Conversations with Myself (9 page)

MANDELA: Well, it was information on which we could work out our own tactics.

8. FROM HIS 1962 NOTEBOOK ON HIS TRAINING IN MOROCCO WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT IN ALGERIA (ALN)

Maroc

18/3

R [Robert Resha]
⁶
and I leave [Rabat] for the border village of Oujda, the HQ of the ALN in Maroc. We leave by train and reach at 8 am on 19/3.

19/3

An officer meets us at the station and drives us to [HQ]. We are received by Abdelhamid [Brahimi],
⁷
head of the political section of the ALN.

Present are Si Jamal, Aberrahman, Larbi, Noureddine Djoudi. A general discussion on the situation in SA [South Africa] ensues and pertinent and searching questions are put to us. The discussion is thereafter adjourned to enable us to see things in training camps and in the front lines.

At 4 pm, accompanied by Djoudi and another officer we drive to training base of Zegangan situate[d] in what was known as Spanish Morocco. We arrive there at 6 pm and are met by the Commander of the camp Si Jamal. He shows us the army museum containing an interesting collection of armaments of the ALN, starting with those used during the uprising of November 1, 1954, to the latest equipment.

After dinner we visit the soldiers’ theatre and listen to music and sketches. The two sketches presented contain terrific propaganda against French rule in Alg[eria]. After the show we return to our quarters and sleep.

21/3

After visiting the ALN printing works and transmission HQ we proceed, in the company of two officers to Bouleker. We first visit the HQ of the battalion on the northern division. It is situated suitably in the most strategic area and heavily guarded. We have lunch there consisting of rabbit meat and fresh bread.

Thereafter we proceed to the HQ of one of the battalions situated right on the Alg border. We see and enter the dugouts. There are a lot of refugees around the camp and their appearance was most touching. Later we return to Oujda for a discussion.

The discussion starts at 6.30 pm and we were to leave at 9.45 back to Rabat. At 9.30 it was decided that we should leave by car for Rabat the next day as we had hardly disposed of ¼ of our business.

9. FROM HIS 1962 NOTEBOOK

Another point…that Capt Larbi made was that the country’s elite must be made to realise that the masses of the people, however poor and illiterate they might be, are the country’s most important investment. In all activities and operations there must be a thorough diffusion of the intelligentsia and the masses of the people – peasants and labourers, workers in the cities, etc.

Thirdly, the masses of the people must be made to realise that political action, of the nature of strikes, boycotts and similar demonstrations, has become ineffective standing just by themselves. Action must be accepted as the primary and most essential form of political activity.

10. FROM HIS 1962 NOTEBOOK

Whilst political consciousness is vital in the formation of an army and in mobilising mass support, practical matters must not be lost sight of. For example, a woman who is not politically developed may do a great deal for the revolution simply because her boyfriend, husband or son is in the army. Also villages may show individual initiative which must be encouraged.

There is a case where one village attacked a French post without instructions from the ALN [National Liberation Front in Algeria]. In another village, the people dug an underground tunnel on their own.

It is also known that at a certain stage the ALN prevented its soldiers from getting married. Later on this was modified and general permission to marry was granted. Those women who were now married to the soldiers of the ALN, including their families, immediately became supporters of the ALN and the revolution.

11. FROM HIS 1962 NOTEBOOK

There are certain vital matters which have to be borne in mind in building up a revolutionary army:

Whilst it is important to have your people trained by friendly countries…this should only be part of the plan. The essential point to grasp is to produce your own schools [which] will establish training centres either inside or on the borders of the country.

You must also plan and provide for replacements simply because in combat you will [lose] many men. You will break the revolution if you do not take the necessary preparations. You will also give confidence to the enemy. On the contrary, and right from the beginning you must show him that your strength is increasing.

You must be flexible and original otherwise the enemy will smash your forces.

Account must also be taken for the fact that the longe[r] the war lasts, the more the massacres increase, and the people get tired.

12. FROM HIS 1962 NOTEBOOK

Spectacular and successful attacks by the revolutionaries enabled the Alg[erian] people to recover their dignity. In Alg[eria] they established zonal commando[s] who had a specialised function. Their activities have no economic advantage but [are] extremely useful in building up the people’s morale. But such action must not fail. Examples of commando operations consist in surface attacks on French soldiers in cities, explosions in cinemas.

You must also not rely merely on a declaration by a prospective recruit that he is ready to fight. You must test him. In one village 200 people declared that they were ready to join the ALN [National Liberation Front in Algeria]. They were then told that the following day there would be an attack on the enemy. Volunteers were called for and only 3 came forward. In yet another case new recruits were told to march to a certain point at night where they were promised weapons. They reached the place at midnight and they were told that the man who had promised to deliver the weapons had not arrived, and were advised to return the next night. Those who complained revealed that they would not be reliable under more difficult conditions.

13. FROM HIS 1962 NOTEBOOK

There must be proper coordination of guerrilla activities in the towns and country areas.

14. FROM HIS 1962 NOTEBOOK

Considerations to be born in mind when starting Rev[olution].

There must be an absolute guarantee that all precautions have been taken to ensure success – organisation is extremely important. There must be a network throughout the country first and foremost…We must make a thorough study of all revolutions including those that failed. Good organisation is absolutely essential. In the wilaya [province] a year was taken to build a proper organisation.

An uprising that is local must be avoided. Many uprising[s] failed because the revolutionary idea was not shared by all.

An uprising must be organised in such a way as to ensure its continuity.

15. FROM HIS 1962 NOTEBOOK

Organisers of rev[olution] must not be unduly worried by lack of military training on the part of the masses of the people. The best commanders and strategists in the ALN [National Liberation Front in Algeria] have mainly been those people who have no previous military experience. There is also a difference between being military and militant. In Alg[eria] women not only could shoot but they could dismantle a rifle and assemble it again.

16. FROM HIS 1962 NOTEBOOK

Date of commencement must be chosen when it is absolutely certain that rev[olution] will succeed and it must be related to other factors. For example, the French Minist[er] of Defence, after touring Tunisia and Morocco made a statement that Alg[eria] was peaceful. The uprising occurred the next day. Thereafter, he made a statement that the uprising was confined to certain areas and not countrywide. Soon thereafter it was extended throughout the country. Choosing of date[s] should be influenced by psychological opportunity.

17. FROM HIS 1962 NOTEBOOK

We must have the courage to accept that there will be reprisals against the population. But we must try and avoid this by a careful selection of targets. It is better to attack targets which are far away from the population than those that are near. Targets must be near as possible to the enemy. To the people and the world the uprising must assume the character of a popular revolutionary movement. To the enemy it must appear as an uprising of a few only.

We must seek the support of the entire population with a perfect balance of social classes. The base of your support will be amongst the common people, poor and illiterate but the intellectuals must be brought in.

Finally, there must be perfect harmony between the external delegation of the revolutionary movement and the high command. Both must consist of similar and equally developed personnel.

18. FROM HIS 1962 NOTEBOOK

14/3/62
Dr Mostefai

The original objective of the Alg[erian] Revolution was the defeat of the French by military action as in Indo-China. Settlement by negotiation was not visualised.

Conception of the struggle when you begin will determine failure or success of the revolution.

You must have a general plan which governs all our daily operations. In addition to the general plan which deals with the total situation, you must have a plan, say for the next 3 months. There must be no action for the sake of action. Every individual action must be done to implement the strategic aim. You must have

a) Military objective

b) Political objective

c) Psychological objective

This is the strategic aim for a limited time. The strategic aim may create a new situation which may make it necessary to alter the general plan. Your tactical plans are governed by strategy. Your tactics will not only be confined to military operations but they will also cover such things as the political consciousness of the masses of the people, the mobilisation of allies in the international field. Your aim should be to destroy the legality of the Government and to institute that of the people. There must be parallel authority in the administration of justice, in administration and in supplies.

The political organisation must be in complete control of the people and their activity. Your soldiers must live amongst the people like fish in water.

The aim should be that our forces should develop and grow and those of the enemy should disintegrate.

To start a revolution is easy but to continue and maintain it is most difficult. Duty of a commander is to make a thorough analysis of the situation before a start is made.

19. CONVERSATION WITH AHMED KATHRADA ABOUT HIS TRIP TO LONDON IN 1962

MANDELA: Yes, well actually, the British gave me a hard time at the airport. Not rude; you see they are very subtle.

KATHRADA: Ja.

MANDELA:…I had to produce my passport, but in the first place, you see, Oliver [Tambo] says, ‘You go to that table; I’ll go to that other one.’ And we parted, and so I gave this chap my passport, and he looked at it and greeted me very politely, and he says, ‘What are you coming to England for?’ So I say, ‘I came to the library, to the museum, because I am writing a book.’ And he says, ‘What book is this?’ So I say, ‘Well, the subject is the evolution of political thought in Africa’ and he says, ‘Oh, sir, wonderful – it’s a wonderful title, and how long do you want?’ I say, ‘I just want two weeks.’ He says, ‘No, don’t ask for two weeks; ask for a month.’ And I thought…I’m going to have a wonderful time, and I say, ‘No, I’ll get a month,’ and he said, ‘Have you got a return ticket…’

KATHRADA: Ah.

MANDELA: ‘…with you?’…I was
shaken
by this. I say, ‘No, but I’ve got some money.’ In fact I think I’ve got about 20 rands or something. [
laughs
] And I said, ‘I’ve got some money’ and I found my hand going to the pocket, but he says, ‘No, no, no, no. Don’t worry.’ Because…he knew…the fact that I had the money and he didn’t want to do that. They are very subtle.

KATHRADA: Ja.

MANDELA: ‘No, no, no, no, don’t do that.’ And then,
as
he was talking to me, the chap in that counter signalled to him, says [
gestures
]…to Oliver, you see? In other words, he was saying that ‘This is a chap in a…’, what-you-call, ‘in the black list.’

KATHRADA: Aha.

MANDELA: And he was
tipping
[off] this chap, and he was asking very subtle questions, but
coming
up, you know, with something devastating, you know?

KATHRADA: Ah.

MANDELA: And eventually [he] says, ‘I’m going to give you Form so-and-so’, you know, ‘which will enable you to stay for a month,’ and then wished me well. In the meantime they were plotting…They discovered that, no, we are freedom fighters. But I had quite a lovely time because I saw British politicians, and they welcomed me
very
well. I saw this chap Denis Healey, of the Labour Party,
⁸
and I saw…the chap Hugh Gaitskell
⁹
…Now they wanted me to meet [Prime Minister] Macmillan but…we were foolish; you see, our programme was too tight, seeing people like David Astor, Anthony…
¹⁰

KATHRADA: Sampson.
¹¹

MANDELA: Sampson and others…

KATHRADA: You didn’t stay with Astor did you?

MANDELA: No, no, no, no. I stayed with Oliver, yes.

KATHRADA: Aha.

MANDELA:…It was, of course, exciting to be in England and the capital of [the] once…powerful British Empire. I enjoyed that, and then in going, you know, to their bookshops and so on and getting literature on guerrilla warfare.

20. CONVERSATION WITH RICHARD STENGEL ABOUT GUERRILLA WARFARE

MANDELA: The revolution in China was a masterpiece, a
real
masterpiece. If you read how they fought that revolution, you believe in the impossible. It’s just miraculous. Who is the American man who wrote the book
Red Star Over China
?

STENGEL: Yes.

MANDELA: What was his name? Famous name, man.

STENGEL: Snow.

MANDELA: Edgar Snow.

STENGEL: Right.

MANDELA: That was the first book I read about China.