It is known that experiments with sugar have been carried out at individual chemical plants for purposes of its use in combustion reactions, but they did not produce any practical results.
In present industrial explosives practice, including geological survey work, the use of sugar in the organization of controlled explosions is unknown. This is explained by the fact that in order to ensure the process of combustion of sugar, the presence of a catalyst is required, i.e. the presence of an active substance that facilitates the sugar s process of combustion. But according to General Mironov s scientific discovery it is quite the reverse and the role of the active substance in the process of combustion or explosion is taken by sugar. It is appropriate here to recall the description given by General Mironov in December 2000, when he asserted that the explosive was delivered to Moscow together with sugar. In other words, according to the FSB version of events the explosive and sugar were not in a mixed state. Only two years previously the FSB and General Mironov were unaware of the peculiar qualities of granulated sugar, yet General Mironov nonetheless asserted at that time that the very same explosive had been used in Tashkent and even in Africa. Evidently this is the source of the conclusion that the mixture was prepared by individuals of Uzbek nationality.
It is surprising that the FSB is not familiar with international classifications, with the socalled international professional hazard information sheets. They are intended for anyone who is responsible for safety in industry. It is well known that sugar is widely used in the food industry. For instance, in relation to the work of bakers, who are exposed to various hazards, there is only a single hazard noted for sugar: Contact with sugar dust may cause dental caries. At the same the international sources warn that dry flour represents an ever present hazard of fire and explosion of the dust. Nothing of the kind is asserted in the case of sugar dust.
General Mironov goes on to make other equally important assertions. He says that when aluminum dust explodes no visible traces remain of the explosion having taken place.
This could lead anybody to ask the logical question: then on what basis did the
268
269
explosives experts of the FSB and MVD reach their conclusions that hexogene and TNT were present, which were subsequently announced by generals Patrushev, Shagako and others? And where did the substances named at the time by Mironov appear from?
According to General Mironov s reply the FSB determined the composition of the explosive mixture on the basis of instructions on bombs and explosives work discovered in secret hiding places in Chechnya. It would have seemed more logical here to refer to the composition of the explosive mixtures discovered unexploded on Borisovskye Prudy Street in Moscow and in the ZIL-130 automobile in Buinaksk.
It is indicative that the general claims: The way they discovered to produce an explosive substance is relative simple in its preparation because it is put together from substances which can almost be found in the kitchen. Then is it not strange that the guerrilla fighters did not actually organize this process in kitchens somewhere in Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk? It is hard to agree that the chemical substances named - TNT and plastic explosive - are easy to manufacture or easily available, but the unique discovery of the qualities of sugar, if it really does exist, could have been made in field conditions by fighters without any special education or the necessary laboratory equipment.
It is a very important point here that in September 2002 General Mironov names the inventor Dekkushev as the organizer of the production of the terrorist s explosive mixture, while the place of production is referred to indefinitely as the Caucasus. In September 2001 the general spoke confidently about the places at which the explosive mixture was produced as being the Urus-Martan and Serzhen-Yurt regions of Chechnya, although for some reason it was produced on a single unknown installation.
A review of the statements made by spokesmen for the FSB concerning various accounts of the composition of the explosive mixture used for blowing up the apartment blocks inevitably leads to the conclusion that they are different and implausible. The descriptions given by the generals of the FSB, the General Public Prosecutor s Office and the MVD contradict each other. The impression is created that someone in the FSB is attempting to coordinate the statements of its leaders concerning the explosive substances used: hexogene and TNT ; ammonium nitrate, aluminum dust with the addition sometimes of hexogene, sometimes of TNT : a hexogene-free mixture of ammonium nitrate, aluminum dust and sugar; and finally, a mixture of aluminum nitrate, aluminum dust, granulated sugar, industrial oil, TNT and plastic explosive.
It is quite impossible to explain the position in all this of the FSB, which fails to consider the possibility that the explosive substances were of industrial origin. It would appear from the statements made by the Moscow and Moscow Region Office of the FSB, the MVD and the Ministry of Education of Russia that this version is the most probable.
269
QUESTIONS TO THE FSB
270
On the basis of the above, several logical questions arise to which the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, as an agency of the state, is obliged to give satisfactory answers.
1. Why do the statements made in the mass media by FSB generals Patrushev, Shagako, Zdanovich and Mironov concerning the origin of the explosive mixtures used in blowing up the apartment blocks in Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk in 1999 contradict each other, ranging from the presence of hexogene to its absence?
2. What is the official FSB account of the types of explosive substances and their origin and why has it not been published after more than three years?
3. Why did the Moscow and Moscow Region Office of the FSB announce on September 10, 1999 that traces of hexogene and TNT had been discovered at the scene of the explosion on Guryanov Street.
4. Why did the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) of Russia announce on September 15 1999 that it was not a home made pyrotechnical mixture that was used on Guryanov Street, but industrial explosive?
5. Why did the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) of Russia announce on September 23 1999 that hexogene fumes had been discovered on Novosyolov Street in Ryazan and that an explosive device had been disarmed?
6. Why did General Shagako announce on March 16, 2000 the discovery in the explosive found in particular cases of admixtures of hexogene and in particular cases of admixtures of TNT? In what does the stated identical nature of the explosive mixtures consist? What was discovered in each particular case?
7. Why did the Federal Security Service (FSB) which on March 16, 2000 confirmed through the words of General Zdanovich that the investigation did not possess any information on cases of the theft of hexogene from state enterprises, fail to investigate Minister of Education Filippov s report in 2000 of indications of the theft of hexogene slabs from units of the armed forces? Why in the case of the theft of 5 kilograms of hexogene discovered by the FSB in the Nizhny Novgorod Region in 2000 were the perpetrators convicted to 4 and 3 years in prison, but in the case of indications of the illegal sale and acquisition of 6 tons of hexogene slabs discovered on Bolshaya Liubanskaya Street in Moscow also in the year 2000, the FSB did not even carry out an investigation?
8. Why in December 2000 did General Mironov claim that he knew for certain how the explosive was produced on one installation that had been identified, but simultaneously in two regions of Chechnya? That some of the perpetrators had been arrested? That the explosive used in the Russian cities was exactly the same as in Tashkent and in Africa?
9. Why did general Mironov state in December 2001, in response to a question from the correspondent Khinstein about how the hexogene was delivered to Moscow, that they had supposedly worked it all out, but the actual term hexogene was not used, and only three substances were named as having been identified - ammonium nitrate, aluminum dust and sugar? 10. Why in September 2002 did General Mironov, replying to a question from Rossiyskaya Gazeta concerning the composition of the mixture, add to the named
QUESTIONS TO THE FSB 270
271
substances industrial oil, TNT and plastic explosive? On the basis of what scientific results did the various different analyses reach their conclusion concerning the composition of the explosive mixture? The results of which scientific investigations made it possible to determine the role of sugar in the explosions that were carried out? 11. On the basis of what FSB data was the General Public Prosecutor s Office able, when replying to a request from State Duma Deputy Kulikov, to provide a detailed description of a high-explosive substance not discovered on Novosyolov Street in Ryazan? On what basis was this substance that was not discovered precisely defined: TNT, hexogene, octogen, TEN, nitroglycerine, tetryl and picric acid? 12. Why did FSB director Patrushev forbid an investigation into the criminal activity of employees of the scientific research institute Roskonversvzryvtsentr of the Ministry of Education of Russia, which was discovered in 2000 and was linked with the illegal circulation of explosive substances in especially large quantities, including during 1999? 13. Why does the FSB maintain the single unique account according to which the explosive substances originated in the Chechen Republic and does not investigate the version of events in which industrial explosive was used? 14. Why, despite the publication in 2002 in various channels of the mass media of materials concerning the illegal trade in explosive substances in Russia, including trade in components of military ammunition and their export, has the FSB not launched an appropriate investigation?
271
272
Appendix 22
The Hexogene Trail 10 November 2003, Novaya Gazeta; Grani.Ru After Batchayev's murder and Krymshamkhalov's arrest on December 2nd, 2002, my only remaining contact was A. Gochiyaev. However, my numerous attempts to receive additional information were hindered by a financial issue: people controlling Gochiyaev demanded money for information. Negotiations over the phone lasted for hours and were boring and tedious, at least for me. The situation came to a dead-lock. It had no way out, because we were not going to pay for information, and Gochiyaev's associates were becoming really annoyed with our stubbornness.
Shortly after one more droning conversation about money in exchange for a tape, on May 7th, 2003, I received a note on my home fax in Boston in familiar Gochiyaev's handwriting. After that Gochiyaev's friends stopped bothering me either by fax, or by phone, or by e-mail. I was not getting in touch with them either. Here is this note (original spelling and grammar preserved).
There is one man, a present FSB employee, an officer. He can come to you and give testimony in this case. But he needs a 100% guarantee of his safety. You understand yourselves that after this, it will be totally impossible for him to come back. If you can give him: guarantee of safety, help with asylum, and solve his financial side, then a man will come to you for negotiations. After your conversation with this man, where you agree on all conditions and guarantees, this man will come.
Besides I want to tell you that through my friends I got in touch with Yushenkov Sergey. After my friends' meeting with Yushenkov who wanted to give him my tape, exactly 1 week after their meeting Yushenkov was killed. This is just something for you to think about. I can make a video recording and tell about this case as well.
Everything that I offered above can be decided only when you, on your part, decide everything you have not decided yet. Without this no further dealings with you will work.
Incidentally, I am acquainted with BAB; we met in Moscow when he was still the LogoVAZ director, and we met later when he was the Duma deputy from our Republic.
Believe me I can find people to deal with who will give very big money, I don't even have to look for them they are looking for me, who are interested in your persons more than in mine.
If what I am writing to you interests you and my suggestions suit you, then make a call within three days after receiving this letter, you have the number, if you do not call during this time, this will be the answer.
Sincerely Achemez A clear case of blackmail. I faxed a printout of this note to the very "persons" that Gochiyaev had in mind and that interested Russian security services even more than
272
273
Gochiyaev himself: Boris Berezovsky and Alexander Litvinenko. Frankly, we did not even discuss this note. We just forgot about it, and that's it; although I could vividly imagine how Gochiyaev's tape comes out where he says that the terrorist attacks in Moscow were organized by Berezovsky, from whom Gochiyaev was buying a Zhiguli car before that, visited him in his Duma office, and gave him a friendly wave as Berezovsky met with his constituency in the KChR. In short, all this appeared so surreal, that it seemed improper to start protesting about this in the media or post the note with comments on the Web.
I would not have done it today either, if not for another reason to remember Gochiyaev once again. And I remembered him because I started analyzing data about legal entities registered in Moscow. Electronic databases are an objective source. And this source shows the involvement of the FSB Moscow City and Regional Department's employee Maxim Yurievich Lazovsky (nicknames "Max" a nd "Lame"["Khromoy"]) in the terrorist attacks in Russia in September of 1999.
A few words about Lazovsky. Lazovsky was a founder of the Lanako company, giving two first letters of his last name to th e company's name. In 1994 Lazovsky formed a special task force including officers of Russi an security services and special forces.
Lazovsky's supervisor in the FSB was the FSB Colonel E.A. Abovyan with the Illegal Bandit Formations Department. For the SVR [the FIS], Lazovsky was supervised by the Foreign Intelligence Service's career officer P.E. Suslov.
As with any history of intelligence and unde r-cover organizations, we know about such people only because of their failures (those who never failed are almost completely unknown). Thus, on September 18 th, 1994, a member of Lazovsky's task force, the GRU
[Central Intelligence Department] officer Roma n Polonsky was killed in a fire-fight with one of bandit groups. On November 18 th, 1994, a Lazovsky's task force member, Captain Andrey Schelenkov was killed in a premature e xplosion of a bomb he was planting in an attempt to blow up the railway on a bri dge across Yauza river. On December 27 th, 1994, a member of Lazovsky's group, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Vorobiov with the Zhukovsky Academy, had exploded a remote control bomb on a bus, route # 33, VDNKh to Yuzhnaya. He was arrested in August 1996. The trial was closed. Even Vorobiov's relatives were not allowed to attend it. Th e FSB gave Vorobiov as its officer a positive character reference which was attached to the criminal record. Vorobiov was sentenced to five years for the terrorist attack committed, but the RF Supreme Court reduced Vorobiov's sentence to three years (which in fact Vorobiov had already spent in detention by that moment), and Vorobiov was released at the end of August 1999. Maybe in order to participate in the September operation?