Authors: Mark Puls
Knox's mission in the final months of his command of the army was to dis-mantle the American force for peacetime. The size of U.S. military dropped to a mere 700 men by late 1783, a skeletal garrison spread thinly over several locations, including the arsenal at Springfield, Massachusetts, and Pittsburgh and the forts in New York. With his duties winding down, he sent Lucy and their three children, Lucy, Henry, and Marcus, home to Boston in December. Henry relinquished the command of West Point in January and headed for home on a chilly Monday, February 9.
He had little choice but to await Congress's decision on appointing a secretary at war or a master of ordnance. Back in Massachusetts, he and his family made a home in Dorchester, not far from the spot where his guns had pounded the British in 1776. The house was a comfortable, picturesque structure owned by an international banker and located on the road to Milton near the Second Congregational Church. One day it would be the summer home of Daniel Webster.
His state legislature tapped Knox for diplomatically sensitive assignments. In the summer of 1784, he was named as a member of a three-man commission to negotiate a treaty with the Penobscot Indians, whose presence along the Penobscot River was alarming white settlers in the district of Maine. Knox and the commission convinced the Penobscot to move farther west. He was also asked by Massachusetts to help settle a border dispute between the people of the British-owned Nova Scotia and the American residents in Maine. The border, according to the peace treaty, was the river St. Croix, which proved to be a confusing line of demarcation because of its many tributaries and winding stretches. The problems were too complicated for a quick resolution, and despite Knox's efforts, the issue would remain unresolved for years.
Knox welcomed the work because he was having trouble finding a way to make a living. After spending nine years in the military, he had trouble adapting to civilian life, and found himself ill suited to return to the life of a merchant. Henry's certificates for his service in the army were not yet redeemable for their full value because of the state of American finances. Meanwhile, his family expenses were growing as Lucy gave birth to daughter in November, whom the couple named Julia, the same name as the daughter who died in infancy in 1779.
While awaiting word of Congress's decision to fill the secretary at war post, Knox received a letter from Washington written Wednesday, January 5,
1785, continuing their ongoing complaint with the anemic national government under the Articles of Confederation. Washington was exasperated by what he viewed as myopic thinking and provincial jealousies in Congress and among the state leaders, which seemed to work to oppose any positive step for the country as a whole. "Would to God our own countrymen, who are entrusted with the management of the political machine, could view things by that large and extensive scale upon which it is measured by foreigners, and by the statesmen of Europe, who see what we might be, and predict what we shall come to," he complained to Knox.
"In fact, our federal Government is a name without substance: No state is longer bound by its edicts than it suits
present
purposes, without looking to the consequences. How then can we fail in a little time, becoming the sport of European politics, and the victims of our own folly?“
6
Knox thought that the national problems stemmed not solely from the politicians but from inherent flaws in the design of the Articles of Confederation that created a federal government with little power over the thirteen states. He responded on Saturday, January 13, 1785, conceding that the federal government could not act decisively on any measure, including funding the army or even clothing the small peacetime garrisons of soldiers. Knox believed a completely new constitution needed to be written: "We are entirely destitute of those traits which should stamp us one nation—and the Constitution of Congress does not promise any capital alteration for the better.“
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Even filling a national office such as the job as secretary at war seemed to be a difficult task for Congress. After leaving a post so critical to the nation's defense vacant for sixteen months, delegates finally elected Knox on Tuesday, March 8, 1785. He was nominated by the Virginian James Monroe, a fellow member of the Society of Cincinnati. Unfortunately for Knox, the cash-strapped Congress approved a modest annual salary of only $2,450 for the post, a sum that was $1,000 less than he had expected.
Some congressional delegates were embarrassed by the meager compensation for such a prominent national office and urged Knox to take the job with the realistic expectation that the salary would soon be increased. Congressman George Partridge of Massachusetts wrote to Knox the same day as his nomination that "[i]t is rather doubtful with some of your friends whither you will accept on account of the deficiency of salary . . . but I have no doubt but there will be an addition.“
8
Delegate Rufus King of Massachusetts was also apologetic, writing Knox on Monday, March 14, asking him to be patient concerning compensation:
”This sum is too small, but in the existing situation of affairs it was not practicable to obtain a larger sum. The office is certainly a very honorable one; and the U.S. will not suffer the head of so very respectable a department to remain unsupported.“
9
King pressed Knox's sense of duty and admitted that the country's humble military structure had fallen into such a delinquent state that only Knox could revive it: "If the wishes of your particular friends, and the entire satisfaction of the states would be an inducement to your acceptance, you cannot refuse. I could not excuse myself, did I not make these observations to you; the present wasting condition of the department requires the hand of a master; if you decline, I fear we shall be driven into an election, that will neither aid the dignity, nor preserve the interest, of the union."
Knox suppressed whatever disappointment he felt over the salary and expressed only a sense of honor for the appointment. Nine of the eleven states represented in the poorly attended Congress had elected him. The position provided him with a respectable office in keeping with his status as a major general and prevented him from the humiliating embarrassment of stepping into a humbling job in private life. Writing to the secretary of Congress, Charles Thomson, on Wednesday, March 17, Knox thanked the delegates for their faith in him: "I have the most grateful sentiments to Congress for this distinguishing mark of their confidence.“
10
Knox realized that the task of setting up the nation's defense would be mired in complications because of the deadlocked Congress. He believed the main flaw of the Articles of Confederation was its provision that a three-quarters majority approval was required to pass any legislation, including military funding. As a result, just three states could block any proposal. Instead of majority rule, the Articles set up a scenario where the minority held sway. In Knox's eyes, this arrangement was undemocratic. In a letter of Tuesday, March 29, to the Connecticut general Samuel Parsons, he explained: "A democracy so constituted that a small minority shall operate to check the great majority cannot be upon durable principles.“
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Knox made plans to travel to the seat of the national government in New York by mid-April and for his family to join him in June. Before he left his home state, he and Lucy laid claim to tens of thousands of acres of land that had legally fallen to her as the last remaining Flucker in America. She was the maternal granddaughter of General Samuel Waldo, who had led a militia regiment that successfully captured the French fort at Louisburg in 1745. Waldo garrisoned the post out of his own expenses until a regiment of British regular
soldiers arrived. To compensate him, the governor of Massachusetts granted him a patent for a tract of virgin land in Maine. Waldo died before laying hold of the land, and the patent fell to the Fluckers. Henry and Lucy's claim, which if resolved would solve their money troubles, was still unsettled when he headed off to New York.
Upon arriving at the capital and taking an oath of office, Knox began assessing the army's needs. When he took over the war office, its total staff consisted of just two people, a secretary and a clerk. No "War Department" yet existed, and therefore his title was "Secretary at War." The entire U.S. military, modest though it was, fell under his control along with the responsibility for the government's relations with American Indian tribes. He was required to take stock of all U.S. troops, military stores, ordnance, supplies, and clothing and report to Congress and to travel to each of the military posts annually, in keeping with his recommendation that the nation's western frontiers be garrisoned with U.S. soldiers.
The Knox family moved into a home on Bowery Lane in the city. Henry enjoyed a rare season of domestic tranquility, surrounded by his four children. His daughter Lucy had reached ten years of age and his youngest child, Julia, was a year and a half old. Lucy was again pregnant.
A note arrived from Lafayette, who had returned to Paris bearing news of Knox's errant brother, William, who had remained in Europe throughout the previous four years to nurse his mental health, and during that time had lost touch with his family as he traveled on business and personal matters. At Henry's urging, the marquis located William but was dismayed to find that he had become a recluse. Lafayette tried to ease Henry's concern, promising in the letter written Wednesday, May 15, 1785, that he would take William into his own home and oversee his care. This provided some relief for Henry, who feared that his brother was going insane. In letters to friends, he expressed his willingness to spend everything he had to find a cure for him. A letter soon arrived from a family friend, however, stating that William had already set sail for Boston.
12
Knox meanwhile found that his concerns over running the War Office proved well founded. Even with the army under his control, he was unable to engineer improvements due to ongoing fears of a standing army and a formidable central government and budget concerns. His dream of establishing a military academy at West Point met with opposition because of costs and objections that such a school would foster a military class that would dominate society.
Knox realized that in order to fulfill his obligation to manage the nation's defenses, he needed to change minds concerning men in uniform. As he saw it, the problem with traditional military arrangements had arisen because armies had been controlled by kings and nobles for their personal welfare, not the general welfare. The relationship between the military and civilian authorities in most countries had not been planned but had evolved uneasily through wars and political turmoil. He believed, however, that America's army could be planned in the tranquility of peace, using wisdom, experience, and reason.
He thought that if America represented an experiment in republican government, then a blueprint for an army could be designed in the same innovative spirit. If armies had traditionally threatened liberty, then a new kind of army could be created that actually supported democratic ideals.
Throughout the early months of 1786, Henry worked to flesh out his vision for a workable, democratically driven American army. Recognizing that many political leaders would never consent to a formidable national army, he set down a plan designed to make use of the state militias. He estimated that by raising militias in each state and rotating three years of service, the nation could have an impressive fighting force of 325,000 men.
It was an ambitious plan. After reading a preliminary version, South Carolina congressman David Ramsay conceded its usefulness but wrote to Knox on Sunday, March 12, that he was expecting too much from his countrymen: "I think it is excellent in theory but I fear the supineness of our citizens would make its execution impracticable.“
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Knox, undeterred, officially unveiled his "Plan for the General Arrangement of the Militia," which filled thirty-four folio pages, on Saturday, March 18, 1786. He opened his proposal with an attempt to change people's perceptions about the military, arguing that soldiers did not have to necessarily represent a distinct class from the rest of the populace; instead, a citizen army could be raised that reflected society's values and could even instill in recruits America's most cherished values. "It is the intention of the present attempt to suggest the most efficient system of defense which may be compatible with the interests of a free people," he wrote.
At the time that Knox was writing, America had not yet established state-run school systems or federal educational programs. There was no cohesive system to foster a national identity or inculcate the principles that the patriots had fought for during the Revolution. He believed that the militias could play a vital role in promoting civic education through military training. "Youth will
imbibe a love of their country—reverence and obedience to its laws—courage and elevation of mind—openness and liberality of character—accompanied by a just spirit of honor. In addition to which their bodies will acquire a robustness—greatly conducive to their personal happiness as well as the defense of their country."
Although his plan was well ahead of its time, it became the basis for training programs for decades to come and was included in National Selective Service manuals well into the twentieth century. It even served as the basis in 1920 for the formation of the Citizens Military Training Camps, which ran from 1921 to 1940.
Knox's plan also provided something of an index of his mind. He did not view himself exclusively as a military leader but as builder of the republic, willing to play the role of architect in creating institutional pillars of American society. He was not content to borrow foreign patterns in formulating the design for the U.S. military; rather he looked at the problem from the vantage point of a statesman and political theorist. For Knox, the American military needed to embody distinctly American ideals.