Brothers in Arms (138 page)

Read Brothers in Arms Online

Authors: Odd Arne Westad

Tags: #Political Science, #International Relations, #General, #test

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friends, he said that if the Soviet and the Chinese Communists would discuss such trifles, that discussion would have no end. We must step aside from these small questions and put the emphasis on the main problems. But you and I cannot solve them, so I am expressing only my own opinion. Ambassador Iudin, chargé d'affairs Antonov worked in the PRC, now Chervonenko works here. All these comrades have been received and talked to by deputy ministers, ministers, deputy premiers, the premier, Liu Shaoqi, Mao Zedong. But the ambassador of the PRC to the USSR cannot meet even with a deputy foreign minister of the USSR and talks just with a deputy head of the corresponding department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Chen Yi stressed again: "with a deputy head of the department. From this one can see continued he to what extent our friendship has deteriorated. The main thing is the existence of disagreements between our parties; if they are resolved, other questions will be resolved as well." But at the talks between Peng Zhen and F. R. Koslov
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in Moscow and N. S. Khrushchev in Bucharest unity was not achieved, [neither was it] at the meeting of the fraternal parties in Bucharest. Our party signed the communiqué [from that meeting], but with certain reservations. "As a Communist I hope, and our party hopes, that all these disagreements will be solved during the next meeting."
Having expressed agreement with the opinion that the specialists emphasized the growth of China's power in order not to give a pretext for hostile propaganda in connection with their departure, Chen Yi declared that during the last year some partial and trifling disagreements between the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] and the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] "has become known to others. And this is not China's fault." In any case, according to his words, up to 1958 there were no such cases as now, but beginning from 1959 there have been more and more of them. He stressed that the fact that they read the two notes to the specialists was not known to anybody.
Coming back to the question of readings of the notes, Chen Yi repeated, that "at the bottom of all this are your sudden actions unilateral, illegal, violating the treaty and the agreements, breaking friendship" and that it was not fair to blame only the Chinese side. Disagreements on some theoretical questions can be fully settled through consultations and such actions should be avoided for the sake of comradely friendship. We can accept your reproach for the illegitimate unfriendly actions, if you accept that your actions have been unilateral, illegitimate, sudden.
Chen Yi said that he did not want to say much, because all the questions would be raised at the meeting of fraternal parties, but considered it necessary to say that [only] once, in 1948, we (the Soviet Union) had undertaken such action (the recall of specialists) against Yugoslavia. . . .
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Frol Koslov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and secretary of the CC CPSU.

 

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Chen Yi continued: I am thinking about another side of the problem. You have undertaken two actions have closed down the journal and have recalled the specialists.
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I don't know what will be next. But we are still brothers, the friendship between our parties was established long ago in Lenin's time. The Chinese side will not undertake any actions against you. Our only task is to give appropriate explanations. Chen Yi again expressed surprise why the Soviet side, while undertaking large-scale political actions against the Chinese side, was "indifferent toward them" and at the same time reproached the Chinese. "We are not Yugoslavia," he said. ''If you want to treat us as Yugoslavia, then we will not accept it."
After that Chen Yi began to talk about the deep hatred of the Chinese people toward the American imperialism, this hatred "will not disappear even in twenty to thirty years." Without reacting to our remark that the Soviet people felt no less hatred toward the American imperialism than the Chinese people, Chen Yi declared that "we will continue this struggle, even if you undertake the third, the fourth, the fifth, and other actions against us." He said that the situation in China was at the moment better than during the guerrilla war. And we (the Chinese) will never lose faith in the Soviet country, in the Soviet Communist Party, which was created by great Lenin and is the legacy of great Lenin.
Chen Yi again mentioned "a third action" and said that as the Minister for Foreign Affairs he was ready for that. But at the same time he expressed the opinion that it would have been good if those events have become the turning point and the situation didn't deteriorate further. He said that we (the Soviet Union) had an advantage there. You (the Soviet Union) have greater power and less difficulties than we. You have the right to help or not to help us, to recall or not to recall the specialists. We (the Chinese) don't have these rights. Our only advantage lies in the fact that we have a little more people. Of course, the recall of the specialists will cause little damage to you and great damage to us.
After that Chen Yi again started to talk about the reading of the notes, trying to reduce the whole problem to the dissatisfaction of the Soviet side with the very method of the reading. I said that the problem should not be artificially complicated, and stressed that the elementary rules of tact did not demand discussion.
Chen Yi agreed with me, but immediately declared that neither were our methods "very good" and that "you began," referring to the fact that since the border conflict with India the Soviet press had started to present regularly materials criticizing China. Chen Yi expressed satisfaction with the frank exchange of opinions.
Source: AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 53, pa. 454, d. 8, pp. 204-18; excerpted. Provided by O. A. Westad; translated by Olga Baeva.
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At the same time as recalling its experts, the Soviet government also banned the Moscow journal
Druzha,
published by the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association and withdrew support from its Beijing counterpart,
SuZhong youhao.

 

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XIV. Record of Conversation, Chervonenko and Mao Zedong, December 26, 1960
This document records what was probably the last the meeting between Mao and a Soviet representative during the Sino-Soviet alliance. The Moscow conference of Communist parties, which had ended in the late fall of 1960, had produced a short-lived compromise between the Soviet and Chinese positions on theoretical issues, and Mao seemed eager to avoid taking any personal blame for any further deterioration in relations.
According to the instructions of the Center, I [Chervonenko] visited Mao Zedong today.
In the name of the CPSU CC [Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee] and Comrade N. S. Khrushchev personally, I congratulated Mao Zedong on his sixty-seventh birthday and wished him good health, long life, and fruitful work. Mao Zedong was very impressed by this warm attention from the CPSU CC and Comrade N. S. Khrushchev. He was deeply moved, and, without concealing his emotions, he most warmly expressed his thanks for the friendly congratulations and wishes. Mao Zedong stated that it is a great honor for him to receive these high congratulations on his birthday. He asked to give his warmest thanks to Comrade N. S. Khrushchev and wished him, personally, as well as all the members of the CPSU CC Presidium, good health and big and fruitful accomplishments in their work. Then, on Mao Zedong's initiative, we had a conversation. He told me that the Chinese leaders have to work a lot now. "As for myself he mentioned I am now working much less than before. Though Mao Zedong went on I mostly work eight hours a day (sometimes more), the productivity is not the same as it used to be." His comprehension of the material studied is less effective, and the necessity arose [for him] to read documents printed in large characters. He mentioned in this connection that "this must be a general rule that people of advanced age are in an unequal position to the young as regards the efficiency of their work."
Mao Zedong then emphasized that his resignation from the post of the chairman of the PRC had lessened the load of state activities on him. Speaking about this he mentioned that at the time when he had submitted this proposal he had been supported only by the Politburo members, while many members of the CCP CC [Chinese Communist Party Central Committee] had objected. "There was even more disagreement among the rank-and-file Communists." By now, he said, everybody was supporting this decision.
As he continued talking about his work and the activities of the leadership of the CCP CC, Mao Zedong said that for several years, practically from 1953-1954 he was not chairing the Politbureau meetings any more. He said that from 1956 on Liu Shaoqi is in charge of all the routine activities of the Politbureau, while he is taking part in some of the meetings from time to time. Mao Zedong mentioned that he personally is usually

 

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