Brothers in Arms (21 page)

Read Brothers in Arms Online

Authors: Odd Arne Westad

Tags: #Political Science, #International Relations, #General, #test

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putting pressure on the GMD.

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However, the American order to let only the GMD government accept the surrender of Japanese troops put the CCP in an unfavorable position. When Jiang invited Mao to go to Chongqing for political negotiations with the GMD, the United States offered guarantees for Mao's personal safety, while Stalin bluntly requested the CCP to give up the armed struggle so as to reach a compromise with Jiang Jieshi. Mao feared that the Soviet policies could expose the CCP to a crushing defeat of the kind inflicted on the party by GMD forces in 1927-1928.
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The CCP Politburo eventually accepted Stalin's suggestion for Mao to meet Jiang. In the Politburo discussion, Mao concluded that China to the United States was like Greece to Britain, an object of intervention. "If the Soviet Union supports us, the United States is sure to support Jiang," Mao said. If that happened, war would break out and chances for peace would be minimal. Hence, the Soviet Union could not render public support to the CCP. In this situation China could only take "the French road" establish "a government led by the bourgeoisie and with proletarian participation."
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After careful discussion, Yan'an decided to offer quite significant compromises in order to achieve peace through negotiation, for instance by modifying the coalition government plan approved by the Seventh Party Congress.
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Even before Mao set off for Chongqing, the CCP Politburo had made a strategic decision to move its forces to the north and to extend its control over the Northeast. This concentration of CCP-held areas would create large revolutionary bases and enable the CCP to continue its rivalry with the GMD. On September 19 the Politburo issued an internal instruction entitled "On Current Tasks and Strategic Arrangements," which outlined its strategy of seizing the Northeast.
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But Mao's strategic plan for the future implied seeking Soviet support -and as the CCP put its Northeast strategy into practice, the CCP-Soviet relationship took a new turn.
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Soviet policy toward China's Northeast also changed after the Japanese surrender. Soviet leaders sought to exploit their military control of northeast China to also achieve political and economic dominance. They already had concluded that the alliance relationship between China and the United States during the war meant that the GMD government would side with the United States in its postwar foreign policy. Moscow, wanting to make the Northeast a buffer zone, in the Sino-Soviet treaty agreed to transfer the region to GMD forces only if Soviet control remained in place.
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The CCP did not figure in this equation even in its military planning Moscow did not expect to work with the CCP forces that controlled large parts of northern China and areas close to the Northeast. In mid-August Soviet forces even demanded that the CCP troops sent to meet them provide proof of their status with the GMD. In early September, when CCP units

 

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arrived in the suburbs of Shenyang, Soviet forces in control there found it necessary to ask Moscow how to deal with them.

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Moscow initially reacted cautiously to the arrival of the CCP forces in the Northeast.
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Soviet forces at Zhangbei and Shanhaiguan seemed quite friendly toward the CCP, probably due to their long-term ideological education. Nevertheless, the Soviets soon showed a different attitute to military cooperation with CCP troops. For example, at Zhangbei, Soviet commanders refused to cooperate with the CCP forces in taking over important areas.
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On September 14 the Soviets sent a military representative to Yan'an to request that the CCP not let its forces openly enter the enter the Northeast before the Soviet forces had left and to withdraw those CCP units that had already entered the cities. During his meetings with Liu Shaoqi and CCP military commander Zhu De, the Soviet emissary said that Soviet forces would not interfere with CCP activities in areas not under Soviet military control but agreed to transfer the former anti-Japanese base areas in Rehe and Liaoning to the CCP.
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On the whole, the Soviet military hoped to limit CCP activities in the Northeast so as to achieve maximum benefits from the GMD and not encourage further American involvement.
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Stalin's suspicions of U.S. motives had been further stimulated by the suggestion of the American ambassador to Moscow, Averell Harriman, that the Soviet Union publicly announce that it would follow "Open Door" principles in Manchuria. Together with the failed U.S. attempts at landing on the Liaodong peninsula before the Soviet army reached Dalian, Harriman's remarks undoubtedly exacerbated Soviet doubts about U.S. intentions in the Northeast.
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Further clouding the situation, the foreign ministers' conference in London in mid-September among representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union failed to reach agreement on a peace treaty with and control of Japan due to Soviet-American bickering. Meanwhile, U.S. forces began to land in the harbors of north China, and U.S. assistance in transporting GMD forces to the Northeast led the Soviet Union to adjust its policy there in early October. Most important, Moscow now began to support some of the CCP's efforts to seize the region. In particular, the Soviet military suggested to the CCP's Northeast Bureau and the CCP CC that the party send 200,000 to 300,000 troops to Manchuria, where Soviet forces would provide large quantifies of military equipment. At the end of October, the Soviet military further encouraged the CCP Northeast Bureau to feel free to carry out its activities in the Northeast, including the dispatch of people to take over industrial cities and industries. Implying that the Soviet military could help the CCP fight the GMD forces, if necessary, the Soviet representative even suggested that it would be best to move the whole CCP leadership to the Northeast.
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The sharp changes in Soviet policy had a fundamental influence on CCP strategy. Although the party was eager to take advantage of Soviet participation in the war against Japan to control the Northeast and to set up a base area near the Soviet Union and Mongolia, it hesitated to go all out in carrying out the plan in August due to uncertainty about Soviet policy toward the region. The visit of the Soviet military representative in mid-September had finally enabled CCP leaders to obtain some clarification regarding Soviet policy. They decided that while Moscow's policies set limits to CCP activities, they also provided opportunities. As long as the CCP fully exploited those opportunities, it could acquire a favorable position in the Northeast. And as American and GMD troops entered north China, it became quite urgent for the CCP to get its forces into place in the Northeast. Between September 15 and 19 the CCP CC decided to speed up its efforts to seize Manchuria.

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According to the Politburo's strategic plan in mid-September, the Communist troops in the Northeast should be stationed in the east, west, and north, trying to control rural areas and smaller cities not occupied by Soviet forces. The CCP believed that the real opportunity for massive expansion could come only after Soviet forces left the region.
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At the end of October, as a result of Soviet encouragement, the CCP CC readjusted its strategic plan and decided to "make all-out efforts to dominate the Northeast." To achieve this goal, it prepared to carry out a strategic battle with the GMD forces in south Manchuria and Rehe.
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In order to win time to maneuver troops, the CCP Politburo instructed the Northeast Bureau and the CCP delegation in Chongqing to consult with the Soviet Union and seek to postpone the withdrawal of Soviet forces and to prevent GMD landings along the northeastern coast.
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While the Soviet military replied that postponement of the withdrawal was difficult, it did agree to prevent the GMD from airlifting its forces to Changchun. In addition, the Red Army was ready to supply CCP forces with weapons, communication equipment, and transport. It also permitted CCP forces to conduct activities in areas where GMD forces landed. In Changchun, for instance, the CCP was able to replace all local government officials except the mayor.
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As the Soviet forces withdrew from Yingkou and Huludao, they helped the CCP occupy these two strategic ports and consequently prevent GMD forces from landing there.
The tighter cooperation between the CCP and Soviet forces in the Northeast had a far-reaching influence on the entire CCP-Soviet relationship. Hoping to counter American pressures and consolidate its own position in the Northeast, a formerly passive Moscow now actively assisted the CCP forces there. This help was vital to the CCP, which could not realize its plan to seize the Northeast and establish large bases there without Soviet acquiescence and support. A common interest in opposing U.S. and GMD attempts to control the Northeast had given

 

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a concrete content to the CCP-Soviet alliance. Although the Soviets later readjusted their Northeast policy, the strategic partnership between the CCP and Soviet Union formed during this period in late 1945 was not changed fundamentally until 1949. In this respect, the development of CCP-Soviet relations in the Northeast represented a major turning point and a foundation for the future.
The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of Civil War
The Soviet Union's basic China policy in the immediate postwar period was to keep its agreements with the United States and the GMD government and protect its established positions in the emerging international structure. Fundamental to CCP strategy, on the other hand, was the promotion of revolutionary change in China and in East Asia. Although in most cases the ideologies of the two Communist parties led them to perceive the world in strikingly similar terms, the problems that they had experienced in their cooperation during the first postwar months persisted during the Chinese civil war. Even with the framework of the alliance in place, the divergences in strategic thinking could create serious difficulties.
In mid-November 1945 Jiang Jieshi decided to suspend his negotiations with the Soviet military in the Northeast and obtained U.S. support to attack the CCP in north China and south Manchuria. At the time Moscow estimated that it would take two months for Washington and the GMD to prepare their offensive.

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Seeking to avoid an immediate confrontation with the United States over the Northeast, Stalin was compelled to draw closer to the GMD.
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In mid-December he explained to Jiang Jingguo Jiang Jieshi's son, who was visiting the Soviet Union that Moscow did not wish to interfere in the struggle between the GMD and the CCP. However, the Soviet leader implied, the GMD government had to maintain neutrality between the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent Soviet support for its enemies.
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As the Soviet Union tried to improve its relations with the GMD government, it began to take measures to restrict CCP activities in the Northeast. On November 19 the Soviet military representative told the CCP Northeast Bureau that Moscow already had decided to transfer all the cities along the Changchun railroad to the GMD government and that CCP forces must evacuate areas within 30 miles of the railroad. In addition, CCP forces were not allowed to enter areas where Soviet troops were stationed and could not attack the GMD before Soviet forces left the area. The Soviet representative even declared that the Red Army was ready, if necessary, to use force to expel the CCP.
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Soon thereafter the Soviet military closed down the local CCP governments and forbade the party from carrying out activities in major cities that interfered with the implementation of the Sino-Soviet treaty that had been concluded the previous summer.
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At least temporarily, Stalin had replaced his policy of assisting the CCP to control the Northeast with a diplomatic strategy of direct negotiations with the GMD.

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The tactical turnabout in Stalin's policy took the CCP leaders completely by surprise. Mao's strategy of "seizing the Northeast, consolidate north and central China" largely depended on Soviet assistance and Moscow's policy reversal suddenly seemed to make that strategy worthless. Because of the Red Army's promises to supply weapons to the CCP, many CCP troops had arrived in the Northeast without necessary equipment. When Stalin changed his mind, these troops were literally defenseless. Naturally upset at Soviet behavior, CCP leaders in the Northeast repeatedly asked Yan'an for information and advice.
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Before receiving the news from the Soviet military representative, the CCP CC already had noted a change in the diplomatic climate in the Northeast. Believing GMD-Soviet relations to be in crisis and the overall political setting to be still fluid, it advised the Northeast Bureau to be prepared for possible changes in the situation.
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After learning about the Soviet requests, the CC instructed the Northeast Bureau not to comply. To win time, it should ask the Soviet military to accept continued CCP control over the Jinzhou and Shanhaiguan areas. Finally, it should request the Red Army to postpone for as long as possible the entry of GMD forces into the Northeast.
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The CCP Politburo still hoped that while their party could not take over all of the Northeast, the Soviet Union would, in the end, help it to seize some of the major cities there.
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In their efforts to discern the motivation behind the change in Soviet policy, the CCP Politburo and Northeast Bureau emphasized the straggle between the Soviet Union and the GMD government. They believed that the policy change was an expedient tactical move intended to enable the Kremlin to take the initiative in its diplomatic struggle with the United States and the GMD government.
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The problem with this assessment was that while it stressed the conflict between the Soviet Union, on one hand, and the United States and the GMD government, on the other, it underestimated Soviet willingness to compromise. Therefore, the CCP Politburo still hoped that the CCP could take over or partially occupy large cities in the Northeast with Soviet assistance.
It was left to the party leaders in the Northeast, who more closely observed Soviet behavior, to provide more systematic thinking on this question. In their report to the Politburo on November 30, Chen Yun, Gao Gang, and Zhang Wentian pointed out that the Soviet Northeast policy's basic goal was to "maintain peace in the Far East and the world." According to them, the change in the Soviet policy served this general aim. Therefore, the CCP should prepare for a long-term struggle and "try to avoid unrealistic dependence on Soviet assistance

 

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