Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (55 page)

70.
Polybius briefly covers the siege at 3.17.1–11; Livy provides more detail 21.7.16 and Lancel, 1999, 49–50 believes Livy’s source may have been Coelius Antipater. Silius Italicus tells the tale over two books,
Punica
1–2, based on Livy (see below, note 73).

71.
Maharbal will appear again as leader of the cavalry at Cannae.

72.
‘To the immortall memorie, and friendship of that noble paire, Sir Lucius Cary and Sir H. Morison’,
c.
1640 (first published edition).

73.
See Dominik, 2003 for the siege of Saguntum in the
Punica
, its parallels with the siege of Troy and with Plataea in the Peloponnesian War. As has been pointed out by Dominik, 2003, 472 the story of Saguntum takes up two whole books of the
Punica
– which seems an excessive treatment of an episode in terms of the whole story of Hannibal’s war. Stocks, 2014, 103–114 for the depiction of Hannibal at Saguntum in Silius Italicus.

74.
Ben Jonson dedicated this poem to his friends Morison (who died in 1629 at age 21) and Cary (who would be killed in the English Civil War after Jonson’s death – ‘the bravest of the cavaliers’). The poem opens with an infant born into the siege of Saguntum who chooses to return to the womb rather than live in the horror. Jonson and circle were Royalists (if not uncritical) in Stuart England and especially supporters of James I (VI of Scotland), who was an active patron of Jonson. James I as the ‘New Caesar’ provoked a distinctly different view of Hannibal from Sir Walter Ralegh’s: see chapter 12 below, p. 236.

75.
Following Rich, 1996, 30. A reasonable argument is that under the Roman system the preparations for a military campaign in that year would be put in place in March when the new consuls took up office. The Romans would have known that Saguntum was under siege by the summer of 219, but did not formally declare war until the following year and the new consuls were in place by March 218.

76.
See Lancel, 1995, 49–50; Hoyos, 1998, 202–204; Rich 1996, 12–14 for the confusion over the dating. Livy claims an embassy arrived from Rome while the siege was ongoing (21.6.8) but Polybius makes no reference to this second embassy and the assumption is that Livy’s embassy is actually Polybius’ embassy at New Carthage from the autumn of 220.

77.
Translation from Rich, 1996, 30–31, although Hoyos, 2005, 99 claims that this is probably not the same Q. Fabius Maximus who would campaign against Hannibal.

78.
As soon as a ship could sail – March/April, contra Walbank, vol. 1, 333–334, who puts the embassy later, after Hannibal had crossed the Ebro (June?). Hoyos, 1998, 233–255 surveys the possibilities. See Wiedemann, 1986 on the formalities of declaring war in the Roman Republic. Rich, 1996 gives a detailed assessment of the sources and Ridley, 2000 looks at Livy’s evidence.

79.
See Brizzi, 2009, who examines the different factions in Carthage during the Punic Wars and the idea of an
amicitia
between the Fabii and the faction of Hanno at Carthage.

80.
Hanno’s speech is thought to be a Livian invention.

81.
The details are preserved in Polybius’ history and he provides a fascinating digression (3.22–29) that recounts the history of Roman and Carthaginian treaties going back to 509.

82.
Harris, 1985, 205.

83.
As noted by Miles, 2010, 231.

84.
An interesting discussion on the Polybian view can be found in Eckstein, 1989.

85.
This view is expressed by Walbank, vol. 1, 319. See also discussion in Ridley, 2000, 18–23, and Rich 1996, 14–18 on the Barcid intentions.

86.
Blame for the Hannibalic War expressed here is largely based on the ideas presented in Eckstein, 2006. Also relevant is Eckstein’s research (1987) on the individual Roman commanders and their decisions, especially on the ‘ad hoc’ diplomacy of a commander in the field.

87.
The ongoing debate over the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 continues today, which only exemplifies the problem of apportioning blame in past wars and ideas of war
guilt. We cannot agree on 100-year–old wars, much less those that took place over two thousand years ago. Debate on the origins of the First World War can be found in publications such as M. McMillian, 2014,
The War to End All Peace
, M. Hastings, 2014,
Catastrophe
, and C. Clark, 2012,
The Sleepwalkers
. Politicians have entered the fray: ‘Michael Gove blasts “Blackadder myths”about the First World War spread by television sit-coms and left-wing academics’, 22:31, 2 January 2014 | Updated: 08:20, 3 January 2014,
Daily Mail
online. Or the rebuttal by Tristram Hunt in
The Observer
: ‘Michael Gove, using history for politicking is tawdry’, | Saturday 4 January 2014 21.05 GMT.

Chapter 5 Legend: Hannibal into Italy

1.
See Palmer, 1997, 31–52 on ‘Carthaginian cargoes at Rome’.

2.
Point made here by Woolmer, 2008 in regard to Greek merchant/spies and it can certainly be extended to include the Romano-Carthaginian connections.

3.
Speculatores
mentioned in i.e. Caesar,
BG
1.47.6 and later in Ammianus Marcellinus 26.6.4–6. For an excellent overview of the methods of tactical intelligence in the Roman period see Austin and Rankov, 1995, 39–86.

4.
Sheldon, 1986 provides a useful discussion of Carthaginian intelligence networks but perhaps underplays the Roman approach to the point of simplicity, the wily Carthaginian and solid, simple peasant Roman being too convenient an analogy. For spies embedded in the enemy’s camp see Polyaenus,
Strategems
Excerpt 7.

5.
See Rankov, 1996, 53 on ‘The Second Punic War at Sea’, which he admits was, to ‘a certain extent, a sideshow’.

6.
Polybius later refers to this as an ‘inscription on the column at Lacinium’ (3.56.4) and Livy mentions it in book 28.46.16

7.
Again the chronology is confusing: if the Roman embassy returned from Carthage in April, the consuls were chosen in March and the preparations for war would have begun as soon as the consuls had been decided, before war had been officially declared.

8.
The term
provincia
meant the region where a Roman consul could exercise complete authority for conquest as a general; it was his sphere of influence.

9.
News of war probably reached Rome and New Carthage at a similar time, by April/May.

10.
Lancel, 1999, 59–64. There are a number of excellent summaries of the two armies: see Goldsworthy, 2003, 25–62 and Daly, 2002, 81–112.

11.
The best recent account of Hannibal’s army can be found in Daly, 2002, 81–112, and see also Lazenby, 1998, 1–28 on Carthage and Roman forces.

12.
As noted by Bagnall, 1990, 10–11. It is interestingly made explicit that military obligation was not part of Hannibal’s agreements with the cities of Italy such as Capua and Tarentum; see further in chapters 8 and 9 below.

13.
Or so claimed Polybius (3.35.8, 8.1.1–8, 15.14.6, 15.15.6–7, 18.28.9–10).

14.
For the textbook description of a general in antiquity see Polyaenus,
Strategems
Excerpts 1–3 where Hannibal figures throughout as an exemplum.

15.
For Alexander’s self-restraint whilst still a boy, and his stern nature, see also Plutarch,
Alex.
7.1.

16.
See Hutchinson, 2000, 180–223 for an analysis of Xenophon’s ideal commander; there is much of what we know of Hannibal in this. Hutchinson discusses how two of Xenophon’s works, the
Kyropaideia
and
Hipparchicus
(Cavalry Commander) were written as if meant as leadership manuals for the ideal commander.

17.
Due, 1993, 55 argues that Alexander was influenced by an ideal of command first set down in Xenophon’s characterization of an ideal leader. There was a philosophy of leadership and command that influenced Alexander, Pyrrhus and perhaps Hannibal too.

18.
The importance of cavalry to a commander in Xenophon studied by Hutchinson, 2000, 183–187 and 240–241.

19.
Rawlings, 1996, 81–82, distinguishes between soldiers and warriors.

20.
See Daly, 2002, 123–128 on command in Hannibal’s army. For the supply of the army see Goldsworthy, 2003, 154–155.

21.
See also Apollodorus 2.5.10; Herodotus 4.8; and Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
Roman Antiquities
1.41 for the Herakles myth and his connection to the western Mediterranean. For what the Bay of Cadiz may have looked like in antiquity, see Aubet, 2001, 262–273, including maps.

22.
See Bonnet, 1988, on Melqart, and the syncretism of the two traditions from early in the first millennium
BCE
; see also Seibert, 1993a, 75–76; Rawlings, 2005; Campus, 2005; Miles, 2010, 235–255. For Cadiz, the temple, its origin and worship see also Aubet, 2001, 259–291.

23.
Referred to as a pilgrimage in both Seibert, 1993a, 75 and Lancel, 1999, 55; see also Huss, 1986 on the claims in Livy of Hannibal’s impiety (223–238).

24.
See Huss, 1986, on Hannibal’s religion, and Livy 21.4 for Hannibal’s impiety. The vows found on inscriptions from the Tophet at Carthage include the form ‘because he heard his voice’, Xella, et al., 2013, 1204. The prayer was also associated with the worship of Melqart from early in the first millennium: see Aubet, 2001, 50 for the Bar Haddad stele from Aleppo.

25.
Although this chronology would make Hannibal a little late for the rebirth ritual it is possible he went to Gades first, then returned and made plans, etc. For the ritual of resurrection (
egersis
) of Melqart see Bonnet, 1988, 221–225, 1986, 214 and Aubet, 2001, 275–277. Miles, 2010, 33–34 describes the rite at Tyre. Silius Italicus’ version takes the short mention of the visit by Hannibal to Gades and combines it with other literary and historical traditions as discussed in Gibson, 2005, 178. For Alexander at Tyre see Plutarch,
Alex
. 24–25

26.
Roman sources pick up and develop this theme, see Gibson, 2005, 181. Plutarch,
Alex.
27: ‘Alexander made splendid offering to the gods and gave money to his priests’.

27.
Seibert, 1993a, 76; Miles, 2010, 241–255; Rawlings, 2005, all discuss the role of Herakles and his legend in Hannibal’s journey; see also Miles, 2011 for the way that Hannibal used the legend in his propaganda to subvert Roman claims to the hero.

28.
Beacham, 2005, 152 uses the phrase ‘myth management’ in reference to Octavian, Antony and Sextus Pompey, but it can equally be applied here.

29.
Rawlings, 2005, 169–170 discusses the soteriological aspects of Herakles’ myth derived from Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ version 1.41.1ff.

30.
Miles, 2011, 268–269 and 2010, 235–255 on the subversion of the Roman claim; and Rawlings, 2005, on Hannibal and Herakles and the route to Italy.

31.
Miles, 2011, 268 points out the battle for the patronage of the hero and provides the background to Roman claims to a ‘Heraclean heritage’, also noting that their tactic of ‘evocatio’ was being used against them.

32.
This was the number of elephants with Hannibal when he reached the Rhône (we do not know for certain how many had left Iberia with him). See Polybius 3.35.1 for the troop numbers and Appian,
Hann.
1.4 for the elephant numbers; for some scepticism about the elephants, see Lazenby, 1998, 33.

33.
Late May departure, Seibert, 1993a, 96, Hoyos, 2005, 102. For a departure of 8 June see Lazenby, 1998, Appendix III (275–277), which includes a detailed diary of the march and distances covered, whose chronology of events is generally followed here although I would perhaps bring the events forward by a week or so.

34.
Perhaps modern Pensicola, following Seibert, 1993a, 96.

35.
For the dream: Cicero,
de div
1.49, repeated also in Valerius Maximus 1.7.1, Silius Italicus,
Pun.
3. 163–214, and Zonaras 8.22.9; see also Devilliers and Krings, 2006, 337, Miles, 2010, 250–255. Valerius Maximus, 1.7
(de somnis
) records a long list of dreams of great generals in Antiquity from Cyrus to Croesus through Alexander to Hannibal to the Roman emperor Augustus.

36.
For Silenus see Cornelius Nepos,
Hann
. 13.3.

37.
Devilliers and Krings, 2006, 338–339 question the assumption that it does and also note that the dream seems ill placed in the narrative; better to have dreamt at Gades in the presence of the god, or in the Alps, or just before the first battle with the Romans. Miles, 2010, 252–255 comments on the Hannibalic propaganda in play.

38.
Noted in Miles, 2010, 250–252; Rawlings, 2005, 170.

39.
See Miles, 2010, 251 and Daly, 2002, 135 on aspects of Hellenistic leadership and divine sanction in Hannibal’s army. See Hutchinson, 2000, 46–47 on the importance of dreams in Xenophon.

40.
For Hannibal convincing ‘his own men that those who died courageously in war returned to life after a short period’ see Polyaenus,
Stratagems
3.38.2.

41.
Hoyos, 2005, 104–105.

42.
The number of soldiers does not add up – if Hannibal started with 90,000 from New Carthage and twenty were either sent home or stationed with Hanno that leaves 20,000 missing soldiers. Either that number of men was lost in the battles after the Ebro (‘with great loss’ Polyb. 3.35.4) or the numbers were wrong from the outset, which seems most likely. See Seibert, 1993a, 97 n.122. Hoyos, 2005, 106–108 believes the original number is the problem and that 50,000 is the correct number for departure. Seibert, 1993a, 97 proposes the crossing of the Pyrenees in three columns, each taking a separate pass, and reconvening on the other side. However, he admits there is no real clue as to which of the passes over the Pyrenees were taken.