Decoding the IRA (32 page)

The IRA in Liverpool

The great port city of Liverpool was home to such a large Irish population that in the early years of the twentieth century the city elected its own Irish Home Rule member of parliament, T. P. O'Connor. In the nineteenth century the IRB organised in the city and established an important arms smuggling route to Ireland. This route was reactivated and developed during the Anglo-Irish War when there was a significant flow of weapons and explosives across the Irish Sea. During the Anglo-Irish War the Liverpool company of the IRA was the most active IRA unit in Britain.

In November 1920 the company successfully mounted a co-ordinated arson attack on warehouses along the docks, but after the subsequent arrests and increased police activity the organisation was ‘for all intents and purposes dead'; however, the following year it resumed activity.
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Between
November 1920 and June 1921 the police had such good intelligence that they were able to arrest four successive captains of the company.
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Like the other English units it went into a marked decline following the Civil War. In November 1924 the IRA's adjutant general (AG) inspected the company and reported: ‘Nobody was working there … the whole situation was hopeless.' The veterans of the Anglo-Irish War or ‘the old workers', were ‘not inclined to work'. On their release from jail these ‘old timers' were no longer remaining active and, according to the AG, ‘only 5 men are left in Liverpool.' He appointed one of the Fleming brothers – Denis or Patrick – as OC, hoping that he would be able to unify the various factions.

The OC found himself in a frustrating position. The company was badly split between the ‘old timers' and the recent IRA immigrants from Ireland, with the former not wishing to associate with the newer arrivals. He also had to spend most of his free time running dances to raise funds for the unit, while there was little help from the other volunteers. The dances were organised in collaboration with the Thomas Ashe Sinn Féin club at the
‘[Irish National] Forrester's Hall'
, and the proceeds split 50:50, the other Sinn Féin clubs in the area having refused to help out. The OC spent three nights a week, from 8 to 11 p.m., working at the dances. One dance ended in a free for all after a group of rowdy immigrants from the west of Ireland had to be cautioned over their use of foul language and their ‘interruptions'. Finally, in October 1926 he resigned as ‘he intended to settle down and get married'.
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The company's adjutant suggested another method of fundraising and asked for ‘specially printed cards, issued and signed by GHQ' to be sent over so that the company could approach ‘friends of the movement who are resident here, with a view to raising funds'.
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The ‘most important arm of the Organisation [IRA]' in Liverpool was the section covering the docks, also called the Special Service Section, which was staffed by the ‘old timers'.
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As well as smuggling weapons and explosives directly to Ireland they helped transfer munitions from ships arriving from New York and New Jersey onto boats crossing the Irish Sea. The IRA leadership was dissatisfied with the performance and discipline of these men, but at the same time dependent on them. Liam
Pedlar, one of the leading IRA arms agents in New York, remarked in 1924 that
‘the last consignment [of weaponry] was taken to and fro
a number of times causing much extra expense. I am told that pressure is being exercised to have one by the name of
Fleming, put in charge there
, and this is given as a reason for the disturbance. If it is the same party as I have had experience of they are N.G. [no good].'
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Pedlar claimed that during the ‘war period' he could get ‘nothing done' in Liverpool as Fleming and his comrades wouldn't help him smuggle munitions over from the US, with the result that Pedlar had to send over his own agent to work in Liverpool.
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The adjutant general wrote to Seán Russell that he would have to give very specific instructions to the Liverpool IRA as to the procedure for receiving contraband from the US, detailing how they should contact the crew on the American boat, who should sign for the goods, etc: ‘Unless you put these down in black and white you will have plenty of trouble in Liverpool.' He commented that the Liverpool men needed to be ordered exactly where to send the munitions as they frequently sent them directly to IRA units in Ireland they had connections with and that ‘every individual coming from Ireland will get some'.
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Notwithstanding their importance, the Liverpool adjutant referred to the Special Service Section as ‘absolutely useless'.
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The men refused to co-operate with the OC; they wanted to elect their own officers and not be mixed in with the recent IRA immigrants to the city. They wouldn't attend parades – though this was probably very reasonable given that they were already well known to the police. The OC reported that the ‘old crowd' refused to place their weapons under his control: ‘There are a few of the old crowd … including
Tom O'Malley who holds guns and refuses to give them up.'
The weapons included four Webley revolvers and a .38 automatic.
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Twomey initially adopted a non-confrontational attitude and recommended to the OC: ‘What I would suggest is that if they refuse to conform to discipline, I would ignore them but would not create any more rows or bickering.' He promised to follow up with the OC and at their next meeting they could decide whether to move the men from active service to the ‘reserve' or whether to dismiss them altogether.
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Twomey wrote to the company's intelligence officer on the same day and was much more intransigent, perhaps because he knew the
intelligence officer was in direct contact with the Special Service Section and wanted the tone of his letter passed on: ‘It must be clearly understood that if these men will not be subject to Volunteer discipline and if they persist in disobeying orders they must be expelled.'
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The local adjutant suggested that the situation could be defused by allowing the men to elect their own officers, a common practice of the IRA early in the Anglo-Irish War.
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GHQ was against this as the ‘old timers' were well known to the police and any officers chosen from amongst them would have difficulty working covertly. Twomey was in prison at the time and so his final decision on the matter is not known.
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The dockers also made contact with sailors on Russian merchant ships, and the OC commented: ‘It would be an easy matter … to get them [the Russians] to fetch some munitions.'
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Twomey however didn't want to cut across the existing IRA's agreement with the Soviets, but at the same time wanted to keep his options open and advised the OC: ‘These men … may be used later, and you should certainly keep in touch with them and find out exactly how much they are prepared to do.'
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The Liverpool adjutant even reported that they were in contact with a boat sailing between Buenos Aires and Liverpool: ‘We are in touch with a friendly Boat plying this route, if the service is any use?'
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To which GHQ noncommittally replied: ‘I have noted your information.'
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In February 1927 Twomey ordered the OC to organise the destruction of arms shipments being sent from Liverpool to Chinese warlords allied with the British, though there's no evidence this was ever complied with (see Chapter 8).
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While the Liverpool company may have fallen well short of Twomey's expectations and was incapable of any sustained urban warfare, it at least fulfilled some function for the IRA and far exceeded the capability of the London and Manchester companies.

The IRA in London and Manchester

In London the OC. Britain largely conducted his duties independent of the local company. In late 1924 the adjutant general commented that the unit was no longer holding staff meetings, and he ordered them to meet every two weeks.
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In May 1927 Twomey wrote a letter to the London adjutant, furious with him for not carrying out a number of duties, including delivering a package to Dublin: ‘It is a very grave matter when the promise and word of a volunteer can no longer be relied on to perform a very simple task.'
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By October, Twomey notified George that he had decided to finish with the unit altogether:
‘It has been decided to disband [the] unit in London. [The] order for this will be sent [over with the] next messenger. You should now recruit people for special work. If you wish the [IRA] Declaration can be administered to them. You will deal with them as individuals. Report what you will do.'
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The IRA's declaration of allegiance to the Irish Republic had been substituted for the previous oath of allegiance, in response to the Catholic Church's objection to secular oath-bound societies.
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Not that this would have mollified the Catholic hierarchy.

In the light of actions such as the pathetic smoke bomb attack at the St Patrick's banquet in 1926, Twomey's decision seems entirely appropriate. He went on to elaborate that: ‘No results whatever have been obtained … the fault lies entirely with the officers, whom they [the Army Council] wish to be severely reprimanded.'
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There is also evidence in the British secret service files from the period that they had an informer among the IRA in London, though his identity remains unknown.
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The Manchester company was the least significant of the main units in Britain and there's little reference to it throughout the documents. In March 1926 a report stated that it had fallen ‘out of touch' with Dublin. This appeared to have been somewhat rectified later in the year, as a number of despatches were sent from headquarters and the officers were introduced to the IRA's system of cipher.

In October 1926 Twomey wrote to the company's OC:
‘We wanted to get you the stink bombs for [William] Cosgrave's visit, as you were anxious to have them.'
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Twomey didn't seem to have learned his lesson from the abortive attack on the prime minister the previous March. The same month Twomey arranged for gelignite and detonators to be sent from Glasgow to both Manchester and Liverpool. It's not clear exactly what operation he had in mind for Manchester, though he wanted the Liverpool company to destroy stocks of coal which may have been readied for shipment to British forces and their warlord allies in China (see Chapter 8).
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Figure 22. Moss Twomey wrote to George, the OC in Britain, informing him of the decision to disband the IRA unit in London, and that Andy Cooney (‘Mr Smith') was to move to London temporarily.

 

In 1927 the police staged raids in the area looking for wanted men, and the intelligence officer had a close shave when they raided his accommodation.
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The IRA in Scotland

Scotland, and in particular the industrial heartland of Glasgow and the Clyde, had a long history of IRB and later IRA support and organisation. However, there's very little information available as to what these units actually did and what they planned to do. Though their successes were few, their plans were likely many. One reason for the lack of knowledge is that the Scottish IRA was never fully under the control of headquarters in Dublin. Additionally, unlike the IRA in Ireland, there's very little documentation or memoirs available on the unit.

The situation in Glasgow differed from that in other British cities.
There was a particularly strong history of support for Irish republicans in the city. It was also a stronghold of communism, and this resulted in serious divisions within the local IRA between the supporters and opponents of socialism.

Many of Glasgow's communists and socialists were in turn very supportive of Irish separatism, including the famous John MacLean. Helen Crawford, a leading member of the Soviet-sponsored Workers' International Relief, travelled to Ireland in 1925 as a communist organiser, and was in contact with IRA leaders and supporters there. In 1927 the British secret service (MI5) linked her with the IRA's activities in support of the secret Soviet agent, Kate Gussfeldt and believed she was in contact with the Woods family in London. The Woods were involved with the IRA and had helped Gussfeldt obtain a false passport.