back towards what had once been known as the Panther Line. 12th Panzer Division, which had been in almost continuous action since it arrived in the area, fought a series of actions to hold off the Soviet 42nd Army, which constantly threatened to cut the line of retreat of the troops pulling back from Luga. Further south, the Soviet 8th Army advanced faster than its northern neighbour, 59th Army, and ran into trouble as it approached Luga from the south-east. A surprise German counter-attack resulted in its temporary envelopment, requiring the Volkhov Front to redirect elements of 59th Army south to rescue 8th Army. This gave the retreating soldiers of Lindemann’s army some precious time to recover, and despite repeated attempts, the German units that had encircled much of 8th Army were unable to wear down and destroy the trapped Soviet formations.

There were further difficulties for the Germans south of Lake Ilmen. Here, the Soviet 1st Shock Army attacked immediately south of Staraya Russa at the beginning of February. It was badly understrength, with only four rifle divisions on a front that extended 60 miles, and its forces – which, unlike in other Soviet offensives, scarcely attempted to concentrate their numbers at one location – made little headway. The 2nd Baltic Front’s 22nd Army and 10th Guards Army attacked further south against the German 16th Army, but tough German resistance and deteriorating weather resulted in minimal progress. Nevertheless, with 18th Army withdrawing in the north, 16th Army faced the possibility of its northern flank being exposed, and there was a further threat at the southern end of 16th Army, where it appeared that the Red Army was receiving substantial reinforcements. Here, much of the winter had been spent in a futile attempt by the Soviet forces to capture the city of Vitebsk from Army Group Centre’s 3rd Panzer Army, and discontinuation of these attacks freed up resources to be deployed against 16th Army. Model ordered Hansen’s 16th Army to withdraw to the west. Soviet units failed to detect the German withdrawal in time to hinder it, and a combination of poor weather, skilful German defence, lengthening Soviet supply lines, and the inability of the Soviet Air Force to keep up with the advance, allowed 16th Army to withdraw safely.

Back on the Narva line, the newly formed 20th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division (1st Estonian) had arrived at the front. The division was created from the 3rd Estonian SS Brigade, which had been serving with 16th Army, and the remnants of
Bataillon Narwa
. The new division was deployed to replace the shattered 9th and 10th Luftwaffe Field Divisions against the Soviet bridgehead north of Narva. For many of the Estonians, this was familiar terrain; in the years before the war, the Estonian Army had often trained in the area in anticipation of a possible attack by the Soviet Union. On 20 February, the division’s two regiments attacked and broke the Red Army’s bridgehead into two parts. The following day, an attempt to reduce the section of the Soviet bridgehead around Riigiküla made little headway, in the face of near-continuous Soviet artillery fire from the east bank. After extensive preparations, a further attack against the small Soviet pocket was launched on 24 February, which had been celebrated as Estonian Independence Day before the war. While a battalion of the Estonian division made elaborate preparations for a frontal assault, a smaller group of soldiers infiltrated into the Soviet trenches. It now became impossible for the Soviet artillery to provide close support without hitting their own men, and by the end of the day, the pocket had been reduced.

The other half of the Soviet bridgehead north of Narva was a little larger, and was defended by 378th Rifle Division, supported by perhaps 20 assault guns. On 29 February, the two regiments of the Estonian division attacked the heavily fortified positions. Within hours, one battalion of
SS
-
Waffen-Grenadier Regiment 46
had lost almost all its officers, but under the resourceful leadership of Unterscharführer Harald Nugiseks, the attack continued. However, determined resistance continued until 6 March, when the bridgehead was finally eliminated. Nugiseks, who was wounded in the fighting, was awarded the Knight’s Cross.

Despite the impatient orders from Moscow, Govorov found that his front was in danger of losing the initiative on the Narva line. In addition to Fediuninsky’s exhausted 2nd Shock Army, he had Korovnikov’s 59th Army and Starikov’s 8th Army available, and on 22 February, he issued new instructions. The main effort would be to expand the bridgehead south of Narva, with 2nd Shock Army striking north-east towards Narva while 59th Army attempted to advance west. 8th Army, still in the process of arriving from its earlier operations towards Pskov, would be available to exploit 59th Army’s advance, by operating on its southern flank in a drive into the heart of Estonia.
³⁰
On 1 March, while the Germans were busy with operations against the remnants of the northern bridgehead, Govorov’s forces began their assault. Despite a few days’ rest, Fediuninsky’s divisions made little headway. To their left, 43rd and 109th Rifle Corps from 59th Army attacked the German 214th Infantry Division after a heavy, though apparently ineffective artillery bombardment. The German division had spent most of the war on garrison duty in Norway, and was not yet ‘acclimatised’ to conditions on the Eastern Front. In three days of heavy fighting, it was driven back, and several elements were surrounded. As more German forces – elements of 11th and 58th Infantry Divisions – arrived, the Soviet advance slowed and halted. Fighting continued for several days before an attack by 11th Infantry Division succeeded in breaking through the Soviet lines and reaching some of the units that had been encircled.

On 18 March, Fediuninsky’s army tried again with 109th Rifle Corps and the remnants of 30th Guards Rifle Corps. Otto Carius was in a bunker near his vehicle, and witnessed the heavy artillery preparation with which the Red Army attempted to batter the stubborn German defences into submission:

At first, the attack appeared to make progress, and succeeded in cutting the Tallinn– Narva railway line. Carius and two other Tiger commanders managed to hold their sector of the line, despite their accompanying infantry being driven off. It took most of the day for Carius to persuade his supporting artillery to open fire – the gunners had remained under the misapprehension that German infantry were still occupying their positions, and would thus be hit by the barrage that Carius requested. As a third Soviet attack seemed imminent, and Carius despaired of beating it off, the artillery fire finally began, badly disrupting Soviet preparations. Not long after, there was a final attack in battalion strength, which Carius defeated again, shooting up another three T34s.

The following morning, Carius led three Tigers and a few dozen infantry in a dawn counter-attack to recapture two ruined houses that had formed the German front line. Although the infantry succeeded in occupying the western house, they discovered that the eastern ruin was more strongly held, with several anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns:

A final Soviet counter-attack was beaten off, and fighting died down. Throughout the battle, Carius and his comrades were frustrated and angered by the refusal of their company commander, Oberleutnant von Schiller, to come to the front line. It was therefore particularly irritating to them when the Wehrmacht daily report mentioned that the company, led by Schiller, had fought with distinction.
³³

The Germans held a narrow salient projecting into the Soviet lines, with the village of Lembitu at the base. The Soviet forces made further attempts to reduce the salient, with the village changing hands several times. The German infantry were reduced to just a handful of men, but backed by Carius’ Tigers, they continued to cling on. When the fighting died down on 22 March, the front line had barely moved from before the Soviet attacks began. Carius calculated that his small group of tanks had destroyed 38 tanks, four assault guns, and 17 artillery pieces. Although the infantry supporting him had suffered heavy losses, Carius’ platoon had only one man wounded when a heavy mortar round struck a tank and penetrated a hatch; a young soldier, new to the battalion, lost a foot as a result. Soviet infantry losses are unknown, but were far heavier than those of the Germans.
³⁴

The final phase of the campaign came with a determined German attempt to destroy the Soviet bridgehead. The German salient that Carius had defended with such determination – known to the Germans as the ‘boot’ on account of its shape – divided the Soviet bridgehead into two bulges, known as the ‘east sack’ and ‘west sack’.

On 26 March, an attack was mounted using 11th and 227th Infantry Divisions, the former supported by an
ad hoc
tank formation commanded by Oberst Graf Hyazinth von Strachwitz. Strachwitz was a colourful figure, who had commanded a tank battalion during the Battle of France and
Barbarossa
, and was wounded during the fighting in Stalingrad in 1942. Injured in October, he was one of the few men to escape the encirclement, being flown out in a transport plane. The following year, he was given command of the panzer regiment of Panzergrenadier Division
Grossdeutschland
, and as in his earlier commands, his energetic leadership from the front line earned him the adulation of his men and the praise of his contemporaries. But despite his decorations – he was the first man other than a division commander to be awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross – and membership of the National Socialist Party, he appears to have been a member of a group of officers opposed to Hitler. After the war, he claimed that it was the fate of the 6th Army in Stalingrad, and in particular the sacking of his corps commander, General Gustav von Wietersheim, for alleged incompetence and defeatism, that convinced him that Hitler had to be stopped. There was a plot during early 1943, involving Strachwitz, Rittmeister Georg
Freiherr
von Boeselager, and Fabian von Schlabrendorff, either to arrest Hitler on a visit to the Eastern Front, or to kill him with a time-bomb placed on his plane. In the event, Hitler landed at a different location from that expected by the conspirators, and the bomb malfunctioned due to the cold.
³⁵
None of the conspirators were arrested. Now, in early 1944, the
Panzer Graf
(‘Panzer Count’), as his men called him, found himself once more in the front line, commanding a mixed force of tanks, including Tigers from
Schwere Panzer Abteilung 502
.