Command and Control (69 page)

Many of the declassified documents cited in this book were found online. Two of the best sites for historical material are the Pentagon's Defense Technical Information Center, “Provider of DoD Technical Information to Support the WarFighter,” and the U.S. Department of Energy's OpenNet. L. Douglas Kenney—the author of
15 Minutes: General Curtis LeMay and the Countdown to Nuclear Annihilation
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011)—has posted a few Strategic Air Command official histories online that I found quite useful. A Web site called the Black Vault also features a wide variety of
declassified documents. And the Federation of American Scientists is an excellent online source for information about nuclear weapons.

I am especially grateful for the work of the National Security Archive, based at George Washington University, which for almost three decades has been obtaining documents through the Freedom of Information Act and suing federal agencies when they are denied—not only to reveal what the government has done but also to hold it accountable for that behavior. The archive is a national treasure. Its digital collection proved invaluable to my research. William Burr, the director of its nuclear project, has done an extraordinary job of uncovering and explaining some of the more significant documents. With the head of the archive, Thomas S. Blanton, and Stephen I. Schwartz, Burr wrote a fine essay that explains why freedom of information is so essential: “The Costs and Consequences of Nuclear Secrecy,” in
Atomic Audit
, pages 433–483. Throughout my bibliography and endnotes I have used the acronym NSA to identify documents originally obtained by the National Security Archive.

Prior to the publication of this book, I gave a rough draft of it to a nuclear weapons expert who is not employed by the U.S. government and yet possesses a high-level clearance. I wanted to feel confident that nothing disclosed in these pages would pose any threat to national security. My unpaid but much appreciated reader found nothing that even remotely does—and I agree with him. A far greater threat has been posed, for the past sixty years, by official secrecy and misinformation about America's nuclear arsenal. The suppression of the truth has allowed a small and elite group of policy makers to wield tremendous, largely unchecked power. There are few issues more important than what nuclear weapons can do, where they are aimed, why they might be used, and who has the ability to order their use. I hope my book contributes, in some small way, to restoring a semblance of democracy to the command and control of the deadliest, most dangerous machines that mankind has ever invented.

P
ART
O
NE
: T
HE
T
ITAN

Not Good

S
enior Airman David F. Powell and Airman Jeffrey L. Plumb
:
I spoke to Plumb and Powell about the accident. Plumb's statement before the Missile Accident Investigation Board can be found at Tab U-71 and Powell's at Tab U-73, “Report of Missile Accident Investigation: Major Missile Accident, 18–19 September 1980, Titan II Complex 374-7, Assigned to 308th Strategic Missile Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas,” conducted at Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, and Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, December 14–19, 1980.

10 feet in diameter and 103 feet tall
:
According to the Titan II historian David K. Stumpf, the height of the missile was often erroneously described as “anywhere from 108 feet to 114 feet.” The actual height was 103.4 feet. See “Table 3.2, Titan II ICBM Final Design Specifications,” in David K. Stumpf,
Titan II: A History of a Cold War Missile Program
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2000), p. 49.

a yield of 9 megatons
: The yields of American nuclear weapons remain classified, except for those of the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But for decades government officials have discussed those yields, off the record, with journalists. Throughout this book, I cite the weapon yields published by a pair of reliable defense analysts. For some reason, the megatonnage of the warheads carried by the Titan and Titan II missiles was disclosed in a document obtained by the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information Act. For the yields of the W-38 warhead atop the Titan and the W-53 atop the Titan II, see “Missile Procurement, Air Force,” U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, May 16, 1961 (
SECRET
/declassified), NSA, p. 523. For the yields of other American weapons, see Norman Polmar and Robert S. Norris,
The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: A History of Weapons and Delivery Systems Since 1945
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), pp. 1–70.

about three times the explosive force of all the bombs
:
Although estimates vary, the American physicist Richard L. Garwin and the Russian physicist Andrei Sakharov both noted that the explosive force of all the bombs used during the Second World War was about 3 megatons. The United States was responsible for most of it. According to Senator Stuart Symington, who'd served as the first secretary of the Air Force after the war, the bombs dropped by the United States had a cumulative force of 2.1 megatons. Two thirds of that amount was employed against Germany, the rest against Japan. The enormous power of the Titan II's warhead seems hard to comprehend. Nine megatons is the equivalent of eighteen billion pounds of TNT—about four pounds of high explosives for every person alive in September 1980. Symington's estimates can be found in “Military Applications of Nuclear Technology,” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Atomic Energy, 93rd Cong., April 16, 1973, pt. 1, pp. 3–4. For the other estimates, see Richard L. Garwin, “New Weapons/Old Doctrines: Strategic Warfare in the 1980s,”
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society
, vol. 124, no. 4 (1980), p. 262; and Andrei Sakharov, “The Danger of Thermonuclear War,”
Foreign Affairs,
Summer 1983, p. 1002.

“hypergolic”
:
The word, according to rocket scientists, means “spontaneously ignitable.” One of the advantages of using hypergolic propellants is that the propellants eliminate the need for an ignition system in a missile. One of the disadvantages is how dangerous they are. For a good introduction to the subject, see B. M. Nufer, “A Summary of NASA and USAF Hypergolic Propellant Related Spills and Fires,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA/TP-2009-214769, June 2009. For a more thorough examination, see the chapters “Liquid Propellant Rocket Engine Fundamentals” and “Liquid Propellants” in George P. Sutton and Oscar Biblarz,
Rocket Propulsion Elements
,
7th ed. (New York: Wiley, 2001), pp. 197–267.

supersonic convergent-divergent nozzles
:
Shaped like an hourglass, a convergent-divergent nozzle increases the velocity of a hot gas by forcing it through a narrow chamber.

The fuel, Aerozine-50
:
A brief overview of the Titan II's propellants and their hazards can be found in “Propellant Transportation Awareness Guide for Titan II Deactivation,” Department of the Air Force, October 1, 1982. A more detailed account is offered in “Titan II Storable Propellant Handbook,” Revision B, Bell Aerosystems Company, Prepared for Air Force Ballistic Systems Division, March 1963.

a Rocket Fuel Handler's Clothing Outfit (RFHCO)
:
For a description of the gear and its proper use, see “Missile Liquid Propellant Systems Maintenance Specialist: Volume 3, Propellant Transfer System,” CDC 4551, Extension Course Institute, Air Training Command, February 1983, pp. 1–42.

Electroexplosive devices were used
:
For the various things that could explode in a Titan II silo and the potential risks, see “Nuclear Weapon Specialist: Volume 5, Rockets, Missiles, and Reentry Systems,” CDC 46350, Extension Course Institute, Air Training Command, November 1980 (
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
), pp. 19–38.

Technical Order 21M-LGM25C-2-12, Figure 2-18
: The relevant excerpt of the tech order can be found in “Titan II Class A Mishap Report: Serial Number 62-0006, 18 September 1980, Damascus, Arkansas,” Eighth Air Force Mishap Investigation Board, October 30, 1980, p. 0-1.

“Oh man,” Plumb thought
:
Interview with Jeffrey L. Plumb.

New Wave

Second Lieutenant Allan D. Childers had gotten out of bed
:
I spoke to Childers at length about that day. His testimony before the accident investigation board can be found in “Report, Major Missile Accident, Titan II Complex 374-7,” Tab U-13.

the
Dash-1
: An abridged version has been published:
Technical Manual, USAF Model LGM-25C, Missile System Operation
(Tucson: Arizona Aerospace Foundation, 2005).

“the hostile invasion . . . by the Iraqi regime”
:
Quoted in “Iran Criticizes Iraq for Ending '75 Pact,”
New York Times
, September 19, 1980.

the International Institute for Strategic Studies . . . issued a report
:
The title of the report was “The Military Balance, 1980–1981.” See Louis Nevin, “Soviets and Warsaw Pact Have Weapons Lead Over West,” Associated Press, September 17, 1980.

an unemployment rate of about 8 percent
:
President Carter cited that figure while speaking to reporters on September 18, 1980. See “Transcript of the President's News Conference,”
New York Times,
September 19, 1980.

“a crisis in confidence”
:
For the complete speech, see “Text of President Carter's Address to the Nation,”
Washington Post,
July 16, 1979.

an official report on the failed rescue attempt
:
See “Rescue Mission Report,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations Review Group, August 1980.

77 percent of the American people disapproved
:
President Nixon's disapproval rate never exceeded 71 percent. These ratings are cited in Donald M. Rothberg, “Carter Plunges in Polls, But Campaign Chief Insists He'll Win,” Associated Press
,
July 30, 1980.

“I refuse to accept [Carter's] defeatist and pessimistic view”
:
See “Transcript of Reagan Speech Outlining Five-Year Economic Program for the U.S.,”
New York Times
, September 10, 1980.

“four more years of weakness, indecision, mediocrity”
:
See “Text of Reagan's Speech Accepting Republicans' Nomination,”
New York Times,
July 18, 1980
.

“a bumbler”
:
Quoted in “Interview with John B. Anderson,”
BusinessWeek,
September 8, 1980.

“People feel that the country is coming apart”
:
Quoted in ibid.

a bestselling nonfiction book in late September
:
See Edwin McDowell, “Behind the Best Sellers; ‘Crisis Investing,'”
New York Times,
September 21, 1980.

“In the last few years before the outbreak of war”
:
John Hackett,
The Third World War: August 1985
(New York: Macmillan, 1978), p. 316.

Ronald Reagan later called
The Third World War
:
In 1983, President Reagan told the
New York Times
that
The Third
World War
was the most important book that he'd read for work that year. See “Reading for Work and Pleasure,”
New York Times,
December 4, 1983.

the techno-thriller
:
For Hackett's role in creating the new genre, see J. William Gibson, “Redeeming Vietnam: Techno-Thriller Novels of the 1980s,”
Cultural Critique,
no. 19 (Fall 1991), pp. 179–202.

“Life begins at forty”
:
Quoted in David Sheff,
All We Are Saying: The Last Major Interview with John Lennon and Yoko Ono,
ed. G. Barry Golson
(New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2000), p. 8.

“Politics and rebellion distinguished the '60's”
: Jerry Rubin, “Guess Who's Coming to Wall Street,”
New York Times,
July 30, 1980.

the highest-paid banker . . . earned about $710,000 a year
:
Roger E. Anderson earned $710,440 in 1980, an income that would be roughly $2 million in today's dollars. A few years later, Anderson was forced to leave Continental Illinois, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation subsequently took it over—at the time, the largest bank bailout in American history. For Anderson's salary, see L. Michael Cacage, “Who Earned the Most?,”
American Banker
(May 29, 1981). The story of how Anderson's bank collapsed remains sadly relevant. See “Continental Illinois and ‘Too Big to Fail,'” in
History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future, Volume 1
(Washington, D.C.:
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Research and Statistics, 1997), pp. 235–57.

“There is a tidal wave coming”
:
Quoted in Ernest B. Furgurson, “Carter as Hoover, Reagan as F.D.R.? Socko!,”
Los Angeles Times,
July 22, 1980.

No Lone Zones

political, as well as military, considerations
:
According to one historian, Congressman Wilbur D. Mills agreed to support a reduction in corporate taxes—and in return Arkansas got the Titan II bases. See Julian E. Zelizer,
Taxing America: Wilbur D. Mills, Congress, and the State, 1945–1975
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 187.

It weighed roughly six thousand pounds
:
Cited in Stumpf,
Titan II
, p. 118.