Authors: John Yoo
Tags: #History: American, #USA, #U.S. President, #Constitution: government & the state, #Constitutions, #Government, #Executive Branch, #Executive power - United States - History, #Constitutional & administrative law, #Law, #Constitutional history, #United States History (Specific Aspects), #Constitutional, #United States, #Presidents & Heads of State, #POLITICAL SCIENCE, #Legal status, #Executive power, #History, #Constitutional history - United States, #History of the Americas, #United States - General, #Presidents, #National Law: Professional, #Political History, #General, #History - U.S., #Presidents - Legal status, #etc - United States - History, #Biography & Autobiography, #Government - Executive Branch, #etc., #laws
47
Wood, supra note 4, at 434.
48
Ibid. at 446-53.
49
Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era 271 (1980).
CHAPTER 2: CREATION
1
1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 65 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (hereinafter "Farrand, Records").
2
Ibid. at 20-21.
3
Ibid.
4
Charles Thach, The Creation of the American Presidency, 1775-1789: A Study in Constitutional History 85 (1923).
5
1 Farrand, Records, supra note 1, at 66.
6
Ibid. at 65.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid. at 65-66. Oddly, the notes of Rufus King of New York show Madison, rather than Pinckney or Wilson, raising the issue. King records Madison as saying that "executive powers ex vi termini, do not include the Rights of war & peace &c. but the powers shd. be confined and defined." Ibid. at 70.
9
Ibid. at 64-65; see also Ibid. at 65 (comments of John Rutledge); Ibid. at 65-66 (comments of James Wilson).
10
Ibid. at 244.
11
Ibid.
12
As James Wilson declared on June 26, the "Senate will probably be the depositary of the powers concerning" relations "to foreign nations" because of senators' longer terms in office. 1 Ibid. at 426. See also John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 Southern California Law Review 1311, 1366-74 (1997) (discussing dual role of the Senate).
13
2 Farrand, Records, supra note 1, at 56-57.
14
2 Jack Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 261-62 (1996).
15
2 Farrand, Records, supra note 1, at 171-72.
16
2 Ibid. at 300-01.
17
2 Ibid. at 299-300.
18
2 Ibid. at 318.
19
2 Ibid. at 319.
20
Ibid.
21
See John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11, at 149-52 (2005). For contrary views, see Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution Means by "Declare War," 93 Cornell Law Review 45 (2007); and Michael Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 University of Chicago Law Review 1543 (2002). For my responses, see Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Making War, 93 Cornell Law Review 123 (2007); John Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 University of Chicago Law Review 1639 (2002).
22
Articles of Confederation art. IX (1777).
23
2 Farrand, Records, supra note 1, at 392.
24
Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1 Perspectives in American History 233, 240-41 (1984).
25
See Yoo, Powers of War and Peace, supra note 21, at 182-214; and Saikrishna Prakash & Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale Law Journal 231 (2001). For a contrary view, see, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Michigan Law Review 545, 637-41 (2004); Harold H. Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair (1990); and Michael Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy (1990).
26
See, e.g., James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development 43 (1979).
27
Federalist No. 68, at 460-61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
28
2 Farrand, Records, supra note 1, at 540.
29
Federalist No. 68, at 460 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
30
1 Farrand, Records, supra note 1, at 29.
31
2 Farrand, Records, supra note 1, at 540-41.
32
Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency 67 (1956).
33
Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984, at 201 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 1984).
34
2 Farrand, Records, supra note 1, at 648.
35
See Forrest McDonald: The American Presidency: An Intellectual History 181 (1994).
36
See, e.g., Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 1-12 (1973); and Michael Genovese, The Power of the American Presidency, 1789-2000, at 12-13 (2001).
37
See, e.g., Donald L. Robinson, "To the Best of My Ability": The Presidency and the Constitution 87-95 (1987); and Thach, supra note 4, at 139-40.
38
For excellent accounts of the political events and leaders of the ratification process, see Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (1986); Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution (1991); and Forrest McDonald, E Pluribus Unum (1979).
39
See Glenn Phelps, George Washington and American Constitutionalism (1994).
40
3 Farrand, Records, supra note 1, at 301-02.
41
George Mason, Objections to the Constitution (Oct. 7, 1787), reprinted in 13 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 349 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) (hereinafter "Documentary History"). Mason's objections were known to have been published in at least 27 newspapers from Maine to South Carolina and served as a sounding board for numerous Federalist and Anti-Federalist essays. See Ibid. at 348. As the influential Anti-Federalist "Federal Farmer" complained before the start of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, "[I]n this senate are lodged legislative, executive and judicial powers..." Letter III from the Federal Farmer (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 14 Ibid. at 32. The Letters from the Federal Farmer were published as 40-page pamphlets for sale, rather than as articles in newspapers. Apparently thousands of copies were sold throughout the states, and they appeared in Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts before their ratifying conventions concluded. See John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino, Editors' Note to Ibid. at 14-18. They are considered to be "one of the most significant publications of the ratification debate." Ibid. at 14.
42
6 The Complete Anti-Federalist 21 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
43
3 Ibid. at 115.
44
3 Ibid. at 38.
45
3 Ibid. at 414.
46
5 Ibid. at 145-46.
47
3 Ibid. at 233.
48
Federalist No. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
49
Federalist No. 41, at 270 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
50
Federalist No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
51
Federalist No. 48, at 334 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
52
Federalist No. 71, at 482 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
53
Federalist No. 70, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
54
Federalist No. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
55
Federalist No. 70, at 480 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
56
2 Documentary History, supra note 41, at 495.
57
Ibid. at 579.
58
9 Ibid. at 1097-98.
59
See generally Douglass Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers (1974).
60
Federalist No. 73, at 493 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
61
McDonald, supra note 35, at 206.
62
Federalist No. 75, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
63
Federalist No. 73, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
64
Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography 184 (2005).
65
Federalist No. 73, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
66
See, e.g., Michael Rappaport, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rights J. 113 (2007). For similar views, see Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 865 (1994); Am. Bar Ass'n, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine 5 (2006), available at
www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_statements_recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf
. Those taking a different view include Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case Western Reserve Law Review 905 (1990); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa Law Review 1267 (1996); and Michael S. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown Law Journal 217 (1994).
67
See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 University of Chicago Law Review 887 (2003).
68
2 Documentary History, supra note 41, at 450-51.
69
Amar, America's Constitution, supra note 64, at 179.
70
Federalist No. 74, at 501 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
71
On this point, see generally Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace, supra note 21, at 30-87; Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 25. For criticism of this theory, see Bradley & Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism, supra note 25.
72
Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 18 (1960).
73
Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, supra note 33.
74
See, e.g., Frederick Marks, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution 52-95 (1986).
75
Federalist No. 74, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
76
3 Documentary History, supra note 41, at 59-60.
77
Rakove, supra note 14, at 276-77.
78
Ibid. at 1282.
79
10 Documentary History, supra note 41, at 1281.
80
See John Yoo, Globalization and the Constitution, 99 Columbia Law Review 1955 (1999).
CHAPTER 3: GEORGE WASHINGTON
1
See Glenn A. Phelps, George Washington and American Constitutionalism 44-46 (1993).
2
Leonard D. White, The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History 27 (1948).
3
Phelps, supra note 1, at 145-49.
4
The story of the Washington-Hancock tiff is retold in James T. Flexner, Washington and the New Nation 230 (1970).
5
See Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of George Washington 39-40 (1974).
6
Ibid. at 39.
7
30 Writings of George Washington 344 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
8
Ibid. at 334. For the view that Washington's move to control the machinery of the Continental Congress is more ambiguous because of the unusual change between forms of government, see Curtis Bradley & Martin Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Michigan Law Review 545, 637-41 (2004).
9
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926) (quoting Daniel Webster).
10
10 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, 1789-1791, at 718-20 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds, 2004).
11
Ibid. at 738-40.
12
Ibid. at 868.