Brothers in Arms (37 page)

Read Brothers in Arms Online

Authors: Odd Arne Westad

Tags: #Political Science, #International Relations, #General, #test

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day we received a report from Pyongyang that Comrade Kim Il Sung also agrees with your position.

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In mid-1952, as American bombing of North Korea escalated, Mao Zedong still was willing to continue the war until China secured favorable terms in a settlement. As he explained to Kim II Sung in a telegram on July 18, "at present, when the enemy is subjecting us to furious bombardment, accepting a provocational and fraudulent proposal from the enemy, which does not signify in fact any kind of concession, is highly disadvantageous for us." Only one negative consequence would follow from rejecting the enemy's proposal, Mao argued: The Korean people and the Chinese people's volunteers would suffer further casualties. However, these sacrifices were strengthening the people of China and Korea and inspiring "the peace-loving peoples of the whole world," which "limits the mobility of the main forces of American imperialism.'' Furthermore, the Chinese and Korean sacrifice is delaying a new world war because it allows the Soviet Union to "strengthen its reconstruction" and "exercise its influence on the development of the revolutionary movement of peoples of all countries."
Mao went on to inform Kim that the Chinese leadership had concluded that accepting the enemy's proposal "under the influence of its bombardment" would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Doing so would lead only to "new provocations" that, given the "disadvantageous position" of the Communist forces, would likely result in even greater losses, severe enough that "the whole game will be lost." Instead, Mao maintained that "if we display resolution not to accept the enemy's proposal and to prepare ourselves for a breakdown in the negotiations from the side of the enemy, the enemy surely will not cause a breakdown in the negotiations."
Furthermore, "decisive insistence by our side on our point of view" may lead the enemy to make a new concession. If however, the enemy does not do so or breaks off the negotiations, "we must continue military operations so as to find in the course of the war, which the enemy cannot resolve, a means for changing the present situation." Mao concluded by informing Kim that the Chinese would report their proposal to Stalin and then communicate his opinion to the Koreans.
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Zhou Enlai discussed Beijing's proposed strategy toward the armistice negotiations with Stalin the following month, when a Chinese delegation traveled to Moscow to discuss continued economic and military support to the People's Republic. The Russian transcripts of the three discussions between Zhou and Stalin that took place between August 20 and September 19 reveal that the Chinese leaders were by then more eager to reach an armistice settlement than they had been in July. Stalin, on the other hand, continued to press for continuation of the war. Neither leader, however, pursued his goal in a straightforward manner. In-

 

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stead, reflecting the complexity of the relationship between the two Communist governments, Stalin and Zhou circled warily around the issue of a negotiated settlement in Korea, trying to avoid open disagreement without compromising their individual aims.
Stalin began by framing the prisoner-of-war (POW) issue as a question of whether Mao would give in to the Americans, who were defying international law in their insistence on voluntary repatriation. Zhou replied deftly that the (North) Koreans wanted to accept the American proposal because they wished to end the war but that the Americans were trying to drive a wedge between China and Korea. Zhou added that Mao believed that continuing the war was advantageous because it prevented the United States from preparing for a new world war, an assertion to which Stalin eagerly agreed.
Zhou then stated that they could not yield to the Americans. Stalin, however, by now in a more favorable position, replied that if the Americans "back down a little, then you can accept, assuming that negotiations will continue on questions still unresolved." Zhou partied with a strong statement of agreement, adding that "if the Americans don't want peace, then we must be prepared to continue the war, even if it were to take another year." Zhou also repeated Stalin's analysis that "this war is getting on America's nerves and that the U.S.A. is not ready for a world war." Boosting the revolutionary credentials of the new Communist state, Zhou added that "China, by playing the vanguard role in this war, is helping to stave off the war for 15-20 years, assuming that [our forces] will succeed in containing the American offensive in Korea. Then the U.S.A. will not be able to unleash a third world war at all.''
Stalin replied by raising the ante, asserting that the
Americans are not capable of waging a large-scale war at all, especially after the Korean war. All of their strength lies in air power and the atom bomb. Britain won't fight for America. America cannot defeat little Korea. One must be firm when dealing with America. The Chinese comrades must know that if America does not lose this war, then China will never recapture Taiwan. Americans are merchants. Every American soldier is a speculator, occupied with buying and selling. Germans conquered France in 20 days. It's been already two years, and the U.S.A has still not subdued little Korea. What kind of strength is that? America's primary weapons, [Stalin said jokingly,] are stockings, cigarettes and other merchandise. They want to subjugate the world, yet they cannot subdue little Korea. No, Americans don't know how to fight. After the Korean war, in particular, they have lost the capability to wage a large-scale war. They are pinning

 

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their hopes on the atom bomb and air power. But one cannot win a war with that. One needs infantry, and they don't have much infantry; the infantry they do have is weak. They are fighting with little Korea, and already people are weeping in the U.S.A. What will happen if they start a large-scale war? Then, perhaps, everyone will weep.

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Stalin' s bombast about America' s supposed weakness seems to have been too much for Zhou, however, as the latter abruptly changed his tone, proposing that if the United States
makes some sort of compromises, even if they are small, then they should accept. If America does not agree to return all POWs and proposes a smaller number, then they should accept the offer, under the condition that the question of the remaining POWs will be resolved under mediation by some neutral country, like India, or the remaining POWs transferred to this neutral country until the question is resolved.
Stalin countered with a proposal that if the Americans are holding back a certain percentage of POWs, then North Korea and China would do likewise until a final solution was agreed upon. He also added that if these proposals were unsuccessful, the Chinese could resort to mediation. "The main thing here is to propose a cease-fire," Stalin inconsistently concluded.
Zhou then wrapped up the discussion of the armistice negotiations by outlining three possible strategies.
First announce from the beginning that they will hold back the same percentage of South Korean and American POWs as the percentage of North Koreans and Chinese held back by America, and leave it at that. Second resort to mediation by a neutral country. Third sign an armistice agreement by putting off the POW question and resuming its discussion afterwards.
Without reaching any decision about which of the three strategies to pursue, Zhou turned the discussion to questions of Soviet military assistance to China, arguing. that this aid was particularly needed inasmuch as the Chinese government was preparing for the possibility of another two to three years of war.
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The same basic dynamic underlaid Zhou's final conversation with Stalin on September 19. The Chinese foreign minister attempted to explore the possibility for a negotiated settlement in Korea without rupturing Beijing's relations with Moscow, while Stalin sought to discourage Chinese agreement to armistice

 

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