Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (50 page)

7.
Diodorus Sic. 17.17.1–2 on Alexander’s spear-won land. The idea is captured brilliantly in an anonymous portrait of a Roman general as Hellenistic ruler: this well-known Roman bronze sculpture some identify as a Roman general, and others as a copy of a Hellenistic original of an unidentified Hellenistic king, can be seen in the National Roman Museum, Palazzo Massimo Terme, Rome, image reproduced in Zanker, 1998, 4, who notes that the un-diademed head is unlikely to represent a Hellenistic king. See Stewart, 1993, 158–190 for Alexander and the imagery associated with this concept and Eckstein 2006, 85, who outlines the right of conquest.

8.
See Krings, 2008 for these descriptions as a kind of literary topos.

9.
Diodorus Sic. 20.14.4–7 alleges that this dire situation led the Carthaginians to believe they had been abandoned by their gods, and a mass sacrifice of children ensued. The infamous description of the children being placed in the sloping arms of a bronze image of Cronos (Ba’al) and rolled into the fire has been embraced by many (including Gustave Flaubert in
Salammbô
), who imagined the rituals that took place at the Tophet. That Carthage turned to its gods in times of strife was certain; as with the Romans after Cannae, sacrifice may have been extreme but the numbers here seem outlandish and unlikely (see Chapter 7 below for the Roman reaction to the defeat at Cannae).

10.
Ophellas, related to Ptolemy I of Egypt, was the governor of Cyrene, a client state that technically bordered Carthage. For Ptolemaic involvement in the Punic Wars, see Appian,
Sic.
1: ‘He [Ptolemy] was on terms of friendship with both Romans and Carthaginians’. Hölbl, 2001, provides a clear history of the Egyptian kingdom in this period. See Gruen, 1986, 675–678; also Adams, 2008, 98–99 on Ptolemy’s supposed neutrality.

11.
This abridged version of the eventful life of Agathocles is found in Diodorus book 20 and is full of difficulties. The rise of the Hellenistic hegemon in the central Mediterranean is discussed in Zambon, 2006 with reference to leaders in Syracuse from Agathocles to Hiero II; see Prag, 2010 on the Greek tyrants in Sicily and their use of the threat of Carthage. The events are closely linked to the battles of the Hellenistic monarchs and the pervasive influence of the Alexandrian model of power.

12.
Zambon, 2006, 79–80 links Agathocles’ campaign in Africa with the development of a Hellenistic style of kingship in Sicily. See articles in Prag and Quinn (eds), 2013 on the impact of the Hellenistic world on the western Mediterranean.

13.
See Stewart, 1993, 266–269, and for a gold stater of Agathocles with the obverse head with the elephant scalp and Ammon’s horn, ibid., fig. 87. The image is adopted from the Ptolemaic standards. See Dench, 2005, 301; also more generally on Italy and Sicily in the Hellenistic age. For an interesting case study of the coinage and the image of Herakles see Yarrow, 2013. For the term ‘heroic leadership’ see Keegan, 1987, 13.

14.
For more on Hannibal’s education see chapter 4. The influence of Agathocles as the first leader of the western Mediterranean to actively employ the image of Alexander on his coinage was important. The Barcid coinage used in Iberia may come from these models and perhaps we can see how the styles and imagery of leadership passed through the Greek tyrants and were adopted by Carthaginian leaders.

15.
Witnessed by the growth in the number of shipwrecks found from the third century and these then increase enormously in the second century. See maps in Parker, 1992, and reproduced in Horden and Purcell, 2000, 368–371.

16.
Casson, 1995, 137–140 for the ‘naval arms race’ in the Hellenistic period.

17.
As described by Eckstein, 2006, 116. The epithet
Poliorcetes
, ‘Besieger of Cities’, was given to Demetrius I of Macedon (336–283
BCE
), son of Antigonus I, one of the
Diadochoi
(Successors). Translation of Plutarch’s
Demetrius
here by John Dryden.

18.
There has been considerable debate on the workings of these ships. A very good discussion can be found in Casson, 1969; see also Casson 1995, chapter 6. Morrison (1995), 55, thoroughly discusses the various opinions offered by the ancient sources.

19.
Diodorus Sic. 14.41.1 and 42.2 credit Dionysius the Sicilian tyrant with the invention of fives. For the development of these ships see Murray, 2012, 13–30 and appendices A and B; also for examples depicted on Macedonian coinage. For developments at Rome see Morrison, 1996, 270–271 and Steinby, 2007; and for Carthage see Medas, 2000 and Rawlings, 2010.

20.
There may have been two different designs for fives: Morrison, 1996, 270. After much debate on how the quinquereme would have functioned, the generally accepted scenario was that it had two benches of oarsmen superimposed, one bench with two rowers per oar and the other with three rowers per oar; see also Morrison, 1996, 255–277. An excellent overview of the development of warships with up-to date bibliography in reference to the Roman navy can be found in Steinby, 2007, 23–29

21.
Murray, 2012, 23–30 looks carefully at the development of the fives. See also Medas, 2000 on the Carthaginian navy; Steinby, 2007 on the Roman navy in the Republic; Rawlings,
2010, on the Carthaginian navy; Rankov, 1996 and 2011; Polybius’ record of the First Punic War emphasizes the sea battles and probably exaggerates the numbers involved and, possibly, the types of ship. The results seem to be an aggrandizement of these battles for his rhetorical purposes.

22.
It has been noted that the depiction of Carthaginian wealth and the issue of its sea trade are in some respects a topos in the ancient literature but there is no question that the essence of Carthage’s power rested in its prowess at sea. For all aspects of the Carthaginian navy see Medas, 2000 and Rawlings 2010. Rawlings, ibid., 270–271 points out that the naval exploits and numbers of ships used in the third century mean that there would have been more than just citizens involved in the naval endeavours – mercenaries, allies, slaves may all have been drafted in to fill the ships needed to fight the wars.

23.
Is this a grandson of the Hamilcar Rhodinus who had gone on a mission to Alexander? See above (note 5) on the surnames of Carthaginians. The comparison is made with Rhodes, whose elite owned and manned their own warships. The idea of the bonus culture derived from a comparable practice in Athens as noted by Rawlings, 2010, 269–271.

24.
See Champion, 2009 for a recent biography of Pyrrhus, and Schettino, 2009 on the construction of the image of Pyrrhus as the archetypal Hellenistic king.

25.
Livy 35.14.5–12 for Hannibal’s knowledge of Pyrrhus, which may be imagined but it is implied that Hannibal was known to have studied Pyrrhus’ battles with the Romans.

26.
Crawford, 1992, 45; Plutarch’s
Life of Pyrrhus
; see Dench, 2005 on the general context of Hellenistic Italy at the time of the Pyrrhic war.

27.
Most previous engagements had been between Tarentum and other cities of Magna Graecia, i.e. Metapontum, Sybaris and Locri.

28.
Gruen, 1986, 319 on the ‘humbling of the Hellenistic invader’.

29.
Lilybaeum was built after the city of Motya was destroyed in 397
BCE
by the Syracusan tyrant Dionysus (Diodorus Sic. 14. 47–53). Also important was the city of Solunto (see
Map 1
).

30.
On Pyrrhus in Sicily see Zambon, 2008, 97–175 and Schettino, 2009.

31.
For the nature of Pyrrhus’ kingship in Sicily see Zambon, 2008, 118–121 and 2006, 86.

32.
Diodorus 22.8.10–13; Plutarch,
Pyrrh.
22–24; Justin 18.2.11–12, 23.3.

33.
The First Punic War would end up with a similar result but it took the Romans much longer to achieve than Pyrrhus. Were the Carthaginians better prepared the second time around, or the Romans less competent but with more staying power than Pyrrhus?

34.
Diodorus Sic. 22.7.5 and Polybius 3.25 cover the terms; Justin,
Epitome
18.2 claims that a general named Mago went to Rome to offer help to the Romans, but then continues on with Carthaginian double dealings and Mago’s ‘
Punico ingenio’
. Not for the first time, Rome and Carthage had signed treaties: Serrati, 2006 charts the Roman and Carthaginian treaties from 509 to 226
BCE
that are recorded in Polybius 3.21.9–3.26. Whether this treaty of 279/278 or the treaty mentioned by the historian Philinus barred the Romans from Sicily and Carthaginians from Italy, as Philinus claimed (Polyb. 3.26.1–6), is a matter for much scholarly debate – most recently in Eckstein, 2010, which provides an excellent survey of the past century of scholarly opinion on the matter (406–407, n. 3). See also Lazenby, 1996a, 32–34, Hoyos, 1984 and 1998, 9–16, Palmer, 1997, 15–17.

35.
Polyb. 1.6.8: ‘They succeeded, contrary to expectation, in overcoming the peoples of Italy except for the Celts, they laid siege to the city of Rhegium.’

36.
See Serrati, 2006 on the treaties between Rome and Carthage, and Polybius 3.22–27 for a description of the treaties known to him. See also Palmer, 1997 for a fascinating study of
Rome and Carthage at Peace
; and the chapter by Ameling, 2011 on ‘the Rise of Carthage to 264’. Again note the counter-argument in Eckstein, 2010 against the existence of the so-called ‘treaty of Philinus’.

37.
The role of Pyrrhus in the historiography of the First Punic War is discussed in Berrendonner, 2009, 249–266.

38.
This is not a comprehensive discussion of the First Punic War; what follows is an overview of the key events. These wars were called the Punic Wars by the Romans of the third century,
Bella Punica
, from
Bellum Poenicum
, the title of a now fragmentary epic by the third-century Roman poet Naevius.

39.
See Hoyos, 1998, 5–93 for a detailed study of the outbreak of the war. The treaties between Rome and Carthage and the existence of the ‘Philinus’ treaty are discussed most recently by Eckstein, 2010, who argues against the existence of the treaty and gives a full and up-to-date bibliography on the subject. For the opposite view see Steinby, 2007, 78–84. Serrati, 2006 has an overview of all the treaties, and see also Hoyos, 1984. Lazenby, 1996a provides an extensive history of the First Punic War; see also articles in Hoyos (ed.), 2011.

40.
The most complete ancient account of the First Punic War is in Polybius 1.10–65. Polybius intended his audience to be impressed by the enormity of the war: ‘we shall find that never before in the history of the world have two such immense forces been ranged against one another at sea’ (1.63.8, trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert). Many scholars believe Polybius exaggerated the size of the battles, the numbers of ships and combatants to make this point, as noted below in relation to specific passages.

41.
On whether we can believe Polybius’ numbers see Hoyos, 1998, 7; Lazenby 1996a, 43–55.

42.
In hindsight it may have seemed that way but Carthage was probably not quite as powerful an entity as Rome when they first clashed in the mid-260s
BCE
. Carthage had suffered serious defeat at the hands of Pyrrhus, and the wealth and prosperity of Carthage seem overstated in the Roman-friendly sources. Some disagreement exists between modern scholars on the relative power of the two entities: see Barceló, 2004b, 22, and 2004a. Lazenby 1996a, 11–30 assesses the populations of the two states (including allied peoples) as similar, and slightly greater on Carthage’s side, but the access to manpower as greater on the Roman side by the nature of their alliances and territories. More is known of the Roman manpower resources in the middle Republic: see de Ligt, 2012 and Rosenstein, 2002, who provide extensive bibliography.

43.
Oscan was one of the languages of Italy. It was spoken widely in the central Apennines and the south in the period up to the Roman conquests of Italy, after which Latin became the common tongue. The latest datable Oscan inscriptions come from
c
. first century
BCE
, for the non-Latin inscriptions of Italy see Crawford (ed.), 2011.

44.
The exact chronology is unclear: the Romans took Tarentum in
c.
272 and had set up colonies in Paestum and Cosa (
c.
273). The Romans’ seizure of Rhegium (Zonaras 8.6) from mercenaries there was the last step in their conquest of southern Italy, which had fallen quickly after Pyrrhus’ departure in 276/275.

45.
This could have happened as late as 265 but here I follow Zambon, 2008, 200, whose chronology seems to more clearly explain the inconsistencies in the sources. See also Hoyos, 1998, 33–46 for an outline of the chronological challenges presented; Lazenby, 1996a, 34–42 also presents the chronology in close detail.

46.
It is possible that Polybius has condensed a series of events occurring over half a decade into a much shorter timeframe. For the discussions around an approximate chronology of the start of the war see Zambon, 2008, 200–207, and also Lazenby, 1996a, 36. The events are chronologically confused and Lazenby points out that Hiero’s rule may have started as early as 270.

47.
Again, Zambon’s (2008, 200–207) reconstruction of the events seems most plausible and there is extensive treatment of the events and arguments in Hoyos, 1998, 33–115.

48.
There is an excellent overview of the evidence for the beginning of the war in Lazenby, 2004, 229–230.