Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (109 page)

Hirohito's reaction to the various land, naval, and air battles associated with Japan's loss of Guadalcanal is telling. When informed of the American landing, he immediately recognized the potential danger—“I wonder if this is not the start of the American-British counteroffensive?”
⁴²
—but felt that Japan had to maintain its winning momentum while steadily building up its reserves of vital oil, rubber, and other resources. Despite his doubts about becoming locked in to a particular island battle, he continually encouraged his commanders in the Solomons to stay on the offensive and strike hard with all the weapons and men they could muster. Sugiyama had told the emperor on September 15, after the Ichiki Detachment had been effectively destroyed, that “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” Hirohito sought to hold him and Nagano to their word by disclosing his doubts about whether the army and navy really had the will to do the job. His pressure on them strengthened their
resolve to retake and secure the island, and thus contributed to the very thing he feared most: getting trapped in a war of attrition.

For Hirohito and Prime Minister T
j
the first month of the Battle of Guadalcanal was also a time of political crisis. For months the army had been planning to establish a new Greater East Asia Ministry that would have jurisdiction over all Japanese-occupied territory in the southeast and China, with the exception of Taiwan, Korea, and Sakhalin. Foreign Minister T
g
disagreed with the plan and refused to compromise on ceding further political authority to the army. Moreover, T
g
had learned about the navy's defeat at Midway and the battles on Guadalcanal, and may have secretly wanted to shake up the cabinet for failing to increase war power sufficiently.
⁴³
When, on August 29, 1942, T
j
's secretary informed T
g
about the army's plan to establish the Greater East Asia Ministry at the next cabinet meeting, T
g
was firmly negative. Thereupon T
j