Brothers in Arms (36 page)

Read Brothers in Arms Online

Authors: Odd Arne Westad

Tags: #Political Science, #International Relations, #General, #test

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having studied, on the basis of the limited materials we have, the general world situation, the needs of our state and the fact that at present Korea cannot continue the war, we think that it is better to think over the question of cessation of military operations at the present front line than to carry on the straggle for the 38th parallel and bring the conference to a breakdown. In connection with this it is necessary to take into consideration that it is possible to gain some concessions from the enemy in the discussion of the proposal about cessation of military operations at the present front line. Thus it will be possible to secure 3-5 years' time for preparation of forces. Of course, if the enemy does not in any way abandon his unfounded proposal, which he is at present insisting on, then we also intend to choose only the path of a schism.

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On August 23, 1951, the North Korean and Chinese delegation suspended the negotiations over allegations that UN troops had violated the neutrality of Kaesong.
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Beijing did not, however, wish a permanent rupture in the talks, apparently still calculating that an armistice was in its favor as long as it was on terms not insulting to China. In Mao Zedong's report to Stalin on August 27, he explained that "if after some period of time the situation will develop so that the enemy wishes to renew the negotiations, then we think that at our own initiative we can propose a way which would lead to a turn in the negotiations and to force the enemy to agree with this."
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Stalin also wished the negotiations to continue, but for somewhat different reasons. In response to Mao's telegram, he informed the chairman on August 28 that
we agree with your evaluation of the present condition of the negotiations in Kaesong and with your [policy] line about the necessity of getting a satisfactory answer to the question of the incident provoked by the Americans to pressure the Chinese-Korean side. As before, with regard to this we will proceed from the fact that the Americans have greater need to continue the negotiations. We do not see the use in inviting, according to your initiative, representatives of neutral states to participate in the negotiations as monitors and witnesses during the present period of negotiations. The negative side of this is that the Americans will view it as [an indication] that the Chinese-Korean side has more need to quickly reach an agreement about an armistice than do the Americans. If you are of such an opinion on this question, then you must communicate this to Comrade Kim II Sung.
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Stalin and the Korean Stalemate
After the initial opportunity for a negotiated settlement collapsed in August 1951, Stalin considered it in the Soviet interests for the war to continue, as long as there was no danger that U.S./UN troops would advance into North Korea again. After the war was reduced to a stalemate, it benefited the Soviet Union in several ways. It tied down American forces, rendering the United States less able to engage in military action in Europe; it drained American economic resources; and it caused political difficulties for the Truman administration. It also provided the Soviet Union with a superb opportunity to gather intelligence on U.S. military technology and organization. And the war in Korea created great hostility between the Chinese and Americans and thus tied the People's Republic more firmly to Moscow.
It is true that the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 brought negative consequences to the Soviet Union as it prompted a massive American military buildup, solidified NATO, and made possible the rearmament of Germany. But the outbreak of the war brought about this damage to Soviet interests. By mid-1951 it appeared that Moscow had more to gain than to lose by encouraging the Chinese to continue fighting in Korea. Russian documents indicate that Stalin's main concern regarding the negotiations was to ensure that the Chinese/North Korean side not give an impression of weakness, since the benefits to the Soviet Union would accrue only if the war continued to be a stalemate. However, if the U.S./UN side were to go on the offensive, either militarily or diplomatically, Soviet interests could be harmed.
After the negotiations resumed on October 25, 1951, Stalin repeated the line on the talks he had enunciated in August. Mao Zedong informed Stalin on November 14 that since he expected that the talks would be drawn out for another half year or year, the People's Republic had taken steps
toward economizing on our human and material forces in the Korean theater of military operations and we are pursuing the tactics of a long, active defense, with the goal of holding the position we presently occupy and inflicting great manpower losses on the enemy, in order to gain victory in the war. . . . It is true that achieving peace as a result of the negotiations is advantageous for us, but we also are not afraid of dragging out the negotiations. Acting thus, we will surely be able to achieve victory. At the same time we will be able successfully to carry out various measures within the country and secure stabilization and further development in the area of politics and the economy.

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Stalin replied:
[W]e agree with your evaluation of the present condition of the negotiations. The entire course of the negotiations for some time past shows that although the Americans are dragging out the negotiations, nonetheless they have more need of rapidly concluding them. This results from the overall international situation. We consider it correct that the Chinese/Korean side, using flexible tactics in the negotiations, continue to pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations.

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In a telegram to Pyongyang five days later, Stalin revealed his concern for avoiding the appearance of weakness. On November 19 he instructed the Soviet ambassador to North Korea to advise the Koreans that "an appeal by the government of the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] to the General Assembly and to the Security Council as it is set forth in your telegram . . . could be evaluated in the present situation, in conditions of blackmail by the Americans, as a sign of weakness on the Chinese/Korean side, which is politically disadvantageous."
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On December 25, 1951, Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko proposed to Stalin that it would be disadvantageous for the Chinese North Korean command to publish a communiqué exposing the Americans' position in the negotiations (as Andrei Vyshinskii had proposed) because such a communiqué "can be evaluated as a sign of their [the United Nations'] weakness."
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On February 3, 1952, Stalin repeated his earlier terse instructions to Mao regarding the negotiations, which apparently were calculated to ensure that the talks would continue. In response to a lengthy telegram laying out the proposed positions of the People's Republic regarding numerous specific negotiating points, Stalin said simply:
[W]e agree with the plan outlined by you and the evaluation of the course of the negotiations which you give. The firm position taken by you has already given positive results and must force the enemy to make further concessions. We consider that you must make an agreement with the leading comrades of Poland and Czechoslovakia about including their representatives in the commission of observers, and they, of course, will agree with this.
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On July 17 Stalin was even more laconic, writing to Mao only that "we consider your position in the negotiations on an armistice to be completely correct. To-

 

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