Command and Control (73 page)

The president was given the sole authority
:
The historian Garry Wills has argued that the decision to give this unchecked power to the executive branch had a lasting and profound effect on American democracy. See Garry Wills,
Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State
(New York: Penguin Press, 2010). For the constitutional and legal basis for such power, see Frank Klotz, Jr., “The President and the Control of Nuclear Weapons,” in David C. Kozak and Kenneth N. Ciboski, eds.,
The American Presidency: A Policy Perspective from Readings and Documents
(Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1987), pp. 47–58.

“We are here to make a choice”
:
For the full text of Bernard Baruch's remarks, see “Baruch Reviews Portent of A-Bomb,”
Washington Post
, June 15, 1946.

“all atomic-energy activities potentially dangerous”
:
Ibid.

willing to hand over its “winning weapons”
:
Ibid.

The number of soldiers in the U.S. Army
:
In August 1945 the Army had more than 8 million soldiers and by July 1, 1947, it had only 989,664—a remarkably swift dismantling of a victorious military force. See John C. Sparrow,
History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1952), pp. 139, 263.

from almost 80,000 to fewer than 25,000
:
See Bernard C. Nalty, ed.,
Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, Volume 1, 1907–1950
(Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), p. 378.

only one fifth of those planes
:
Ibid.

the defense budget was cut by almost 90 percent
:
The United States spent about $83 billion on defense in 1945—and about $9 billion in 1948. Cited in “National Defense Budget Estimates for FYH 2013,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2012, p. 246.

“No major strategic threat or requirement”
:
Quoted in Walton S. Moody,
Building a Strategic Air Force
(Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995), p. 78.

the Soviets were “fanatically” committed to destroying
:
Kennan's quotes come from his famous “long telegram,” whose full text can be found at “The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” February 22, 1946 (
SECRET
/declassified), in United States State Department,
Foreign Relations of the United States: 1946, Volume 6, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 696–709.

an “iron curtain”
:
For the speech in which Churchill first used that phrase, see “Text of Churchill's Address at Westminister College,”
Washington Post
, March 6, 1946.

“
terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio”
:
For Truman's speech, see “Text of President's Speech on New Foreign Policy,”
New York Times
, March 13, 1947.

the Pentagon did not have a war plan
:
The first major study of potential targets in the Soviet Union was conducted in the summer of 1947. For America's lack of war plans, see L. Wainstein, C. D. Creamans, J. K. Moriarity, and J. Ponturo, “The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, 1945–1972,” Institute for Defense Analyses, Study S-467, June 1975 (
TOP SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA
/declassified), pp. 11–14; Ernest R. May, John D. Steinbruner, and Thomas W. Wolfe, “History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945–1972,” Pt. 1, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, March 1981 (
TOP SECRET
/
RESTRICTED DATA
/declassified), pp. 21–22; and James F. Schnabel,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy; Volume
1
,
1945–1947
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), pp. 70–75.

The U.S. Army had only one division . . . along with ten police regiments
:
Cited in Steven T. Ross,
American War Plans, 1945–1950: Strategies for Defeating the Soviet Union
(Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 40.

for a total of perhaps 100,000 troops
:
In May 1945 the United States had about 2 million troops in Europe; two years later it had 105,000. Cited in “History Timeline,” United States Army Europe, U.S. Army, 2011.

The British army had one division
:
Cited in Ross,
War Plans,
p. 40
.

the Soviet army had about one hundred divisions
:
See Schnabel,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume 1,
p. 71.

about 1.2 million troops
:
Cited in Ross,
War Plans
, p. 53.

more than 150 additional divisions
:
Cited in ibid., p. 33. Some intelligence reports claimed that the Soviet Union had 175 divisions in Europe, with 40 of them ready to attack West Germany. The Pentagon estimates of Soviet troop numbers varied widely—and, according to the historian Matthew A. Evangelista, deliberately overstated the strength of the Red Army. A more innocent motive might have been a desire to prepare for the worst. In any event, by early 1947, the U.S. Army was greatly outnumbered in Europe. See May et al., “History of Strategic Arms Competition,” Pt. 1 pp. 37, 139–41; and Matthew A. Evangelista, “Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised,”
International Security
, vol. 7, no. 3 (1982), pp. 110–38.

the Bikini atoll in the Marshall Islands
:
For a patriotic account of the test, which somehow inspired the name for a woman's two-piece bathing suit, see W. A. Shurcliff,
Bombs at Bikini: The Official Report of Operation Crossroads
(New York: Wm. H. Wise, 1947).

“Ships at sea and bodies of troops”
:
“The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon,” Enclosure “A,” The Final Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board for Operation Crossroads, June 30, 1947 (
TOP SECRET
/declassified), p. 12.

“The bomb is pre-eminently a weapon”
:
Ibid., p. 32.

“man's primordial fears”
:
Ibid., p. 36.

“break the will of nations”
:
Ibid.

“cities of especial sentimental significance”
:
Ibid., p. 37.

if “we were ruthlessly realistic”
:
Quoted in Marc Trachtenberg,
History & Strategy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 100.

“I don't advocate preventive war”
:
Quoted in “The Five Nests,”
Time
, September 11, 1950, p. 24.

“I think I could explain to Him”
:
Quoted in ibid.

Support for a first strike extended far beyond the upper ranks of the U.S. military
:
Marc Trachtenberg offers a fine summary of American thinking about “preventive war” in
History & Strategy,
pp. 103–7. For other views of the subject, see Russell D. Buhite and W. Christopher Hamel, “War for Peace: The Question of an American Preventive War Against the Soviet Union, 1945–1955,”
Diplomatic History
, vol. 14, no. 3, (1990), pp. 367–84; and Gian P. Gentile, “Planning for Preventive War,”
Joint Force Quarterly,
Spring 2000, pp. 68–74.

Russell: . . . urged the western democracies to attack
:
Bertrand Russell and his admirers later denied that he'd ever called for such an attack. But his rejection of pacifism, when dealing with the Soviets, had already been made clear. See “Russell Urges West to Fight Russia Now,”
New York Times,
November 21, 1948; Bertrand Russell, “The Atomic Bomb and the Prevention of War,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(October 1, 1946), pp. 19–21; and Ray Perkins, “Bertrand
Russell and Preventive War,”
Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies
, vol. 14, no. 2 (1994), pp. 135–53.

“anything is better than submission”
:
Quoted in
New York Times,
“Russell Urges West to Fight.”

Winston Churchill agreed
:
See Trachtenberg,
History & Strategy
, p. 105.

Even Hamilton Holt, lover of peace
:
See Kuehl,
Hamilton Holt,
pp. 250–51.

“should be wiped off the face of the earth”
:
Quoted in ibid., p. 250.

the
Joint Chiefs of Staff approved HALFMOON
:
For an abridged version of HALFMOON, see “Brief of Short Range Emergency War Plan (HALFMOON), ” JCS 1844/13, July 21, 1948 (
TOP SECRET
/declassified), in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis,
Containment: Documents
on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 315–24. For additional details, see May et al., “History of Strategic Arms Competition,” Pt. 1, pp. 38–39; Ross,
War Plans,
pp. 79–97; and Kenneth W. Condit,
The
Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume 2, 1947–1949
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), pp. 156–58.

an “atomic blitz”
:
See “Conceptual Developments: The Atomic Blitz,” in Wainstein et al., “Evolution of U.S. Command and Control,” pp. 11–16.

Leningrad was to be hit by 7 atomic bombs, Moscow by 8
:
Cited in Condit,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume 2,
p. 158.

“the nation-killing concept”
:
Quoted in Wainstein et al., “Evolution of U.S. Command and Control,” p. 15.

“a nation would die just as surely”
:
Quoted in Robert F. Futrell,
Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, Volume 1, Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–1960
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1989), p. 240.

a “devastating, annihilating attack”
:
Quoted in Jeffrey G. Barlow,
Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950
(Washington, D.C.: Government Reprints Press, 2001), p. 109.

“It will be the cheapest thing we ever did”
:
Quoted in Moody,
Building a Strategic Air Force
, p. 109.

“The negative psycho-social results”
:
The State Department official was Charles E. Bohlen, quoted in Futrell,
Ideas,
vol. 1,
p. 238.

the Harmon Committee concluded
:
An abridged version of the Harmon Report—“Evaluation of Effect on Soviet War Effort Resulting from the Strategic Air Offensive” (
TOP SECRET
/declassified)—can be found in
Etzold and Gaddis,
Containment,
pp. 360–64.

reduce Soviet industrial production by 30 to 40 percent
:
Ibid., p. 361.

kill perhaps 2.7 million civilians
:
Ibid., p. 362.

injure an additional 4 million
:
Ibid.

“For the majority of Soviet people”
:
Ibid.

“the only means of rapidly inflicting shock”
:
Ibid., pp. 363–64

The Soviets detonated their first atomic device
:
For the making of the Soviet bomb, see ibid. David Holloway,
Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).

The yield was about 20 kilotons
:
Cited in ibid., p. 218.

Each of its roughly 105,000 parts
:
For the extraordinary story of how the B-29 was reverse-engineered, see Van Hardesty, “Made in the U.S.S.R.,”
Air & Space
, March 2001; and Walter J. Boyne, “Carbon Copy,”
Air Force Magazine
, June 2009.

Soviet Union wouldn't develop an atomic bomb until the late 1960s
:
In 1947, General Groves predicted it would take the Soviets another twenty years. See Gregg Herken, “‘A Most Deadly Illusion': The Atomic Secret and American Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1945–1950,”
Pacific Historical Review,
vol. 49, no. 1 (February 1980), pp. 58, 71.

without a single military radar to search for enemy planes
:
See Wainstein et al., “Evolution of U.S. Command and Control,” p. 90.

twenty-three radars to guard the northeastern United States
:
Cited in ibid., p. 94.

a bitter, public dispute about America's nuclear strategy
:
For an excellent overview of the military thinking that led not only to the “revolt of the admirals” but also to Pentagon support for a hydrogen bomb, see David Alan Rosenberg, “American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision,”
Journal of American History
, vol. 66, no. 1 (June 1979), pp. 62–87. For the cultural
underpinnings of the revolt, see Vincent Davis,
The Admirals Lobby
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967). And for the dispute itself, see Barlow,
Revolt of the Admirals,
p. 109.