Brothers in Arms (71 page)

Read Brothers in Arms Online

Authors: Odd Arne Westad

Tags: #Political Science, #International Relations, #General, #test

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[newly built] plants became jointly owned and operated." Since Khrushchev had these arrangements eliminated in 1954, Mao told Iudin that "we were grateful for that." But, "you [Russians] have never had faith in the Chinese people, and Stalin was among the worst." Stalin regarded the Chinese Communists as ''Tito the Second" and treated the Chinese people "as a backward nation." Although "you [Russians] have often stated that the Europeans looked down upon the Russians, some Russians look down upon the Chinese people." Therefore, up to now, "there has never existed such a thing as brotherly relations among all the parties to which [your leaders] merely paid lip service and never meant it; as a result, the relations between parties can still be described as between father and son or between cats and mice." Mao then reminded Iudin that he had raised this issue in private with Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders who "all admitted that such a father-son relationship" should not be tolerated. But, as Mikoyan's congratulatory speech delivered at the CCP's Eighth National Congress had proved, the current Soviet leaders did not want to change that. Hence, "I deliberately refused to attend that day's meeting so as to protest, . . . because, acting as if he was the father, [Mikoyan] regarded China as Russia's son."
Mao explicitly pointed out that Moscow was paying back kindness with ingratitude.
As for [the differences over] the issue of peaceful evolution, we have never openly discussed [them], nor have we published [them] in the newspapers. Cautious as we have been, we chose to exchange different opinions internally, . . . [because our public criticism of the Soviet leadership] would hurt Comrade Khrushchev's [political position].
With regard to international relations, "we are opposed to any [act] that is harmful to the Soviet Union. We have objected to all the major criticism that the revisionists and imperialists have massed against the Soviet Union." Moreover, China "has held no secrets from you [Russians]. . . . We trust you people, because you are from a socialist country, and you are sons and daughters of Lenin." The CCP leadership even helped Moscow to resolve the Polish dispute. "Once even I have persuaded the Polish people that [we all] should learn from the Soviet Union." But Moscow was taking China's support for granted, Mao asserted.
Moscow, in Mao's view, had never tried to be sensitive to Chinese pride and feelings. "There was a [Soviet] advisor in [our] military academy," he told Iudin, "who, in discussing war cases, would only allow [the Chinese trainees] to talk about those of the Soviet Union, not China's, would only allow them to talk

 

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about the ten offensives of the Soviet Army, not [ours] in the Korean War." Defense Minister Peng Dehuai reinforced Mao's allegation by pointing out that some high-ranking Soviet military advisors had "a rude attitude and rough style," and they hardly tolerated any challenge to the Soviet military codes and theories. Mao then became excited and indignant: "Please allow us to talk about [our own war experiences]! For God's sake, we fought wars for twenty-two years; we fought in Korea for three years!" He also advised Iudin and Soviet specialists "to pay more visits to each of our provinces so as to get in touch with the people and obtain firsthand information.'' Only by doing that would the Soviets be better able to understand the Chinese.
Finally, Mao stressed that he would never accept any Soviet proposition for "a joint ownership." It was his determination that China "won't get mixed with you: we must be independent from one another." These remarks, he told Iudin, "may not sound so pleasing to [your] ear. You may accuse me of being a nationalist or another Tito. My counterargument is that you have extended the Russian nationalism to China's coast." Khrushchev had given up joint ownership of the four plants, "but why in the world do [you Russians] want to build a 'joint ownership' navy now? How would you explain to the rest of the world that you propose to build a 'joint ownership' navy [in China]? How would you explain [that] to the Chinese people?" If Moscow attempted to control China through its economic weapon, Mao asserted, "we won't satisfy you at all, not even [give you] a tiny [piece of our] fingers." Although Beijing had to "refuse to accept [Soviet] aid on [China's submarine construction] for ten thousand years," he assured Iudin that "it still is possible that [we] cooperate on many other affairs; it is unlikely that we would break up. We will, from beginning to the end, support the Soviet Union, although we may quarrel with each other inside the house." Moreover, Moscow did not have to satisfy every CCP request. "Because if you hold back your aid from us, [you] in effect would compel us to work harder [to be self-reliant]; should [we] get everything from you, [in the long run] we will end up in a disadvantageous position." Mao wanted Iudin to report all his comments to Khrushchev: "[Y]ou must tell him exactly what I have remarked without any polishing so as to make him [Khrushchev] uneasy. He has criticized Stalin's [policy] lines but now adopts the same [policies] as Stalin did."

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These disputes were not settled until Khrushchev's hastily scheduled visit to Beijing on July 31, 1958. The Soviet leader accommodated the CCP's concerns by confirming that the Soviet Union would provide only loans and technology for building the radio station, which China would own completely. Khrushchev also explained to Mao that Moscow never intended to establish a joint nuclear submarine force in China and that Iudin had passed the wrong message, thus re-

 

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suiting in the "misunderstandings."

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On October 20, 1958, Liu Xiao, the PRC ambassador to Moscow, reported that the Soviet leadership began to show signs of rectifying its "erroneous" attitudes toward China, thus taking Beijing's positions increasingly seriously. With regard to international situations, Khrushchev on several occasions "underlined the correctness of our position that war must not be feared and peace cannot be begged [for]." The Soviets had "gone one step further in understanding and assessing the important roles that our country has played in international straggle and the experiences that our socialist construction has achieved; . . . in some cases, they gradually incorporate China's experiences [in their economic work].'' Moreover, Khrushcbev began to "put increasing stress on speeding up [economic] construction to win time." These changes, Liu asserted, were positive; but further changes would "depend upon the interaction of Soviet internal and external forces."
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Beijing welcomed these changes and undertook measures to encourage more. Mao endorsed Ambassador Liu Xiao's suggestions of January 13, 1959, that China should be "more considerate" and "take their [Soviet] situations into more serious account so as not to be too imposing"; Chinese leaders "ought not to reveal or criticize Soviet opinions that differ from ours either in the media or to the public"; and "[we] should be more sensible to the Soviet advisors in China and [we] must take a modest attitude toward them."
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On February 13 Mao added to the "CCP CC Instructions on How to Rectify Arrogant and Imperious Attitudes in Our Dealing with Foreign Relations" that "[we] must emphasize that [we] shall continue to learn all the advanced experiences that suit our conditions from the Soviet Union and other brotherly states."
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Mao also pointed out in his conversation with the Soviet ambassador and ambassadors of ten other socialist states on May 6 that "all of you are our teachers, but the most important teacher is the Soviet Union" and that China's success in economic construction was in part due to Soviet assistance.
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In 1959, indeed, Beijing intensified its quest to obtain maximum military-technical aid from Moscow. Despite the CCP' s political mistrust of Khrushchev, a good number of Chinese purchase orders and requests for aid and advisors, now available in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives, show that Mao and his comrades seem to have wanted more, not less.
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The year 1959 also saw the biggest increase in trade between China and the Soviet Union. Amounting to more than 2 billion yuan, which was 5 times more than that in 1950, Sino-Soviet trade made up 48 percent of China's total foreign trade.
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Nevertheless, the revival of Sino-Soviet friendship did not last long. Despite its clear need for Soviet aid, the CCP leadership explicitly vowed that China would never imitate Soviet ideas and regulations that ran counter to its cherished revolutionary traditions. In Mao's mind, revolutionary self-reliance and grass-

 

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roots participation in and support for economic reconstruction, not foreign aid, would guarantee CCP success in resolving any problems, domestic or international.

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Especially with regard to Western economic sanctions, Mao believed that China had already come out victorious. When asked to comment on the effects of the Western trade embargo during an interview with two Brazilian journalists on September 2, 1958, the CCP chairman replied that it "has not hurt us a bit but has been of great benefit to us." One obvious benefit, Mao explained, was that it helped the Chinese people to do away with "blind faith in foreigners." Getting rid of this "blind faith" was "a matter of immense importance," Mao asserted. ''[A]ll countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America should carry out this task." China would definitely continue to "eradicate this kind of superstition."
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Mao also admonished against "blind faith in foreigners" at the fifteenth meeting of the Supreme State Conference on September 5 and 8. Addressing the question of what effect the Western economic embargo had on China, he insisted that the embargo "has greatly benefited us, and we don't feel any detrimental effects of the embargo. On the contrary, the embargo has been of enormous benefit to our basic necessities of life including food, clothing, shelter, and transportation [
yi shi zhu xing
] as well as our [economic] construction (iron and steel production)." In his view, the embargo had compelled the Chinese people to "rely on themselves" and to wage the Great Leap Forward. "It is absolutely great that [the embargo] has helped [us] to get rid of the dependent mentality and do away with blind faith [in foreigners]." The longer the embargo lasted, Mao asserted, the more iron and steel China would produce and the stronger China would become, thus ultimately smashing the embargo.
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The CCP leaders were dismayed to find out that Moscow had strong doubts about their envisioned achievements. As Ambassador Liu Xiao reported in October 1958, the Soviet leaders "lacked a profound understanding of the application of our Party's strategy and tactics [in economic affairs] and the new thoughts and new practices that have emerged in our [economic] development." Many issues, such as "the People's Communes, China's transformation toward Communism, [the idea of] obtaining food without paying for it, and our current propaganda on Communist ideology," were "incomprehensible" to them.
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On July 2, 1959, the PRC embassy in Moscow again reported that "recently there have been rumors widely spread among some Soviet cadres, especially those who have had working relations with our country, that China has encountered great difficulties [in its economy], and some yet-to-be-publicized statistics [pertinent to our economy] have been often talked about [by the Soviets]." Ignoring China' s "major achievements," these people "merely concentrate on [our] shortcomings" and had concluded that "the Chinese [Communist] Party has committed grave errors." Obviously very concerned about the contents of the embassy' s

 

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