Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (81 page)

Meiji returned to the Akasaka Temporary Palace on October 11. He sent for Motoda Nagazane, who urged him to dismiss
Ō
kuma immediately. He said that
Ō
kuma’s recommendation that a parliament be immediately convened had aroused conflicting emotions and seemed likely to lead to disaster. The emperor hesitated to act. He asked if it was not true that the Satsuma councillors had banded together to get rid of
Ō
kuma. He also asked for proof that
Ō
kuma had conspired to do wrong. He was informed that although proof was difficult, evidence had been obtained from disciples of Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1901). It was alleged that
Ō
kuma, Fukuzawa, and Iwasaki Yatar
ō
(1834–1885)
²⁸
had joined in a conspiracy. Motoda insisted that not only the Satsuma councillors but all the rest were outraged by
Ō
kuma. He predicted that if the emperor ceased to trust the Satsuma councillors, the cabinet would be destroyed. The emperor yielded but commanded that
Ō
kuma should not be compelled to resign without being given an explanation.

It
ō
Hirobumi and Saig
ō
Tsugumichi were delegated to go to
Ō
kuma and persuade him to resign.
Ō
kuma agreed without hesitation. In return, the emperor on October 12 directed Sanj
ō
Sanetomi to withdraw permission for the sale of government properties. The government announced that
Ō
kuma had resigned because of a recurrent attack of rheumatism that made it impossible for him to carry out his political duties. Other politicians associated with
Ō
kuma also resigned.
²⁹
The Satsuma and Ch
ō
sh
ū
cliques in the cabinet, which for some years had been on bad terms, had united in face of the threat from an outsider (
Ō
kuma was from Saga). But in order to mollify
Ō
kuma’s supporters, it was officially announced that the promised parliament would convene in 1890, rather too soon for the advocates of gradualism.

Although Kuroda had been frustrated in his attempt to sell government properties, he was consoled by the dismissal of his enemy
Ō
kuma. He did not suffer any lasting disgrace despite his involvement in the scandal; indeed, in 1888 he became the prime minister. All the same, the incident, often referred to as the “political crisis of 1881,” was not forgotten. It was a peculiarly unsavory example of power politics.

Meiji seems to have disliked most of the politicians involved. According to his chamberlain Ogi Masayoshi, who accompanied the
junk
ō
to the north, one night in the bath the emperor had expressed these opinions of the councillors: “Kuroda wants to become a minister and has the habit of pushing until he gets what he wants. He is utterly loathsome. Councillor Saig
ō
[Tsugumichi] is always drunk, and when he speaks, he seldom makes sense. When Reed, a member of the British Parliament, came to Japan some years ago, Councillor Kawamura treated him in a way that was not at all what I intended.
³⁰
It is Kuroda’s practice not to attend court, alleging that he is ill, whenever his proposals are not carried out. And when he stays away, Saig
ō
and Kawamura, for no reason, also stay away. It’s extremely difficult to understand.” Ogi added, “He is aware of Councillor Inoue [Kaoru]’s deviousness and dislikes him. As for the others, His Majesty commented that during the recent
junk
ō
,
Ō
ki [Takat
ō
] acted exactly like a wooden puppet. The only person he really trusts is Councillor It
ō
Hirobumi.”
³¹

From this time on, we can sometimes hear Meiji’s voice in both the stereotyped phraseology of the rescripts and the distinctive tones of a man who, having heard much, has decided that the time has come for him to speak.

Chapter 35

The year 1881 was when demands for a constitution and a national assembly reached such intensity as to make it seem likely that the advocates would soon be successful. Little progress had been made toward drawing up a constitution during the years since the emperor had promised one in September 1876. Needless to say, nobody openly opposed a constitution, for that would have defied the emperor’s stated wishes,
¹
but a policy of “gradualism” was advocated by many who hoped that the implementation of a constitution could be put off indefinitely. However, advocates of a constitution and a legislative body had become tired of waiting, and many demanded prompt action.

There was pressure on the government, some of it from surprising quarters, to take concrete steps. In December 1879 Yamagata Aritomo had sent a long letter to the prime minister, Sanj
ō
Sanetomi, stating his views on the advisability of constitutional government. After enumerating the various causes of discontent with the government—the loss of jobs, economic duress,
²
and the abandonment of traditional morality and customs—all of which had alienated the people and encouraged the rise of the Freedom and Popular Rights movement, Yamagata stated his belief that the most urgent need was a reform of the legislative, administrative, and judicial powers; otherwise, there were sure to be more armed disturbances like those that had already occurred in Saga, Kagoshima, and elsewhere. He had become convinced that the only way to restore people’s confidence in the government was to promulgate a constitution. Such a constitution, given that it was likely to endure through many future generations, obviously could not be drawn up in a day and a night, but it was time to establish at least the basic principles. Once it became evident that the government as a whole and the various ministries in their different fields were conforming with these principles and that a future course had been determined, people would once again offer their allegiance.

Yamagata stressed that nothing in the new constitution should be construed as infringing on the authority of the imperial line. As far back as his Oath in Five Articles, the emperor himself had promised that there would be progress toward constitutional government. Already, at lower levels—in the prefectures, counties, and districts—assemblies had been created. The most gifted members of these assemblies should be selected for a national assembly, which would be the plebeian counterpart to the Genr
ō
-in.

Sanj
ō
approved of Yamagata’s proposal, which was seconded by Iwakura Tomomi. They presented the proposal to the emperor, who was pleased to accept it. He also asked each councillor to submit a statement of his views on constitutional government.
³
Among the responses, It
ō
Hirobumi’s was the most detailed. After describing the samurai’s resentment of the changes that had occurred since the abolition of the domains, he contrasted the present situation with the days of the shoguns when the samurai were well educated, enjoyed stipends, and owned property. Despite the changes, the samurai class still considered that they should assume responsibility for affairs of state. When the samurai made political pronouncements, the common people were swayed: “If we may compare society to a human body, the samurai are like the muscles and bones; the common people are like the skin and flesh. When the muscles and bones move, the skin and flesh follow.”
⁴

It
ō
warned of the influence of the French Revolution, predicting that sooner or later every country would be affected. The notion of the government’s sharing power with the people had entered Japan along with books and other imports from Europe. New ideas of government had gained currency among both samurai and commoners, and in the past few years the influence had spread irresistibly to the cities and villages. Some agitators were startling listeners with their wild words. Others moaned, although they were not ill, and bewildered people with their displays of demented behavior, oblivious of the plans the sovereign might have. But all this was as inevitable as plants springing up after rain had moistened the soil, and it was not worth marveling at.
⁵

It
ō
seems to have accepted as inevitable the need to share with the common people the responsibility for government. He insisted, however, that plans for a parliament not be hastily drawn up, as some men advocated. This was to be an unprecedented change in Japanese polity, and it would take time to construct a firm foundation. It
ō
favored two houses of parliament, on the European model. The upper house (Genr
ō
-in) would consist of 100 members chosen from among the nobility and samurai; its special function would be to support the imperial house and to preserve the Japanese heritage. It
ō
hoped that direct involvement in the government would mitigate the samurai’s antipathy.

The lower house would consist of “inspectors” (
kensakan
) chosen from among members of local assemblies; its responsibilities would be limited to matters of finance. Obviously the upper house would be far more important than the lower house. It
ō
thought that this would make for stability and that the upper house would protect the lower house from radical tendencies.
⁶
He concluded by stating that he hoped the emperor himself would preside over the gradual establishment of a parliamentary government.

At first Councillor
Ō
kuma Shigenobu was reluctant to express his views, but the emperor asked Prince Taruhito to urge
Ō
kuma to disclose his thoughts concerning this crucial issue. Taruhito reported back that
Ō
kuma wished to present his views verbally, fearing that if he wrote them down, they might be leaked. The emperor, however, insisted on a written statement, and in March 1881
Ō
kuma finally sent a memorial to the minister of the left, Prince Taruhito, asking that no one—not even the prime minister or the minister of the right—be permitted to see it before it was presented to the emperor. Taruhito agreed.

Ō
kuma’s memorial was in seven articles. The first called for a prompt public announcement of the date for the opening of the parliament, the selection of persons to draw up the constitution, and the commencement of construction of the parliament building.

The second article provided that the appointment of high-ranking officials would take into account their level of support from the people. The parliament that would operate under the future constitution had to reflect the wishes of the people. Decisions by the parliament also had to be in accordance with the wishes of a majority of its members. The head of the political party that enjoyed the most popular support should head the parliament.
⁷
The establishment of a constitutional monarchy would enable the emperor to find without difficulty the most suitable persons to assist him. By relying on elected officials, he would be spared the trouble of examining the credentials of potential advisers. However,
Ō
kuma pointed out, a political party elected by the voters might in time lose popularity because of its inept administration. In that case, it would hand over the government to the party with the greatest strength. The emperor would then choose a prime minister from this party and ask him to form a cabinet.
⁸

Ō
kuma’s third article established a distinction between those officials who changed with the party in power and those who retained their positions permanently, regardless of which party was in power. The latter, who constituted the great bulk of officials (all but the top-ranking positions), were not permitted to become members of parliament but had to remain politically neutral.

As provided in the fourth article, the constitution would be promulgated by the emperor. It would be extremely simple, consisting entirely of general principles and combining a clarification of the responsibilities of administrative power and a similar clarification of the rights of the individual citizen. The fifth article proposed that a parliament be convened at the beginning of 1883, and in order to make this possible, a constitution should be promulgated in 1881 and the members of the parliament chosen by the end of 1882.

The sixth article asked that the various political parties establish platforms and that contests among the parties be among their different platforms (rather than among personalities). The seventh article called attention to the need for political parties to be faithful to the spirit of constitutional government. If they followed the letter but not the spirit, this would be unfortunate for the nation but a disaster for the administrators and would stigmatize their rule for generations to come.
⁹