Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (56 page)

43.
Hoyos, 2005, 103–104 contends that Hannibal delayed here in the region for a time, waiting to see how and what the Romans would do, giving himself the option to react.

44.
See more in Sheldon, 1986.

45.
Scullard, 1974, who claims that Carthage must have had a decade or two of training the elephants before they employed them.

46.
The image of an elephant decorated Carthaginian coinage minted in Iberia during the rule of the Barcids and at Carthage they appear on votive stelae (Plate 5 above). Both the elephant with rider and elephant alone appear on these famous coins; other evidence from Hannibalic coinage minted in Italy also shows an elephant symbol, as noted most recently by Charles and Rhodan, 2007, 364.

47.
Ibid.

48.
The Indian elephant was probably not used by the Carthaginians, although the knowledge of training and adapting elephants for warfare originally came from India: see Scullard, 1974, 146–177. Ibid. on the first Carthaginian use of elephants in the early third century. Polybius (1.40.15) describes the Romans capturing ‘then elephants and their Indian drivers’ is explained by Charles and Rhodan, 2007, 364 (and others) as a generic term used for elephant handlers.

49.
Charles and Rhodan, 2007, 366, Scullard, 1974, 174–177 for an Indian elephant and see also Rance, 2009 for an interesting interpretation of a fragment of Polybius. Livy 28.14.4 may imply turrets on the elephants but not necessarily Indian elephants.

50.
Or perhaps our sources had less of an idea of the ability of elephants than Hannibal did. Scullard, 1974 158 provides a clear explanation for the elephants not swimming across. There is an interesting discussion of the elephant issue in Edwards, 2001.

51.
Scullard, 1974 156, who thinks we should believe Polybius’ account of the method of the elephant crossing and O’Bryhim, 1991, 121–14, who points out that herd instinct follows the female but shows that elephants are good swimmers and challenges the account in Polybius and Livy, arguing that time made it more likely that the elephants were driven into the river and swam/walked across, following a rejected account in Livy 21.28.

52.
The easiest route would have been along the Durance (a tributary of the Rhône) but Hannibal may have judged this too close to the coast and the Roman army there.

53.
A point made by Lancel, 1999, 69; Seibert, 1993a, 99–100, 105; Miles, 2010, 263; Lazenby, 1998, 51 among others.

54.
Lazenby, 1998, 35–36 would put the crossing between Arles and Avignon; for the argument for north of the Durance see Lancel, 1999, 67–70 (including map that surveys various options), and see Seibert, 1993, 100–105. The ‘Heraklean Way’ along the Durance is discussed in Miles, 2010, 263, Lazenby, 1998, 37. The route outlined on
Map 2
is a general overview rather than a specific choice of pass, as we just do not know.

55.
See Hoyte, 1960.

56.
BBC4’s 2010 series,
On Hannibal’s Trail
(broadcast July–August).

57.
Follow the most recent dispute in Mahaney, 2013, rebutting Kuhle and Kuhle, 2012, who rebut Mahaney, 2010; see Mahaney, 2010, 157 for a map that shows three possible routes; see also Leveau and Mercalli, 2011 whose illustrated paper provides a detailed geography; Dalaine, 2011 with an overview map showing the many options and survey of the literature; Prevas, 1998; and Seibert, 1993b, 199–200, who provides a comprehensive list of relevant publications for the various options up to his time.

58.
The complications and permutations derive from the name of the river, written as the Isère in the Loeb Classical Library Polybius text but in the original manuscript given as Skaras or Skoras, as variously in Livy. The arguments are lengthy, but well discussed in Walbank, 1985, and Lazenby, 1998, 37–38; also see Appendix 2 in J. Yardley’s translation of Livy (Hoyos, 2006). Specific studies that deal with the Alps question are also numerous (see Hoyos, 2005, 227–228, who gives a good summary in an appendix and above, note 54). See also discussions in Seibert, 1993a, 106–113, 1993b, 195–200, and Lancel, 1999, 70–80. The Isère is considered one of the most likely routes but it is impossible to be sure.

59.
See Lancel, 1999, 74–80; Hoyos, 2005, 110–111; Lazenby, 1998, 37–48. Livy becomes ‘like a rambler whose compass has gone haywire’ in Lancel, 1999, 74.

60.
Walbank, vol. 1, 382–387 provides a detailed analysis and comparison of Livy and Polybius.

61.
Seibert, 1993b, 197–200 surveys the options and suggests they were hostile and friendly members of the same large group. See Lazenby, 1998, Appendix 3 for a chronology of the march.

62.
This interpretation was suggested by Michael Crawford in conversation, May 2012, and would indicate Fabius Pictor as the source. Walbank, vol. 1, 390 for a survey of options, and Mahaney, 2010, who believes the Col de Traversette would provide the view.

63.
Hoyos, 2006, 634–635 n. 35; see also Walbank, vol. 1, 390, who claims the term is used more generally to signify the approach of the bad weather and that the actual date may have been a month earlier, in late September/early October.

64.
All the options were over 2,000 metres: see Seibert, 1993b, 199–200.

65.
For the use and history of vinegar see Mazza and Murooka, 2009, 19–21 on ‘Vinegars through the Ages’; see also Hoyos, 2006, 635 n. 37, who cites Vitruvius 8.3.19, and see also Seibert, 1993a, 109–110 (and n. 173) on the methodology employed. Appian,
Hann.
4, also mentions the vinegar and that the road through was called ‘Hannibal’s pass’ in his day. Juvenal,
Satire
10.54–155 celebrates the technology as well: ‘Nature then bars his passage with the snowy Alps; whose rocks/he splits with vinegar and fire, bursting through the mountains’.

66.
Lazenby, 1998, Appendix 3.

67.
This is a low estimate but hard to dispute since Polybius claims the numbers were taken from Hannibal’s inscription in Lacinium. Livy (21.38.1–5) gives a range of numbers that his sources provided which go much higher, to 80,000. Polybius 3.60.5, states that from the Rhône he had an army of 46,000 (38,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry) with him. Daly, 2002, 29–31 notes (following others) that some forces that turn up at the battle of Trebia are missing from Polybius’ total. Walbank, vol. 1, 366 (35.1) provides a good range of options and thinks the losses are an exaggeration.

68.
A suicide mission, according to Seibert, 1993b, 200, and although it is likely that desertions made up a big part of the missing numbers, a large amount of casualties is a certainty.

69.
The Gothic invasion in the early fifth century
CE
. Even more so, considering that when the Gauls sacked Rome some 172 years or so previously (390
BCE
) they had been a marauding force rather than an invading army and Pyrrhus had acted on invitation from Tarentum.

70.
Here from Miles, 2011 on Hannibal’s active use of the idea of the Labours of Herakles in each of his obstacles and the mirror image that it left in our sources. Which of Polybius’ sources is he referring to? His reference to the divine guide could refer to the dream, which Cicero records came from Coelius Antipater (Cicero,
de div.
1.49). The whole list of possibilities can be found in Walbank, vol. 1, 381.

71.
Livy 21.38.5 calls these people the Taurini,
semigalli
(half-Gauls).

72.
Walbank, vol. 1, 395 calls the numbers ‘scarcely credible’.

73.
Plon and Dumaine (eds), vol. 29, 88f.

74.
From Englund,
Napoleon, A Political Life
, 174.

75.
Excerpts taken from Plon and Dumaine (eds), vol. 29, 88f. and vol. 32, 307.

76.
Plon and Dumaine (eds), vol. 32, p. 307. The translation used here is by Marie-Luce Constant.

77.
On a nineteenth-century engraving of an idealized triumphal arch: see for example at British Museum online collection (number 1875,0710.5866) for a seventeenth-century Flemish arch depicting the deeds of the heroes with Hannibal in the company of Achilles and Jason.

Chapter 6 Hannibal the Conqueror: From the Trebia to Trasimeno

1.
In
The Complete Works of Lord Byron
, Paris, 1831.

2.
The Romans may have been better prepared than our sources allow; making the most of Hannibal’s abilities at this point in the narrative plays into his superhuman reputation.

3.
Referred to here as Sempronius Longus. See Lazenby, 1998, 54–55, and Seibert, 1993a, 121–126.

4.
See Cornell, 1995, 369–402 for this complex process down to 264.

5.
See Lomas, 2011 on the status of the Roman allies and allied citizens during the Second Punic War. On Hannibal’s strategy see Miles, 2011, 262–263.

6.
For the exact location see Lazenby, 1998, 52–53.

7.
Miles, 2010, 256–276.

8.
Walbank, vol.1, 375–377 explores the Roman troop numbers, as does Lazenby, 1998, 52; see also Seibert, 1993a, 114 for Publius Scipio’s journey to the north of Italy.

9.
For the exact location and various options see Walbank, vol. 1, 399. See also Daly, 2002, 12–14; Seibert, 1993a, 116–118; Goldsworthy, 2003, 169–173; Lazenby, 1998, 52–54.

10.
Livy claims here that Publius Scipio was saved by his son (a tradition not mentioned in Polybius’ version of the battle but noted later in Polybius’ discussion of the young Scipio, 10.3.6–7); Coelius Antipater has a Ligurian slave saving the consul (Livy 21.46.9–10). Seibert, 1993a, 118.

11.
Seibert, 1993a, 120; Lazenby, 1998, 55.

12.
Lazenby, 1998, 53 on the superiority of the Carthaginian cavalry.

13.
Ariminum had been a Latin colony since 268
BCE
.

14.
Livy 21.51.1–7; Polybius 3.68.12. Does it matter by which route the Roman army arrived in the north? Although Livy gives by far the more detailed account the tendency is to believe Polybius because it was already late October/early November when sea travel was dangerous. Livy’s account is more convincing as a whole. Perhaps a part of the army risked the sea journey by hugging the coast to make it up to northern Italy more quickly or, more likely, these events took place earlier in the season. Lazenby 1998, 54–55 deals with the discontinuity and prefers Polybius’ account, as does Hoyos, 2006, 636 (n. 51). Seibert, 1993a, 123, n. 247 analyses the issue. See Derow, 1976 on the problems with the Roman calendar in these years.

15.
Since Polybius’ patrons were the Scipio family and one of their distinguished ancestors was being discussed, it makes it difficult not to question the fact that all the blame is placed on Sempronius Longus in his narrative. Then again, Publius Scipio would have had the more realistic experience with Hannibal, while Sempronius Longus’ Sicilian experiences would have made him all the more confident. But Walbank, vol. 1, 404 notes that portraying Sempronius as ‘ambitious, full of false confidence and jealous of his colleague and successors’ should be overlooked as part of the pro-Scipionic tradition.

16.
See also Seibert, 1993a, 126–131; Lancel, 1999, 85–88; Lazenby, 1998, 56–59; Goldsworthy, 2000, 173–181 (plus clear map); Daly, 2002, 14–15.

17.
See chapter 10 below, p. 193. Polybius 11.22.4–8. It is the reverse scenario and deals with the preparation of Scipio’s men before the battle of Ilipa in Iberia; see also Livy 28.14.7.

18.
Seibert, 1993a, 126–127; Lazenby, 1998, 56–57 for analysis of the differing numbers; see also Walbank, vol. 1, 404–408 with an analysis of the numbers.

19.
Lazenby, 1998, 58. Textbook material for a Hellenistic general – aspects of which appear in the Xenophon (
Oecon.
21.4–8 and
Mem.
3.1.6) on military strategy and the instilling of loyalty in the men. See Hutchinson, 2000, 52–53.

20.
The exact location of Hannibal’s winter camp is nowhere made clear. Livy 21.59.10 claims he withdrew to Liguria for winter quarters. See Erskine, 1993 on Polybius’ rhetorical use of the ‘freedom agenda’ of the Hellenistic generals from Alexander. There seems no reason not to believe that Hannibal’s strategy was to win over the Italian allies but the rhetoric used here may be Polybius’ creation.

21.
As in Zonaras 8.24.8; for Punic bilingualism as a source of distrust, see chapter 1, pp. 16, 245
n
. 51. One thinks again of Hannibal’s studies when reading about Xenophon’s views on secrecy and deception; see further in Hutchinson, 2000, 67–73.

22.
Poseidon among the Greek soldiers urging on the troops was a popular theme on vase painting, as in Homer,
Iliad
13.42–59. Walbank, vol.1, 410 considers this a ‘worthless anecdote’. See also Seibert, 1993a, 139–140.

23.
Miles, 2010, 270–276 and 2011, 274–279 discusses the impact of Hannibal’s propaganda and the Roman response in the period up to Trasimeno and Cannae.

24.
For Livy’s account of an earlier aborted departure over the Apennines and another battle with Sempronius see 21.58–59. This is largely rejected as fictitious but may reflect some advance scouting done by the Carthaginians, as suggested by Hoyos, 2006, 637. See also Seibert, 1993a, 140.