Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (52 page)

4.
Roman elite families traced their lineages back to the founders of Rome and it would have been normal for them to assume the Carthaginian elites could do the same – and perhaps they did. Evidence for the grand estates of the Barcid clan comes from many years later when Hannibal was believed to have estates south of Carthage in the region of Thapsus and Hadrumentum (modern Sousse): Livy 33.48.1; for Hadrumentum see Pliny,
NH
15.5.3. Earned epithet or family surname is difficult to know; for more on names see Lancel, 1999, 6–7; Miles, 2010, 193 translates it as a nickname meaning ‘flash’ – the nickname of the Hellenistic king Ptolemy ‘Keraunos’ has much the same meaning.

5.
He is a somewhat elusive character, about whom we know very little, but what we do know of Hamilcar is best documented and explained in Hoyos, 2005, 21–22 and Lancel, 1999, 1–24, and Seibert, 1993a, 25–39 who provides a less than glowing account of his skills, which may well be overblown by Polybius or the sources he used.

6.
Polybius 1.56.2 tells us that Hamilcar joined the war effort in Sicily in the eighteenth year of the war.

7.
Lazenby, 1996a, 143–159 covers this part of the war in detail; see also Miles, 2010, 193–199; also Seibert, 1993b, 83–94, who questions the glowing account of Hamilcar’s abilities.

8.
See Hoyos, 2005, 7–20 on Hamilcar at the heights of Heirkte and Eryx. Heirkte is thought to be Monte Castellaccio north of Panormus, following Lazenby, 1996a, 147. At Eryx, the Phoenician–Punic deity Astarte had traditionally been syncretized with an Elymian deity worshipped there. The goddess was then syncretized with the Graeco-Roman versions of Aphrodite-Venus into Venus Erycina. This was a powerful and holy multicultural shrine that was significant for both sides. For the Carthaginians there is evidence for this version of Astarte (from Eryx) worshipped at Carthage, at Sicca Veneria and in Sardinia: see Bonnet, 1996, 115–120. Romans placed great significance on their Trojan origins and through the connection to Venus. See Erskine, 2001, 198–205 on the importance to Rome of its Trojan roots; and Myles, 2010, 274–276 on Venus Erycina and her temple at Rome.

9.
Lazenby, 1996a, 111–122 for Carthage’s defensive war in Sicily.

10.
For the coinage of Carthage during the First Punic War see Visona, 1998; Alexandropoulos, 2000; and Crawford, 1985, 136 for the debased coinage.

11.
Appian,
Sic.
1 for the state of the Roman and Carthaginian economies. Appian asserts that the Ptolemies remained neutral in the war – perhaps watching to see who came out on top. See Gruen, 1986, 676 for Ptolemaic Egypt during the Punic Wars, and also Adams, 2008 on Ptolemaic neutrality. Rawlings, 2010, 265–272 notes that it would have been usual practice at Carthage, given the size of its citizen base, to recruit both from within and without the citizenry to man its fleets.

12.
Tusa and Royal, 2012 for the recent discovery of the battle site and bronze rams from ships sunk there in 241.

13.
Polybius does not mention that any Roman ships were lost, whilst Diodorus Siculus 24.11.2 provides different numbers, claiming ‘Carthage lost 117 ships, 20 of them with all the men on board and that the Romans lost 80 ships, 30 of them completely, while 50 were partially destroyed’. Tusa and Royal, 2012 discuss the battle site and the evidence from the ships that were sunk.

14.
‘the Carthaginians … already short of money, ships and men, sought an armistice from Lutatius (the Roman consul)’ (Appian,
Sic.
2.1).

15.
The exact date for Sicily becoming a province is debatable, but from 241 the island was essentially under Roman control with Syracuse much like a client kingdom: see Serrati, 2000b, 109–111.

16.
Lancel’s (1999, 1) claim that the war and the subsequent invasion of Hannibal should be seen as one long ‘double Punic War’ was not the view in antiquity, although Hamilcar and Hannibal’s intentions towards war with Rome were linked, there was a distinct period of ‘peace’ with declaration of war following the interval between 241 and 218. See Polybius 1.62–63 for the text of the treaty of Lutatius to end the war. Polybius continues to tell us that the treaty was amended by the people (people’s assembly) in Rome in order to impose harsher conditions and a shorter reparations period. Superior Roman manpower and resource form a frequent topos in Polybius.

17.
A point made by Seibert, 1993a, 11.

18.
The Mercenary War, or
Truceless War
, as it is called by Polybius, 1.65.6; see Hoyos, 2007 and Loreto, 1995 for detailed studies of the events of these years.

19.
Barceló, 2004a, 55–69 describes the ‘traumatic childhood’ of Hannibal. Polyb. 1.65–88 covers the events from 241 to 237 in North Africa in some detail (the Mercenary, or so-called ‘Truceless’, War). See also, more briefly, Appian,
Ib
6.1.4;
Sic.
1–2; and Diodorus Siculus, 25.2. Hoyos, 2007 provides a close look at the war and its context with an excellent
updated bibliography and Loreto, 1995 also devotes a volume to the political and military implications of the Mercenary War; see also Seibert, 1993a, 11–24 and 1993b, 95–107. Goldsworthy, 2003, 133–136 provides a brief overview of the main events.

20.
Rawlings, 1996 on soldiers in the Second Punic War. Daly, 2002, 81–112 surveys the ethnic groups and their function in Hannibal’s army, and see ibid., 107–108 for the Balearic slingers who Daly contends were mercenaries rather than allied soldiers. Diodorus Siculus 5.16 claims that Carthage founded its first colony on Ibiza in the seventh century so the relationship between the city and Balearic slingers may have been linked for many centuries as noted in Whittaker, 1978, 59. See Ameling, 1993, 212–215; Brizzi, 1995, 303–315; and Hoyos, 2007, 6–12; also Goldsworthy, 2003, 30–36 for the mercenary army of Carthage.

21.
This may reflect Gisgo’s thoughts and be derived from a pro-Carthaginian source, but also seems a bit like Polybian hindsight. Polybius was deeply hostile to mercenary armies.

22.
As noted in chapter 1, Carthaginian civilian magistrates and military command did not seem to be as closely linked as in the Roman Republic.

23.
Flaubert,
Salammbô
, 18.

24.
For Carthaginian coinage see Jenkins and Lewis, 1963, and for the debased coinage at the end of the First Punic War see Carradice and La Niece, 1988, 48; also Acquaro et al., 1991. Crawford, 1985, 136 suggests that these were produced for the Libyans. An example is reproduced clearly in Hoyos, 2007, figs 7.3–7.4; ibid., 39 for the calculation of the worth of the coin.

25.
Sicca is modern Le Kef, 170km south-west of Carthage, a Libyphoenician town under Carthaginian influence; however, it may not have been under its direct control: see Lancel, 1995, 257–259. Differing views on the status of Sicca are clearly outlined by Hoyos, 2007, 16–19. Sicca Veneria, as it was known, also housed an important version of the cult of Astarte/Venus from Eryx – which may also account for the destination of the soldiers.

26.
Hamilcar’s whereabouts during this period are unknown: see below, nn. 28, 29.

27.
Polybius’ account of the rebellion is pro-Carthaginian, which relates to his sources, or to the rhetorical point of barbarian versus civilization, in this particular case the Carthaginians. Polybius claims that the Carthaginians preferred ethnically mixed troops in their armies as it tended to minimize sedition (1.67.4). The command structure in the Carthaginian army of Hannibal is surveyed by Daly, 2002, 83, who notes that the highest-ranking officers were Carthaginian but the cohorts of different ethnicities had commanders as well. Could the 20,000 be the approximate number of soldiers that had been in Sicily as suggested by Hoyos, 2007, 25–29?

28.
Hoyos, 2005, 35; 2007, 20–21 n. 11 argues that Appian confused the chronology of this prosecution. Appian places Hamilcar’s prosecution after the Mercenary War (237) whereas Hoyos argues for the prosecution to have taken place directly after the loss of Sicily, which makes, to my mind, more sense. Seibert, 1993, 13–14 places the trial just after the outbreak of the rebellion. See Goldsworthy, 2003, 133–134 on Hamilcar’s movements during this period.

29.
Diodorus Siculus continues that ‘the basic cause in this matter was the Carthaginians’ severity in inflicting punishments’. Diodorus’ discussion of military trials relates to events 70 years earlier than the Punic Wars, in the period of Agathocles (
c.
310
BCE
). Miles, 2010, 145–149 provides an interesting suggestion on this issue in connection to Agathocles, bringing up the possibility that a conflict between generals chosen by the people and the governing elite might lie behind some of this turmoil after peace had been achieved.

30.
The furthest extension of direct Carthaginian control inland is recorded at Tebessa, in modern Algeria (Roman Theveste and in Greek Hecatompylus). See Lazenby, 1996a, 144 and Ameling, 2011, 48, from Polybius 1.73.1 and Appian,
Ib.
4.

31.
Walbank, vol. 1, 131 analyses the use of the term and the reasons Polybius invests so much energy in describing the events of these four years. Hoyos, 2007 uses the title for his study of the war and Loreto, 1995 refers to it as a Libyan insurrection.

32.
This is much simplified: not all the Libyphoenician or Libyan population would have been favourable to the revolt and there existed a very intricate system of loyalties, intermarriage and cultural fusion between the Libyan and Carthaginian populations. See Hoyos, 2007, 83–84.

33.
The number of troops is clearly exaggerated, according to Walbank, vol. 1, 139. Cornelius Nepos,
Ham.
2.2 put the number at 100,000. Hoyos, 2007, 77–86 agrees on the inflation of the numbers contra Loreto, 1995, 97–89 and 119–121.

34.
Polybius’ sources for the Mercenary War are not known. This is discussed in Walbank, vol. 1, 130–131 and Hoyos, 2007, 261–274.

35.
Brett and Fentress, 1996, 25; Fentress, 2006, 6–22 for an overview of the pre-Roman countryside in North Africa.

36.
According to Hoyos, 2005, appendix 5, this Naravas could well have been related (perhaps an uncle) to the Numidian king Masinissa who would play such an important role in the fate of Hannibal and the Second Punic War. If Hamilcar indeed married his daughter to Naravas, then the connection between the Barcids and Masinissa would have been very close (for more on Masinissa and the family links to Hannibal see chapter 11, note 3). See Hoyos, 2007, 146–150 on Naravas. Interesting questions arise about how Carthage recruited its armies. Did Hamilcar personally recruit soldiers to fight for him or did Carthage raise the army and place Hamilcar in command? The issue of personal recruitment of an army would cause havoc in the Roman Republic in the last century of its existence and it is interesting to consider whether Carthage was facing some of the same issues.

37.
It seems most likely that Naravas was married to Hamilcar’s third daughter as the two elder were already married: this is Flaubert’s eponymous heroine Salammbô. See Hoyos, 2005, 37–38 for the marriage. The kind of personal military leadership Hamilcar exercised would come to dominate the late Republican armies of Rome and was also key to the personal armies of Hellenistic commanders.

38.
Exaggerated, according to Walbank, vol. 1, 143–144; discussed by Loreto, 1995, 156 and Hoyos, 2007, 150–151.

39.
ΛΙΒΥΩΝ – the Greek script indicating there was a significant Greek presence among the soldiers, but there is also Punic text on most of the coins. For the coinage of the Libyans see recently Yarrow, 2013, 359–364; Zimmermann, 2001; Acquaro, 1989; and Carradice and La Niece, 1988. Crawford, 1985, 135 does not think that the possibility of these being struck at Carthage should be excluded, which would give a completely different meaning to the issues.

40.
The chronology of the rebellion is not clearly laid out in Polybius. Walbank claims the Sardinian garrisons revolted after or at the same time as the second battle between Hamilcar and Spendius, although in the narrative it comes directly after the first. See Walbank, vol. 1, 144; Hoyos, 2007, 154–159. For Sardinia see van Dommelen, 1998 and van Dommelen and Gómez Bellard, 2008; Bernardini, 2004 on the Phoenician and Punic settlements.

41.
Carthage was closely linked to Sardinia from the late sixth century. Polybius (3.22.3) lists two early treaties between Rome and Carthage that linked Sardinia and Libya together by defining the access allowed by Carthage to Rome. For the treaties see Serrati, 2006. For the extent of the Punic realm in Sardinia see discussion in van Dommelen, 1998.

42.
Late in 238 or early in 237 is the accepted date for the end of the war. See Hoyos, 2007, 275–276 for an approximate outline of the major events discussed in this chapter.

43.
The brutality of the Gauls who had marauded and pillaged their way through Italy and Greece in the previous centuries was a narrative construction in the Roman (and Greek) literary tradition, which may reflect Polybius’ source here.

44.
See Hoyos, 2007, 173–177 for Hamilcar’s response and the rebels’ attempts to deter their followers from going over to him.

45.
Hanno lived to a ripe old age and was the standard-bearer of opposition to the Barcid family in the Carthaginian Senate according to Livy 21.3, 21.10, 23.12, 30.20, and Appian,
Lib.
24.

46.
Hanno’s opposition to the Barcids is a theme in Livy’s narrative of the Hannibalic War; see Fariselli, 2006 and Brizzi, 2009 on the political aims of the Barcids and the factionalism in politics at Carthage during the Punic Wars.