Brothers in Arms (87 page)

Read Brothers in Arms Online

Authors: Odd Arne Westad

Tags: #Political Science, #International Relations, #General, #test

60. Dittmer,
Sino-Soviet Normalization,
189-90.

 

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Page 245
61. Dismukes and McConnell,
Soviet Naval Diplomacy,
20.
62. Dittmer,
Sino-Soviet Normalization,
172.
63. See Robert G. Weinland, ''The Evolution of Soviet Requirements for Naval Forces: Solving the Problems of the Early 1960s,"
Survival
26 (1984): 22-3.
64. For a description of the initial period of uncertainty and attempts to mend the alliance, see Jones and Kevill,
China and the Soviet Union,
60-1.

 

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8.
Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance
Chen Jian and Yang Kulsong
No other event during the Cold War contributed so much to changes in perceptions of the Communist powers as the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Emerging in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the "brotherly solidarity" between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union was claimed to be "unbreakable" and "eternal." But by the latter part of the decade, serious disputes began to develop between Chinese and Soviet leaders, causing the alliance to decline and then to collapse in the early 1960s. In the years that followed, the hostility between the two countries rose so far that it led to a bloody border war in 1969. In the 1960s and 1970s, the total confrontation between the two countries became a basic element of international affairs.
What, then, were the causes underlying the rise and demise of the Sino-Soviet alliance? Scholars may answer this question in many ways. This chapter, with the insights gained from newly available Chinese source materials,

1
reinforced by fresh Russian documents,
2
adopts a
domestic-oriented
approach. Without ignoring the merits of other interpretations, especially those emphasizing the role played by China's security concerns and international ideological commitments, this chapter argues that China's alliance policy toward the Soviet Union was
always
an integral part of Chairman Mao Zedong's grand plans for transforming China's state, society, and international outlook. While security and socialist internationalism conditioned the rise and fall of the alliance, it was Mao's efforts to define and redefine the mission and scope of his "continuous revolution" that constituted the central theme of Chinese politics during his era (1949 to 1976) and that shaped Beijing's attitude toward China's alliance with the Soviet Union.

 

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The Meaning of the "Lean-to-One-Side" Approach
On June 30, 1949, Mao Zedong issued his famous "lean-to-one-side" statement. In a long article entitled "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," he announced the special relationship of the New China with the Soviet Union. He said that the People's Republic must:
Externally, unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equal and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democratic Countries, and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front. . . . We must lean to one side.

3

What was the meaning of Mao's extraordinary choice of terms? The content was obviously linked to the long-term revolutionary policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of attaching itself to the international "progressive forces" led by the Soviet Union. By the late 1940s, CCP leaders clearly perceived the postwar world as divided into two camps, one headed by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States, and regarded their revolution as a part of the Soviet-led international proletarian movement.
4
Mao's statement was consistent with this view of the postwar world structure.
But the lean-to-one-side approach also grew out of the CCP's assessment of the serious nature of the threat from Western imperialist countries, especially from the United States, to the completion of the Chinese revolution. As the CCP neared final victory in China's civil war in 1949, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders became very much concerned about the prospect of direct U.S. intervention in China.
5
Although the American military did not intervene directly during the latter phase of the civil war, CCP leaders, given their belief in the aggressive and evil nature of Western imperialism, continued to view the Western capitalist countries in general and the United States in particular as dangerous enemies. In the eyes of Mao and his comrades, "it was the possibility of military intervention from imperialist countries that decided the necessity of China allying itself with socialist countries."
6
In addition to these ideological commitments and security concerns, though, Mao's lean-to-one-side decision must be understood in the context of his determination to maintain and enhance the inner dynamics of the Chinese Communist revolution at the time of its nationwide victory. The final goal of Mao's Chinese Revolution, as the CCP chairman himself repeatedly emphasized, was the transformation of China's "old" state and society and the destruction of the "old" world in which, as Mao and his comrades viewed it, China had been a humiliated member during modern times. Mao never concealed his ambition that

 

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his revolution should finally turn China into a land of universal justice and equality, while at the same time, through presenting the experience of the Chinese Revolution as a model for other "oppressed nations" in the world, China would reestablish its central position in the international community. In 1949, when the Chinese Communist revolution approached nationwide victory, Mao and his comrades understood that the New China would have to meet such challenges as establishing and consolidating a new revolutionary regime and reviving China's war-worn economy.
But what concerned the CCP chairman the most was how to prevent the revolution from losing its momentum. In his New Year's message for 1949, Mao called upon his party "to carry the revolution through to the end," by which he meant not only the thorough destruction of the Guomindang (GMD) regime but also the promotion of the revolution toward its higher, post-takeover stage.

7
Throughout 1949 he repeatedly warned against imperialist plots to sabotage the revolution from within either using the "sugar-coated bullet" to shoot down the weak-willed Communists or dividing the revolutionary camp by applying the "doctrine of means" to confuse the distinction between revolution and counterrevolution.
8
Mao stressed that ''after the destruction of the enemies with guns, the enemies without guns are still there, and they are bound to struggle desperately against us." He therefore warned the party: "If we fail to pay enough attention to these problems, if we do not know how to wage the struggle against them and win victory in the struggle, we shall be unable to maintain our political power, we shall be unable to stand on our feet, we shall fail.
9

It was to create momentum for China's continuous revolution that the CCP leadership made three fundamental decisions on New China's external relations, what Mao referred to as "making a fresh start," "cleaning the house before entertaining guests," and "leaning to one side."
10
These three decisions were closely interconnected. While the first two represented Mao's and his comrades' determination not to be influenced by the legacy of "old" China's diplomatic practice, the last one reflected Mao's conviction that an alliance with the Soviet Union would help destroy any remaining illusions among the Chinese people, especially the intellectuals, of the utility of assistance from Western capitalist countries. Because the Soviet Union had been the first socialist country in the world and had established the only example for building a socialist and Communist state and society, Mao's continuous revolution had to learn from the Soviet experience. In this regard, the argument of Zhang Baijia, a leading Chinese scholar in Chinese diplomatic history, certainly makes good sense:
Contrary to the prevalent view, Mao treated the "lean-to-one-side" concept as a grand strategy to influence the Party's foreign
and
do-

 

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