Brothers in Arms (67 page)

Read Brothers in Arms Online

Authors: Odd Arne Westad

Tags: #Political Science, #International Relations, #General, #test

page_193<br/>
Page 193
rience, but not fear of or fawn on them. This is the correct understanding of nationalism."

9

This sentimental mind-set underlined CCP attitudes and policies toward the political and economic relationship with the Soviet Union. This relationship, however, constituted for CCP leaders an inevitable paradox: Political independence would require China not to depend on the Soviet Union economically, whereas the enormity of China's economic problems would compel the new regime to seek as much external aid as possible. Finding a balance between obtaining sufficient Soviet economic assistance and avoiding total reliance on the Soviets proved to be one of the gravest challenges the CCP had to deal with in sustaining the alliance relationship.
Aside from security concerns, economic reconstruction became a life-and-death issue for the CCP in its initial years of ruling China. The Communists faced several obvious difficulties. After decades of wars, civil and international, the nation's economy verged on the edge of a total collapse. In 1949, according to rough CCP estimates, China's industrial production was only 30 percent of the nation's best record, with light industry and agriculture no more than 70 percent. The transportation system was hardly functional: More than 5,000 miles of railroads were crippled, 3,200 bridges and 200 tunnels of rail lines were severely damaged; less than 4,000 miles of vehicle roads were barely usable; air and maritime transport capability was close to zero.
10
Moreover, the CCP worried that a possible U.S.-led Western economic embargo would further hamstring the nation's economy. Given China's pro-Soviet stance, Mao earlier had anticipated that the Americans might "throw in their own forces to blockade China's ports." Chen Yun, a top CCP leader in charge of economic reconstruction, believed that it was almost impossible to maintain trade relations with or obtain aid from capitalist countries, because the United States would pressure them "not to buy from or sell to [a Communist] China."
11
The CCP also lacked experience and expertise in handling economic affairs. To reorient his party toward economic reconstruction, Mao told his Politburo in September 1948 that the whole party "must learn how to operate in industry and business." Through education, "propaganda,'' and "[guideline] articles," Mao stressed, "this task must be fulfilled."
12
As serious as these difficulties were, however, Mao and his comrades believed that the new regime should not dread them. Mao reasoned that China was a self-sufficient country and its economic rebuilding did not have to rely entirely on external aid and foreign trade. As "scattered, individual agriculture and handicraft, . . . make up 90 percent of the total output of the nation's economy [and the] modem economy accounted [only] for less than 10 percent of China's Gross National Product," he asserted that the principle of "self-reliance" was the

 

page_194<br/>
Page 194
key to the CCP's success in economic reconstruction.

13
Mao thus set as "the two basic policies" to guide his regime's economic rebuilding "regulation of capital at home and [state] control of foreign trade."
14
Mao's lieutenant, Zhou Enlai, also made it clear that "most of those materials we need [in economic reconstruction] can be provided by ourselves and some by our friends" and, therefore, there was no need to panic.
15

The U.S.-led economic embargo was not necessarily a bad thing, the CCP asserted, because it would not only help boost the people's nationalist sentiment against Western imperialism and help the CCP to recruit popular support, but it also would give the CCP ample time to eliminate pro-West elements at home. "Let them [the U.S. and Western capitalist states] blockade us! Let them blockade us for eight or ten years !" Mao declared in 1949. "By that time all of China's problem will be solved. . . . We have come triumphantly through the ordeal of the last three years [of the civil war], why can't we overcome those few difficulties of today? Why can't we live without the United States?"
16
Thus Mao was determined to "make a fresh start" and "sweep the house first and then receive guests." This policy, Zhou Enlai elaborated, was "to clean up the vestiges of imperialist influence [in China] so as not to leave [imperialists] space to operate in the future.''
17
Therefore, in order to avoid "being entangled in the shameful diplomatic tradition," the CCP order on foreign affairs on January 19, 1949, stipulated that "we must abolish imperialist privileges in China and safeguard the independence and liberation of China as a nation. This stance is not compromisable." It further specified:
We do not recognize any embassies, legations, consulates, and other diplomatic agencies of the capitalist countries formerly recognized by the GMD government and which have yet to establish diplomatic relationship with us. . . . We do not formally and legally recognize any foreign investments, economic privileges, and industrial and commercial enterprises conducted and enjoyed by all capitalist countries or individuals. But we should not show any sign at this point that we will forbid, regain, or confiscate them. We will, however, issue an order to forbid foreign investment which infringe upon the sovereignty of the country such as inland water transportation. We will not stop the business of foreign banks but order them to report their capital, accounts, and routine businesses for our ratification later, nor should we deal with insurance companies, particularly the insurance company for maritime transportation. . . . We should not establish or restore hastily normal trade with capitalist countries, such as to sign trade agreements. We only conduct tern-

 

page_195<br/>
Page 195
porary, individual, and lucrative export and import business with these countries at a local level for some needed goods.

18

This hardly meant, Mao maintained, that China would adopt a "closed-door" policy toward all foreign governments, including the Soviet Union. He saw no reason for Moscow to reject another Communist state's request for economic help; perhaps Moscow would instead treat the CCP regime as an equal. "The Soviet Union and other democratic forces have struggled against the reactionary forces," and more important, "the Soviet policy is not to interfere with any country's internal affair,'' Mao explained to the Politburo in September 1949.
19
Wishful as it may have sounded, Mao felt that acquiring Soviet aid was highly desirable, if not necessary, so as to resolve the nation's immediate economic problems; at the same time, however, he was clearly wary of Soviet dominance over China. The end result entailed mixed feelings concerning several important aspects of economic relations with the Soviet Union.
The CCP's immediate priority was to establish trade relations with the Soviet Union. As early as August 1946, the CCP's Northeastern Bureau had approached the Soviet authorities at Dalian (Darien) to sell grain (wheat, corn, soybeans) and buy cloth, medicines, and other necessities of daily life so as to stabilize that region' s market. The initial endeavor did not work out, because the Soviets would not include cloths in the deal. At the end of 1946, however, scattered, small-scale trade did begin.
20
After as many as fifteen rounds of negotiations in early 1949, the Chinese were able to strike a more comprehensive trade deal with the Soviets.
21
In the summer of that year, the CCP central leadership clearly wanted to enhance trade with the Soviet Union. As a major component of New China's diplomacy, Liu Shaoqi assured Stalin in July, the CCP would "promote [foreign] trade relations with, in particular, the Soviet Union and other new democratic [socialist] countries, but under the premise of equality and mutual benefit."
22
Stalin seemed understanding and supportive. Suggesting that the barter system would be "more appropriate" than "the cash-sale practice of the capitalist world," he promised Liu that his government would compensate for China's losses by bartering low-priced agriculture products for Soviet high-priced machinery.
23
Encouraged by Stalin's favorable attitude, Mao endorsed his Central Committee's instructions on foreign trade policy on February 16, 1949, which clearly gave priority to trade with the Soviet Union. The instructions stated:
The basic guideline of our foreign trade policy is that we should export to and import from the Soviet Union and other new democratic countries so long as they need what we are able to offer or they can offer what we need. Only in the situation that the Soviet Union and

 

Other books

Las cenizas de Ángela by Frank McCourt
Live Girls by Ray Garton
Feet of the Angels by Evelyne de La Chenelière
Crave by Erzabet Bishop
Catboy by Eric Walters
My Brilliant Career by Miles Franklin