Brothers in Arms (72 page)

Read Brothers in Arms Online

Authors: Odd Arne Westad

Tags: #Political Science, #International Relations, #General, #test

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report, Mao added a title to it that read "Some Soviet Comrades Are Criticizing Our Great Leap Forward [Campaign]," and directed his associates to "study [
yan jiu
] this matter."

88

Mao had long worried that Khrushchev, much like the old czars, would try to dominate China by utilizing the Soviet Union's might. In March 1958, when Khnlshchev replaced Nikolai A. Bulganin as Soviet premier, Mao became more concerned that Khrushchev would intensify his control over China once he had consolidated his position in the Kremlin. Mao easily transformed his personal dislike of Khrushchev into political mistrust. At the CCP CC meetings in Lushan in the summer of 1959, the chairman ousted Marshal Peng Dehuai. An important allegation was that Peng and his followers, supported by Khrushchev, had "conspired to topple" Mao's leadership, thereby placing China under Moscow's direct control.
89
A further irritation arose when Khrushchev "suddenly" went to Beijing in late September. At a seven-hour-long meeting with Mao and other top CCP leaders on October 2, the Soviet leader accused Mao of his "risky" policy toward the Taiwan Straits and Beijing's belligerent attitude toward the Sino-Indian territorial dispute. Khrushchev pressured Mao to consider the possibility of an independent Taiwan and adopt a more accommodating policy toward the United States. As minutes of the meeting are still classified, details are unknown. It is hardly surprising, however, that Mao felt bitter because the meeting "severely damaged the Sino-Soviet relations."
90
Deeply resentful, Mao felt certain that Khrushchev and his policies toward China were becoming an earnest threat to his country's vital national interests. In December 1959 Mao prepared a special meeting with his top associates to discuss the international situation. He vehemently accused Moscow of its constant attempts he counted a total of ten between 1945 and 1959 to dominate China. Mao then pointed out that Khrushchev suffered from fatal weaknesses: first, "[he] is very naive, and has so little understanding of Marxism-Leninism that he is easily deceived by imperialists"; second, "he does not understand China to the utmost extent and he refuses to learn; instead, he only trusts a number of false intelligence reports and wags his tongue too freely and, if he does not correct this, he will completely fail in a few years (eight years, maybe)"; third, "he is extremely afraid of China; he is not only fearful of imperialism but also of the Chinese-style Communism, because he is afraid that Eastern European and other [Communist] parties will not trust them but us"; and fourth, "his world view is pragmatism which is subjective idealism, and he is [so] lacking consistency that, whenever he sees an advantage, he will quickly change [his positions]." In Mao's view, all these problems were "historically rooted,'' and "Lenin didn't have time to remold [these problems]." The chairman was certain that this type of "chauvinism will one day turn to its opposite."
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At another

 

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meeting in the same month, Mao summarized Khmshchev's policies toward China: first, "[he] treats China as Soviet Union's son"; second, "[he] does not want students to surpass masters"; third, "[he always] holds back a trick or two [
liu yishou
]"; and fourth, "[he] is behind subversion [conspiracies against the current CCP leadership]."

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Hence, in Mao's eyes, Khmshchev lost all his political credibility.

Despite the grievances against Khrushchev, however, Mao did not expect an immediate Sino-Soviet split, nor did he anticipate that Khrushchev would employ economic blackmail against China. But on July 16, 1960, the Soviet Union "suddenly" notified Beijing that all Soviet advisors and experts in China would soon be withdrawn. Without waiting for China's reply, Moscow on July 25 instructed all Soviet advisers and experts to leave China by September 1. At the same time, the Kremlin held back the dispatch of more than 900 experts it had earlier agreed on. Within one month, as many as 1,390 Soviet advisors and experts returned, and Moscow tore up 12 agreements on economic and technologic aid and abrogated more than 200 projects of scientific and technologic cooper-
ation.
93
The Chinese leaders were shocked and furious. The withdrawal of all the Soviet advisors and experts and abrogation of all the aid projects would damage China greatly: Many priority national defense and high-technology projects had to stop or slow down only partway through. To minimize the potential damage, Beijing in its first response to Moscow on July 31 asked that the Kremlin reconsider its decision, or at least let the experts stay until their contracts expired. On August 4 Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi met with the Soviet ambassador to China, pointing out that since the Soviet Union already had caused China to suffer economically, Moscow had to stop "hurting the friendship between the two countries." "We may debate on differences over basic theories of Marxism-Leninism and international issues," Chen said, but "the bilateral [economic] relations should by no means get worse."
94
Seeing no change in Soviet policy, Beijing began to harden its own. In a series of "diplomatic notes" to the Soviet Foreign Ministry in August and September, the CCP attacked Moscow for "seriously violating the common laws and rules guiding the relationships among the socialist countries"; China would never be intimidated by "socialist-imperialist blackmail."
95
Meeting with a high-ranking Soviet delegation in September, CCP Secretariat-in-General Deng Xiaoping explicitly pointed out:
The CCP will never accept the father-and-son relationships between parties or governments. Your withdrawal of experts has inflicted damages upon us, thus causing us a great deal of difficulty, and hav-

 

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ing adverse effects on our country's economic construction, especially those economic and foreign trade plans will have to be rearranged. The Chinese people are prepared to swallow these losses, and determined to make up for the losses with our own hands and build our own nation.

96

The Sino-Soviet split thus became a reality.
Economic Relations and the Causes of the Split
Inevitable friction arising from economic relations was one of the most persistent dynamic characteristics of the Sino-Soviet rifts; economic conflicts constituted a contributing factor to the Sino-Soviet split. Was it because the economic relations benefited one side more than the other so much that the unsatisfied partner had to withdraw? Or was it because, as some scholars claimed, Mao was determined that "China should become a superpower" politically and economically whereas the Soviet leadership was determined "to prevent it"?
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Or were other factors to blame?
Rational considerations, or cost-effect calculations, were not as significant as culture-bound irrational factors. Clearly, cultural thought patterns myths as well as reason and images as well as reality formed the core of Chinese Communist policy toward Sino-Soviet economic relations. There can be little doubt that the economic relations forged an interdependent pattern. In that, both sides more or less gained: Whereas China acquired badly needed aid, technology, expertise, and industrial products, the Soviet Union penetrated China's market, established an external channel to obtain materials subject to the Western embargo, and would, in the long run, be able to incorporate China into the economic system of the Soviet-led Eastern Bloc. The economic interdependency should have gratified both sides.
Nevertheless, Beijing's discontent and antagonism toward Moscow derived largely from how its leaders
perceived
and
felt
about their ally. Given their strong sentiment about "foreign devils" and "national humiliations," the CCP leaders hardly could let go of their memories of the century-long Russian "chauvinism." Ideological similarities, shared security concerns, and mutual economic interests failed to make the Chinese less sensitive to or more tolerant of "Russian arrogance." With old grievances against Stalin unresolved, conditions attached to the Soviet aid, trade on an allegedly unequal basis, Soviet advisors' special privileges in China, Moscow's reluctance to offer advanced (especially atomic) technology, dubious ''joint ventures," and, most of all, harsh and open criticism of China's economic policies all led the Chinese leaders to suspect that, like the old czars, the Soviet leaders continued to look down on the Chinese

 

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and aspired to control and take advantage of China. Mao felt this most acutely of all. In addition to his extreme nationalism, he easily let his own emotions and feelings interfere with policymaking and frequently turned personal dislike into political mistrust.
China's power aspiration certainly was a factor. Seriously concerned about American threats, the CCP leadership felt obliged to acquire a formidable power status within the shortest possible time. Moreover, hardly immune from an inferiority complex as a result of China's impotence in facing foreign challenges in the past, Mao and his associates persistently hoped to restore China's rightful place in the socialist bloc, if not the entire international community. To reach these goals, Mao had to undertake rapid industrialization and military modernization, of which iron, steel, and atomic weapons were the prominent symbols of Great Power status. The accomplishment of these goals invariably depended on Moscow's extensive economic and technological aid, which, Mao believed, the Kremlin had every reason to offer, for an industrialized and powerful China would enhance the socialist camp's strength. Hence the CCP leadership adopted labor-intensive, extremist economic policies for rapid development: the First Five-Year Plan, the People's Communes, and most of all, the Great Leap Forward. Clearly, the Soviet leadership saw the postwar period from a rather different angle and had distinctively different expectations of China's modernization efforts. When Moscow attempted to modify Beijing's "premature advance," "irresponsible behavior," and ''reckless policies," the CCP tended to see the Soviet policies through the lens of traditional foreign interference and intimidation.
It is sheer exaggeration to assert that, from the outset, the People's Republic wanted to become a superpower. In its relations with the Soviet Union, the best that Beijing hoped for was to become an equal partner; anything less would not be acceptable. Cognizant of the long-held notion that China was a country with vast land, rich resources, and a nation of intelligent and hardworking people, Mao and his associates never doubted that China could survive economically by being self-sufficient and self-reliant. Although valuing Soviet economic and technological aid, in due time the Chinese leaders became too optimistic about their success and too sensitive to their pride to adopt a flexible stance toward Moscow. It is evident that the Chinese leaders held an
ethnocentric
view of foreign affairs. They were strongly inclined to see the whole material world through the prism of their own experience, images, memories, and, sometimes, aspirations. Thus it was more likely for them to mold their perception of external threat to fit their own strategy than to adapt their strategy to an adversary's behavior. While accusing Khrushchev of not understanding Chinese culture and of refusing to learn about China, Mao never asked himself how much he under-

 

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