Heinrich Himmler : A Life (61 page)

discovery of this fact merely confirmed to me how right it was to relieve you of the responsibilities of head of the Race and Settlement Main Office. I have made a clear decision to remove the Indoctrination Office from the SS Race and Settlement Main Office. I consider it incompatible with the obedience expected of an SS man to circumvent an instruction, not its letter but, and this is even more serious, its spirit. Although you have no more influence in this matter I have felt obliged, in order to set you on the right path, to declare to you my clear and unambiguous opinion for the benefit of your future professional life.
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Hofmann tried to expunge this serious reproach by declaring his loyalty:

The accusation of disobedience that you have levelled at me hits me exceptionally hard, as neither in this case nor at any time have I intended to circumvent one of your instructions. I have always regarded you as the epitome of the man who, after the Führer, claims my reverence as well as my loyalty and obedience. This is my true attitude and so I would request you, Reichsführer, not to burden me with this serious reproach.
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Yet Himmler did not withdraw the accusation but rather, a year later, added a further, much more serious one to it, namely, that of cowardice. In a devastating letter in November 1944 he claimed that the SS and Security Police agencies ‘seem to have fled in panic and in a cowardly manner’ from Alsace (for which Hofmann, as Higher SS and Police Leader for the SouthWest, was responsible). And he added: ‘To give you clear direction in this matter I wish to apprise you that I had a Security Police chief in Paris shot for similar things.’
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Himmler’s criticism of Gerret Korsemann was similarly devastating. He relieved the Gruppenführer and police general in July 1943 of his post as deputy Higher SS and Police Leader for Russia Centre because he considered the accusation levelled at Korsemann of having been in too much of a hurry to retreat from the Caucasus as justified. Himmler summoned Korsemann and ‘urgently’ brought home to him the need ‘to cleanse himself by the most committed effort from the charge attaching to him of lack of
courage’. To this end, Himmler would, he said, move him to the SS division Leibstandarte, where as soon as possible he was to take over a company ‘going into action’.
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Himmler gave express instructions to the commander of the division that Korsemann, in the rank of a Waffen-SS Hauptsturmführer, was to be ‘deployed on the front line. I forbid you to deploy him in a rearguard position [ . . . ] I have given Korsemann the opportunity to see action with the tank division “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” so that he can clear himself through this action of the accusation of lack of courage and weakness of nerve.’
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The Waffen-SS generals were also admonished and told off; remarkably, such letters nevertheless often end in a conciliatory manner, in spite of frequently vehement reproaches. In November 1942 Himmler wrote a positively exemplary warning letter to Theodor Eicke. Now leader of the SS Death’s Head division, Eicke had once again sent an SS leader assigned to him back to Berlin, in this case Kleinheisterkamp, as the latter ‘was ill and at the end of his tether’. ‘Dear Eicke,’ was Himmler’s riposte, ‘I cannot resist the impression that if anyone is ill and at the end of his tether it is you and not Kleinheisterkamp.’ Himmler reproached Eicke with two instances of ‘impossible behaviour’: first of all that he had ‘blatantly gone against my order’, and secondly that, ‘at the most difficult time’, he

had taken away from the 3rd Death’s Head regiment an able, experienced commander, respected by his men, simply because you do not get on with him [ . . . ] You cannot justify to your men what you did here. You have placed your headstrong ego in what are surely private differences of opinion above the well-being of your division. You may be in no doubt that by this you will not gain the affection of your men or an increase in the respect shown you.

After this accusation Himmler changed his tone. His next words are solicitous:

The only explanation I can find, as I am really not willing to accept that you are consciously annoying and disappointing me in this way, is that you are not yet recovered and your nerves are not at all as they should be. In my view you came out too soon and the pain your foot gives you naturally has an effect on your decisions. That is not right, however, and must change. Either one is in good health and takes all decisions calmly and in a fit state or one is not in a healthy state and is ill (by no fault of one’s own, of course). In that case one must not occupy this position and make life difficult for others by one’s bilious mood.

I now expect from you an impartial report, not based on Herr Eicke’s idiosyncracies, but a clear statement from my old comrade Eicke about how his health is. If
it is not good—as I unfortunately assume—then come back here for four weeks and get properly better. If on the other hand you believe you are fit, then you cannot afford any further episode of this kind under any circumstances.

Himmler’s closing words were: ‘I have never doubted your personal loyalty for a single moment. What I want to eradicate is your irrational self-will and your irrational waywardness. [ . . . ] I am sorry this letter was necessary. Yours, Heinrich Himmler.’
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In July 1938 he reprimanded Sepp Dietrich, the leader of the Leibstandarte, in a similarly fatherly and gentle manner for having wilfully exceeded his authority. In response the Wehrmacht High Command had sent in a complaint. ‘Dear Sepp,’ Himmler admonished him, ‘you know what we are facing in the weeks ahead and how much unnecessary bother all these arbitrary actions on the part of your subordinates cause me and, in the final analysis, cause you also; so please put a final stop to them.’
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When, in 1943, he got wind of the fact that in the Ministry for the Eastern Territories a comment of Dietrich’s was being spread about to the effect that ‘even’ [
sic
] Dietrich ‘no longer believes that we can defeat the Russians’, he first of all made it clear in a letter to Dietrich that ‘an opinion of yours concerning the combat strength of the Russians’ must have been ‘misunderstood’, before telling him to ‘contact Rosenberg’ or write ‘a short note to him along these lines’. Himmler added: ‘I know your view of the war in Russia very well. We are well aware that it is not easy. At the same time, however, we are certain that we can and will defeat the Russians, and indeed in the foreseeable future. Sincere greetings and Heil Hitler, Your good old friend Heinrich Himmler.’
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In July 1943 Himmler asked the head of the SS Main Office, Berger, to have a talk with one of his most important Waffen-SS generals, Felix Steiner. Himmler had been annoyed by his exchange of telegrams with Finnish volunteers. ‘I want to spare Berger’, Himmler wrote, ‘being spoken to by me personally. I think I am well known for having shown the greatest generosity towards the vanity sported by soldiers and in particular by the typical general.’

Himmler had been struck by the fact that, in his telegram, Steiner had used the formulation ‘in the ranks of my troops’. ‘In this instance Steiner should really have given pride of place to the Führer and, as befits an SS man and Obergruppenführer, he should have remained in the background.’ Apart from that, Himmler went on to complain, ‘I have no recollection
of a greeting “Hail to you” being used in the SS. Since I have been a National Socialist SS man the greeting has been “Heil Hitler”.’ Furthermore, wrote Himmler to Berger, it was his wish that in future Steiner be addressed by his SS rank and not as general. In addition, he was to be so good as to desist from ‘the backbiting tone that quite a few men in the ‘Viking’ division still feel free to use towards me as Reichsführer-SS in their conversations in the mess, etc.’.
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Only a month later Himmler wrote to Steiner directly, because the deployment of an SS-Oberscharführer on the staff of the ‘Viking’ division that he had ordered had been arbitrarily changed. Admittedly, he avoided putting the blame on Steiner himself, but rather expressed ‘the expectation that you will find the guilty man on your staff and will, by means of an exemplary punishment, lend my orders the weight I must require [ . . . ]. I must also say here candidly that even in the messes of the Viking division it should be unheard of for SS leaders to discuss the actions of the Reichsführer in a tone of criticism that goes beyond the proper limits of mess discussions.’ Since his warning the month before, therefore, there had clearly been no change. Himmler insisted that ‘the last trace of this spirit in the leadership of the Germanic corps be extirpated completely and that orders from the Reichsführer-SS be carried out blindly, unconditionally, and without hesitation’.
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After Steiner had assured him of his loyalty, Himmler let him know that as far as he was concerned the matter was closed. ‘I have absolute confidence in you.’
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In a letter of March 1943 Himmler levelled serious accusations at Paul Hausser, the commanding general of the 2nd SS Tank Corps, but in the end went no further than a reprimand. On his own initiative Hausser had approached the supreme army command of the Wehrmacht to which his tank corps was subordinated and requested replacement personnel from among members of the Wehrmacht (in this case a Luftwaffe division assigned to an army formation). Himmler was critical:

You cannot expect me, as Reichsführer-SS and founder of the SS, with my own hand to reduce to rubble the foundation on which the successes of your tank corps were ultimately built, namely racial and human selection and education. The moment I make a move to integrate a division of the army or air force, lock, stock, and barrel, into my old divisions, we might as well give up. I doubt very much, dear Hausser, for all that I acknowledge your merits, if you can take that upon yourself. Even in the exigencies of war neither you nor your chief of staff can resort to actions that tie my hands as Reichsführer-SS.
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If lectures and reprimands were not sufficient, Himmler took active steps to educate his men. Disciplinary transfers to the ‘front line’, alcohol bans, and treatment for addiction have already been discussed; SS leaders who, in Himmler’s view, spent too much time hunting could in a similar fashion receive a ‘hunting ban’ from the Reichsführer.
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Smoking bans were also issued.
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Himmler developed idiosyncratic methods of dealing with disputes among SS leaders. ‘My procedure when two are in conflict’, he told Obergruppenführer Arthur Phleps in May 1944, ‘is always on principle to transfer both [ . . . ] Similarly, even if there has been no conflict, I never appoint the man who has hitherto been his subordinate as successor to his superior officer; for otherwise the door is opened wide to intrigue.’
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In a concrete case, as he told the Gruppenführer in 1938, he had ‘sent word to two Oberführer who were in an unresolved dispute with each other [ . . . ] that I would make my office, with a bottle of water and two glasses, available to them from eight in the morning to eight at night. I would assume that by evening they would have had a chance to discuss every last issue. In future I will do the same in every individual case.’
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This procedure had potential to be extended: in 1942 the
SS Guidance Booklets
contained a report, headed ‘A Chance to Talk Things Through . . . The Reichsführer’s Order Concerning Comradeship’, about an order of Himmler’s to make two SS leaders who had fallen out live together for six weeks in one room. The
SS Guidance Booklets
commented that this example showed that ‘the Reichsführer-SS gives precise consideration to every disciplinary case, looks into the motives, and takes measures accordingly—and that he most certainly tries out “amusing” punishments if he is convinced that his aims will be achieved.’
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‘Amusing’ punishments were a true speciality of Himmler’s, and a tendency to sadism is undeniably present in them. In October 1942 the Reichsführer issued an order to all Waffen-SS and police leaders, reminding them of their duty to pay detailed attention to their men’s diet. ‘Leaders who fail to obey this command shall experience personally what a negative effect poor nourishment has on the performance and morale of the troops, and shall learn at the same time how to do better. I shall therefore consign
these leaders to the House of Poor Nourishment I have set up. They shall stay there long enough to gain first-hand experience of how bad it is for the men to be forced to eat poor food provided by their commanders.’

Himmler had personally planned in detail the ‘House of Poor Nourishment’, which was to be situated next to the SS catering school in Oranienburg. Inmates were to spend up to four weeks there, and were not allowed to leave the building. ‘Three-quarters of the time those taking part in the disciplinary course at the House of Poor Nourishment will receive poor and insufficient food, while for the remaining quarter they will be given an exemplary diet for troops.’ The ‘poor nourishment’ was to be produced on the following principles: ‘No variety. Overcooked. Tinned food with no fresh vegetables. Badly prepared.’ If he encountered ‘particularly bad menus’, Himmler went on, ‘I reserve the right to serve the commander in question this menu for the duration of the punishment’.
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In August 1944 Rudolf Brandt informed Standartenführer Guntram Pflaum, whom Himmler had put in charge of pest control, about a new idea Himmler had had. After the war Himmler intended to set up a ‘Fly and Gnat Room’. ‘All SS leaders and police who are either uninterested in the nuisance created by flies and gnats or even dismiss it with a superior smile will find they will be taken into care there for some considerable time, during which they will have the opportunity to study the question of flies and gnats from a theoretical angle as well as to enjoy the attentions of the hundreds and thousands of flies and gnats in the room itself.’ Even now, Brandt continued his exposition of Himmler’s reflections, thought should be given to ‘collecting the appropriate literature for both rooms. The culprits to be accommodated there were to study this literature in depth and to write long and detailed essays on it, for example “Flies as carriers of disease”, “Why do we need insect screens?”, and so on.’ ‘Fly and Gnat Rooms’ were, according to Himmler’s concept, to form part of a ‘House of Correction’, for which he occasionally set down further detailed instructions.
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