Fighting to Lose (63 page)

25. See Hesketh,
Fortitude
, passim.

26. NARA, RG2 42, T-77, I540, Frame 0282.

27. PRO, KV2/674. This is MI5’s CELERY “folder,” which when examined in 2008, contained little more than some biographical material and copies of CELERY’s correspondence with Robertson and Commodore Boyle. Dicketts’s real name had been removed from all documents and on one the name had been cut out with a razor blade. See also, “Ripples in Time,”
Straits Times
, 24 Oct. 1930; and “Charming Crook,”
Milwaukee Sentinal
, 13 Nov. 1949. For straight gin, see PRO, KV2/451, Doc. 1658z.

28. Ritter,
Deckname
, 213–15.

29. Ritter,
Deckname
, 242–52. He places the meeting in Oct. 1940, but this does not properly fit into the sequence of his descriptions of the other 1940 spies. For evidence it was February: Hamburg to OKW, 27 Feb. 1941; 3504, meldet bei einem Treff in Lissabon am 17.2.41; and regarding the latest FLAK guns being developed in Britain, NARA, T-77, Reel 1540. There was one report a day taken from Owens between 15–20 Feb. and all were sent on 27 Feb. The message numbers in the lower right corner are consecutive. This proves the meeting took place and Ritter then returned to Hamburg to file his reports.

30. Popov,
Spy/Counterspy
, 76.

31. Deutsch,
Conspiracy
, 149–66; and Hoffman,
German Resistance
, 60–61. See also, Chapter 6.

32. PRO, KV3/3.

33. Postwar interview with Madame Szymanska, Colvin,
Chief of Intelligence
, 91–2, 138. The available intercepted movement messages have him in Vienna in April, and Salonic, Athens, and Sofia to late May, PRO, KV3/3. For Szymanska being used by Canaris as a contact with MI6, see Lahousen, III,1. Also, Jefferys,
MI6
, 380–82. He suggests she was an agent developed by MI6 but the facts are she was
provided
to
MI6.

34. Colville,
Fringes
, 346–47. This particular item is especially valuable because accounts of the informal meetings of the Allied decision-makers by independent observers are rare, but one can be sure these informal sessions were where much of the real work was done. Colville was a minor staffer in Churchill’s entourage who happened to be in the room. He kept a diary, which is preserved in longhand.

1. John Campbell, “A Retrospective on John Masterman’s
The Double-Cross System
,”
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence
18 (2005): passim; and C.J. Masterman,
On the Chariot Wheel: An Autobiography
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 348–55. This is a valuable social document for the insight it gives into Britain’s privileged class of the 1930s.

2. Masterman,
Chariot Wheel
, 176 and passim.

3. Apart from anything White knew from his own secret sources, he had at hand the postwar, after-action report of Roger Hesketh dealing with deception operations in 1944. Thorough and honest, the case it makes for the success of Plan
Bodyguard
and
Fortitude
is very weak, and Hesketh dismisses earlier efforts like Plan
Starkey
. It was released by MI5 in the late 1990s. See Roger Hesketh,
Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Plan
(New York: Overlook Press, 2000). One must ignore the claims in the “Introduction” and read the book.

4. Curry,
Security Service
, 247. He mentions that details can be obtained from the “B1A sectional report.” Because it was a directorate that included the XX Committee, this was probably the “history” Masterman wrote, co-opting it to his own credit. The permission to report the weather had actually been obtained in 1939. See Chapter 3.

5. This writer was an overseas post-graduate student at Leeds University 1966–68. Student militancy was very strong, but to a Canadian looking on, the demonstrations seemed to have more show than depth. The protest marches were huge, however, and certainly would have worried the authorities.

6. Tom Bower,
The Perfect English Spy: Sir Dick White and the Secret War 1935–90
(London: William Heinemann, 1995), passim. Blunt and Liddell were exposed by the accusations of Michael Straight and Goronwy Rees.

7. Farago listed Masterman’s
The Double-Cross System in the Second World War
in the Unpublished Documents section of the “Bibliography” of
The Game of Foxes
(662). Note the slight variation from the actual title of Masterman’s book and the fact that Farago finished his in 1971. See Note 14 below.

8. Farago,
Game of Foxes
, 269. The messages he describes are all to be found in NARA, T77, 1540.

9. Farago,
Game of Foxes
, 175, 270–71, 662. In addition to his reference to Masterman’s book-to-be in his “Bibliography,” Farago’s designation of Masterman as the “official historian” of double-cross is further evidence that Farago had a preview of his work. The “two allusions” refer to the giving of the location of an aircraft factory and the attempt to draw air attacks onto aerodromes, an ineffectual strategy adopted for TATE after establishment of the Wireless Board: See Masterman,
Double-Cross
, 11, 83.

10. PRO, KV2/451, Doc. 1803a. It is bracketed in the file by “Extract from Ritter’s final interrogation report,” 16 Jan. 1946, Doc. 1802b; and Gwyer to Major Vesey, 15 May 1946, Doc. 1804a. Apparently Owens and Caroli were still in custody when Doc. 1803a was written.

11. PRO, KV2/451, Doc. 1803a. Some mistakes: McCarthy was planted on Owens (Chapter 18) and the first meeting at sea was set for 21 May 1940. See Spruch nr 115 von 3504, NARA, T-77, 1540.

12. Farago,
Game of Foxes
, 159.

13. Farago,
Game of Foxes
(New York: David Mackay, Advance Reading Copy — tentative publishing date, 14 Jan. 1972).

14. CO U.S. Naval Advanced Base Weser River to CO British Army of the Rhine, 19 Jan. 1946, with attachments, PRO, KV3/207. Bremen was in the British occupation zone, so liaison had to be with the U.S. Navy presence in the port. Note Farago’s description of finding the microfilms in a U.S. Navy footlocker at NARA: Farago,
Game of Foxes
, xi.

15. Campbell, “A Retrospective,”
IJIC
: 326. He bases his statement that the two books came out “within weeks” of each other on a collection of newspaper reviews.

16. Anyone who doubts the seriousness of the “war” in the 1960s in the inner sanctums of Western governments should be reminded that the Cuban Missile Crisis took place in 1962, and brought the world within a hair’s breadth of nuclear conflagration.

17. White used the term. See Campbell, “A Retrospective,”
IJIC
: 320–53.

18. For how the Pearl Harbor controversy played into disillusionment with the war in Vietnam, see Frank Paul Mintz,
Revisionism and the Origins of Pearl Harbor
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 69–77.

1. Schellenberg,
Invasion 1940
, 26.

Abshagen, K.H.
Canaris
. London: Hutchinson, 1956.

Andrew, Christopher. “Churchill and Intelligence.” In
Leaders and Intelligence
, ed. Michael Handel. London: Routledge, 1989.

————.
The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5
. Toronto: Viking, 2009.

————.
Her Majesty’s Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community
. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986.

Barros, James, and Richard Gregor.
Double Deception: Stalin, Hitler and the Invasion of Russia
. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995.