Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (62 page)

38.
Ovid,
Fasti
6.770, ‘Hasdrubal fell by his own sword’ does not contradict the depiction in Polybius – the battle being lost, Hasdrubal, assuming his brother had also been defeated, did not see a way out other than victory; capture by the Romans was not an option for him. Polybius’ digression supports the use of suicide as an honourable way out for a defeated general (11.2.1–11).

39.
The time elapsed could not have been too long or the head would have rotted beyond recognition.

40.
As Briscoe, 1989, 55 points out.

41.
Appian,
Ib.
25–27 is considered unreliable and irreconcilable with Polybius and Livy, as noted by Walbank, vol. 2, 296. The name of the place – Ilinga in Polybius, Silpia in Livy and Karbone in Appian – is confused but the location near Seville largely agreed upon. See Lazenby, 1998, 145; Lancel, 1999, 150; Goldsworthy, 2003, 279–284; Seibert, 1993a, 393–396.

42.
Perhaps north to Gallicia as well, the region referred to by its Roman provincial name Hispania Ulterior in Livy 28.12.13.

43.
Regarding the superior numbers of the Carthaginian forces, in Polybius (20.2) listed as 70,000, plus 4,000 cavalry and 32 elephants and in Livy (28.12.13) 50,000 plus 4,500 cavalry. Appian (
Ib.
25) follows Polybius on foot soldiers but puts the number of cavalry at 5,000, Scipio’s army was in the neighbourhood of 45,000 foot and 3,000 cavalry. The Carthaginians had a ‘slight but not very substantial numerical advantage’, according to Walbank, vol. 2, 297; whereas Lazenby, 1998, 145 is inclined to accept Polybius’ numbers as an explanation for the complicated stratagem that Scipio employed.

44.
The very specific details of the three manoeuvres are covered by Lazenby, 1998, 147–149 following Polybius 11.22.8–11.24.11; see also Walbank, vol. 2, 269–304 with diagrams. See also Goldsworthy, 2003, 280 for a clear plan.

45.
Ilipa was 14 km north of Seville on the Guadalquivir river; see Walbank, vol. 2, 296–304 for the detailed breakdown of Scipio’s complicated movements, and also Scullard, 1930, 135 for a diagram of the stages of the battle.

46.
Hoyos, 2006, 685 n. 28.16 notes that this retreat could have taken weeks and that Livy has compressed the events to make it seem a few days.

47.
Hasdrubal Gisgo went to Syphax’s capital Siga for a rendezvous with the Numidian king and at the same time Scipio showed up in the harbour. One wonders if this was not a prearranged meeting, some kind of summit? Livy covers the meeting and the importance of Syphax in 28.17.10–16.

48.
For Scipio’s new foundations see Appian,
Ib
. 38, home of the future emperors Trajan and Hadrian.

49.
Briscoe, 1989, 60; and Iberia would not be a fully settled province of Rome (the provinces of Hispania) until the period of Augustus, as Livy notes in 28.12.12.

50.
Silius Italicus gives Hannibal a wife named Imilce from Castulo (see chapter 4). Livy’s line from 28.19.16 where Scipio approaches the walls of Illurgia putting himself in danger mirrors Hannibal outside the walls of Saguntum (21.7.10) rushing the wall and receiving a spear in the thigh. Hannibal’s injuries sent his men into retreat, whereas Scipio’s caused them to rush the walls with greater determination.

51.
L. Marcius Septimus. For location see Walbank, vol. 2, 305. Appian,
Ib.
33, Livy 28.23.4, and Polybius 11.24.10–11.

52.
Events summarized here cover the period between 207 and 205: see Livy 28.12.12–28.38.1 and Polybius 11.20–11.33, including detailed accounts of the battle of Ilipa and the mutiny of the Celtiberians under Andobales, Scipio’s illness and the final battle in Iberia somewhere south of the Ebro.

53.
Appian refers to these settlers as Blastophoenicians. See Lowe, 2009, 52 and the translation and commentary on Appian’s Iberian books by Richardson, 2000, 151, who notes that Appian may be conflating the name originating from earlier settlement of Phoenicians with Hannibal.

54.
Scipio’s visit to Syphax (see above,
n
. 47) and subsequent alliance being enough of an indicator.

55.
Were the Carthaginians trying to resupply their generals in Italy? The nature of the mission of the 80 Carthaginian freighters that were captured perplexed Livy himself, as his sources conflict: Coelius Antipater claimed they were aimed at resupplying Hannibal, whilst Valerius Antias claimed it was booty from the north where Mago was causing trouble. See Hoyos (2006, 691 n. 46), who believes Livy/Coelius. On Mago’s last years and the
Carthaginian strategy in Italy see Seibert, 1993a, 418–419; Lazenby, 1998, 196; Lancel, 1999, 158. References from Livy here (28.11–12).

56.
Following Lancel, 1999, 153–154.

57.
The retributions exacted and settlements made by the Romans in the south of Italy were, as noted by Fronda (2010, 307), the final stages in their complete conquest of Italy. As each city and region was retaken, specific conditions would have reflected their role in supporting Hannibal as well as the local elites’ relationship with Rome – although generally speaking the treatment of the communities was punitive and severe punishments were inflicted. See Fronda, 2010, 234–279, and 307–329 on ‘Rome and the Italians’; see also Toynbee, 1965.

58.
See Lazenby 1998, 195 on the legions in the field in 205; Seibert, 1993a, 413–423.

59.
Here Livy echoes Polybius 11.19 on Hannibal’s character: ‘No one can withhold admiration for Hannibal’s generalship, courage and power in the field …’

60.
See also Polybius 11.19, and Lancel, 1999 151–157 on ‘Hannibal at Cape Lacinium’.

61.
The rise and fall of support from Carthage meant that for much of the period when Hannibal was in Italy he was fighting for himself. The loyalty of Hannibal’s troops in Livy is interestingly balanced with a passage on rebellion among Scipio’s troops.

62.
Lancel, 1999, 157, Jaeger, 2006 and Brizzi, 1983. The narrative of Hannibal in Bruttium at the temple of Juno in Crotona is the perfect example of how Livy’s epic has constructed our image of Hannibal. On the nature of the text and whether it served as a type of memoir of Hannibal’s deeds, a true
res gestae
, there is much debate: see Meister, 1990 for an interesting discussion on Hellenistic autobiography.

63.
These Carthaginian-style coins may be the identifiable ones and Hannibal could have minted coins in the Greek style as well, making them less distinguishable. See Robinson, 1964; Jenkins, 1987; Alexandropoulos, 2000, 104–108.

64.
See Crawford, 1985, chapter 4 on the Second Punic War and 62–69 on the Hannibalic and allied coinage.

65.
No numbers are provided in the sources other than those relating to the army he took with him back to Africa. Livy contends that it was still a ‘large’ force and the Roman reactions to Hannibal suggest it was considerable enough to keep them wary of full engagement.

66.
Much to Roman chagrin, Livy insists.

67.
Thus bringing to an end the First Macedonian War that had rumbled on in the background over the period from
c.
212/211: see Gruen, 1986, 373–381 for the background. Livy (27.30.10) reported that during the diplomatic negotiations (in 208) leading up to the peace treaties the intention was to end the war ‘so that neither the Romans nor Attalus would have reason to enter Greece’. The Mediterranean world was sensing Rome’s growing power and the demise of the Carthaginian threat.

68.
As noted by Jaeger, 2006, 390.

Chapter 11 Hannibal Returns

1.
The History of the World
book 5, sect. 21, chapter 3.

2.
Kunze, 2011, 397. Reflecting Polybius’ interests in Masinissa and his connection with Scipio Aemilianus, no doubt.

3.
Family ties include Naravas, a Numidian prince married to a daughter of Hamilcar in Polybius (1.78.1–9), and Masinissa’s uncle, who was married to Hannibal’s niece (daughter of his sister, in Livy 29.29), perhaps the daughter of Naravas and his sister. On the Barcid family and Numidian ties see Hoyos, 2005, 25–26 and Kunze, 2011, 399 n. 8.

4.
Scipio makes this point in his speech to the Senate during the debate over the invasion of Africa in Livy (28.44.4–5; along with Livy’s slander of ‘faithlessness’ etc.).

5.
The discussion in Eckstein, 1987, 233ff. For a detailed study of Masinissa, see also Storm, 2001 (especially pp. 35–60 for the period discussed here) and an interesting discussion in Walsh, 1965. On the formation of the Numidian kingdoms see Camps, 1960 and Quinn, 2013 on their ideological development.

6.
Masinissa travelled back and forth between Africa and Iberia in the following years, he was at Carthage in 210/209 with a unit of 5,000 cavalry and he returned to fight in Iberia in 208–207 (Livy 27.5.11). After Hasdrubal Barca lost the battle of Baecula and departed for Italy, Masinissa was given a force of 3,000 cavalry to roam the region attacking the enemy and assisting the allies (Livy 27.20) – although Lazenby raises some interesting questions about Livy’s account of the aftermath (1998, 143).

7.
Discussions were held between Silanus, Scipio’s deputy, and Masinissa, after the Carthaginian general Hasdrubal son of Gisgo had abandoned his forces and fled to Gades (Livy 28.16.11–12). Masinissa’s father Gaia had recently died and the struggle for succession was unfolding in Numidia. Masinissa’s uncle had been married to Hannibal’s niece (perhaps the daughter of his sister and Naravas, or the daughter of another sister). See Walsh, 1965, 150–151.

8.
The sentiments of Masinissa may have been real, perhaps reported to Polybius personally and then picked up by Livy. Livy’s depiction of Masinissa being almost ‘dazed at merely meeting’ Scipio sounds very much like flattery.

9.
Livy’s claim that Masinissa stayed with the Carthaginians until late in 206 and that – while he was with Mago Barca at Gades, just before Scipio left Iberia to return to Rome – the two men met face to face seems unlikely. The conflicting accounts of the meetings in Livy (28.16.11 and 28.35.1–13) are unlikely both to be correct and the suspicion that Livy has constructed the meeting with Scipio is a distinct possibility: see Walsh, 1965, 150; Lazenby, 1998, 151–156.

10.
Masinissa’s dynastic rivals and familial situation summarized by Livy 29.29.6–13.

11.
For Scipio’s election as consul for 205 see Scullard, 1930, 160–162, Lazenby, 1998, 193, Hoyos, 2005, 158–159. For the wider Roman view on events here, including the summoning of the Magna Mater from Asia Minor, see Gruen, 1990, 47–48, and Burton, 1996. For a breakdown of the rhetorical nature of both ‘set-piece’ speeches and the wider historiographical contexts see Laird, 2009, 204–208. Scipio was advocating a policy that would have been pursued by his father and uncle from Iberia if they had survived, according to Livy’s estimation (24.48.1) and this debate was a long-standing one, going back to 218.

12.
See also Livy 28.38.12; 28.38.40–45; Plutarch,
Fab.
25; Appian,
Hann.
55 and
Lib.
7; Silius Italicus 16, 692–700. Scipio could never be certain that he would not be recalled to Rome and another commander given his army. Scipio’s allies, with the backing of the popular assembly in Rome, continuously supported Scipio’s command and would work to ensure that he was not recalled from Africa until the end of the war (Livy 30.27.2–4, 43.1–3). See Eckstein, 1987, 233ff. on Scipio’s command from 205 and the prosecution of the war in Africa. See Briscoe, 1989, 73–74. Livy 30.27 describes the attempts in later years to take the control of the Africa campaign away from Scipio – but the popular assembly continued to vote to leave him in command.

13.
The games had been vowed by Scipio during the mutiny the previous year: Livy 28.24–29, 28.45. On the mutiny of Scipio’s troops and his illness see Polybius 11.25–30 and Walbank, vol. 2, 310–11; Lazenby, 1998, 152–153; also Goldsworthy, 2003, 269–285; Eckstein, 1987, 224–226.

14.
Yardley’s 2006 translation uses ‘gifts from the spoils of Hannibal’ (Livy,
Hannibal’s War
, 511), but the Oxford and Loeb Latin texts state Hasdrubal so I have used that here.

15.
Was a troop levy denied or deemed unnecessary as Sicily was already well manned? With the 7,000 volunteers there were at least four legions at Scipio’s disposal, and the refusal of some of the Latin allies to fill their requirement of troops may have made a levy difficult, according to Lazenby, 1998, 195. Scipio funded the construction of the ships built for the transport himself, and with the support of the allies, according to Livy 28.45.13.

16.
Goldsworthy provides an excellent account of the preparations needed for such an expedition – for example, building transport ships, training troops to the necessary standard for battle. Scipio’s expedition was supplied from Sicily for the whole time he was in Africa (2003, 288–289).

17.
Livy 29.3 claims Laelius landed at Hippo Regius (Annaba in Algeria), but Hoyos, 2006, 692 n. 3, points out that this must be a mistake: Hippo Regius was in Massyli territory and
hundreds of kilometres from Carthage, so it is more likely that he landed at Hippo Diarrhytus (Hippo Accra, modern Bizerte) situated about 60 km north-east of Carthage and an allied city. Lazenby, 1998, 197, in contrast, accepts Hippo Regius as the destination.

18.
From 217 onwards there was raiding, pillaging, looting, including a massive raid that year by the consul Gnaeus Servilius Geminus with 120 ships, who attacked the islands off the coast of Tripolitania including Meninx (Djerba) and, further north, Kerkina. A raiding party had landed but was ambushed (Livy 22.1.6–9; 22.31.1–7). A gap in the records for the years between 214 and 211 may mean that the concentration of the fleet on Sicily gave some reprieve to the Carthaginian lands; see Lazenby, 1998, 196–197 for the complete references in Livy and also see Rankov, 1996. Carthage had equally been raiding, but less successfully, the Italian coast and the islands.