Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (61 page)

59.
Lazenby, 1998, 133 points out that Livy’s story of young Scipio’s appointment is hardly credible and the Romans ‘just did not do things like that’, and that the appointment was probably made by the
comitia centuriata
, perhaps on recommendation of the Senate.

60.
For the Iberian soldiers in the Second Punic War, see Rawlings, 1996 and Daly, 2002, 95–101.

61.
The risk is noted by Hoyos, 2013, 698.

62.
Seibert, 1993a, 326–330 discusses the events in Rome in 210; see also Lazenby, 1998, 133.

63.
Livy claims he is 18 at Ticinus, see Polybius 10.3.3–7 and Livy 21.46.7–10; others claim it was a slave who saved the elder Scipio.

64.
Rossi, 2004, 363.

65.
Traditionally the minimum age for a
curule aedile
was 27. The claim that Scipio had to get his mother’s permission (his father was away in Iberia) to stand for the aedileship
(Polyb. 10.4.1–5), is discussed in Walbank, vol. 2, 199–200, means he would have been 21/22, which makes his mother’s intervention unlikely.

66.
Paradise Lost
, 9.510, the reference comes from Ennius’ poem on Scipio originally. For the reference to Alexander’s mother and quasi-divine status see Spencer, 2002, 178–180.

67.
Again see Spencer, 2002, 178–180 for a discussion of the ‘Roman Alexander Complex’.

68.
See Polybius 10.2.1–10.5.9 for the ‘character of Scipio’. Walbank notes that Polybius’ lament is useful for its proof that by his time, not long after the death of Scipio, the legends of Scipio’s quasi-divinity existed (vol 2, 196–197).

69.
The story is repeated in Valerius Maximus 1.2.2, and Aulus Gellius 6.1.

70.
For example Sosylus and Silenus and the unknown Charaeus. Polybius’ relationship with Scipio Aemilianus, who was the adopted son of one Publius Scipio, the son of Scipio Africanus, began in
c.
168. Although technically a captive in Rome, he acted as mentor to Scipio Aemilianus and accompanied him during his tour of duty in Iberia, and in Africa, where he met Masinissa (
c.
150/149). Scullard, 1970, 11–14 outlines the connection; and see Walbank, vol. 1, 1–6 on Polybius’ life.

71.
Scipio in Polybius 10.2.12.

72.
See Rossi, 2004 on the construction of parallel lives in Livy. The reasons for the relatively noble portrayal of Hannibal in Livy, especially at the end of the war, have been explored by Moore, 2010.

73.
Livy gives the year as 211 and his age as 24, but the year has to be 210: see Scullard, 1930, 36 note 1, and also Walbank, vol. 2, 14–15 and 191–192.

74.
Modern Empurias in Catalonia.

75.
Polybius and Livy provide slightly different accounts of the whereabouts of the Carthaginian armies. Polybius (10.7.5), who is the preferred source, claims that Mago was near Gades, Hasdrubal was in the Carpetani region, and that Hadrubal son of Gisgo was near the mouth of the river Tagus (in Lusitania, modern Atlantic coast of Portugal). Livy’s account of the whereabouts (26.20.6) places Hasdrubal in the neighbourhood of Saguntum.

76.
This makes little sense as reported – one wonders if the Carthaginian armies might not have been occupied elsewhere with a rebellion or a recall to Africa? After almost a decade of fighting the Romans the Barcid brothers must have known that they would not be deterred by a total defeat and that another army would return to avenge the deaths of their proconsuls – either a misjudgement of the enemy on a massive scale or something is missing from our sources here. The sequence of events and exact timing leave many questions unanswered.

77.
See Livy 27.7.5–6 where he questions his own dating of these events, which he puts in 210. The fall of New Carthage took place in 209 although some anomalies persist, like what Scipio and the Carthaginian generals did for the rest of the campaigning season, as is mentioned by Hoyos, 2006, 675 n. 27.7. See also Lazenby, 1998, 140.

78.
Laelius was still alive when Polybius wrote his history and Polybius (10.3.2) consulted him as an eyewitness to these events, probably about 160
BCE
: see Walbank, vol. 2, 198.

79.
See Lazenby, 1998, 135; Hoyos, 2006, 672 (note on Livy 26.42); Polybius 10.9.7.

80.
Scipio’s forces totalled 28,000 plus 3,000 cavalry, according to Polybius 10.6.7, 10.9.6, but some must have been left to guard his supplies, etc. See also Livy 26.42.1–2.

81.
The description of the city in Polybius is invaluable as it is our only eyewitness account of it (see also Polyb. 10.9.8–10.10.13).

82.
Goldsworthy, 2003, 273–275.

83.
Scipio only used Roman soldiers at this point – perhaps not trusting his allies, who had abandoned his father and uncle. He may have left the Spanish allies to guard their rear: see Polybius 10.6.1–10.17.16 on the account of the taking of the city and the sack. For an overview see Eckstein, 1987, 209–228 on Scipio in Iberia.

84.
Livy 26.45.7–8 also mentions this draining of the water. On this curious phenomenon of an ebb tide see Seibert, 1993a, 355–356; Walbank, vol. 2, 192–193. Hoyos, 1992 examines the issue in detail and suggests it was a natural phenomenon. He raises the question of why that side of the city was left as exposed as it was. It is a curious passage and still not fully explained.

85.
One wonders whether the garrison could have held out – as the Roman garrison at Tarentum had, just to make it more difficult for Scipio – but the Carthaginians once again proved not quite as determined and their navy seems to have gone missing. Many unanswered questions persist in this account.

Chapter 10 Over the Alps, Again

1.
See Walbank, vol. 2, 189–191 on Polybius’ Tarentum narrative. Again Livy’s chronology for the fall of New Carthage is wrong: see Hoyos 2006, 664 n. 25.36 and 675 n. 27.7.

2.
Goldsworthy, 2003, 235–236.

3.
See Hoyos, 2006, 677 n. 16; explored in Brizzi, 2009 and for the background see Palmer, 1997, 115–130.

4.
Fabius Maximus was commended for his ‘strength of character’ during the sack of Tarentum where he ‘passed up booty’ such as colossal statues of the gods. This swipe at Marcellus’ behaviour in Syracuse was further magnified by the celebration at Rome of an official triumph by Fabius, granted by the Senate. Fabius Maximus is commended by Livy for his piety: ‘the people of Tarentum were to be left their angry gods’ (27.16.8). The triumph of Fabius Maximus vs ovation of Marcellus discussed in Eckstein, 1987, 169–171. See Lazenby, 1998, 191 for the first triumph celebrated for a victory in battle (as opposed to the taking of a city) granted to Claudius Nero and Salinator after the Metaurus.

5.
Crawford, 1985, 60.

6.
Livy is suspected of concealing Roman defeats in his narrative: Goldsworthy, 2003, 236.

7.
For the excavations and survey see Bellón et al., 2009, 259, who argue that the location is Cerro de las Albahacas. Previous scholarship has placed the battle further west of Castulo, at modern Balien.

8.
The archaeological material can help unravel the confused narrative in the literary sources, especially the geography, as Livy’s text is muddled and contradictory for this key period in the battle for Iberia.

9.
The same description of Scipio’s superior troops vs Hasdrubal’s greater numbers is the reverse situation of Hannibal’s victories over the Romans. One does wonder about the literary construction of strategic victory rather than the true facts of the day. See chapter 11, p. 193, on Ilipa.

10.
For the exact location and recent excavations at the site see Bellón et al., 2009. The intensive survey focused on 20 hectares of land to uncover an array of armour, clothing and coins from both sets of troops, as recently reported in
El Pais
(
http://cultura.elpais.com/cultura/2013/03/09/actualidad/1362850068_856601.html
) consulted 30 March 2013.

11.
Lazenby, 1998, 142.

12.
His escape route, as noted in the excellent map by Bellón et al., 2009, 254.

13.
Difficult to imagine what else the brothers believed might happen. Hannibal’s victories at Trasimeno and Cannae had not forced a peace from Rome; it was always unlikely that any defeat in 208/207 would meet with a different reaction – but perhaps they were hopeful of a more favourable peace, and even now realized an invasion of Africa was likely.

14.
Trouble in Etruria would continue for years afterwards.

15.
Although favoured by some, this was not a policy agreed by the leading military commanders at the time.

16.
Marcellus’ son was also injured in the attack. Here again some information is missing: for both consuls and the son of the consul to be trapped is extraordinary, especially at this stage of the war. The imprudence of the consuls that allowed them to be caught like this is mentioned by Polybius 10.32.7, and followed by Livy 27.27.11. See Lazenby, 1998, 179, and for the complete career of Marcellus see Broughton, 1951, 289–290.

17.
Translation of Virgil here by Fagels, 6.985ff.

18.
See also Livy 27.28. 1–2.

19.
Livy 27.28.1–13 on the ruse with the ring The question of whether or not a Roman garrison had been left in the town also arises, but it is difficult to assess as Livy contradicts
himself. See Fronda, 2010, 258–260, who notes the lack of credibility and assesses the evidence for a garrison.

20.
Or possibly the intention of the line is ‘more quickly than expected’, as suggested by Lazenby, 1998, 182.

21.
Although Livy claims that Hasdrubal took the same path as Hannibal (27.39.1–9 for Hasdrubal’s crossing) it seems unlikely that he would have choosen a more difficult route than necessary.

22.
Numbers calculated in Lazenby, 1998, 181.

23.
Commanded by Terentius Varro and Porcius Licinus respectively, following Lazenby, 1998, 181–182.

24.
Making Marcellus’ and Crispinus’ deaths the year before even more perplexing.

25.
Command of the legions at Tarentum was with Q. Claudius Flamen, a praetor for 208, and at Capua another propraetor named C. Hostilius Tubulus (Livy 27.36.10–13), Lazenby, 1998, 181–182.

26.
Livy may be overstating the losses: see Walbank, vol. 2, 267, Lazenby, 1998, 185.

27.
Lazenby, 1998, 184–185 claims that Livy’s account of Hannibal’s movements ‘makes little or no sense as it stands’ and that he has mixed up the events of 208 with those of 207.

28.
Hoyos, 2006, 680 views Hannibal’s ‘zigzagging’ around the south of Italy as evidence of his loss of men and thus his need to muster more troops.

29.
Etruria would have welcomed the Barcids, and Livy (28.10.4–5) mentions Romans investigating communities in Etruria that had been planning on going over to the Barcid brothers. Hannibal and Hasdrubal had coordinated this with locals, including people of Arretium (Arezzo). Rumours of an Etruscan rebellion are mentioned in Livy 27.21.6–8, 27.24.1–9, 28.10.4–5; see Fronda, 2010, 239 n. 17, 289–290. For the famous inscription found at Tarquinia of the 106-year-old Larth Felsnas, whose epitaph notes that ‘he fought with Hannibal’s people at Capua’, see Pfiffig, 1967, 663.

30.
The date taken from Ovid (
Fasti
6.770) is 22 June but see Derow, 1976, 281, who would place it about a month earlier, with calculations to redress the imbalance in the calendar, on 19 May. See the wider arguments in Walbank, vol. 2, 270–271. Lazenby, 1998, 182–190 covers the whole period from the Alps to the Metaurus.

31.
For the debate on the location of Hasdrubal at Sena and not further north at Fanum see Walbank, vol. 2, 267–269; Lazenby, 1998, 183–189; Goldsworthy, 2003, 238–243; Seibert, 1993a, 382–393.

32.
Nero had sent messengers ahead but had moved quickly.

33.
Polybius’ account is incomplete; it picks up with Hasdrubal being displeased about something and launches into the battle: see Walbank, vol. 2, 267–274.

34.
Estimates vary. Livy (27.49.6) gives the number at 56,000 and Appian (
Hann.
52) concurs, but Walbank (vol. 2, 273) points out that this figure seems to be greatly inflated – especially given Hasdrubal’s willingness to fight Livius and Porcius but hesitation about fighting the armies of the two consuls combined even though Claudius Nero’s army was only some 7,000 selected troops.

35.
Missing detail here about which river was forded by whom: if Hasdrubal was to reach the Metaurus, he and his army would have had to cross the river Misa or the Cesano before he got there (if his camp really was at Sena), as noted by Hoyos, 2006, 681.

36.
Hasdrubal’s movements are well reasoned by Lazenby, 1998, 183.

37.
Livy’s claim of 57,000 enemy dead cannot be trusted and is considered far too high; Polybius’ claim of 10,000 Carthaginian and Celtic troops slain seems closer to the mark. The number of captured soldiers is also significant – they raised more than 300 talents in ransom, which has been estimated as the equivalent of close to 10,000 prisoners: see Walbank, vol. 2, 273–274 for the references to calculations.